The evolution of international restraints on chemical weapons and land mines : the interplay between international humanitarian law and arms control by Powell, Maria Elena
  
THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS 
ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND LAND MINES : THE 
INTERPLAY BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND ARMS CONTROL 
 
 
Maria Elena Powell 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD 
at the 
University of St Andrews 
 
 
  
1997 
Full metadata for this item is available in                                                                           
St Andrews Research Repository 
at: 
http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: 
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/15359  
     
           
 
This item is protected by original copyright 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL 
RESTRAINTS ON CHEMICAL 
WEAPONS AND LAND MINES: 
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN 
INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND 
ARMS CONTROL
by
Maria Elena Powell
Doctor of Philosophy
University of St. Andrews
June 1997
ProQuest Number: 10167363
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, 
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest.
ProQuest 10167363
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code 
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
-2,"^
C h
To my family
ABSTRACT
Weapons are acquired to protect the national security interests of the state: they 
may be used to settle disputes between one state and another, or they are 
accumulated as a defensive precaution to dissuade any future or offensive military 
action. Quite often, weapons are used in great quantities in various internal 
conflicts to the detriment of the individual, both civilian and combatant. Over 
time, the international community has developed certain humanitarian principles, 
norms, treaties and control mechanisms to reduce tensions between states, and to 
lessen the consequences of unrestrained weapons use. International Humanitarian 
Law (IHL) or the Law of War seeks to regulate or prohibit the use of particular 
weapons based on the principle that the means of injuring one’s enemies are not 
unlimited, and that there should be restraints on weapons which are indiscriminate 
or cause unnecessary suffering. Arms control and disarmament law seeks to limit 
or even prohibit the use, transfer or trade, production, and stockpiling of certain 
weapons. There is an interplay between these two approaches when the weapon in 
question is being restrained because of its perceived nature. Two weapons that 
have evoked calls for prohibition or restriction because of their pernicious nature 
are chemical weapons and land mines. Currently, in the Post-Cold War security 
environment, both these weapons are high on the international political and 
security agenda rendering them relevant subjects for a comparative study. This 
thesis examines the respective histories of these regimes of restraint and attempts 
to determine what lessons may be drawn in comparing efforts to place legal 
prohibitions on so-deemed inhumane or intolerable weapons. By examining the 
main similarities and differences in responses to chemical weapons and land 
mines, it may possible to understand what criteria are necessary for prohibiting a 
weapon on humanitarian grounds.
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Chapter I-Introduction.
Throughout history, states have been reluctant to accept limitations upon their
capabilities to wage war. Once a weapon has been introduced into the arsenal of a 
state or put to extensive use, states are reluctant to relinquish them. Paradoxically, as 
technological advances have made war more deadly and indiscriminate, nations and 
individuals across the globe have recognized that the means and methods of waging 
war should not remain unlimited. With this recognition have come demands for the 
restriction or abolition of certain weapons. As a result, a tension exists between these 
two competing interests, which makes the regulation or abolition of particular 
weapons all the more difficult. It is this tension which encompasses some of the basic 
ideals of what is commonly known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL) or the 
Law of 'Warfare.1 From these conventions come the basic laws and rules concerning 
the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, belligerents and neutrals. 
military and civilian targets, and the permissibility or legality of a particular weapon. 
The debate over the legality of particular weapons incorporates the tenets of both IHL 
and arms control and disarmament. Two weapons which have evoked responses of 
prohibition or restriction owing to their odious nature are chemical weapons and land 
mines. This study will examine the evolution of regimes of restraint and prohibition
' According to Michel Veuthey, “The terminology used to refer to these international treaties may vary 
(humanitarian law. international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts, law of Geneva, Red 
Cross Conventions, law of the Hague, human rights in armed conflict), but all seek the same 
objective—namely, to limit the use of violence. Some of these instruments, like human rights treaties, 
are based on a peacetime approach, while others, such as humanitarian law, are normally applicable 
during armed conflicts. Yet their scope often overlaps, especially as regards the fundamental rights 
they embody.” See Michel Veuthey, “The Contribution of International Humanitarian Law to the 
Restoration of Peace”, in Kevin Cahill, (ed.), A Framework for Survival Health. Human Rights, and 
Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters. (New York; Basic Books and the Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1993).
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and attempt to determine what lessons may be drawn in comparing efforts to place 
legal prohibitions on so-deemed ‘inhumane’ weapons.
Section 1.1-Reason and Objectives for Study
To a certain extent it might appear that the histories of these two weapons systems, 
and efforts to restrain their use, development, and proliferation, are distinctive to each 
weapon. Regardless of these differences, both weapons do share one common bond: 
attempts at their regulation originate from the nature and effects of the weapon. The 
shaping of these regulations involves an interplay between political, militaiy, public 
interest and humanitarian variables: today, land mines and chemical weapons provide 
the most pertinent examples of how the humanitarian element affects the 
establishment of arms control and disarmament policies.
The notion of restrictions or prohibitions on weapons based on their nature has been a 
neglected area of arms control. During the Cold War, arms control remained 
exclusively in the realm of superpower politics. Most arms control agreements 
involved quantitative disarmament rather than qualitative disarmament. With the 
exception of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of 1972, and 
more recently the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1993, no agreements 
were negotiated prohibiting specific weapons categorically.2 Although there has 
always been a moral opprobrium against nuclear weapons, for strategic reasons there 
is little chance of these weapons being banned completely as a weapon system. 
During this Cold War period. IHL controls on weapons were also neglected, which
■ Other arms control agreements have eliminated sub-categories or particular models of weapons but 
never an entire weapon system besides biological and chemical weapons.
was all the more detrimental, as conventional weapons were used with alarming 
intensity and frequency in numerous low-intensity conflicts.
In the current international security environment, however, two interdependent 
conditions prevail which make these case studies relevant. First, the Cold War has
ended, creating an environment more conducive to multilateral arms control
negotiation.3 As Ivo Daalder explains:
The end of the Cold War has settled many problems, but it has also stimulated the 
need for new thinking in arms control and other areas. New arms control 
opportunities have emerged, as have challenges that were previously subordinated to 
the dynamics of the Cold War.4
Second, security concerns are focusing on the numerous low-intensity conflicts around 
the world as well as on the proliferation threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) which could be used by unstable actors in the international system. The 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) reflects a new stage of co-operation and 
universality in the prohibition of a particularly abhorrent weapon. This treaty 
recognizes the security threat from the proliferation of this particular WMD. The use 
of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, the gassing of the Kurds, the spectre of 
chemical warfare during the Gulf War, and the Tokyo Subway Sarin gas attack are
3 There is an opposing viewpoint which argues that the end of the Cold War has actually complicated 
the prospects for peace and security. In an overarching bipolar system, the superpowers maintained a 
form of structure and control over the international system. They also drove and shaped the arms 
control process. In the current security environment, there are no Cold War tensions to mask the 
simmering security problems w'ithin the international system. As a result, the system may become more 
anarchical with more players striving for power. At the same time, the thawing of relations between 
these two powers has lead to revised threat assessments and more co-operation between them 
concerning arms control matters. While there is a risk that co-operation may be more difficult to 
achieve if more players are involved in the process, the fact that there are more players actively 
involved in the arms control process is important, as it allows relevant issues to be debated without 
Cold War politics interfering. It is also important to note that Russia and especially the United States 
still have some of the largest and deadliest arsenals in the world, and have the political clout to 
significantly influence the arms control process world-wide.
4 Ivo Daalder, “The Future of Arms Control”, Survival. Vol. 34, No. 3, Autumn 1992, 70. N.J. Rengger 
had also noted that : “...the practice and the theory of arms control have, therefore usually subordinated 
the interests of‘international society’ to that of the interests of particular members of it.” See N.J.
3
ominous reminders that the international norm against the use of chemical weapons
has weakened, and that firmer measures have to be instituted—hence the relevance of
a multilateral, non-discriminatory, universal disarmament regime. The numerous low- 
intensity conflicts around the world have also demonstrated the consequences of 
uncontrolled conventional weapons use. The unrestrained use of land mines has had a 
devastating impact on civilians and the environment; these effects can no longer be 
ignored. Therefore, the cunent salience of both land mines and chemical weapons on 
the international political and security agenda renders these weepons as prime subjects 
for joint case studies. A comparison between these two seemingly different weapon 
systems can elucidate the multiplicity of concerns and the difficulties that must be 
considered in formulating multilateral restraints on particularly heinous weapons. 
Moreover, a comparison between these two weapons emphasizes the differences and 
difficulties in promoting selective and comprehensive disarmament.
Section 1.2-Method and Structure of Study
Case study analysis will be the main method of investigation for this study. Producing 
two case studies has the advantage of illustrating what variables must be present or are 
predominant in the level of restraints or prohibitions placed on these weapons. A 
historical case-by-case examination of the evolution of restraints on abhorrent 
weapons reveals that there are precedents for restraints on weapons. A comparative 
analysis may also indicate whether these models of restraints have wider applications 
for future arms control endeavours. Finally, a comparative method can demonstrate
Rengger, “Arms Control, International Society, and the End of the Cold War”, Anns Control, Vol. 13, 
No. 1, April 1992,41.
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whether these regimes of restraint or prohibition reflect the changes of the
international security order, or are unique occurrences.
This study will be divided into two distinct sections of threat and response, followed 
by a conclusion. The threat section will examine the histories of chemical weapons
and land mines through an exploration of their military fimctions, proliferation, 
production, the context of their usage, and the communities affected. This section will 
conclude with an analysis of the threats posed by these two weapons. Also, by 
examining the typology of these weapons, it is possible to analyse what factors are or 
should be present for deeming these weapons ‘inhumane’ or ‘intolerable’. The next 
major focus of this study will concentrate on the variety and depth of responses 
accorded to these particular weapons. This section will focus on collective or 
alternative restraints, and existing treaties as well as historical precedents. Collective 
restraints include control regimes, moratoria, unilateral/national restraints and 
bilateral agreements. Restraints on weapons can take a variety of approaches which 
are not exclusive, but which over time may be complementary. Sometimes the 
implementation of these alternative measures are more practical and expedient, and 
can serve as temporal building blocks until more comprehensive measures can be 
arranged. Finally, the area of response that will be most closely examined are the 
treaties applicable to these weapons: The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and 
the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Treaties are important, as they 
represent the pinnacle in successful anns control negotiation. The fact that a treaty 
exists demonstrates that the international community recognizes that restraints on the 
weapon in question are necessary. The history of both treaties will be examined and
5
their main points critiqued to determine exactly how far states have been willing to go
in placing restrictions or prohibitions on their weapons.
Finally, this study will analyse the similarities and differences between the threat
inherent in and the responses to these weapons, and draw some conclusions from 
these lessons. This section will seek to address what, and how large, a role the military 
establishment plays in establishing prohibition regimes by looking at how the 
responses to chemical weapons and to land mines differ. How much influence does 
politics or the political climate have on regimes of restraint? How do commercial 
interests affect weapons regulations? What role do states, institutions. and the media 
play in restrictions or prohibitions on these weapons? What degree of interest and 
influence do these other actors exert on the state in weapons policy regulation? 
Finally, the role and influence of IHL in establishing restraints on these two weapons 
presents an interesting comparison that encompasses all the preceding factors. Why 
have both these weapons met with the particular responses they have? Are the 
difficulties encountered in declaring a weapon illegal endemic to the arms control and 
disarmament process, or are other factors now exerting more influence in these
processes?
This study will seek to address whether a realist approach can still satisfactorily 
explain the restraints on these two weapons, or whether other approaches are gaining 
ground. Traditionally, anns control policies have been ruled by a realist dynamic. The 
humanitarian element in arms control policy has been eclipsed by the political and 
strategic interests of the time. The right to bear arms is the right of the sovereign 
state, and therefore the state must do what is in its best interest to ensure its own
6
security. States have always been aware of the destruction their weapons can cause, 
but they choose to exercise restraint in their weapons policies when such restraint is in
their own interest. That is realism. At the same time, however, the IHL approach to 
weapons policies should not necessarily be viewed as the antithesis of realism. 
According to Jacques Meurant, IHL “...is a mixture of both realism and idealism.*’'-’ 
For the mutual benefit and protection of all parties, the IHL approach acknowledges 
the destructiveness of conflict but seeks to ameliorate its consequences. IHL measures 
seek to place restraints on actions or weapons that are the most damaging. It is one of 
the goals for this study to take into account both realist and normative/legalistic 
approaches in seeing which ones really influence or predominate within weapons 
control policies.
There has also been a real-time approach to this study which has benefits and 
limitations. The politics of treaty ratification, shifting policy positions and the review' 
process of the CCW constitute rather fluid and unsettled issues. Therefore April 1996 
is the cut-off period for this study. Should any relevant or new information come to 
light during the editing period, evevy effort will be made for its inclusion. States may 
have changed specific policies after this date. Still, it is the process of change and its 
analysis, which provides the primary focus for this study of the evolution of weapons
restraints.
5 Jeeqoee MsuocoS. “Iarse Arne Gen'iee: Eefiorlga eon NcSoos gF Iarsencrigacl Homcalree'ca Lew, 
Jgoooei gF Psces RseuceeT. Vgi. 24, Ng. 3, 1987, 247.
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Section 1.3-Literature Review
There is not a great deal of academic literature which specifically explores the
evolution of restraints on tliese particular weapons on a comparative basis, or in­
depth studies of the interplay between IHL and arms control and disarmament—hence
the relevance of this study. Most academic arms control literature has focused on 
strategic, nuclear, theoretical, scientific and technical issues. Works on specific 
weapons other than nuclear weapons have not been as prolific. Most IHL literature
was to be found in the annals of international law, rather than in the broader realm of
international relations. There has been the criticism that;
For too long humanitarian law has remained unknown except to a comparatively 
small number of specialists and, as will be seen when reading the contributions, this is 
an intolerable state of affairs.6
Writers of contemporary strategy have also shown little interest in legal issues relating
to the use of force. Adam Roberts observes that:
For reasons which are understandable but not altogether convincing, there has in the 
post-1945 era been a tendency, stronger perhaps in writers on strategic matters than in 
those concerned with the implementation of policy, to view many legal issues relating 
to the use of force as arcane.7
This study will use primary source material such as briefings, legal documents, 
reports, treaties, interviews, first-hand observation by the author, and informal 
discussions. Technical information, documentation and informed discussions gained
from the U.S. Anns Control and Disannament Agency, the United Nations and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) all proved to be useful and vital 
resources. As a good deal of anns control information comes from government 
sources, it should be remembered that this information may be presented from a 
particular viewpoint. Governments may have their own agendas to present.
6 “Preface”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1987, 213.
Similarly, sources from NGOs or other humanitarian organizations may also have 
their own agendas as well. Keeping in mind all these agendas, it is hoped that by using 
both types of source material, a fair-minded, honestly representational balance can be 
struck. Secondary sources used in this study include books and journal articles, 
mostly by experts in the field, which are helpful as background material in 
understanding IHL and some of the intricacies of weapons control. Tertiary sources 
include newspaper reports and articles from journals such as Anns Control Today and 
Disarmament Diplomacy, which have provided source material which has kept the 
study as up-to-date as possible.
Although chemical weapons did not elicit as much attention on the arms control 
agenda as nuclear weapons, renewed fears about proliferation of these weapons, and 
the establishment of the CWC has led to a revived interest in these weapons and hence 
more debate. Previously, most of the work on chemical weapons was produced by 
think-tanks or strategic information groups such as the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), and Julian Perry Robinson and the Harvard-Sussex
Infomiation Bank on CBW Warfare. The debates on chemical threat and control
issues are found mostly in the form of monographs and essays on the subject. Most 
useful are the works edited by Brad Roberts of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS), Washington, which examine and debate chemical 
weapons anns control issues. For example. Ratifying the Chemical Weapons
7 Adam Roberts, International Law and the Use of Force: Paper I. International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, London, Adelphi Papers, No. 266, 1991-1992, 53.
* The following authors offer some interesting insights on chemical weapons issues: Kathleen Bailey, 
“Problems with a Chemical Weapons Ban”, Orbis, Spring 1992, Elisa Harris, “Towards a 
Comprehensive Strategy for Halting Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation”, Anns Control, 
September 1991, Nicholas Sims, “Commonwealth Reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol 1930-92”,
9
Convention* 9 is a valuable work as it examines the CWC through the opinions of a
variety of experts. This study is important and useful because if presents a balanced 
perspective of chemical disarmament issues.
In comparison to chemical weapons land mines have attracted even less attention,
especially in the arms control field. Most literature was confined to military manuals 
or excerpts in law of war literature. According to Lieutenant Colonel Burris
Carnahan:
Uitii rrcratiy, 'otumctifacl iew gevr IIuIs gulncacu gi thr proprr usr gt iein mmss 
eon bffby treps to ertorn cgaillcts....Similarly, eon to egitrest wtth mgrr 
cfatrfvurslcl erms such es pflsga ges, iepeim eon iucirer w^gis, thr ieon mtis 
hes ettractrn eimgst ig cttrat'go frgm wrttrrs go thr iew go ermrn cgafl'ct.10
It is doubtful that the average citizen was aware of the Convention on Conventional 
Weapons, let alone what it was about. Since the early 1990s, however, the land mine 
crisis has become impossible to ignore, resulting in an increase in the land mine 
literature. Opinion pieces and advocacy campaigns, government sources, international 
organizations and NGO literature as well as the media all contribute to this body of 
literature. Most of this has focused on the land mine crisis and proposed solutions to 
it, but detailed discussions of the difficulties in transforming IHL restrictions into 
firmer arms control or even disarmament measures have not been as forthcoming, or 
have been rather vague whenever they have been discussed. •
Thu Rguin Tebie. Ng. 324, 1992, Amy Sm^go, ‘lImplemeatlag thr Chum^ei W^ois Cgavratlfa”, 
SupvIvcI, Sprtog 1994.
9 Bren Rgbrrts, (rn.). Re^ijoyog thr Chrmtcei Wuepgos Cgovuotlfa. (Weshlagtgo: CSIS, 1994). Mgst 
go Rgbrrt’s wgrk Is cvelicblu to CSIS’s Slga'frceot Issuus Surtus. Othrr rriuveit wgrks by Rgburts 
'aclunr thr ffllfwiag: Bren Rgbrrts, (rn.). Thr Chrmlcci W^ois Cfavuatlga: Impirmratetlfa Issuus. 
(Wcsh'ag^fn: CSIS, 1992), Chrm'cei eon U.S. Srcurtty. (Bguiciur: Wustvtew Prrss,
1992), “Chrmtcei D'scrmemrot eon Iitumatigoei Sscurity”, Iotumatigiei Institute lor Strategy 
Stuntrs, L^ngi, Anight Pepsrs 267, Sprtog 1992.
10
Probably, the most comprehensive land mine studies for any region are produced by 
the non-governmental sector. The ‘bible’ of these studies is Landmines: A Deadly 
Legacy by Human Rights Watch, a work referred to constantly by most authors.10 1 Its 
utility as a reference source is invaluable as it is the first major work to cover all 
aspects of the land mine crisis and responses proposed to end it. This study also 
includes initiatives and developments in international law and the reproduction of key 
texts. While it must be remembered that this publication is produced by an NGO with 
an anti-mine agenda, A Deadly Legacy still remains a reliable reference; the 
information is very detailed, and more importantly, it is well documented. Another 
useful source is a report by the ICRC from its Montreux Symposium on Anti­
Personnel Mines. 12 This symposium brings together experts from the legal, medical, 
military and other professional fields to debate all aspects of the land mines issue. 
Clearing the Fields Solutions to the Global Land Mines Crisis13 sponsored by the 
Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for International Health and 
Cooperation also uses the symposium format with experts debating the major issues of 
the land mine dilemma from a variety of perspectives. Both these publications are 
very useful as reference sources which explain clearly, and from all sides, the major 
land mine issues. Although, these publications emanate from symposia with 
humanitarian-interest overtones, they still include a range of perspectives on the land 
mine issue. In addition, there are also two forthcoming studies from the ICRC (AP
10 Lieutenant Colonel Burris Carnahan, “The Law of Land Mine Warfare: Protocol II to the United 
Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons”, Military Law Review. Vol. 105, 1984, 73.
" The Arms Project of Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Landmines: A Dead ly 
Legacy. (New York: Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, 1993).
12 See ICRC, Symposium on Anti-Personnel Mines. ICRC Report, Montreux 21-23, April 1993.
13 The Center for International Health and Cooperation and the Council on Foreign Relations sponsored 
a symposium of experts on the global land mine crisis which is used as the basis for this book. See 
Kevin Cahill, (ed.), Clearing the Fields Solutions to the Global Land Mines Crisis. (New York: Basic 
Books and Council on Foreign Relations, 1995).
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Mines: Friend or Foe?) and the Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College, University 
of London, (Military' Utility of Land Mines)14 which may well become influential. 
Both studies are reported to tap the opinions and expertise of senior military personnel 
in support of the idea that mines are now of marginal utility militarily.15 16
Most IHL authors have discussed weapons controls usually as part of a wider 
discussion of IHL on the means and methods of warfare. Military lawyers have also
contributed to the literature on weapons controls as a product of their legal discourse. 
The divisions in scholarly and technical writing between IHL and arms control and 
disarmament are perhaps intrinsically artificial, and it is an area that needs to be 
explored further. Nevertheless, there are a few key articles that explore the links 
between these subjects. The most salient article is “International Humanitarian Law 
and Arms Control” by Daniel Frei.'1 The major question Frei's article seeks to address 
is to what extent should IHL be considered a contribution to amis control. Frei
acknowledges that the relationship between IHL and anns control and disarmament 
measures has often been overlooked and suggests that more effort should be made to 
define the relationship between the two. He concludes that IHL is indeed a legitimate 
part of the arms control process and is not contradictory to the goals of arms control 
and disannament. Ove Bring also takes a similar position regarding the relationship 
between IHL and amis control and disarmament in the article “Regulating
14 These studies are supposed to be published by the middle of 1996.
15 John Davidson and Hugh McManners, “Landmine Reports Challenge UK Stance”, The Times. 24 
March 1996. 21, and Michael Binyon, “Red Cross Study Questions Military' Value of Weapon”, The 
Times. 29 March 1996, 15.
16 Daniel Frei, “International Humanitarian Law and Arms Control”, International Review of the Red 
Cross, No. 267, November-December 1988, 503. Frei was a Professor of Political Science at the 
University of Zurich, a specialist on disarmament, neutrality, and international co-operation, and a 
member of the ICRC.
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Conventional Weapons in the Future—Humanitarian Law or Arms Control?”17 18In 
“Arms, Armaments and International Law”, Frits Kaishoven, the Dutch jurist traces 
the development and use of particular weapons and the restraints upon them through
both IHL and disannament law. He concludes that despite the difficulties in the
weapons control process, both types of law are important, and both should continue to 
be improved and developed. The value of this work is that it examines how weapons
control policies have to interact with the politics and processes of the international
system.
Section 1.4-What is International Humanitarian Law?
To comprehend how international humanitarian law (IHL) or its predominant ethos 
has influenced the arms control process, and how it affects a comparative analysis of 
two controversial weapons regimes, it is necessary to provide a brief resume of its 
history and fundamental principles. IHL seeks to avoid total inhumanity in warfare by 
limiting the means and methods of warfare and protecting the rights of individuals, 
both civilian and combatant. Technically, IHL can be subdivided into specific tenets: 
the Law of the Hague, the Law of Geneva, and the Law of New York. The Law of the 
Hague relates to the conduct of warfare through limitations upon its means and 
methods; the Law of Geneva governs the protection of victims of armed conflict; the 
Law of New York concerns the preservation of human rights in armed conflict.
17 Ove Bring, “Regulating Conventional Weapons in the Future—Humanitarian Law or Arms 
Control?”, Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 24, No. 3, 1987.
18 For a succinct discussion of these three trends in IHL, see Frits Kaishoven, Constraints on the 
Waging of War. (Geneva and Dordrecht: ICRC and Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 9-23. See also 
Allan Rosas, “The Frontiers of International Humanitarian Law”, Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 24, 
No. 3, 1987, 221.
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To a certain extent, IHL itself seems paradoxical; wa- by its nature is not a 
benevolent endeavour, therefore attempts at its humanitarian regulation may be an 
exercise in futility. Rules of. conduct negotiated during times of peace may not 
withstand the stresses of conflict. Once war has broken out, legal restraints may have 
already broken down, preceding a further deterioration of the rules. 19 *In the heat of 
battle, for example, combatants may ignore the guidelines they once accepted in order 
to achieve victory on the battlefield. In spite of this criticism, IHL still enables states 
to respect mutual agreements which ameliorate the horrors of wa-. ' According to 
Antonio Cassese, IHL is a “...policy of lesser evil which ultimately pays dividends 
since humanitarian and political concerns are not incompatible.”2’ Mutual benefits 
may include factors such as protection of field hospitals, treatment of prisoners of war. 
and the restricted or prohibited use of weapons which both sides abhor. Belligerents 
are more prone to co-operate when they can each see a mutual benefit to observing
these rules.
In the aftermath of World War II, scant attention was paid to the development of IHL 
as war was technically outlawed and international organizations such as the United 
Nations were supposed to keep the peace.'* Any control on weapons was relegated to 
the jurisdiction of superpower politics. By the 1960s, however, there was the 
realization that numerous small conflicts were not being contained and that civilians 
were being caught in the crossfire. As a result, attention began to be focused upon
19 Jozer Gginbiet mekrs thts poIiI cgacrrllog oou go thr wuekoussus ti thr Lew oo Armrn Cflfllct. Suu 
JozerGablet, Arms Cgitrgi: A Gutnu tg Nugftlct'gos ein Agrrsmrits. Iltunlctiflel Psecr Rrsrerch 
lost^nts (PRIO), OsIo, (Lgingo: Segr Pubilcctlfas, 1994), 200.
2(1 AioiIo Cesssss Is qu^rn ti ei erticiu by Jecqurs Muureot, gp. ctt., 247.
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human rights and measures to reduce human suffering. Since the 1960s, the 
unprecedented scrutiny of media organizations brought the destructiveness of war and 
human suffering tothe public in many nations. Many special interest groups have 
become involved in the issues of wtor and human rights, humanitarian aid and
development, as well as concerns for the environment. In addition, the gap or 
distinctions between the various IHL traditions began to narrow in tliis period as well.
The ICRC which was traditionally more concerned with developments in Geneva 
Law, eventually recognized the importance of the overlap with the other areas of 
IHL.21 2
Although throughout history, the modern codification of IHL comes primarily from a 
Western perspective, there have been many sources of inspiration for restricting the
means and methods of warfare.
The historical sources of humanitarian law are universal and timeless. Throughout the 
history of humankind, all civilizations have developed rules within the group, tribe, 
nation, civilization, and religion to ensure its survival—in Asia, Buddhism, 
Hinduism, Taoism, and Bushido; in the Middle East, Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam; in Africa, a multitude of customs valid only within a given tribe; in Europe, the 
mutual restrictions imposed by cl^i^^ll^, bt^fco^ci the condottieri and lace-clad war 
generals were supplanted by the humanists (Grotius, Hobbes, Kant, Pufendorf, 
Rousseau, Vattel, Henry2 Dunant, and Francis Lieber)—all aiming to avoid excesses 
that would turn clashes into anarchy and hence make peace more difficult to 
achieve.23
From this diversity of cultures and ages also comes particular perceptions of what can 
be considered humane or inhumane. Both soldiers and civilians may have the same 
humanitarian concerns, or under particular circumstances, one groups' concerns may
21 It was thought that the maintenance of peace and the regulation of conflict were two incompatible 
goals. Meurant points out, however, that this opinion failed to take into account that there were no 
safeguards against states waging war or any other aggressive military actions. Meurant, 238.
22 As the Law of Geneva was being updated in the 1960s, specialists involved understood that because 
modem methods and means of warfare had become so destructive, with civilians bearing most of the 
consequences, the Law of the Hague also needed to be updated. For example, Additional Protocol I to 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions contains provisions on the regulation of the means and methods of 
warfare. Rosas, 220-221.
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be more prominent. To a certain extent, there are customary principles that can be
agreed upon by different parties of what constitutes civilized behaviour. Other 
principles depend upon a balance between a variety of variables that go beyond the
traditional IHL dichotomy between humanity and military necessity. Jacques Meurant
points out that;
,..[T]he so-called compromise between military necessity and humanitarian 
considerations cannot be considered as a fully satisfactory explanation. The 
outlawing of certain methods of combat is rather achieved as a result of decisions 
taking into account the political, economic and military interests of the beliigeennt.23 4 25
There are certain principles which underscore the concept that the means and methods 
of warfare are not unlimited. Military necessity seeks to restrict the use of force to 
what is strictly necessary for achieving the military objective. Under the Lieber Code 
of 1863, “Military necessity, as imderstood by modem civilised nations, consists in 
the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of war, 
and which are lawful according to the modem law and usages of war.”’5 Another 
definition of military necessity describes it as “such destruction, and only such 
destmction, as is necessary, relevant, and proportionate to the prompt realization of 
legitimate military objectives. ”’5 Closely related to the concept of military necessity 
is the issue of proportionality. Proportionality strikes a balance between the militaiy 
utility of a weapon or the intensity of attack against the suffering it causes. For 
example, it would be a disproportionate response to destroy a village of civilians in
23 Veuthey, op. cit., in Cahill, (ed.), (1993).
24 Meurant, 245.
25 The Lieber Code was named after the jurist Francis Lieber who was commissioned by President 
Lincoln to draw up a law code of war during the American Civil War. Although the code was an 
attempt to codify the law of war on a domestic basis, it formed the basis for later attempts on the 
international scale. See Section 1, Article 14 of the “Instructions for the Government of the Armies of 
the United States in the Field”, Prepared by Francis Lieber, Promulgated as General Orders No. 100 by 
President Lincoln, 24 April 1863. This text is reproduced in Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman, (eds.), 
The Laws of Armed Conflict A Collection of Conventions. Resolutions and Other Documents, 3rd ed.,
Henry Dunant Institute-Geneva, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988), 3-23.
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order to remove one sniper.” Unfortunately, this can be a rather grey area and open
to subjective interpretation. If a weapon or action is considered to be militarily
expedient, then its deployment may be justifiable. The principle of umiecessaiy
suffering or superfluous injury also treads a fine line between military necessity and
the interests of greater humanity. Once again, the problem of what constitutes
‘unnecessary suffering' can be a subjective concept. The St. Petersburg Declaration of
1868 proclaims: .
That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during 
war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy;...That this object would be 
exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of 
disabled men,...®
All weapons have the capacity to kill and injure in the quest for military gain; that is 
their purpose, but they should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve these goals. 
The concept of superfluous injury concedes that a weapon may take the life of a 
combatant, but the weapon in question should not create injuries which exceed his 
actual incapacitation. Hays Parks uses the example of a barbed spear to illustrate this 
point:
A spear without barbs will incapacitate the enemy soldier: the barbs do not enhance 
the probability of incapacitation, but serve to aggravate the wound, thereby causing 
superfluous injury. The concept is sound: it recognizes that all wars end, and 
weapons that cause superfluous injury needlessly extend the suffering of combatants 
beyond the war."9 * * * *
26 Myres McDougal and Florentino Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order. (New Haven: 
1961), 72 as quoted in W. Hays Parks, “The Laws of War”, in Richard E. Bums, (ed.). Encyclopedia of 
Anns Control and Disannament. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993) 1055.
27 Ibid., 1056. According to W. Hays Parks there are three general means to assess proportionality: an 
act of self-defence during peacetime should be proportionate to the threat; the reprisal action is 
proportionate to the original wrong; the military value of the weapon should be balanced against the 
suffering it may cause.
28 ‘Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes 
Weight’ (The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868). Full text available in Schindler and Toman, 101­
103, and Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, (eds.), Documents on the Law's of War. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), 29-31. The Declaration is also excerpted and discussed in Frits Kalshoven, 
“Arms, Armaments and International Law”, Recueil des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague 
Academy of International Law. 1985, II, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), 206.
29 Parks, op. cit., in Burns, (ed.), 1056.
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Unfortunately, these prohibitions on the means of warfare do not prohibit the weapon 
itself, but only its effects which result in numerous violations.30 31 32 33If the weapon itself is 
not prohibited, then it is very difficult to control its effects.
Next, the principle of discrimination seeks to protect non-combatants or civilians from 
the excesses of war. A military attack should be designed to discriminate between
civilians or civilian targets and combatants and military targets. In practical
application, however, the targeting of a specific military objective is not always 
carried out rigorously, mixing together both civilian and military targets. 
Discrimination becomes even more problematic when weapons are used which camiot
be aimed specifically to distinguish between a combatant and non-combatant. Few 
states are willing to concede that a weapon can be classified as inherently 
indiscriminate; instead, they advocate using them with all requisite caution.” Frits 
Kaishoven acknowledges that “the conclusion seems therefore hard to avoid that 
violation of the requirement of discrimination will in general result from the method
of use of a given weapon rather than from its properties.”
It is also forbidden to use perfidious acts that trick an adversary into believing that he 
will be protected under the law of war, when in fact it is a ruse. For example, faking a 
surrender before carrying out an attack is prohibited.” There has been a reluctance to
30 Knut Ipsen makes this point in a discussion about prohibited means and methods of warfare. See 
Knut Ipsen, “International Law Preventing Armed Conflicts and International Law of Armed Conflict-A 
Combined Functional Approach”, in Christophe Swinarski. (ed.), Studies and Essays on International 
Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet. (Geneva-The Hague: ICRC. 
1984), 357.
31 Kaishoven notes that in the conferences re-examining IHL. experts were reluctant to name a specific 
weapon as indiscriminate, but preferred to use the standard of weapons being indiscriminate in certain 
circumstances. See Kaishoven, op. cit., (1986), 246-247.
32 Ibid., 236.
33 Parks, op. cit.. in Burns, 1064.
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define perfidious weapons as such; instead, weapons can be considered perfidious 
according to the circumstances of use. Booby-traps and poison have been considered 
as perfidious weapons by some of the experts debating this issue.’'* Finally, the 
principle of intentional environmental damage is also considered an unlawful method 
of warfare. Article 35, Paragraph 3 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions states that “It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare 
which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment.”” The 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of 
Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques 
(ENMOD) also supports this principle. Total prohibitions on the use of specific 
weapons as a means of warfare are very rare under IHL. The Geneva Gas Protocol of 
1925 and Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments of the CCW of 1980 attest to the 
uniqueness of such an action and the hesitations states may have in prohibiting a 
weapon/6
Section 1,5-The Interplay Between IHL and Arms Control and Disarmament
The study of IHL, both in its making and its application is far more complicated than 
it used to be; it also overlaps with and bears more relevance to other disciplines of 
contemporaiy international relations. Specifically, the overlap between IHL and arms 
control and disarmament is relevant to this study. International law intended to 
prevent aimed conflict in connection with tlie arms race pertains to arms control and 
disannament law which is based upon treaty or conventional law. International law 
applicable during anned conflict pertains to the law of war which is based upon
34 Kaishoven, op. cit., (1986). 237.'
35 Ipsen, op. cit., in Swinarski, (ed.), 357.
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customary rules and principles.” These two tenets in international law intersect when 
the methods and means of warfare are being restricted or prohibited. Arms control
measures are both a preventative and reactive response to particular weapons and are
normally applicable during both times of peace and conflict. IHL usually prevails
during times of armed conflict. Whenever there are any restrictions or prohibitions on 
the use of weapons, especially during times of conflict, arms control elements are at
work—hence the crossover between IHL and arms control. The most fitting
o o
description of this crossover is defined by Ove Bring as ‘humanitarian arms control’. 
Traditionally, aims control policy has been negotiated taking into account concerns of 
national security and international stability. Humanitarian considerations have played 
a lesser role, and policy matters remained the sovereign right of the state. Cun-ently. 
other actors are beginning to influence the arms control process. The campaign to ban 
anti-personnel land mines has forced governments and military establishments to re­
examine the effects and consequences of weapon use. Thanks to this campaign, a 
definite ‘humanitarian creep’ is influencing the consideration of weapons policy. The 
CCW review process has opened the door for restricting the use of other weapons that 
may be particularly odious or distinctly anti-persomiel in nature.
To a certain extent, there is an interdependence between IHL and arms control. For 
example, when it is not possible to remove a particular weapon from an arsenal or 
prohibit its use, then an alternative response or solution may be found in regulating the 
means and methods of warfare under IHL. Paradoxically, any efforts designed to
37 Ibid
37 Ibid., 352. Despite its customary basis, the Law of War has also been codified into Conventions.
38 According to Ove Bring, Legal Advisor, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, ‘humanitarian arms 
control’ is an appropriate description when the humanitarian element dominates. See Bring, op. cit., 
(1987), 275.
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curtail the use of particularly reprehensible weapons will be undermined as long as
these weapons are retained by various states.39 As Ove Bring argues:
The de facto relationship between humanitarian law and arms limitation was not 
coincidental. Any total prohibition on use could lead to weapons being eliminated 
from the arsenals. Mere restrictions on use of certain weapons, however, w'ould 
probably not lead to such results.40
Bring is implying that if there are only restrictions as opposed to prohibitions on the 
use of a particular weapon, then it is imlikeiy that regulations will be any more 
forceful in the arms control or disarmament field. If there are no precedents or norms 
established under IHL denouncing a particular weapon, then it is very difficult for the 
humanitarian argument to prevail at the arms control or disarmament stage. Still, the
limitations of IHL should not obscure its considerable effectiveness, and its value:
International humanitarian law can justly be seen as part of the arms control process.
In imposing constraints on warfare it shares the same fundamental motives underlying 
all efforts towards disannament and arms control. When its basic aims and practices 
are examined systematically from the viewpoint of arms control, not only does its 
intimate proximity to other arms control endeavours become evident, but also it can 
quite pertinently claim to represent one of the most successful cases of arms conrrol.41 42
Obviously, the closest link that IHL has to arms control and disarmament is to make 
war less destructive and destabilizing. Daniel Frei pinpoints four dimensions of 
restraints on the use of w9epons applicable to the relationship between IHL and arms 
control and disarmament: geographic, material, operational, and targeting. For 
example, both IHL and arms control measures can restrict the area where weapons are 
deployed or used; restrict the use of a particular type of weapon; restrict the way the 
weapon is used; and restrict the selection of targets.4' Frei argues that chemical 
weapons, one of the few weapons whose use is prohibited under IHL, have the
39 Jozef Goldblat makes this point in a discussion about the law of armed conflict and disarmament. 
See Goldblat, 200.
■i Ove Bring, op. cit., (1987), 276.
41 Frei, 503.
42 Ibid., 493-497.
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capacity to create strategic instability due to the proliferation of these weapons in 
areas of high tension. Traditionally, smaller, conventional weapons were not 
perceived as causing strategic instability. In reality, however, it is the smaller 
conventional weapons which are being used in the numerous, limited conflicts being 
waged throughout the world at any given time, causing untold damages. As Aaron 
Karp observes, “...it is the trade in small and light weapons that pose the immediate 
threat to human well-being and international stability.”” No one would argue that 
land mines are a strategic weapon system per se. but that does not mean that the 
excessive, indiscriminate use of land mines is not destabilizing. If states cannot return
to nonnalcy, then further instability may ensue.
IHL and arms control and disarmament also have similar goals in the pursuit of peace
through conflict management and a relaxation of tensions. Arms control measures can
foster trust between states through Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) such as a
relaxation of tensions achieved by reducing the number of weapons aimed at an
adversary. IHL opens a dialogue between states so that negotiations for more peaceful
relations can take place. Jozef Goldblat argues that:
The objective of CBMs is to translate the general principles of international law into 
positive action so as to provide credibility to states’ affirmations of their peaceful 
intentions....In general, CBMs do not directly affect the strength of armed forces or 
armed inventories, but they make less likely the use of force for settling disputes.
They may facilitate progress towards disarmament: they thus constitute a category of 
arms control measures.43 4
IHL agreements also facilitate confidence between states by creating a climate of 
goodwill and reciprocity which lays the foundation for future restraints. IHL restraints 
on the use of a weapon can be viewed as CBMs in themselves as they are less
43 Aaron Karp. “The Arms Trade Revolution: The Major Impact of Small Arms”, The Washington
Quarterly. Autumn 1994, 65.
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ambitious than full arms control or disarmament agreements. Until the political
climate improves or is more suitable, these measures may also present the only 
practical option available. As Ove Bring argues:
...[I]n trying to get ‘the ball rolling' one should not exclude that the approach of 
international humanitarian law could be useful also in the context of international 
security....The two concepts [IHL and arm.s control] overlap and cannot be mutually 
exclusive. Moreover, one legal approach does not exclude the other.45
IHL and arms control are complementary approaches to restricting or prohibiting a 
particularly repugnant weapon. Neither stands alone. Where one fails (IHL), the other 
(arms control or disarmament) should prevail. When arms control or disarmament 
measures are absent, then IHL should regulate in their absence. IHL can be used as a 
‘measuring stick' to indicate the wrongs in the international system. If one could say 
that disarmament is the endpoint of IHL, then perhaps IHL is the starting point of 
disarmament. When restrictions on the use of weapons are constantly violated, then 
stronger measures are required. The only way to ensure that these weapons are not 
used illegally is to place restrictions or prohibitions not only on their use, but also 
upon their manufacture, transfer, or stockpiling.
'f4 Goldblat, 2.
45 Bring, (1987), 284.
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CHAPTER II
The Threat of Chemical Weapons and Land Mines
Chemical weapons and land mines pose a threat both to international security and
to human beings. To understand the depth and nature of this threat, it is necessary
to examine the following criteria: the manner in which these weapons function;
the immediate and long-term effects of these weapons; concerns about
proliferation and the reasons for acquisition; the frequency and circumstances of
use; and the military and perceived military utility of these weapons. Such an
examination is important, as there are many different perceptions and
misconceptions concerning these two weapon systems. Outwardly, land mines
appear to be small, uncomplicated, conventional weapons used frequently for
legitimate military purposes. To date, however, they have been the cause of
prolonged human suffering in numerous Third World countries. Chemical
weapons, on the other hand, have been perceived as so horrific that it is hoped,
virtually universally, that they are never used. Chemical weapons are also
considered a weapon of mass destruction (WMD), giving them strategic
significance, and a much higher position on the arms control and non-proliferation
agenda than land mines. Nonetheless, both of these weapon systems can be
triggered indiscriminately and can cause terrible injuries or death. The purpose of
this section is to separate fact from fiction, to evaluate how similar or different are
the threats from these weapons, as well as to ascertain which weapon really is
j
more of a threat, and to whom. iJ j
•A
J
i
i
24
Section 2.1-Chemical Weapons-A Description
“Poisonous” weapons have been used throughout the ages as a method of warfare, 
or as Howard Levie puts it: “if fire and smoke are chemical weapons, as has
A
sometimes been claimed, then chemical weapons have been used for many 
centuries.”1 Chemical weapons, commonly referred to as gas or poison weapons, 
are composed of chemical agents which have varying effects on humans. The U.S. 
Congress's Office of Technology Assessment defines these agents as “poisons that 
incapacitate, injure or kill through their toxic effects on the skin, eyes, lungs, 
blood, nerves or other organs.”2 Contemporary chemical weapons are more than 
just poisons. Chemical weapons capabilities which are truly viable militarily 
require:
A complete CW munition programme involving fabrication of munitions, 
production of CW agents and filling of the agents into the munitions after which 
they would be delivered into the military logistics system for storage.3
There are five main categories of agents: disabling; choking; blistering; and blood 
and nerve agents. Disabling agents or harassing agents are probably the most 
innocuous form of a chemical weapon; tear gases like CS and CN are the most 
common of these agents. Choking agents such as phosgene and diphosgene attack 
the victim's respiratory tract by filling the lungs with fluid and killing the victim, 
or leaving him with chronic breathing problems. Chlorine gas, a choking agent, 
was used extensively during World War I. Blister agents produce water-based
1 Howard Levie, "A Lookback at the Efforts to Eliminate Chemical Warfare", The Military Law and 
Law of War Review, Vol. XXIX, No. 1-2, 1990, 289.
2U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Assessing the Risks. (Washington: USGPO, 1993), 3, (Hereafter OTA, Assessing the Risks).
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blisters on the skin and can also damage the eyes, respiratory tract and blood cells; 
the most common of these is mustard gas. Blood agents, as the name suggests, are 
absorbed into the body by breathing, and once in the bloodstream, deprive vital 
tissues of oxygen; hydrogen cyanide is the most common of these agents. Nerve 
agents are divided into two different categories: G agents and V agents. G agents 
cause death by inhalation; V agents are normally liquid in origin and are absorbed 
through the skin. The most common and lethal nerve agents are Tabun, GA, 
Sarin, GB, Soman, GD, and VX. For example, a lethal dose for humans of one of 
these nerve agents is less than .01 mg per kg of actual body weight. As the name 
suggests, nerve agents attack the nervous system, causing a loss of bodily 
functions and respiratory distress resulting in eventual death from the paralysis of 
the respiratory muscles.3 4
A chemical weapons attack against an unprotected population can produce 
massive casualties.5 6Under perfect dispersal conditions, 7.2 tons of VX delivered 
by aircraft would kill 125, 000 civilians in densely populated area.5 Five tons of 
nerve gas dispersed over open countryside using the most common atmospheric 
dispersion models would cause casualties of about 50% over 4 square miles
3 Gordon Burck, “Chemical Weapons Technology and the Conversion of Civilian Production”, 
Arms Control. Vol. 11, No. 2, September 1990, 122.
4Frank Bamaby, The Role and Control of Weapons in the 1990s. (London; Routledge, 1992), 67­
69; Mervin Hamblin, "Potential Risks Associated with New Technologies in the Chemical 
Weapons Field", in Joachim Krause, (ed.), Security Implications of a Global Chemical Weapons 
Ban. (Boulder; Westview Press, 1991), 65. See also OTA, Assessing the Risks, Table 2-1, 47, for 
a concise description of these various categories.
3julian Perry Robinson, “Chemical Weapons Proliferation”, in Efraim Karsh, Martin Navias and 
Philip Sabin, (eds.), Non-Conventional Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993), 79.
6Anthony Cordesman, “One Half Cheer for the CWC; Putting the Chemical Weapons Convention 
into the Military Perspective”, in Brad Roberts, (ed.), Ratifying the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), 44.
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against the unprotected population. Under different circumstances the results 
could be dramatically different. Although the examples which follow were not
military chemical attacks per se, the resultant chemical contamination might 
indicate the range of destructiveness of a chemical weapons attack. The chemical 
accident in Bhopal, India, killed over 2000 people and injured thousands more, yet 
at the same time a comparable accident in Hamburg, Germany, in 1928 only killed 
eleven people due to the prevailing weather conditions.7
Section 2.1.1-Use of Chemical Weapons
It was the advent of the industrial age which made possible the mass production 
and use of chemical weapons in the modem context.8 About 40 different chemical 
agents were used in World War I, but Chlorine, Mustard, and Phosgene gases 
predominated. It was estimated that about 100,000 people were killed and over 
one million were injured during that conflict by the use of chemical weapons 
alone.7 A note of caution is in order when assessing these casualties. The use of 
chemical weapons in World War I resulted in between 1.6 to 5 times as many 
casualties as from a corresponding amount of conventional explosives; these rates 
dropped when adequate protection was used or made available. Casualties were 
highest in 1915 when gas was first introduced against unprotected troops, and
7Robinson, op. cit., in Karsh et al., 80.
8Victor UtgofF, The Challenge of Chemical Weapons: An American Perspective, (Basingstoke and 
London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1990), 3.
TBamaby, 71, and Thomas Gradam, “Limitations on Chemical and Biological Weapons”, in Paul 
B. Stephan and Boris M. Klimenko, (eds.). International Law and International Security Military 
and Political Dimensions. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991), 116.
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again in 1917 when mustard gas was introduced, requiring the hurried provision of 
protective clothing as well as gas masks.10
Other uses of chemical weapons have been more sporadic and less concentrated 
since that era. There appear to be more cases of alleged use than verifiable or 
admitted uses. According to Dr. Ralf Trapp, of the Verification Bureau of the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), verifying a 
chemical attack is a nebulous process; it is often difficult to pin-point exact 
locations of a chemical weapons deployment, as the properties of chemical agents 
may disappear after a few days, effectively erasing the evidence as well. Although 
interviews with alleged victims can be helpful, unless there is actual medical 
evidence from the victims detailing recognized tell-tale symptoms, or if chemical 
delivery shells have been recovered, it is very difficult to verify that a chemical 
agent has been used.11 Finally, states may have a political agenda in accusing one 
another of using chemical weapons. There is a fair amount of consensus 
pertaining to some of the deployments, but a good deal of controversy regarding
others.
The following cases of chemical weapons use have been either substantiated or 
acknowledged since World War I: Spanish forces in Morocco in 1925; Italian 
forces in Libya in 1930; Soviet forces against Muslim insurgents in Sinkiang in 
1934; Italian forces in Ethiopia in the 1930's; Japanese forces in Manchuria
10Thomas McNaugher, "Ballistic Missiles and International Chemical Weapons", International
Security, Fall 1990, 19. For a further study of the different stages of gas warfare in World War I 
see Utgoff, Chapter I.
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during World War II; Egyptian forces in North Yemen in the 1960s; and British
forces in the Russian Civil War in 1919.12 There was also widespread use of
chemical agents by the United States in Vietnam between 1961-75 in the form of 
herbicidal warfare. While these defoliants were meant to destroy the environment, 
by-products of their use, such as dioxin, are reported to have had carcinogenic and 
genetic effects on humans; therefore, these agents may have contributed to long­
term health hazards for anyone exposed to them.13 The most prominent example 
of the contemporary use of chemical weapons after a long period of abstinence 
was their deployment during the Iran-Iraq War. Although the exact number of 
casualties is not known, these weapons are thought to have caused about 50,000 
casualties including 5,000 deaths.14 Iraq was also the perpetrator of recent 
chemical weapon use against Kurdish civilians at Halabja in March of 1988. It is 
estimated that about 5,000 Kurds died and that 7,000 were injured during that
conflict.15
1 interview conducted with Dr. Ralf Trapp of the Verification Bureau of the Provisional Technical 
Secretariat for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), The Hague, 
November 1994.
12 Data taken from the Sussex-Harvard Information Bank on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation 
by Julian Perry Robinson, op. cit., in Karsh, et al., 73; McNaugher, 7; Bamaby, 72.
13Bamaby, 74. Ironically, Agent Orange, the most common of these defoliants, is alleged to have 
caused cancer and other medical problems years later in U.S. servicemen exposed to their own 
agents. This has always been a controversial matter for the U.S. militaiy and to date, there have 
also been no comprehensive studies on the effects of these agents on civilians in the country, to the 
author's knowledge.
14OTA, Assessing the Risks, 10. Its estimates of 50,000 casualties are from the testimony of R. 
James Woolsey, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, before the Senate Committee on 
Government Affairs, February 25, 1993. The United States’ estimates of the numbers killed by CW 
is put at 5000 according to Utgoff, 82, in reference to Don Oberdofer, "U.S.-Soviets May Meet 
Soon on Curbing Chemical Arms", The Washington Post, 4 January 1986, 1. Iranian sources also 
estimate 50,000 casualties and 5,000 deaths. See Michael Eisenstadt, The Sword of the Arabs: 
Iraq's Strategic Weapons Program, Policy Paper, No. 21, Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, 1990, Chapter I, quoting as a reference Iran's Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velyati’s 
comments to the international conference on chemical weapons, January 7, 1989 as reprinted in 
FBIS-West Europe, January 9, 1989, 7.
15Kenneth Timmerman, The Death Lobby How the West Armed Iraq, (London: Bantam Books, 
1992), 377, and Bamaby, 75. Press reports estimate a slightly higher figure of nearly 10,000 
casualties as cited in Karsh, et al., 40. A lesser figure of 3000 civilians killed is given by Victor
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There have also been numerous cases of the alleged use of chemical weapons
which have yet to be substantiated or verified. 16 The difficulties in substantiating 
the use of chemical weapons lie not only with actual verification, but also with the
political motivations of states or actors who make the accusations. As states had
pledged not to use chemical weapons except for retaliation, the political costs to
any state caught using them would be high. For example, the Soviet Union and its
satellites were accused of using chemical weapons in South East Asia and
Afghanistan during the 1970s. This became a major political issue as:
Distrust was to arise as detente was crumbling. On the other hand, there were an 
increasing number of claims that Soviet proxies in the developing world, 
including Vietnam, Ethiopia and Angola, had obtained toxic substances from the 
Soviet Union and were actually using them. Even the Soviet Union itself was 
reported to have employed CW agents in Afghanistan. Whatever the veracity of 
these reports, they served those who had a vested institutional interest in renewed 
American CWW production well*7
At the instigation of the United States, a UN Group of Experts was convened to 
investigate this situation. Its members were denied entry into the states involved, 
which resulted in inconclusive reports. These reports did stipulate, however, that 
there was some evidence of the use of chemical substances. Unfortunately, no 
clear-cut answers were forthcoming, as it was also acknowledged that these 
chemical traces could have resulted from natural causes. According to Victor
Utgoff, 85, from a reference by Norman Kirkham, "Iraqi Gas Leaves a Modem Pompeii", The 
Washington Times, 23, March 1988, 1.
•7vietnam in Laos and Kampuchea (1974-78), in China (1979); Thailand along its border with 
Kampuchea, (1982, 1985, 1988); South Africa in Angola (1978, 1982, 1988); Angola against 
UNITA positions (1985,1986,1988); C.I.A. activities in Cuba (1978-1982); the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan (1979-1986); Ethiopia in Eritrea (1980-1986), and in Somalia (1981); El Salvador 
(1981-1985); Nicaragua (1985-1986); The U.K and Argentina in the Falklands (1982); Guatemala 
against rebels, (1984), the U.S. in Grenada (1983); Indonesia in East Timor (1985); Libya and 
Chad in Chad, (1986, 1987). This list is reproduced from Timothy McCormack, "Chemical 
Weapons in the Gulf War", California Western Journal of Law. Vol. 21, No. 1, 1990-1991, 2, 
through his compilations from various SIPRI Yearbooks.
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Utgoff, “both positions have some merit, and both pose considerable hazards as 
well.”17 8 The truth may have been lost not only through the practical problems of 
verification but also through the political climate of the day. These examples also 
demonstrate how difficult it is to prove that chemical weapons attacks have taken 
place when there is a delay between the reporting of the incident and the 
investigation, not to mention a lack of co-operation from the parties involved.
Section 2.1.2-Possession
Very few states have actually admitted to possessing chemical weapons. Suspected 
chemical weapons possessors have kept a veil of secrecy over these programmes. 
As a result, according to Julian Perry Robinson:
The present state of that 'spread' of chemical warfare weapons is hard to specify.
The picture is in shades of grey, not the relatively sharp contrasts that distinguish 
the 'haves' from the 'have-nots' in the realm of nuclear weapons.19
Officially, only the United States, the former Soviet Union, and Iraq have admitted 
possessing chemical weapons. The Director of U.S. Naval Intelligence, Rear 
Admiral Thomas Brooks, testified to the U.S. Congress in 1991 that there were 
about 14 states outside NATO and the Warsaw Pact that probably had offensive 
chemical weapons capabilities, and that ten more were seeking to develop the 
capability.20 These figures are disputable as other sources have claimed that only
17Jean Pascal Zanders, “Towards Understanding Chemical Warfare Weapons Proliferation”, 
Contemporary Security Policy. Vol. 16, No. 1, April 1995, 86-87.
18Utgoff, 80.
19Robinson, op. cit., in Karsh, et al., 88.
20Julian Perry Robinson, “The Supply-Side Control of the Spread of Chemical Weapons”, in Jean- 
Francois Rioux, (ed.), Limiting the Proliferation of Weapons, The Role of Supply-Side Strategies, 
(Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992), 60-61, from the Statement of Rear-Admiral Thomas A. 
Brooks, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials 
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, on Intelligence Issues, 7 March 1991, 56-
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about twenty states besides the former Soviet Union and the United States have 
chemical weapons capabilities but that only five or six actually possess a militarily 
viable stockpile. In addition, some states have adamantly denied possession of 
these weapons.21 As these programmes are clouded in secrecy, it is often difficult 
to ascertain to what degree and level of sophistication development has reached. 
A note of caution is advised when considering quantity versus quality of arsenals. 
There is a good deal of confusion surrounding the definition of just what 
constitutes an offensive chemical weapons capability.22 The difficulty in assessing 
the military significance of a state's chemical weapons programme is exemplified 
by the case of Iraq. It was not until the subsequent UNSCOM investigations 
following the Gulf War that the true size and sophistication of the Iraqi arsenal 
was uncovered. After the United States and Russia, Iraq was thought to have the 
third largest arsenal in the world, and the most advanced in the Middle East23
69. See also Elisa Harris, “Towards a Comprehensive Strategy for Halting Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Proliferation”, Arms Control, Vol. 12, No. 2, September 1991, 129. The 
following countries are suspected of possessing an offensive chemical weapons capacity: In the 
Middle East: Egypt, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria; in Asia: Burma, China, India, North Korea, 
Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam. Harris also includes Ethiopia in this list, as Admiral 
Brooks named this country in earlier testimony. Countries which “may possess” chemical weapons 
include the following: Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Thailand.
21Robinson, op. cit., in. Rioux, 61; Elisa Harris, "Chemical Weapons Proliferation: Current 
Capabilities and Prospects for Control", in The Aspen Strategy Group, New Threats, Responding to 
the Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical, and Delivery Capabilities in the Third World, (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1990), 72; and Bamaby, 83. The following countries have all 
declared non-possession: Afghanistan, Argentina, Burma, Chad, Chile, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Ethiopia, France, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, North Korea, 
Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
22 According to Elisa Harris, there are substantial differences between having the capability to 
produce chemical weapons, and the possession of a comprehensive and viable military stockpile. 
One definition of what constitutes a chemical weapons capability is explained by Kenneth 
Adelman. He states that a chemical weapons capacity is “ ‘sufficient so that it could give a military 
utility to the possessing country, and sufficient to cause a great deal of damage to the other side. 
We are not talking about experimental possession, research possession.’ ” See Harris, op. cit., in 
The Aspen Strategy Group, 68, note 4.
23Eisenstadt, Chapter 1; Geoffrey Kemp, The Control of the Middle East Arms Race, (Washington: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1991), 75.
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Section 2.1.3-Proliferation
In an interdependent world, access to technology and information transcends
borders. The internationalization of the petrochemical, pharmaceutical and
pesticide industries has stimulated a growth in trade and hence access to these
technologies and capabilities.24 The diffusion of technology and information has
had a significant impact not only on industrial development, but on the burgeoning
chemical weapons programmes. The extent to which Western industrialized states
are responsible for chemical weapons proliferation is controversial, but it would
be difficult to dispute that economic interests were placed ahead of security
interests in the development of chemical weapons programmes25 The former
Director of the CIA, William Webster, points out that:
...[TJhese companies [mostly Western] have provided crucial assistance, 
including chemical precursors, production equipment, actual production 
facilities, munitions parts, and training for personnel. Without this assistance, 
many of these programs simply would not exist.26
It remains a fact that technology in an interdependent world is becoming more 
difficult to control, as it serves both legitimate and non-legitimate functions. The 
spate of embarrassing publicity surrounding Western participation in aiding these 
illicit programmes eventually led to tighter controls being enacted. It was not until 
the late 1980s, however, that industrialized states started to co-operate and restrict 
their export control policies.
24Brad Roberts, Chemical Disarmament and International Security. International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, London Adelphi Papers 267, Spring 1992, 16.
25For an interesting investigation of Western companies that supplied dual-use technology to Iran, 
Syria and Libya see Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from Middle East Defense News, 
Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria and Libya, (Los Angeles: August 1992).
26Elisa Harris, “Chemical and Biological Weapons: Preventing the Spread of the "Poor Man's 
Atomic Bomb?”, in Rioux, (ed.) op. cit., 75-76. Harris takes Webster's comments from U.S. 
Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs and its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
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Dual-use technology found in the chemical industry sometimes makes it difficult 
to differentiate between legitimate and non-legitimate purposes. According to the 
U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), "Intent cannot be inferred directly 
from capability. ’ 127 This relationship between intent and capabilities is one of the
more confusing aspects of the proliferation picture. Nevertheless, it is a common 
misperception that a significant chemical weapons manufacturing capability can 
easily develop from the legitimate chemical industry. According to Gordon Burck, 
there are three common myths about the manufacture of chemical weapons: that 
they can be produced easily in any chemical plant; that a commercial chemical 
plant can be converted to chemical weapons use quite easily and rapidly; and that 
the reverse process is also viable.27 8 *While the technology to produce mustard and 
nerve gas is well documented, the equipment and production steps required in the 
process are not easily convertible from the techniques used in the civilian 
chemical industry. New plants would have to be built or extensively altered.22
Other trends have also influenced the proliferation of these weapons in recent 
years. First, the alliance of chemical weapons with ballistic missiles, although not 
yet utilized, could truly transform these weapons into weapons of mass 
destruction; especially if they were targeted at cities or other highly populous 
regions. Second, political barriers against the use of chemical weapons have also
Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons, 1O1st Congress, 1st Session, (Washington; 
USGPO, 1990), 11-12.
27OTA, Assessing the Risks. 37.
2*Burck, 137. See the whole article for a discussion of the technical aspects of CW technology 
production and the difficulties of differentiating them from commercial production.
29Burck, 122.
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eased. In its war with Iran and its attack on the Kurds, Iraq breached a long­
standing taboo against the use of chemical weapons, and was not held accountable
for its actions. This may encourage further violations. As Timothy McCormack 
warns: “Because of their silence, governments from all countries have encouraged 
future violations of the Geneva Protocol.”30 Iraq also used chemical weapons to 
some tactical advantage in its war with Iran, and thus a weak state may infer 
advantages to using such a weapon if they feel there would be no international 
action or sanction against them. The Indian Defence Forces have commented that 
“ Tf the political costs are seen as minimal, and as affordable, the military 
incentives for chemical weapons would multiply globally....’ ”31 Third, if a 
weapon can have such far reaching consequences, perhaps it can be used as a 
bargaining chip to counteract stronger regional powers .32
Section 2.1.4-Military Utility of Chemical Weapons and Other Reasons for 
Acquisition
An examination of the military and perceived military utility of chemical weapons 
is crucial to understanding the reasons for their acquisition and retention. It is 
sometimes difficult to generalize about the military utility of these weapons, as 
different states may have divergent political views and security needs. By 
examining the varied perspectives on the utility of chemical weapons, it might be
30McCormack, 29.
31 Ibid., 29-30.
32See Roberts, op. cit., (1992), 16-17. Roberts is pointing out that in the context of regional power 
struggles in the Middle East, states seek to acquire chemical weapons as a bargaining tool to offset 
any military or political inferiority they may have. Arab states may also link their disarmament of 
chemical weapons to Israeli disarmament of nuclear weapons.
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possible to see if any definitive conclusions can be drawn regarding their value as
a weapon system.
The military utility of chemical weapons can be divided into strategic and tactical 
use. Strategic use of these weapons would involve destroying the opponent's 
military infrastructure as well as its economic infrastructure and population base. 
To date, this type of action with chemical weapons has not occurred, and is 
unlikely to occur in the immediate future. While there could be a great deal of 
civilian casualties if chemical weapons were to be used against an unprotected 
population, civilian defence measures and the unpredictability of chemical 
weapons dispersion could reduce casualties significantly. In addition, chemical 
attacks could contaminate infrastructure but not destroy it; hence, economic 
infrastructure would probably be left intact after decontamination. It is also likely 
that protected military installations would be able to withstand a chemical attack.33
Tactical use of chemical weapons concentrates on the more direct engagement of 
front-line military forces and supply lines.34 Persistent chemical agents could 
create contaminated zones, restricting the military operations of both sides. 
Similarly, non-persistent agents might be used to disrupt the enemy and allow 
advances through their territory.35 36Chemical weapons are perhaps best utilized as a 
force multiplier. They can be used in conjunction with other weapons to add 
confusion to the battlefield scenario, as troops are slowed down by having to don
33 OTA, Assessing the Risks, 55, 62. I
34 Ibid., 55. j
35 Ibid., 9.
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protective gear and to decontaminate themselves.36 Chemical weapons also have a 
significant psychological impact on victims in terms of morale. Their use can 
scare participants and instil panic at the tactical level, and deployed at the strategic 
level against cities and civilians, they can cause mass panic.37 Finally, chemical 
weapons are considered useful for deterrent purposes, as no country wants to risk 
retaliation with these weapons.
A brief review of the use of chemical weapons in a major conflict is necessary, as 
it demonstrates how useful these weapons have been in actual conflict. There are 
few examples of this type of situation in terms of the modem widespread usage of 
chemical agents in warfare. Interestingly enough they are on opposite ends of the 
time spectrum, World War I and the Iran-Iraq War. Chemical weapons were first 
used on a wide-scale basis during World War I to overcome a stalemate in the 
trenches. They were introduced as a new innovation to the battlefield. The 
Germans initiated the use of chemical warfare in the assumption that the allies did 
not have the capabilities to retaliate in kind.38 Had this assumption been 
completely valid, the German forces could have gained a decisive military 
advantage. Although chemical weapons succeeded in adding to the horrors of war 
and complicating action on the battlefield, their use did not achieve decisive
results.39
36Robinson, op. cit., in Karsh, et al., 78.
37McNaugher, 15,22 and OTA, Assessing the Risks, 9.
38Utgoff, 5 and Sabin, op. cit., in Karsh, et al., 14.
39 Utgoff, 10.
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The Iran-Iraq War presents an interesting case-study of the perceived military 
utility of chemical weapons in a modem conflict. The Iraqi’s used chemical 
weapons on the battlefields in 1984 in response to Iranian human wave assaults. 
The war had been going very badly for Iraq and as Thomas McNaugher observes:
Morale was high; at this point in the war religious fervor gave Iranian youths the 
courage to walk through minefields, and no doubt made them fearless of gas 
clouds as well. Zealotry could not keep them alive, however, so Iraqi chemical 
weapons no doubt took its toll in Iranian casualties.40
There is a popular perception that the Iraqi use of chemical weapons against the 
ill-equipped Iranians was a decisive victory and a major validation of the use of 
chemical weapons. While it is likely that the use of chemical weapons did bring 
Iran to the bargaining table, it is disputable whether the use of such weapons 
brought the war to a close, or just expedited its inevitable conclusion.41 With the 
mass panic chemical weapons caused among Iranian soldiers, and the spectre of a 
chemical threat against Iranian cities looming, it would appear that Iraq did use 
chemical weapons to some advantage. In reality, it was Iran’s own reaction to its 
unpreparedness which may have aggrandized the effects of Iraqi chemical use. 
Still, Iraq managed to use chemical warfare as a force multiplier, to compensate 
for its inferiority in other military areas.
The non-use of chemical weapons during World War II (except for Japanese use 
in China) is very significant, as it attests to the lack of battle merit attached to 
chemical weapons warfare. Victor Utgoff is quick to point out that the chemical
40McNaugher, 17.
41 Thomas McNaugher speculates that the Iranian government gave more credence to the chemical 
threat than was necessary because it diverted attention from the fact that the war was a strategic
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option was not resorted to as “.. .a matter of simple mutual deterrence, but was due 
to a number of factors which happened to combine in a particularly fortuitous 
way,...”42 There are at least three major factors that deterred the warring powers 
from resorting to chemical weapons during this conflict. First, owing to 
intelligence overestimates of their opponents’ actual chemical weapons warfare 
capabilities, neither side wished to initiate chemical weapons warfare out of fear 
that its opponent's retaliatory capabilities were superior to its own. Second, 
parties in the conflicts were put off from using chemical weapons because of 
logistical problems and impediments to operational mobility. Finally, there was
the fear that if chemical warfare escalated from the battlefield to air warfare
against each other’s cities, unacceptable damage would be inflicted on 
civilians.43 This was due in part to the terrible memories of World War I. 
Although John Ellis Van Courtland Moon argues that the non-use of chemical 
weapons during World War II resulted more from mutual deterrence than from the 
pursuit of humanitarianism, he does concede that “paradoxically, the non-use of 
chemical weapons in the war strengthened the argument against them after the 
war, thereby reinforcing the humanity argument.”44
Chemical weapons are a tum-of-the-century technology; there are many more 
modem technical options available to military planners. In a discussion as to why
mistake. By focusing on Iraq’s use of inhumane weapons, Iran was trying to gloss over its own 
inadequate military performance. See McNaugher, 7.
42 Utgoff, 26.
43 See Utgoff, 26, and Chapter 3, “Testing ‘Strategic Deterrence’: Chemical Weapons and World 
War II” for a discussion of the reasons why the use of chemical weapons was considered in certain 
situations, but the option was forsaken. See also Sabin, op. cit., in Karsh, et al., 14-15.
44John Ellis Van Courtland Moon, “Controlling Chemical and Biological Weapons Through World 
War II”, in Richard Dean Bums (ed.), Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, (New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 672.
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chemical weapons programmes have petered out in some countries, Julian Perry 
Robinson makes the following observation:
There was a slow realization that the promise held by those wartime discoveries 
was actually a false promise; the new technology was barren. Scientific 
developments were not, after all, capable of overcoming the inherent technical 
limitations of chemical warfare to the point where chemical weapons had more 
than marginal utility. 45
In terms of technical constraints, chemical weapons are a weapon which is indirect 
at best. They contaminate rather than destroy directly. And this contamination 
depends upon the skills of the attackers, the prevailing atmospheric and 
geographic conditions, large enough quantities of these agents, and the degree of 
protection of the defender. For example, these agents are most effectively 
dispersed in wide open terrain, but in a city or hilly terrain, they cannot be 
dispersed as evenly, probably weakening the effectiveness of the agent. Air 
temperatures also affect dispersal, and wind can blow agents away from the 
intended target.46 This means that the desired outcome of a chemical weapons 
attack cannot be guaranteed. Chemical weapons may not even be as lethally 
effective against well-protected troops as conventional weapons47 Protective 
measures can be taken against a chemical attack, such as special clothing and 
masks. In addition, some agents can be countered by antidotes if administered 
early enough after contamination. Likewise, buildings and vehicles can be 
specially sealed against chemical attacks, and outside surfaces can be
decontaminated after a chemical assault48
45 Robinson, op. cit., in Rioux (ed.), 59.
46OTA, Assessing the Risks, Table 2-2, 48.
47Ibid., 52.
48Ibid., 49.
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Other criteria besides operational and logistical problems may limit the usefulness
of chemical weapons as a military option. Psychological, political, cultural, and
institutional factors encourage the non-use of these weapons. Conventional
weapons, on the other hand, tend not to have such scrutiny attached to their use.
Resorting to chemical weapons means crossing a significant threshold, of which
the costs may be too high to bear. Victor Utgoff argues that chemical weapons
have never been used against a state, with strong retaliatory capabilities, and that
chemical proliferation has not led to widespread chemical warfare. When chemical
warfare has been initiated, it has tended to be restrained. For example, in the
missile attacks during the Iran-Iraq War, chemical agents were not used against
major cities, although they were used elsewhere.49 50 *The U.S. Office of Technology
Assessment points out that “...political inhibitions on using the weapons may
render moot their purely military effectiveness.’^0 Although it is generally agreed
that the major reason that Iraq did not use chemical weapons against coalition
forces during the Gulf War was due to the fear of massive retaliation, this answer
may be too simplistic. According to Richard Price:
While the threat and fear of massive retaliation for the use of CW seems to have 
been largely responsible for inhibiting Iraq, the point being made here is that the 
argument of deterrence cannot be understood without recognizing the role of 
prior stigma attached to CW; this stigma set chemical weaponry apart as a 
symbolic threshold of acute importance.^ 1
There has always been a long-term dislike within the military establishment of the 
use of chemicals, and the idea that the use of poison as a method of warfare is
dishonourable. This pervasive objection to the employment of chemical weapons
49Utgoff, 220.
50OTA, Assessing the Risks, 55.
5'Richard Price, "A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo", International Organization, . Vol.
49, No. 1, Winter 1995, 5-6.
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as a method of warfare has translated into apprehensions on their use. Frederic 
Brown argues that" 'The combination of personal and institutional dislike of toxic 
agents and the estimated marginal overall effectiveness of gas as a weapon system 
were insurmountable restraints on such employment.' "52
The military utility or the perceived military utility of chemical weapons warfare 
has been open to dispute and interpretation over the years. Some states have had 
them fully incorporated into their operational capabilities while others have 
retained them solely for deterrent purposes. States have sought and acquired 
chemical weapons not so much for their technical attributes but rather for their 
deterrence effect. The threat of the use of chemical weapons may instil such fear 
in an adversary, that they will acquire a chemical weapons stockpile for the 
capability to retaliate in kind. For example, it should be remembered that nuclear 
weapons were used only once, yet their deterrent value remains enormous. In the 
case of chemical weapons, however, especially in the strategic context, their 
potential for retaliatory threat has been diminished and hence, their justification as 
a weapon of deterrence.
The military utility of chemical weapons has been downgraded. Cynics would 
argue that this change in attitude was due to the fact that the major powers had 
more powerful and precise weapons in their arsenal, and that they could forgo the 
chemical option. Anthony Cordesman believes that the possession of chemical 
weapons has had little bearing on international security. Therefore:
52As quoted by Sabin, op. cit., in Karsh, et al., 25, referring to F. Brown, Chemical Warfare: A 
Study of Restraints. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 246.
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...[Cjhemical weapons were at best a sideshow to the issue of nuclear weapons in 
the East-West conflict. They did not materially affect the balance of power or 
propensity of violence in any Third World conflict or crisis.33
Julian Perry Robinson takes a similar position to Cordesman concerning the utility 
of chemical weapons as part of military strategy. He points out that as the 
confirmed use of gas warfare has only been verified in less than 12 out of the 300 
wars this century, and that chemical weapons warfare is thus a rare occurrence. 
Hence, “that rarity [of gas warfare] must presumably say something about the 
military utility of CW weapons.”53 4 55 * *
The perceived utility of chemical weapons in the superpower context is important, 
as the United States and Russia retain the largest chemical weapons stockpiles and 
arsenals in the world. 5 5 During the Cold War, there was the fear that a combined 
Soviet chemical and conventional attack would greatly enhance a Soviet advance 
into Western Europe, but only if NATO could or would not retaliate in kind.5® 
NATO’s capability to retaliate in kind was also inferior to that of the Warsaw 
Pact.®7 There was a school of thought amongst certain NATO allies that a strong 
chemical retaliatory capability was unnecessary, as there was a nuclear option. As 
one West German politician has stated, chemical weapons “ ‘are superfluous as a 
means of maintaining the peace, considering the vast nuclear arsenals in the East 
and West.tt.The world hardly needs a chemical deterrent on top of the nuclear
53Cordesman, op. cit., in Roberts, (ed.), (1994) 34.
54Rooinson, op. cit., in Karsh, et al., 73-76 for a discussion on the utility of CW warfare and tables 
of cases of actual uses as opposed to alleged uses, as taken from the Sussex-Harvard Information 
Bank on Chemical and Biological Warfare Armament and Arms Limitation. *
5®Brad Roberts, op cit., (1992), 9.
55 Utgoff, 145.
55 Ibid., 151 and Chapter 7 for a discussion of NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities and various
chemical warfare scenarios.
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variety.' Eventually, the credibility of the NATO strategy of nuclear
escalation to a Soviet chemical weapons attack was called into question."'' As the
scenarios for the actual use of chemical weapons were called into question, so too
were the reasons for possession. One commentator on Soviet military thinking has
observed that:
The military’s perception of the diminishing utility of chemical warfare in a 
future European war is a more compelling rational for a CW ban. The General 
St^lfF recognized in the early 1980s that future war would be dominated by long- 
range, high precision, advanced conventional munitions.58 * 60
The ending of the Cold War and the amelioration of the traditional Soviet threat 
and war scenarios has further eroded any potential utility of chemical weapons in 
this context. Chemical weapons have become an obsolete military option in the
East-West context.
The function of a chemical weapon in battle has not changed since World War I.
In spite of its recharacterization as a weapon of mass destruction (oruzhiye 
massovogo porazheniye) in the 1960s, chemical weapons do not possess great 
destructive capabilities.®1
If the military utility of chemical weapons is considered limited, then can they still 
be considered a weapon of mass destruction? Chemical weapons have been 
lumped together under the rubric "weapons of mass destruction" along with 
nuclear and biological weapons. They have also been labelled the "poor man's 
atomic bomb". The perception of what constitutes a weapon of mass destruction 
depends on whichever stand-point one is taking. Chemical weapons debilitate
58 Elisa Harris, “Chemical and Biological Arms Control: The Role of the Allies”, in Fen Hampson, 
Harald von Riekhoff, and John Roper, (eds.). The Allies and Arms Control. (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1992), 79 and note 25.
55R^oi^(^ilis, op. cit., (1992), 12. Robert points out that “The prevailing view was that such a threat 
[A NATO nuclear escalation to a Soviet chemical attack] would serve to lower the nuclear 
threshold at a time when NATO was seeking to raise it, and was also struggling with broader 
problems regarding the credibility of its nuclear strategy.”
05 Stephen Covington, “The Evolution of Soviet Thinking on the Utility of Chemical Warfare in a 
Major European Armed Conflict”, in Krause, (ed.), op. cit., 7.
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rather than destroy. In a U.S. Office of Technology Assessment comparison of the 
lethality and destructiveness of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in 
neutral conditions, chemical weapons ranked a dismal third. A 12.5 kiloton TNT 
equivalent Hiroshima-type atomic bomb would affect 7.8 square kilometres of 
terrain and cause between 23,000-80,000 deaths. One 1 megaton hydrogen bomb 
would affect 190 square kilometres and cause 570,000-1,900,000 deaths. Thirty 
kilograms of anthrax spores (biological weapons) would contaminate an area of 10 
square kilometres and cause between 30,000 to 100,000 casualties. Yet, three 
kilograms of chemical weapons such as Sarin nerve gas would contaminate .22 
kilometres and kill between 60-200 people.61 2 More importantly, the OTA study 
points out that chemical weapons should not be considered the “poor man’s 
nuclear weapon”, as the ratio of deaths to injuries in World War I and the Iran 
Iraq War were relatively low.63
Chemical weapons, it must be remembered, do not destroy infrastructure and some 
of its agents are merely incapacitants. In addition, there are other military 
alternatives that may be more efficient. Indeed, "the military non-use of chemical 
weapons during Desert Storm appeared to have sealed their fate as totally obsolete 
in the face of modem tedmolgyy.”64 In a discussion on the merits of chemical 
weapons, Anthony Cordesman states that:
61Ibid., 6.
62see Table 2-1, OTA, Assessing the Risks. 53 and Cordesman, op cit., in Roberts, (id.) (1994), 
Table 5-2,48.
63OTA, Assessing the Risks. 58 quoting Pelletiere and Johnson, Lesson Learned: The Iran-Iraq 
War (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1991), Appendix 
B Chemical Weapons, 100.
64Zanders, 88.
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It is highly unlikely that the CWC will have any meaningful impact on human 
suffering or the level of violence used in future conflicts, not because chemical 
weapons are unimportant but because there are so many alternatives....The fact 
that the CWC is unlikely to impact the cumulative levels of suffering in future 
conflicts is not an argument for decontrol of a major killing mechanism. It is an 
argument against unrealistic expectations about the result. 65
It could also be argued that the military utility of chemical weapons has been 
transformed from a weapon of mass destruction to a weapon of terror. According
to Jay Brin:
Chemical weapons still pose a significant military threat to poorly equipped 
armies and unprotected civilians, as was demonstrated by Iraq's effective use of 
these weapons against Iran and its own Kurdish population.66
Simply because the military utility of chemical weapons has diminished in the
traditional East-West context does not mean that other states or actors are not
trying to acquire them. Utility may be in the eye of the beholder. As the U.S. 
Office of Technology Assessment points out: “...these weapons may also be 
sought for symbolic, deterrent, intimidating, or terrorist purposes that may not be 
simply related to their value from a purely military perspective.”67 Chemical 
weapons may be seen as useful to weaker states because their possession evokes a 
sense of fear; in turn, those who are feared also come to possess a sense of power, 
be it real or perceived. It should also be pointed out that since World War I, most 
cases of chemical weapons use and proliferation have been situated in the Third 
World. It is estimated that about seventeen states are known to possess chemical
weapons, and about fourteen are situated in the Middle East or East Asia.68 There 
is no real historical precedent of chemical weapons use in a major confrontation in 
these regions, the exception being the Iran-Iraq War. In the Western European
65Cordesman, op. cit., in Roberts, (ed.), (1994), 35-36.
66Jay Brin, "Ending the Scourge of Chemical Weapons', Technology Review, April 1993, 34.
67 OTA, Assessing the Risks, 7.
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context, the large-scale use of these weapons led to a very strong revulsion against
their further use. But Western experiences and perspectives are not always the
norm in other parts of the world.
Chemical weapons are also easier and less expensive to manufacture than nuclear
weapons, and it might be a more practical and less expensive option to develop
them as a weapon system. The numerous conflicts and insurgent movements
endemic in less developed countries might also provide a tempting environment
for using these weapons.69 If a particular Third World actor does not have nuclear
capabilities or has weaker conventional capabilities than an adversary, or both, it
may be attractive to have a long-range chemical weapons capability, with which to
threaten an adversary's cities at the very least. Weaker states may perceive the
acquisition of chemical weapons as a force multiplier to help offset their
conventional inadequacies.70 In addition, certain states view chemical weapons as
a deterrent against attacks by nuclear powers. A chemical weapons capability is a
source of pride to certain Third World states, as these weapons are still at least i.
perceived as a weapon of mass destruction. They may be used as a substitute for 
nuclear weapons or as a stopgap measure.71 Having the ability to use them would 
certainly enhance a particular state's military potential. It is the use of chemical 
weapons against insurgent groups that probably remains the most dangerous
j
capability within Third World states. For example, the Iraqi government employed j
__ _________________________________________________________________________ ______________ 5
68 Utgoff, 199.
69Ibid., 199.
70Edward M. Spiers, "The Role of Chemical Weapons in the Military Doctrines of Third World
Armies", in Krause, (ed.), op. cit., 43.
71 Martin Navias, “Third World Demand for Weaponry and Missiles”, in Trevor Taylor and 
Ryukichi Imai, (eds.), The Defence Trade, Demand. Supply and Control. (London: Royal Institute 
for International Affairs, 1994), 45.
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chemical weapons against the Kurds; a fairly cost-effective way of driving out the 
unprotected masses.72 The danger from non-state actors such as terrorist 
organizations using these weapons also remains a major threat, as evidenced by 
the Sarin gas attack in March of 1995 on the Tokyo underground.
The military utility of chemical weapons warfare seems to be dubious at best, but 
this has not stopped some states from seeking to acquire or use them. Although 
there is a prevailing international norm against their use from military, legal, 
political and moral perspectives, not all actors in the international system conform 
to this perspective. Their perspectives are based upon their own security needs. It 
should be remembered that states tend to support norms when it is in their 
interest to do so. Most states have refused to cross a certain line in initiating 
chemical warfare; many if not most of these states have assessed that these 
weapons are not as useful as they were once perceived to be. Paradoxically, the 
few cases in which countries have not observed the norm against the use of 
chemical weapons may encourage proliferation of these weapons. The irony of 
this situation is that while the traditional sources of the chemical weapons threat 
have diminished, the likelihood of their being used somewhere else has increased.
72 In the insurgent context, chemical weapons may be cost-effective as there is little risk of 
retaliation from insurgents, less manpower resources are needed, and heavy casualties can be 
inflicted on insurgents, forcing them to flee. See Spiers, op. cit., in Krause, (ed.), 45.
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Section 2.2-A Physical Description of Land Mines
According to the definition under Article 2 of the Protocol on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) of
the Convention on Conventional Weapons:
‘Mine’ means any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface 
area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the presence, proximity or 
contact of a person or vehicle, and ‘remotely delivered mine’ means any mine so 
defined delivered by artillery, rocket, mortar or similar means or dropped from 
an aircraft.73
A land mine is a lingering weapon which cannot distinguish between civilian or
soldier either in time or in intent. Land mines contain numerous activation and
explosive features, but the one feature that all land mines have in common is their 
ability to maim and kill without discrimination.
There are two basic types of land mines: anti-personnel, and anti-tank or janti- 
vehicle. Anti-tank mines are larger, since they are designed to destroy large 
vehicles rather than people. An anti-personnel mine, on the other hand, could be 
small enough to fit in the palm of one’s hand.73 4 The average anti-tank mine would 
require about 100 kg of pressure to be activated, and most vehicles would easily 
meet this requirement, detonating about 6 kg of explosives in the process.75
73The definition of a mine as defined in Article 2, Definitions, paragraph 1 of The Protocol on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) of 
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
74Small modem plastic anti-personnel mines may be as small as 6 cm in diameter. See United 
Nations General Assembly, Forty-Ninth Session, ‘‘Assistance in Mine Clearance”, Report of the 
Secretarv General. 6 September 1994, UN Doc. A/49/357, 2 (Hereafter UN, “Assistance in Mine 
Clearance”).
7®bid.
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Anti-tank mines should still be considered to be dangerous. These mines can have 
anti-handling devices, and can also be adapted for anti-personnel use.76 Many 
civilians still fall victim to these mines. In just a few of the recent press reports 
22 Angolans died and 14 were injured when a truck in which they were travelling 
ran over an anti-tank mine in the province of Moxico; in Southern Grozny, one 
child and nine adults were killed when a bus evacuating refugees hit a mine.77 
Anti-tank mines can kill or injure civilians engaged in routine activities, albeit 
with less frequency than anti-personnel mines. There is also the problem of naval 
mines which can cause much havoc to shipping.78 It is ironic that the international 
community rushed naval mine-sweepers to the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq 
War to protect oil shipments but were more apathetic about the more pressing 
humanitarian mine problem, the anti-personnel mine. This is the mine most 
known for affecting both the individual and society. This study will focus on anti­
personnel mines, as they are the ones which cause the most damage.
76Anti-Handling or AnthLift devices were developed to prevent the mine from being picked up or 
easily deactivated. If they are handled in the wrong manner they may detonate. In addition, AT 
mines can be modified to detonate under less pressure.
77See The European, 10-16 March 1995, 8 and The Guardian, 20 February 1995, 9 for these 
reports.
78There have been proposals made for a naval mines draft protocol to the CCW to update the 1907 
Hague Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Mines. It was felt that advances 
in naval mine technology required an update of protective measures against these mines. This issue 
was not highly prioritized for the Review Conference's work as land mines were the primary focus. 
This draft protocol was also introduced to the UNGA as DOC. A/C.l/46/15. See "The Rationale 
for Considering Other Proposals Relating to the Convention and to its Existing or Future 
Protocols", Group of Governmental Experts to Prepare the Review Conference of States Parties to 
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Background 
Documentation Prepared by the ICRC. July 1994, 23-24 (Hereafter ICRC, Background Document, 
July 1994).
50
There is controversy as to whether other types of munitions should also fall under 
the definition of a land mine, specifically in the case of sub-munitions. Sub­
munitions include bomblets, cluster bombs, and grenades, all usually remotely
delivered. It has been estimated that some 30 million sub-munitions were launched
during the Gulf War and 30% of all aircraft weapons dispersals were cluster 
bombs.79 Significant quantities of sub-munitions that failed to explode were also
found in Kuwait after the Gulf War.80 81
In recent years, technological and tactical developments have increasingly 
blurred the line between scatterable mines and the much broader range of rocket 
and aircraft delivered bomblets, cluster bomb units (CBUs), and other 
submunitions, which are often anti-personnel in their deployment and effect.81
Mine-clearance expert Rae McGrath goes a step further than the above definition, 
believing that the actual definition of anti-personnel mines should include sub­
munitions because they "become de facto anti-personnel mines when deployed in 
such a manner that they do not explode on impact".82 When sub-munitions hit the 
ground and do not explode (the dud factor) the unpredictability of a future 
detonation makes them function like an anti-personnel mine. Their physical effects 
are also similar to land mines. There have been suggestions that any sub-munition 
with a delayed action fuse beyond a certain time limit should be classified as a 
land mine.83 Sub-munitions are also referred to in the more generic sense (once
79See the Arms Project of Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Landmines: A
Deadly Legacy. (New York: Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, 1993) 347
(Hereafter HRW, A Deadly Legacy), in reference to a presentation by William Arkin to the NGO
Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines, London, May 24,1993, 5.
80Ibid., 53, in reference to John Taffe at the ADPA Symposium describing unexploded U.S. J
Rockeye munitions found by demining teams in Kuwait.
81 Ibid., 42.
82Comments reported in Robert Block, "Bomblet Casts Doubt on Export Policy", The Independent,
6 June 1994, 10. j
83ICRC, Background Document. (July 1994), 21, in reference to possible solutions discussed
during an Experts Meeting on Conventional Weapons convened by the ICRC in Geneva May 30-
June 1 1994. 1
!
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actually on the ground) as unexploded ordnance.84 The U.S. Department of State, 
however, does make a distinction between land mines and sub-munitions or
unexploded ordnance (UXO):
While the damage caused by UXO can. be the same as that caused by landmines,
it is important to note the differences between the two. A landmine is a weapon 
which is designed to detonate upon proximity of its target. The use of landmines, 
as a distinct class of weapons, is subject to doctrinal and international legal 
controls. UXO is a dangerous, uncontrollable, long lived waste product of a 
battle, and is only present after combat because it did not function according to 
its design. In addition, UXO is generally located on the ground surface, not 
buried like land mines, and UXO casings are metal, which make buried UXO 
much easier to detect than modem plastic mines.85
It should be pointed out that sub-munitions only take on the properties of land 
mines when they fail to work correctly. A British MOD official makes the point 
that if these weapons are reclassified, then there is the danger other weapons will 
be placed in these categories simply because they are flawed. But as Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) argues, when land mines are actually classified as sub­
munitions, there is the danger that these weapons could be used to circumvent 
controls; they could be deliberately designed to not explode on impact, thereby 
becoming a land mine under another guise.86 It is not the purpose or place of this
84UN, "Assistance in Mine Clearance", 5.
85U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs. Hidden Killers: The Global 
Landmine Crisis, 1994 Report to the U.S. Congress on the Problem with Uncleared Landmines 
and the United States Strategy for Demining and Landmine Control, (Washington: December 
1994), 8 (Hereafter DOS, Hidden Killers).
*®According to the HRW there are differences between the official classifications of mines in the 
U.S. Army Countermine Systems Directorate, Fort Belvoir, Research, Development and 
Engineering Center Worldwide Informational Mine Guide 1993, (Army Database) and that of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, 
Landmine Warfare-Trends and Projections. Also see The Independent, 6 June 1994, 10.
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study to debate the merits of this argument although it is an troubling side issue to
the whole land mines debate.87
Mines were first used as a weapon system towards the end of World War I when
German forces utilized buried shells to halt attacks by British and French tanks.
The development of a lightweight form of TNT explosives in the 1920s led to the
creation of the modem form of anti-tank pressure mines. Since anti-tank mines
could be picked up and replaced, a need developed to place protective mines
around them; hence, anti-personnel mines were developed as anti-lift devices for
anti-tank mines.88 These rudimentary anti-personnel mines were composed of
small containers holding explosives which were set off by pressure and emplaced
around an anti-tank mine for protection.89 When anti-tank mines started to
incorporate built-in anti-lift devices, anti-personnel mines were developed as a
military weapon in their own right. By World War II, the experimentation was
over and both mine types were used extensively by all parties to the conflict.90 The
majority of anti-personnel mines in existence today were created from technology
i
being used between World War II until the mid-1970s. Although these systems
j
are limited in some respects and rather rudimentary in design, they still remain
effective and deadly. Some of these older metallic mines have been in the ground
j
for decades and still present a hazard; others have corroded through exposure,
become unstable, and should be considered hazardous. In the past twenty years,
i
87For a further detailed study on the leftover munitions from war see Arthur H. Westing, (ed.), j
Explosive Remnants of War: Mitigating the Environmental Effects. SIPRI and UNEP (London:
Taylor & Francis, 1985)
88Interview with Tore Skedsmo, Deputy Demining Consultant, Department of Peacekeeping, 1
United Nations, New York, January 1995. i
89 HRW. A Deadly Legacy. 17. j
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mines have become extremely sophisticated thanks to advances in electronics and 
miniaturization technology.90 1
The most common mine types found in conflict zones are the basic conventional 
anti-personnel mines using dated design and technology. As they are 
technologically rather unsophisticated, they have been easy to mass-produce and 
copy. They are also manually emplaced. The next level of mines are the 
scatterable anti-personnel mines. These mines are disseminated by remote delivery 
systems such as launchers, aircraft, and artillery. Although they can cost about 10 
to 50 times the price of regular conventional mines, they are more cost-effective in 
terms of sheer volume and efficiency; some systems can deploy over 1,750 mines 
per minute.92 The more advanced mines can be categorized as "Improved 
Conventional Mines". These mines are especially dangerous as they are small and 
light-weight, almost entirely plastic, difficult to detect and easily portable. As 
these mines also encompass more advanced technology than their rudimentary 
ancestors, they are sometimes difficult to deactivate and may contain anti-handling 
devices.93 The portability, low cost, and detection factors make these mines a 
particularly popular choice of weapon in low-intensity or guerrilla warfare.
90For a brief description of this history see William Fowler, "The Devil's Seed", Defence, August 
1992, 11 and DOS Hidden Killers, 3.
91 Hamish Rollo, "The Military Use of Anti-Personnel Mines", in ICRC Report, Symposium on 
Anti-Personnel Mines, Montreux, (Geneva: ICRC, 1993) 213-214 (Hereafter ICRC, Montreux 
Symposium').
92For example, the Italian Valsella vehicle mounted Istrice Mine Scattering System can dispense 
1,750 mines a minute. See HRW, A Deadly Legacy, 38-41 for a description of these mine types.
93Ibid, 43 and Vehbi Dincerler, "Landmines and Mine Clearance Technologies", Scientific and 
Technical Commitee, North Atlantic Assembly, (NAA), STC (95) 13, October 1995,2-3.
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Most mines also have standard explosive properties. The "blast" anti-personnel 
mine is the most common mine type; the victim simply needs to step on the mine
to activate it, which sends the mine materials and other debris up the leg of the 
hapless victim. The result of this blast can usually kill a child, or require 
amputation in the case of adults. Victims can die of shock or infection when 
immediate medical attention is not available.94 A "fragmentation" mine is usually 
supported on a stake and activated by a tripwire; a victim walks into it and the 
mine is detonated sending fragments into an area of 20 metres. Unlike the blast 
mine the fragmentation mine has the capacity to injure anyone within those 20 
metres. An even more devastating version of this mine is the directional mine. 
This mine scatters fragments in a particular direction of up to 50 metres. An 
example of this type of mine is the U.S. Claymore mine which sends about 700 
steel balls out on a 60 degree arc over 50 metres, effectively wounding just about 
everyone in that vicinity. Bounding mines combine blast and fragmentation 
properties; when pressure is applied or a tripwire is activated, the mine body is 
projected upwards and explodes above ground, sending fragments over a wide 
area.95 All these mines have extremely destructive consequences for human 
beings.
Mines can also be classified according to their destructive properties. Most older 
mines tend to be non-self-destructing (NSD), and remain in the ground until they 
are detonated. In contrast, self-destructing (SD) mines, as the name suggests, 
destruct after a certain time period. It is estimated that 10-20% of these mines fail
94 HRW, A Deadly Legacy. 19. and Dincerler, 5.
95Ibid., 20
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to self-destruct.96 Unofficial sources argue that a 30% failure rate is a more
realistic figure.97 It is interesting to note that there are a number of cases where 
mine clearance operators have come into contact with self-destructing mines
which have failed to detonate. Rae McGrath claims that mine clearance teams
have come into contact with failed self-destructing mines in Laos 22 to 29 years 
after they were originally sown; they were designed to self-destruct in 120 hours. 
It has also been reported that post-Gulf War deminers in Kuwait found U.S. 
GATOR SD mines which had failed to detonate, though once again no exact
numbers were provided.98
Regardless of the true figures, however, McGrath correctly points out that these 
figures are virtually irrelevant since mines can be sown in the millions; thus even a 
10% failure rate presents a significant hazard. From a mine clearance perspective, 
every mine will still have to be found and cleared.99 While self-destructing mines 
would save some lives by destroying themselves, it is their unpredictability that 
remains a danger to the civilian population. Civilians can never be certain when 
the mines will actually explode, and can still be injured or killed by these mines if 
they happen to be in the vicinity at the wrong time. Also, if there are no set time
96The figure of 10% is reported in "The Land Mine Crisis: Humanitarian Disaster: What Can be 
Done?" Forum held at the United Nations on 16 November 1994 as reproduced in Ending Reliance 
on Nuclear and Conventional Arms, Disarmament, (New York: United Nations, 1995), 122 
(Hereafter referred to as UN Land Mine Crisis Forum), and Paul Jefferson, "Technical Aspects of 
Anti-Personnel Mines" in the ICRC Montreux Symposium, 106. The figure of 20% is reported in 
the public press; L. Doyle, "West Finds Riches in Deadly Mine Trade", The Independent, 6 June 
1994, 10.
97It has been alleged that studies have been conducted testing the failure rate for these mines, and 
that the failure rate has been on the high side. The results of these studies have not been released, 
the implication being that if the 10% rule was valid, governments would have been eager to release 
them.
98Attributed to John Taffe as quoted in HRW, A Deadly Legacy, 53.
"interview with Rae McGrath.
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limits, civilians will have to continue to exercise extreme caution. This means that
if civilians need the surrounding land for daily subsistence, they will either have to
take their chances or declare the land unusable.100
Yet additional varieties are the self-neutralizing (SN) and self-deactivating (SDA)
mines whose internal mechanisms render them harmless. These mines also are
problematic. If a self-neutralizing mine fails, it has to be treated as a real mine, 
for there is no way to differentiate between one that has been neutralized and one
that requires neutralization. According to Human Rights Watch:
It is difficult to persuade anyone to walk into a minefield where mines are still 
visible. Civilians will not know for certain when a mine is no longer active, and 
if they cannot be sure it is safe, they will not return to occupy the land. Not only 
will civilians be denied use of the land but deminers will also have to clear entire 
fields just as if each mine were live. It involves exactly the same amount of time 
and cost.101
Their failure rates, unpredictability, and difficulties in distinguishing between
active and inactive states of these mines make them hazardous to those in their
vicinity. They are an improvement to the non-self-destructing mines, but they do 
not make mines absolutely safe.
Section 2.2.1-Military Utility/Use of Mines
Mines can be used for legitimate military purposes under the guidelines of 
international law. Experience has shown, however, that there is a fundamental 
problem with mine use: the onus is on the mine-layer to place the mines correctly. 
In the current environment, irresponsible practices by too many have allowed
100HRW, A Deadly Legacy, 345.
,01Ibid„ 344-345.
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mines to be used as an indiscriminate weapon. This section will discuss the
various aspects of the military utility of such mines and the realities of their use.
In today's modem militaries, combat engineers are supposed to lay the mines in a
particular pattern, since they would have to be systematically removed in the 
future as required by military strategy and international law. It is considered 
prudent to mark these mines, because one’s own troops may have to retreat 
through them. Therefore, it is important to know where the mines have been laid. 
For example, during the Vietnam conflict, U.S. forces sometimes had to retreat 
through minefields they had remotely delivered. 102 103in the current state of 
widespread hit-and-run warfare, it is not likely that forces would be willing to take 
the time to mark minefields or acquire the capabilities to do so. As Garth Whitty 
points out: “Mine fields were marked because it was assumed that the land would 
be retaken. But the use of mines by irregular forces in civil and ethnic conflicts, 
such as those in Cambodia and Angola, have nullified these assumptions.”1 
In this type of warfare, it is usually considered strategically advantageous if the 
opposing side does not know exactly where the mines are. This intimidates
civilians and combatants alike.
In regular military strategy mines serve three basic purposes: they can protect 
military bases or sensitive border areas; they can be used to channel or divert
102 HRW, A Deadly Legacy. 18.
103 Jim Wurst, “Ten Million Tragedies, One Step at a Time”, The Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists. July/August 1993, 15.
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enemy forces into a particular direction; they can deny routes and positions to
enemy.104 According to Terry Gander:
,..[T]he main military function of mine warfare today is to inflict delay upon the 
enemy. Modem military tactics involve the speed of movement and manoeuvre, 
coupled with firepower, to defeat an enemy, so any time delay or physical 
hindrance which can be imposed upon an enemy by the introduction of 
landmines is to the advantage of the defender. 105
Mines are also used to ambush the enemy at particular locations and as a guard 
device to alert troops that an enemy is nearby.106 Land mines are best utilized as a 
force multiplier. Land mines enhance the lethality of land and air weapon 
systems; they can increase the cost-effectiveness of these air weapon systems 
three-fold as compared with them being deployed alone.107 The development of 
remotely delivered scatterable mines can be used offensively to separate an enemy 
from its supply lines, to force the enemy into a less advantageous position, or 
simply to protect one’s own forces during an offensive thrust. Remotely delivered 
mines can be deployed deep behind enemy lines and enhance the offensive 
potential of mines.108
Mines also have an insidious military utility in terms of psychological warfare, as 
most mines are designed to maim rather than kill. In a cold logistical sense, a 
wounded soldier is more of a liability on the battlefield than a dead one. A soldier 
in pain requires medical attention which may distract other combatants and instil 
fear in his comrades as they wonder whether they too will unwittingly step on a
104 Rae McGrath, "The Reality of the Present Use of Mines by Military Forces", in ICRC, 
Montreux Symposium, 8; Dincerler, 3. Also, in an interview, Tore Skedsmo discussed these 
aspects of military utility.
105 Terry Gander "Anti-Personnel Mine Warfare-An Outline", in ICRC, Montreux Symposium, 
203.
106Ibid., 203-205.
107 Lt. Col. N. Hamish Rollo, “The Military Use of Anti-Personnel Mines”, in ICRC, Montreux 
Symposium. 212.
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mine. Even in military strategy the land mine has an aspect as a terror weapon, its 
very elusiveness and unpredictability make troops proceed with caution.108 09 As an 
added tactical advantage, if troops have to proceed with caution, then they are 
further delayed by having to carefully breach a mine field in order to ensure safe 
passage.110
The long-running, mostly internal conflicts that have characterized the state of war 
over the past few decades have also produced a shift in the military role of land 
mines. Previously, mines were used mostly as a defensive support weapon; now 
they are being used more extensively and offensively, owing to more sophisticated
technology. According to Kenneth Anderson:
Landmines have now evolved from a tactical, defensive, battlefield weapon to an 
offensive, sometimes even strategic, weapon operating in environments far larger 
than what classically would have been regarded as the “battlefield”.111
Most of modem day conflicts tend to be fought on continually changing 
battlefields, with very large portions of a country being used as the war theatre. 
The most common type of conflict where these type of conditions prevail are in 
counter-insurgency scenarios. The counter-insurgency scenario can take the form 
of government and opposition forces fighting an internal conflict, or an outside 
actor pursuing a conflict on behalf of the regime they want in power. As a result, 
random wide-scale mining of agricultural or communal land, villages, water
108See HRW, A Deadly Legacy, 22 and DOS, Hidden Killers, 7.
109see ICRC, "Landmines; Time for Action", ICRC Public Information Brochure, May 1994, 8; 
see also Gander, op. cit. in ICRC, Montreux Symposium, 205, for a discussion of the psychological 
effects of mine warfare.
1,0"Breaching" is a military term for clearing a path through a minefield to facilitate movement. It
does not imply that the entire minefield will be cleared.
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sources, and shrines takes place as a form of terror warfare against civilians. The 
military justification for this indiscriminate mining is based on the premise that as 
the enemy is all over the community, it is justifiable for the target range to be 
increased. This justification allows the aggressor to treat the whole community as 
a military target. For example, in the Afghanistan conflict, Soviet forces in 
conjunction with the Kabul government mined large tracts of mountain grazing 
land to bring to a halt the agriculture and husbandry industries of the region, in 
their pursuit of the Mujahideen rebels. While food to the enemy is restricted, it is 
restricted to the civilians as well.1 12 In these types of conflicts, respect for civilians 
appears minimal. The combination of technological advances, the structure of 
warfare, and violation of the rules governing land mines all contribute to 
alterations in the military utility and use of land mines.
Although land mine use is considered a legitimate part of military strategy, there is 
controversy within the military establishment itself as to its effectiveness as a 
weapon system. According to one military expert:
I know of no situation in the Korean War, nor in the five years I served in South­
east Asia, nor in Panama, nor Desert Shield-Desert Storm where our use of mine 
warfare truly channelized the enemy and brought him into a destructive 
pattern....I'm not aware of any operational advantage from broad deployment of 
mines.* 3
.^Kenneth Anderson, "An Overview of the Global Land Mines Crisis", in Kevin Cahill, (ed.), 
Clearing the Fields Solutions to the Global Land Mines Crisis. (Basic Books and The Council on 
Foreign Relations: New York, 1995), 20.
. *2Rae McGrath, op. cit. in ICRC, Montreux Symposium. 9-10.
.^Former Marine Corps Commandant Alfred Gray Jr., as quoted in Stephen S. Rosenfeld, 
"America Doesn't Need Landmines", Ir^t<^irnatt(^n(jl Herald Tribune, September 25, 1995, 10.
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In the Vietnam war, it is estimated that between 30-70% of battlefield casualties
were caused by land mines.114 Recent studies regarding the military utility of 
mines have concluded that mines are of marginal utility.115 Mines also pose a 
hazard to peacekeeping operations around the world, endangering those sent to 
keep the peace.116
Section 2.2.2-Proliferation of Land Mines—Why Now, Why So Bad?
Like a deadly disease long absent and assumed conquered, the land mine, that 
scourge of the battlefield of World War I, has reemerged on a scale unimagined 
and with hideous, unanticipated effects. There is today a global land mine crisis.
And while it began as a military problem, it is now an ongoing humanitarian 
disaster.117
According to the United Nations and the U.S. Department of State there are 110 
million land mines littering the land in 64 countries, and from two to five million 
more are being laid each year.118 Unfortunately, even with all the current demining 
programmes which have been established around the world, only about 130,000 
mines were removed in 1993, and 100,000 removed in 1994. There is significant 
deficit in what is being removed as opposed to what is being added.119 In addition,
114 According to DOS, Hidden Killers, 7, some 16% of total deaths in Vietnam were a result of 
land mines although it is possible the figure could be as high as 30%. The figure for one-third of 
all casualties is quoted by Richard Johnson in Cahill, op cit., (1995), 37. The figures for 65-70% 
casualties are taken from 1965 estimates of U.S. Marine Corps casualties and do not detail which 
parties' mines actually caused these casualties. Information is quoted from U.S. Defense 
Intelligence Agency and U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center (DIA/FSTG), 
Landmine Warfare-Tends and Projections, December 1992,DST-1160S-019-92, p2-l as referenced 
in HRW A Deadly Legacy, 17.
115 The Institute for Defense Analyses “found that APMs help in few battlefield situations, and 
even then extra firepower can compensate.” Another study by a panel of military experts published 
by the ICRC also came to the conclusion that mines are of marginal military utility. See Tom 
Masland and John Barry, “Buried Terror”, Newsweek. April 8, 1996,28.
116In Somalia, for example, 26% of U.S. casualties were caused by land mines. See Kevin Cahill, 
(ed.), Clearing the Fields Solutions to the Global Land Mines Crisis, (New York: Basic Books and 
The Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 3.
117Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "The Land Mine Crisis", Foreign Affairs, September/October 1994, 8.
118Figures quoted in DOS Hidden Killers, 1 and UN, "Assistance in Mine Clearance", 2.
119Figures according to David Gowdey, UN DHA Demining Consultant and Dincerler, 1.
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it is estimated that there are about 100-150 million mines stockpiled.120 For the 
immediate future, it is not imperative to remove all these mines because some are 
in very remote positions and-tend not to endanger civilians. Cordoning off land, 
however, is only a temporary solution, as the land may be needed in the future. For 
example, the Egyptian government is now searching for ways to clear mine- 
saturated regions as population demands increase.121 As Rae McGrath argues, one
should not necessarily look at total mine numbers, and total mine removal
numbers, as the problem and the solution. It is the intrinsic value of the land
which is important.122 In a state like Eritrea, 500,000 land mines are a big problem
as refugees need to be repatriated within a rather small area, and resources are very
limited. In Iraqi Kurdistan, although 60% of minefields are marked, civilians are 
in constant danger as they must use the land for daily subsistence. In Cambodia, 
mines are just about everywhere and are a fact of daily life.
The regions most plagued by the land mine problem are primarily situated in Third 
World conflict-ridden states. According to one demining expert, "You go to a 
place like Cambodia or Angola, and your odds of finding mines are astronomically 
high. Like Mardi Gras Beads on Fat Tuesday in New Orleans."123 As a result of 
decades of conflict, the African continent is the worst affected by land mine
120 United Nations, “The Unfinished Disannament Agenda”, Disannament, (Special NGO 
Committee for Disarmament: Geneva, February 1995), 31.
12’DOS, Hidden Killers, 4, (1993 edition) estimates that about 30% of mines could fall into the 
category of secondary priority for mine removal.
122Whether an area is heavily or lightly mined does not matter in terms of demining efforts; the 
deminers still have to look for all the mines. Progress is actually judged by the clearance of land 
that is crucial to infrastructure such as agriculture, irrigation, grazing or where it interferes with 
civilians’ daily lives. (Interview with Rae McGrath).
123Statement of Floyd Rocky Rockwell, Mine Field Supervisor for Conventional Munitions 
Systems, (CMS) as quoted in Donavan Webster, "It's the Little Bombs that Kill You", The New 
York Times Magazine, January 23, 1994, 5.
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proliferation, with 30 million land mines spread over some 18 states. Some of the 
most mine ridden states in the world include Cambodia (8-10 million), 
Afghanistan (10 million*), Angola (9 million), Iraq (up to 10 million), and about 
2-5 million in the former Yugoslav republics. 1 24 .
The situation caused by the use of modem landmines is a pertinent example in 
this respect. These weapons have always been considered normal conventional 
weapons and certainly not weapons of mass destruction that merited important 
international arms control measures. However, a certain amount of th<^uu>ht and 
foresight would have shown that the introduction of plastic mines which can be 
sown in large quantities, which are cheap and widely available, and which remain 
active for an indefinite period would lead to the grave situation we now face. The 
international community does not have to wait for catastrophes to happen, but 
rather can anticipate probable dangers. In this respect it needs to take into 
account the types of conflict that actually occur and the way in which weapons 
proliferate. Once a weapon is fielded it is very difficult to stem its proliferation 
and widespread use. 124 5 *
There are a variety of reasons why the global land mine crisis has occurred. First, 
the availability of these mines has increased. Forty-eight states have produced at 
least 340 types of anti-personnel mines, and at least 29 countries have exported 
them.i26 It must be noted that not all of these states still export these mines. Many 
governments have been accused of doing too little to stem the proliferation of land 
mines, as economic interests were at stake. According to David Gowdey, 
Demining Consultant to the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs:
As for the question of economics, very few states make alot [sic] of money on the 
question of land mines. 1 believe that one F-16 fighter sale would make more for 
the U.S. than the revenue for all the land mines they have sold in the last twenty
124See UN, "Assistance in Mine Clearance", 15-20 and DOS, Hidden Killers. 15. Both U.S. and 
UN sources estimate that there are probably 9-10 million uncleared land mines in Afghanistan, but 
that the number could be as high as 35 million. See HRW, A Deadly Legacy, 145.
l25See "The rationale for amending Protocol II of the 1980 Convention", Group of Governmental 
Experts to Prepare the Review Conference of the State Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions 
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, Background documentation prepared by 
the ICRC. April 1994,2. (Hereafter ICRC Background Document. April 1994).
!26<5ee HRW, A Deadlv Legacy, 8-11 for a detailed description of these trends.
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years When you are talking about sales that total maybe $3 million a pop, you 
are talking about small change in the international arms trade.127
Although the land mine industry per se is not very large compared to the rest of 
the armaments industry, land mines are still exported in very large quantities due 
to the low unit cost of production.128 It is difficult to gain an accurate fix on the
total number of mines produced and sold.129 Quite often, mines are included as a 
part of larger arms deals.130 In the West, mines are not a large part of the defence 
budget, nor are there many companies whose sole interest lies in mine
manufacture only. In addition, as mine technology tends to be simple to replicate, 
numerous other countries may in fact produce land mines either under direct 
license or as unofficial copies of the original.131
Advances in technology have made mines more difficult to detect and more deadly 
to remove. Remotely delivered mines have also made it possible to sow mines in 
vast quantities, with more speed and with less accuracy. Remotely delivered mines 
are almost impossible to map once dispersed.132 Even if the location of mines are 
known, climatic conditions can shift the mines over time, and additional mines 
may come to overlay the old. Also, local authorities may be reluctant to divulge
127Personal communication with David Gowdey.
128Ferrucio F. Petracco, "Anti-Personnel Mines Production and Trading", in ICRC, Montreux 
Symposium. 24.
129 Land mine holdings are not listed in the UN Register of Conventional Weapons and even large 
research groups like SIPRI hardly have any information on these weapons. Part of the reason is 
that it is difficult to track small, light weapons, and land mines are sometimes attached to larger 
ticket items.
130 Wurst, 17.
131Christopher Foss, “The Trade in Mines: Manufacturers, Exporters and Importers”, in ICRC, 
Montreux Symposium. 19-20.
132Factors such as weather conditions, means of delivery, and navigation skills all influence the 
accuracy of defining the general area of mine targets; borders are always difficult to define, and an 
air dispersion especially makes it very difficult to accurately mark any object. For example, an 
aircraft travelling at a speed of 625 km/hr from a height of 300 metres could not possibly be able to
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the location of mines because they may want to keep them for protection.133 It is 
also very difficult to develop demining techniques to clear randomly scattered 
mines that may be buried in undergrowth and jungle and beneath structures. By 
their very nature, according to the U.S. Department of State "...it is one of the 
characteristics of mines that while they are extremely easy to lay, they are also 
extremely difficult to detect and destroy."134
Further exacerbating the land mine problem is the fact that it has largely been 
ignored at the domestic and international political level. For years, land mines 
were causing problems mostly in poorer regions of the world, but they were not 
perceived to be a problem for the major powers.135 Had these proliferation 
problems been prevalent in the centres of power, it is more than likely that 
something would have been done about their effects a long time ago. As one 
demining consultant has observed:
If land mines were being laid in New York, Paris, London, Moscow and Beijing- 
there would be as much work put into restricting them as is put into nuclear 
missiles. However, the reality is that land mines are strewn mostly in the Third 
World and they do not present the menace to the big powers posed by nuclear 
missiles.136
On the domestic front, tensions between civilian and military sectors, or 
whichever groups are vying for power in a particular country, have also hindered
precisely designate the locations of the mines being dropped. For this reason, it is also very 
difficult to designate a single military target as a mine objective. From Rae McGrath, (lecture).
133See UN, "Assistance in Mine Clearance", 3-4.
134See DOS, Hidden Killers, p ii.
135In defence of the major powers, Third World countries have preferred non-interference in their 
affairs, and it can be difficult politically for outside actors to balance the interests of sovereignty 
with that of humanitarian intervention.
'-^Correspondence with David Gowdey.
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control efforts.137 It is difficult enough to bring these factions to the negotiating 
table, let alone to reach agreement on the need for a unified arms control agenda. 
Perhaps most tragically in the political sphere is the fact that very few parties, 
whether internal or external to these conflicts, have ever recognized or cared to 
recognize the growing menace of land mines. If any party did identify these 
dangers, their voices were effectively drowned out. Although much damage has 
already occurred because of land mines, the problem of land mine proliferation is 
finally gaining the attention it deserves, as humanitarian matters are presently 
spilling over into the security field.
Section 2.2.3-Effects of Land Mine Use
Although the decision to use land mines is a matter of military policy, the 
consequences of their use have more repercussions in the civilian sector. Former 
UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali describes these repercussions in the
following manner;
These mines have been placed not only in combat zones, but also in areas of 
purely civilian and commercial activity, thus bringing terror to large populations. 
In the hinterlands and countrysides of the world, the legless, blinded, ravaged 
bodies of the living are an increasingly common sight. They are condemned to a 
future of marginal social and economic existence and place an impossible burden 
on nations striving for development. Mines have been planted around key 
economic installations, including electric plants and power lines, water treatment 
plants, road networks, market centres and port facilities. By neutralizing 
essential infrastructure, mines present a virtually insuperable obstacle to post­
conflict peace-building.138
Even if one takes the view that these weapons are a legitimate military instrument 
being used incorrectly, there are still significant differences between the
137Interview with Tore Skedsmo.
138Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 8
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consequences for the military and for the civilian population as a whole. For
example, once mines have achieved their military aims, the soldiers who actually
laid them can move on, but the inhabitants of the infected areas cannot leave;
civilians must continually struggle with the hazard of land mines. Victims
continue to be claimed long after the soldier who laid the mine has left. Mines are
"more damaging because of the collateral effect of their continued lethal nature 
upon societies in infested states".J39Moreover, at the end of most conflicts, 
weapons can be put away, but the physical nature of land mines makes this
impossible.139 40 141 *
Those who suffer the consequences of indiscriminate land mine use live mostly in 
poor Third World countries already suffering from a host of other problems. The 
worst consequences are the death and horrific injuries land mines cause. 
According to the ICRC, more than 800 people are killed per month and thousands 
more are injured by land mines, about 26,000 casualties a year.^1 In the next five 
years it is estimated that 50,000 more people will be killed and another 80,000 
injured?42 The most telling medical consequence of land mine use is the abnormal 
high rate of amputations in countries infested with mines.‘43 Tragically, the
139UN, "Assistance in Mine Clearance", 3.
140Rae McGrath (Interview). *
141UN, “Assistance in Mine Clearance”, 2 and DOS, Hidden Killers, 1. It should be noted that 
Red Cross statistics are quoted frequently because most of the countries affected do not have or 
keep cohesive casualty records. It should also be noted that the figures quoted may be insufficient 
because many victims died where a mine hit them or they never made it to a hospital. Records are 
only kept for victims admitted to hospitals.
'^According to UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as quoted in the International 
Herald Tribune, May 4-5, 1996, 2
143The following are mine amputation rates for these states: Angola-1 per 470 persons, Cambodia- 
1 per 236 persons, Somalia-1 per 1,650 persons, Mozambique-1 per 1862 persons, Uganda-1 per 
1100 persons, Vietnam-1 per 2500. In contrast, the United States, a country without a land mine 
problem, has an amputation rate of only 1 per 22,000 people. See Dr. Robin Gray, "Humanitarian 
Consequences of Mine Usage", in ICRC, Montreux Symposium. 63-64 citing statistics from the
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medical infrastructure required to deal with these mine traumas is simply 
inadequate in poorer countries,. The only people likely to receive prompt medical 
aid are the soldiers themselves. They also tend to receive priority in follow-up 
care as well; in Cambodia, for example, most of the amputees who are prioritized 
for artificial limbs are soldiers.* 144 *Not only are the dangers more prevalent in 
heavily mined areas, but the medical response is abysmal for these types of 
injuries. Disabled land mine victims are relegated to a life of marginality and 
poverty amidst already harsh circumstances.
The activities most likely to risk mine injury include collecting firewood, farming, 
grazing livestock, children playing and rescuing other victims. Most of the land 
mine victims are civilians carrying out their daily business.^5 In certain areas, 
people knowingly venture into- minefields because they are searching for food. 
Civilians take these risks because their alternatives are limited. Refugees, for 
example, can be repatriated to unfamiliar, mined territory and have to make do in 
a hostile environment. Daily subsistence depends on accessing these areas. Even 
where minefields are marked, people still need to enter them to go about these 
type of activities.
Not only do land mines impact most directly on non-combatants but they have an 
impact on society, the economy, and ultimately security.
Medical Educational Trust, "Indiscriminate Weapons: Landmines", London, June 1992; HRW, A 
Deadly Legacy. 126-127 citing figures from Africa Watch and Asia Watch (divisions of Human 
Rights Watch); Eric Stover and Dan Charles, “The Killing Minefields of Cambodia”, New 
Scientist. 19 October 1991, 27.
144 Stover and Charles, 29.
14s!CRC, Background Document. April 1994, 53.
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The rate of return of refugees to their homes is another victim to the hidden 
killers, this time through the uncertainty they cause-an uncertainty which also 
prevents the full use of key resources such as water and agricultural land. Thus, 
some of the most fertile areas of Angola have had to be abandoned, while 27 
percent of Libya's arable land lies unused since the Second World War. Mines 
have contributed to the impoverishment of many third world countries and are a 
serious obstacle to recovery from war, notably in Cambodia.146
When arable land becomes mine infested, it becomes unusable, and hence self­
sufficiency in food production also decreases. This has the ripple effect of 
societies having to depend on outside bodies for food supplies. For example, 
much of the arable land in Angola has been mined and is therefore unsuitable for 
food production. Cambodia actually has to import 200,000 tons of rice as a direct 
result of its decreased production.147 * *In Mozambique, the mining of roads 
interferes with the transport of food relief. Even shepherds and nomadic people 
are having a difficult time, as prime grazing land is mined, placing their already 
scant subsistence in jeopardy.‘48
Mine infestation is taking up precious lands and resources which will be needed 
even more as population demands increase and resources dwindle. David Gowdey
argues:
It is an insane situation where if we do not stop the proliferation of land mines, 
eventually large parts of the world will be uninhabitable. We are creating one of 
the largest, stupidest environmental disasters in the history of mankind, mine by 
mine?49
Mines also interfere with other essential infrastructures; the delivery of water and 
electricity becomes unstable and unreliable, mined roads become unusable, and 
local businesses deteriorate due to lack of supplies. The result is that the price of
146RUSI Newsbrief. Vol. 15, No. 8, August 1995, 63.
147 Masland and Barry, 28 and Reid, 17.
*48UN, "Assistance in Mine Clearance", 5 and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 8.
^Correspondence with David Gowdey.
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goods increases, as does unemployment, and the poor become even poorer. In 
addition, displaced people then congregate in urban areas, overburdening those 
resources and adding to further economic depravation and hardship.150 Land 
mines also present considerable costs to the international community. Not only are 
mine clearance operations extremely expensive and laborious, but the cost in 
international humanitarian aid to heavily mined communities is also enormous.
150Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 8.
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Section 2.3 Threat Comparison
Another important avenue to pursue is placing mines in the same legal and 
ethical category as chemical and biological weapons in order to stigmatize them 
in the public imagination. The use of mines is so common that for those 
unfamiliar with their effects they may not evoke the horrific visions of chemical 
or biological warfare. Were their effects better known, land mines would 
undoubtedly shock the conscience of mankind-the same public reaction that led 
to the banning of chemical and biological weapons.151
To the casual observer, any similarities between the threat represented by chemical 
weapons and land mines might seem unlikely. It would seem almost a David and 
Goliath comparison. In reality, however, the threat these two weapon systems'pose 
to international security and humankind are not dissimilar. In fact, the threat from 
chemical weapons may be overstated while the one for land mines has been 
understated. This section will provide a brief overview of the similarities of and 
differences between these two weapon systems. This is important in 
understanding the true rather than the perceived nature of the threat which these 
weapons pose, both in the humanitarian and security context.
There are far more sophisticated, precise, and damaging weapons systems (smart 
ordnance) available than chemical weapons and land mines.152 The underlying 
technology of both these weapons has remained almost constant for decades. Both 
are used as force multipliers, designed to enhance the effectiveness of other 
weapons systems and strategies. Chemical weapons can delay opposing forces by 
forcing them to don protective gear and later having to decontaminate. Land mines 
can also cause opposing forces to slow their movements, either by making them
151 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 13.
152 While chemical weapons can be replaced by more precise and destructive weapons to achieve 
better results, it would be difficult to replace one of the fundamental uses of land mines; namely to
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proceed with extreme caution through mined areas or avoiding them altogether. 
Chemical weapons and land mines can also threaten the forces which deployed 
them; atmospheric conditions can blow chemical agents back on to their own 
forces. Likewise, troops sometimes have to retreat through the mines they have 
laid. Both weapons are also strictly anti-personnel in nature; they do not destroy 
objects or infrastructure, but are designed specifically to injure or kill human 
beings. The fundamental difference is that special clothing and masks can be worn 
to protect against deadly chemicals, but no amount of clothing can protect victims 
of land mines. Both weapons can contaminate the environment or infrastructure as 
well; but whereas decontamination and protective measures can be taken against 
chemical weapons, land mine pollution is of indefinite duration and no protective 
measures can be taken against a land mine offensive.
Both weapons are also indiscriminate, as they cannot distinguish between
combatants and non-combatants.153 The classification of land mines as
intrinsically indiscriminate, however, is a controversial matter. Those who oppose 
land mines being categorized as indiscriminate weapons point out that it is land 
mine misuse that is indiscriminate rather than the properties of the weapon itself. 
The effects of a chemical weapons dispersal are intentional and therefore 
attributable directly to the weapon itself.
protect borders in conflict areas. Until alternatives are found to protect border areas, militaries may 
remain attached to land mines for this reason.
153 While chemical weapons can be aimed at enemy forces generally, the uncertainty of the 
dispersion techniques, such as varying atmospheric or geographic conditions, could easily 
contaminate more than the target area. In the case of land mines, it is more a case of temporal, 
indiscriminate use. Land mines meant to target soldiers remain in the ground long after the soldiers 
have left, and for years continue to claim victims caught in their wake. Also, minefields are quite 
often unmarked, and both combatants and non-combatants must face their hazards.
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Can both these weapons be considered to be excessively injurious and the source
of unnecessary suffering, and therefore be classified as inhumane? As SIPRI
points out:
The term humane is applied to weapons, not to the context or outcome of their 
use, despite the fact that the weapons under consideration—generally irritant or 
incapacitant weapons—can usually be used with humane or inhumane results, 
according to what other weapons are used in follow-up, how they are used, the 
temper of the conflict, and so on.154 155
It is with some irony that the treaty restricting the use of land mines is entitled the
“Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects”. This misleading and capricious title belies the fact that
military planners have been extremely reluctant to classify land mines as
excessively injurious or indiscriminate, and therefore an inhumane weapon. In
contrast, chemical weapons for the most part have always been perceived as
inhumane unless it was expedient or convenient not to do so. The effects of
chemical weapons on a human being are horrendous but some observers would
say they are not the worst imaginable. Anthony Cordesman offers the following
insight on the effects of both chemical and conventional weapons.
To begin with, it is important to understand that regardless of how horrifying 
chemical weapons may seem to those who have never engaged in war, the more 
effective chemical weapons are far more merciful than untreated or badly treated 
fragmentation and body cavity wounds from small anms....Cavity wounds are 
usually slow, hideous killers.‘55
154 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological 
Warfare. Vol. V, The Prevention of CBW, (Almqvist & Wiksell: Stockholm, 1971), 135.
155 Anthony Cordesman, op. cit., in Roberts, (ed.), (1994), 35.
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Land mines elicited calls for prohibitions only when civilians began to fall victim 
to these weapons on a massive scale; previously, soldiers had to take their chances 
with these weapons. The special odium attached to chemical weapons originated 
with a military dislike of these weapons. Had land mines been the subject of such
militaiy disfavour, it might have been easier to classify them as inhumane
weapons. Part of the reason for the military dislike of chemical weapons was their
utility as a psychological or terror weapon. The fact that chemical weapons are an
unseen and silent killer that cannot be faced squarely makes them insidious and
treacherous; the fear of a chemical attack can be very debilitating psychologically
to both combatants and civilians. On the surface, it would not appear that land
mines are an instrument of psychological warfare. When one looks beneath the
surface, however (both figuratively and literally), the fear of not knowing whether
one’s next step will be on to a land mine, and therefore one’s last, can instil
psychological terror as well. David Hackworth points out that:
Even soldiers who escape from a minefield unscathed are haunted by the 
experience. Many cases of posttraumatic stress disorder, a serious psychological 
malady, were caused by the preying fear of mines and booby traps. Years later, a 
walk across an open field brings back the old dread: What’s under those leaves?
Do I dare put my foot on that freshly turned earth? Walk through a minefield, 
and you’ll never be young again.156
In terms of frequency of use and perceived utility, there are some substantial 
differences between these two weapon systems. With the exception of the First 
World War, and more recently but to a lesser degree the Iran-Iraq War, chemical 
weapons have been used very rarely in any conflicts. When they have been 
utilized, it usually has been against those who could not defend themselves or 
retaliate in kind. In contrast, land mines have been used with much more
156 David Hackworth, “One Weapon We Don’t Need”, Newsweek, April 8, 1996, 29.
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frequency and intensity, and have emerged as the weapon of choice in numerous 
low-intensity conflicts around the world. As noted earlier, mines are a cheap and 
plentiful weapon, and have been used as a terror weapon against civilians in many 
of these conflicts. Chemical weapons are considered strategic weapons, yet have
been used very rarely in that context. Most of the major powers held on to
chemical weapons stockpiles for deterrent purposes, but ultimately concluded that 
they were obsolete157 as a method of warfare, and that more advanced weapons
were at their disposal to achieve their security goals. Land mines, on the other 
hand, were never considered to be a strategic weapon system. They will not alter 
the balance of power or decide the outcome of a war. To date, chemical weapons 
have not altered strategic stability, either. What is perhaps erroneous in these 
perceptions is the notion of what constitutes security. Kenneth Anderson argues
that:
International wars have rarely (if ever) been caused by landmines, and so anti­
personnel landmines have not received attention from the “security” as 
distinguished from the “humanitarian” perspective. The fact that the international 
community is now willing to intervene in places like Somalia, where no small 
part of the breakdown of society and starvation is due to such “non-destabilizing 
weapons” as small arms and landmines should cause the international community 
to rethink weapons and stability.158
Simply because security definitions are changing does not necessarily mean that 
land mines should be reclassified as a strategic weapon or a weapon of mass 
destruction. Perhaps chemical weapons should be downgraded from its status as a
157There are some members within the military establishment who would argue that chemical 
weapons do retain some military utility as a force multiplier; during an offensive manoeuvre, 
chemical weapons could be used to slow down and confuse the forces of the opposition. The 
likelihood of these weapons ever being used for these purposes is remote if not nil, as the first use 
of chemical weapons is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. There is also a tremendous 
stigma against the use of these weapons. Therefore, if a weapon is unlikely to ever be used, and 
has no deterrent effect, it becomes obsolete as a method of warfare.
158Kenneth Anderson, “Overview of the Problem of Anti-Personnel Mines”, in ICRC, Montreux 
Symposium. 14.
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weapon of mass destruction, but is unlikely that such a perceptual change will 
occur in the near future. A more accurate description of land mines is a “theater­
wide weapon of mass civilian destruction”. Land mines are not a strategic
weapon, but they are destabilizing to security in the widest sense.
Both weapons seem more of a threat in Third World regions than in developed 
ones. Although in terms of weapons categorization land mines and chemical 
weapons are on the opposite ends of various continuums, they both hold a certain 
promise to weaker states and other actors. Chemical weapons are often labelled 
“the poor man’s nuclear weapon” and land mines have been called “the weapon of 
the weak”. While the military utility of chemical weapons has been downgraded 
by the major powers, weaker states seek to acquire them as the next best thing to 
nuclear weapons. Similarly, while there are numerous sophisticated conventional 
weapons available, land mines have become the cheaper, alternative weapons 
system in numerous low- intensity conflicts. If one can draw the analogy that 
chemical weapons are a step down from extremely destructive and efficient 
strategic weapons like nuclear weapons, then the same standard of reasoning could 
be applied to land mines and more advanced conventional weapons. Jim Wurst
describes the role of land mines in the Post-Cold War world:
If the horrific effects of land mines do begin to penetrate the public mind, these 
weapons may become symbols of the cruelty and chaos of the Post-Cold War 
World just as the superpowers’ nuclear arsenals symbolized the Cold War.
Instead of high tech tools of massive death in the hands of the planet’s elite, the 
land mine is available to all and it is user-friendly. And, as always, the victim are 
poor and helpless, picked off by these internal sentries, one by one, and limb by 
limb.159
159 Jim Wurst, “Ten Million Tragedies, One Step at a Time”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, 
July/August 1993, 21.
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Both these weapons can also present a terrorist threat. The Tokyo subway Sarin 
gas attack sent shock-waves throughout the international community. For years, 
there was discussion about the potential threat of a terrorist attack with chemical, 
biological or even nuclear weapons. Tokyo made that threat real, and since that 
time the threat of chemical terrorism has become the new international bogeyman. 
The chemical attack in Tokyo took relatively few casualties in comparison to other 
terrorist incidents. In contrast, while land mines are considered a weapon of 
terror, they generally are not referred to as a terrorist weapon. From a different 
perspective, however, land mines can be considered small bombs which 
indiscriminately claim their victims. As George Reid states, “...it is the blind 
terrorism caused by anti-personnel mines which won’t leave my mind.”160 In the 
traditional way of thinking about and discussing terrorism, these weapons would 
be considered a serious threat. It should be stressed, however, that a terrorist attack 
with chemical weapons could bring even worse destruction, especially against 
unprepared civilian centres.
To date, land mines have proliferated more rapidly, and have been responsible for 
more carnage and destruction than chemical weapons. If chemical weapons were 
responsible for the deaths of 800 people a month and thousands of casualties, their 
threat would be considered extremely dangerous. While chemical weapons were 
responsible for 100,000 deaths and one million injuries during World War I, these 
casualties were on the battlefield; for the most part civilians have not been subject 
to mass casualties and this scale of casualties has not been repeated. The 
fundamental difference between land mines and chemical weapons is that it is the
160 George Reid, “No Halt Sign for Massacres in Slow Motion”, The Scotsman, 18 April 1996, 17.
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potential of what chemical weapons could do that is considered a major threat to 
security, rather than what they have actually done to date. If chemical weapons 
were to be used with ballistic missile technology against major population centres 
in areas of conflict, then they could pose a significant threat to local balances of 
power. This frightening scenario has yet to occur, but with rogue states seeking to 
acquire chemical weapons the possibility looms.
Chemical weapons present more of a threat to urban elites (therefore, the weapon 
is seen as more of a threat) and thus create a more visceral terror. Mine victims are
usually hapless rural inhabitants (and in ‘unimportant’ countries)—removed from
policy imagination and thereby discounted. Therefore, the threat assessment can 
be said to be self-serving. In the present security environment, however, it is the 
collateral damage of land mines that has most affected the stability of particular 
states and their ability to recover from conflict. On balance, the threat from land 
mines is ongoing and devastating while the one from chemical weapons is more 
feared than realized. Both weapons will continue to threaten the weak or the 
unprotected.
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Chapter III
Collective Restraints
A variety of measures are available to states beyond formal arms control treaties 
for curtailing the proliferation of weapons: these include freezes on the 
production, use and transfer of weapons; the renunciation of particular weapons; 
bilateral agreements on weapons reductions or destruction; and non-proliferation 
regimes or supplier cartels that seek to restrict access to the supply of dual-use 
technology or destabilizing weapons. These approaches are more useful when they 
are orchestrated on an international scale, as the diffusion of weaponry is world­
wide and co-operation between states is the most crucial element in making these
restraints effective. Most of these measures rely on informal agreements or 
declarations rather than on rigid treaty obligations. Some of these agreements may 
be problematic as they can be vague, non-verifiable, and unenforceable; merely 
declarative approaches to weapons controls are rarely substantial enough. 
Nonetheless, these approaches have the political and practical advantage of 
allowing states to expedite the co-operative process rather than being slowed down 
by formal agreements that are often difficult to negotiate and even harder to 
obtain. This chapter will examine the variety of options available to states in 
restraining weapons or technology, or both, short of adopting a multilateral treaty 
completely prohibiting them.
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Section 3.1-Supplier Control Regimes
Supplier cartels are designed to monitor and restrict access to the tools and means 
that may produce undesirable weapons. Problems of cheating and verification can
make a specific weapon by itself very difficult to control; it is notoriously difficult 
to keep track of light or small weapons such as land mines, let alone control access 
to them. Dual-use technology; that is, technology with both civil and military 
applications, can also complicate non-proliferation efforts. 1 As technology has 
also been diffused in an interdependent world, it can be very difficult to control. 
The major problem that supplier cartels and export control mechanisms seek to 
address is how to prevent sensitive technology from falling into the hands of 
irresponsible or rogue states without infringing upon opportunities for free trade 
and technological development. This also creates an uneasy balance between 
security concerns and economic development. Controls of this nature may impede 
the supply of these weapons in the short term, but they cannot effectively limit the
demand for them.
Whether party to a “mullilateral arrangement or not, most states do have some 
system of export controls in place, and in more recent years have sought to revamp 
them.2 Supplier cartels rely upon national export controls for implementation.
' The agents used to make chemical weapons are a classic case of dual-use technology. Some 
chemicals having legitimate functions for industry can also be used to make weapons, either alone 
or in combination with other agents. In contrast, land mines only have a singular use; they are a 
complete weapon in their own right.
2For a detailed discussion of various countries’ export control policies please see the following: Ian 
Anthony, (ed.). Arms Export Regulation. (London: Oxford University Press, 1991); SIPRJ 
Yearbook 1993. World Armaments and Disarmament, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
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Multilateral controls will not work without domestic support, and unilateral
controls by themselves are hardly enough. Weak export controls can facilitate
easier access to various technologies and weapons for rogue states or other actors
determined to acquire them. But even strong export controls can be ineffective
against proliferation if there is no form of co-ordination with other supplier states.
In other words, the spectre of the arms dealer becomes all too real. If country A
cannot sell arms to country B, then country C definitely will. There may also be
disagreement among certain states as to which states should or should not benefit
from the export of a particular technology or weapon. For example:
While the Allied governments agree in principle on maintaining national security 
controls, most have disagreed with elements of U.S. policy. Most have preferred 
less extensive national security and have opposed the use of export controls for 
foreign policy purposes. The extraterritorial application of U.S. controls—the 
extension of U.S. controls to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms and foreign firms 
that use U.S. technology—has also been a divisive issue between the United 
States and its allies?
What is in the national security interest of one state may not be in the interest of 
another. Therefore, supplier cartels, or control regimes, are important to non­
proliferation efforts as they seek to find a common ground in co-ordinating 
weapon control policies.
A variety of export control regimes are available to restrict the diffusion of 
technology and weapons. Although this study is concerned with the regimes 
pertaining to chemical weapons and land mines, a brief look at some of the other
For a look at the policies of the European Union countries, see the SAFERWORLD Report, 
Regulating Arms Exports: A Programme for the European Community. September 1991. For a 
discussion of the various policies relating to export controls on particular countries, see Hans G. 
Brauch, H. J. Van Der Graaf, John Grin and Wim A. Smit (eds.), Controlling the Development 
and Spread of Military Technology (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992), Chapters 16, 18, 19. 
For a discussion of U.S. export controls see Glennon Harrison and George Holliday, "Export 
Controls", CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, updated April 30, 1993, Washington.
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supplier regimes is in order. The oldest and most well known multilateral export 
control supply regime was the Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls, or COCOM as it was more commonly known.3 4 COCOM was 
established in 1949 at the commencement of the Cold War “...principally in order
to prevent and/or delay the acquisition of militarily relevant Western technology 
by the communist states.”5 The COCOM regime was based upon common or 
international control lists on particular items.6 All members pledged to co-operate 
with each other regarding common criteria for export controls, and any exceptions 
to these controls had to be approved by the unanimous decision of all its
members.7
With the end of the Cold War and an altered international security environment, 
the very raison d’etre of COCOM was called into question. It is widely believed 
that the successor regime, “The Wassenaar Arrangement”, (originally the “New 
Forum”) will shift the focus from a traditional East-West context to what is
3Harrison and Holliday, 2.
4 COCOM was technically dissolved in March of 1994, and it was thought that the new group, 
initially called the "New Forum" and now “The Wassenaar Arrangement” would be operational by 
October 1994, then January 1995; implementation is now set to begin in 1996. Until the new 
organization is up and running, most states are still operating under the old COCOM controls 
during the interim period. See Paul Eavis and Oliver Sprague, "Conventional Weapons 
Proliferation and Control", in Deltac Limited and Saferworld, Proliferation and Export Controls. An 
Analysis of Sensitive Technologies and Countries of Concern, (Great Britain: Deltac/Saferworld, 
1995), 92-93 and Sarah Walkling, "Post COCOM 'Wassenaar Arrangement' Set to Begin New 
Export Control Role", Arms Control Today, December 1995/January 1996, 24.
5Peter Van Ham, Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s Power, Politics, and Policies. 
The Royal Institute for International Affairs, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 
1994), 3-4.
6 These control lists were divided into three separate categories: The International Industrial List
covered commodities or data, which have both civilian and military applications; the International 
Atomic Energy List controlled the sale of items related to atomic energy; and the International 
Munitions List controlled items which only have military application. See Ian Anthony, “The Co­
ordinating Committee on Export Controls”, in Anthony, (ed.), op. cit., 209. The Industrial List was 
updated quite frequently due to the ever changing nature of technology. See Paul Rusman, "A 
Conventional Arms Transfer Regime in the EC", in Brauch, et al., 272.
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perceived as more relevant in supply regimes—a North-South focus. The
successor to COCOM must operate in an environment where technology and 
knowledge are no longer the privilege of only a few states. Moreover, the 
members of the regime are no longer as united as they once were against a
common enemy.
At the final COCOM meeting, it was agreed that the New Forum would focus on 
conventional arms and equipment and related dual-use goods, and would 
complement the other existing supplier regimes that aim to limit the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction and missiles (MTCR, NSG, Australia Group). 
Moreover, it was becoming clear that the New Forum would have two main 
pillars: one dealing with dual technologies relating to advanced conventional 
arms, and the others concerned with the exports of conventional arms and 
military equipment7 8 9
Like COCOM, the Wassenaar Arrangement will still contain "two COCOM era 
control schedules: the international industrial list of civilian use technology and 
the industrial military list of conventional weapons and dual-use technology.^ 
Although the structures of these lists will remain similar it is likely they will be 
revised and shortened. The Wassenaar Arrangement will be much less stringent
than COCOM. In the Post-Cold War world there must be a balance between
proliferation concerns and the right of access to technology. According to Lynn 
Davis, the U.S. Under-Secretary of State, this new regime “would not attempt to 
match the old, ideologically driven mechanism for stopping Western exports to a 
clearly delineated bloc of Communist States. It isn't going to be that good.”10
7As COCOM operated by consensus, one member would be able to block a transfer or sale, using a 
‘de facto veto’. See Anthony, (ed,), op. cit., 209.
8Owen Greene, Developing an Effective Successor to COCOM. Saferworld Briefing, September 
1995, 7.
9 Sarah Walkling, “Russia Ready to Join New Post-COCOM Organization”, Arms Control Today, 
September 1995, 31.
‘°R, Jeffrey Smith, “Military Export Controls Will be Loosened”, International Herald Tribune, 21 
September 1995, 10.
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An increasing security concern in the Post-Cold War world is that the most 
destructive weapons are proliferating at high rates, especially in areas of high 
tension or conflict where certain states may not hesitate to use these weapons. 
Politically, however, it is a sensitive issue to actually name a proscribed state in 
the controls, as there may be fears of a terrorist backlash or of losing future trading 
or even political partners. A compromise solution may be found in singling out 
regions of concern instead.11 2 13In effect, states could still single out specific states 
without doing so officially. Unlike COCOM rules which provide a right of veto, 
member states can no longer intervene in the export or sales decision of another 
member state. The issue of advanced notification of an impending sale has 
remained a sticking point for the Group*3 A compromise solution was found in 
requiring notification of a sale 30-60 days after the licence has been granted to a
non-member if the transfer had been denied by another member in the past three
14years.
This Wassenaar Arrangement will be more inclusive and less restrictive than the 
old COCOM regime. It addresses relevant non-proliferation issues in the Post­
Cold War security environment and seeks to fill the gaps between other supplier 
control regimes. The fact that the Wassenaar Arrangement has no mandatory 
controls may weaken its implementation and hence its effectiveness. More
" See Walkling, op. cit., (September 1995). 31-33. At the December 1995 meeting of the 
Wassenaar Arrangement it was agreed that specific states would not be targeted but the regime 
would “...work to prevent destabilizing accumulations of conventional weapons and transfer of 
arms and sensitive technologies ‘for military ‘end-uses’ in so-called ‘rogue states’. See Walkling, 
op. cit., December/January 1996,24.
l2Walkling, op. cit., September 1995, 31.
13Walkling, op. cit., Dec/Jan 1996, 24
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pointedly, an important supplier such as China remains outside the regime. Until
all the major suppliers are in sync, the regime will have considerable weaknesses. 
But this regime still serves as a useful mechanism for curtailing the weapons trade.
»
After COCOM, the next oldest of the supplier groups is the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group, (NSG). The NSG was established by a group of countries who came
together in 1976 to establish “common guidelines about regulating and ‘exercising 
restraint’ in the export of sensitive reprocessing, enrichment and heavy water 
production facilities.”14 5 This was in response to the realization that there were 
many loopholes allowing for the diversion of nuclear materials in the nuclear non­
proliferation regime.16 17The Guidelines seek to prevent any export of nuclear 
material from being used or diverted for weapons use?5 The Guidelines were 
rather vague, and implementation was considered lacklustre by some of the 
members. The Guidelines were not updated until April of 1992 when the 
Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines Part II on the transfers of nuclear dual-use 
equipment, material, related technology and a list detailing 65 dual-use items were
14 Previously, the Russian government had held out for the notification of regime members 30-60 
days after the item in question had been shipped. See Sarah Walkling, “Wassenaar Members 
Resolve Most Differences During July Plenary”, Arms Control Today. July 1996,23.
15 The founding members of the NSG were the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet 
Union, Japan, Canada, West Germany, and France. Owen Greene, Successor to COCOM Regime: 
Options and Dilemmas, Saferworld Briefing, March 1994, 4.
16 The explosion of a nuclear device by India in 1974 was a wake-up call announcing that the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime was not as strong as it should be. IAEA safeguards "applied only 
to exported materials and equipment and not to all nuclear activities of recipient countries". See 
Van Ham, op. cit., 15.
17 The guidelines advocate restraint in any transfer of facilities or technology that could be diverted 
for uranium enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production; the protection of nuclear 
materials and facilities; restrictions on the retransfer of exported items; and finally acceptance of 
the Zangger Committee Control List. See Roland Timerbaev and Lisa Moskowitz, (comps.), 
Monterey Institute for International Studies, Inventory of International Non-Proliferation 
Organizations and Regimes. Program for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1994 ed., 12. The Zangger 
Committee Control List was a “trigger list” of special fissionable materials and equipment designed 
for the processing, use, and production of fissionable materials that are subject to IAEA safeguards.
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introduced.18 9 Members also pledged to export materials and facilities under full 
IAEA safeguards.20
The Missile Technology Control Regime (The MTCR) was established in 1987 in 
response to the proliferation of missile production. The MTCR was meant to 
enhance current nuclear non-proliferation policy “...by controlling transfers that
could make a contribution of nuclear weapons deliveries other than manned 
aircraft.”21 It was also hoped that the regime would discourage the proliferation of 
delivery systems for other Weapons of Mass Destruction such as chemical 
weapons. Not only were states in volatile regions seeking to acquire chemical 
weapons but they also were pursuing the missile technology to deliver them. The 
MTCR has established a set of export control guidelines which operate according 
to two separate categories of common control lists.22 Because the MTCR is an 
informal agreement, it has no enforcement or verification provisions. A state must 
persuade another state to drop a sale through diplomacy, or impose unilateral 
sanctions if the response is negative.23
18 Greene, op. cit., March 1994, 4.
19 Timerbaev and Moskowitz, 12.
20 Ibid.
21 Robert Shuey, “Assessment of the Missile Technology Control Regime”, in Brauch, et al.
22 Category I includes materials used specifically for developing and producing missiles and sub­
components. Category II materials are basically dual-use components which may have civilian 
applications or be applied to burgeoning space programmes.
23For example, a major dispute between Russia and the United States erupted over the former's 
proposed sale in 1992 of rocket stage technology to India. The Clinton administration was able to 
secure a partial cancellation of the sale. The Russians claimed the sale would be for peaceful 
purposes, but the Americans saw the motivations of India as more sinister. The U.S. in turn 
imposed sanctions to include a two-year ban on imports and exports on U.S. government contracts 
with Glavkosmos and ISRO. In 1993, in talks between the two parties, the U.S. threatened 
additional sanctions not only against the two aforementioned Russian companies but other Russian 
firms as well. By July of 1993, however, compromise had been found. Under a Memorandum of 
Understanding on missile technology, the Russians were permitted to deliver the rocket stage, but 
restrictions were placed on the accompanying transfer of production facilities and technology so 
that India could not easily reproduce the rocket stage. In return, the U.S. dropped sanctions and 
Russia agreed to abide by the terms of the MTCR. See Charles Peterson, “Moscow, Washington,
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All these supplier groups are important to non-proliferation efforts and they are
meant to fill any gaps in the proliferation pathways so that destructive weapons or 
component technologies do not fall into the wrong hands. Although they all are a
product of international co-operation, they rely upon national laws and controls
for implementation; the tenacity of enforcement or even application can vary from
state to state. Economic and security interests are not always compatible between
states, and as Peter Van Ham argues:
The somewhat hazy nature of many non-proliferation agreements indicates that 
Western supplier cartels already find it very difficult to agree upon a control list 
which is acceptable to all states concerned. Intensive bargaining takes place 
during the regular revisions of the control lists, since this has obviously has 
significant consequences for the export opportunities of the members’ high- 
technology and defence related indusrries.24
If important suppliers are left outside the regimes, then would-be proliferants can 
always go to other suppliers. There may be cries of discrimination from states left 
outside these regimes that they are being denied access to economic development. 
Most important, regimes cannot eliminate these weapons, or the technologies to 
make them—they can only impede their acquisition. These inherent difficulties 
notwithstanding, supplier regimes reflect a commonality of purpose among states 
professing common non-proliferation goals.
and the Missile Technology Control Regime”, Contemporary Security Policy. Vol. 16, No. 2, 
August 1995, for a detailed description of U.S. and Russian interpretations of the MTCR,
24Van Ham, 41.
88
Section 3.1.1-The Australia Group
The chemical industry is very extensive which makes it difficult to monitor the 
diversion of chemical agents to chemical weapons production. In addition, many 
technologies used for making chemical weapons are substitutable. If one specific
component is banned, then with appropriate technical knowledge, it can be 
replaced by another agent.25 Many Western nations had supplied the equipment 
and materials to build chemical weapons facilities in today’s areas of concern; 
this occurred through a combination of sloppy export controls, connivance, and 
clandestine means?2 The use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War in the 
mid-1980s raised additional security concerns about the proliferation of these 
weapons. In 1985, negotiations on the projected CWC appeared hopelessly bogged
“For example, thionyl chloride is used as a chlorinating agent in making methylphosphonyl 
dichloride, which is necessary for nerve gas. It can be replaced by phosgene or sulphuryl chloride, 
which are not on control lists. See J. P. Robinson, "The supply side control of the spread of 
chemical weapons" in Jean Francois Rioux (ed.), Limiting the Proliferation of Weapons. (Ottawa; 
Carleton University Press, 1992), 68. Another example of a substitutable chemical agent is the 
nerve gas tabun, which is composed of four major chemicals: sodium cyanide, ethanol, 
dimethylamine and phosphorous oxychloride. Further complicating matters, these agents are also 
produced by numerous other countries outside the control regimes. Only dimethylamine and 
phosphorous oxychloride are under international controls and both are also used in many legitimate 
chemical industry processes. As a result, these chemical can be imported separately for legitimate 
reasons and then diverted for illicit use. See Kathleen Bailey, "Problems with a Chemical Weapons 
Ban" in Orbis. Spring 1992, 239-240.
i6Some examples of Western aid in chemical weapons development are the following: Bayer AG, 
of Germany was the major equipment supplier for an Iranian pesticides plant in 1987-88 and was 
raided by German prosecutors in 1989; Tecnimont of Italy was involved in engineering and 
construction work at the Iranian Tabriz ethylene base complex. Ethylene has legitimate civilian 
applications but can also be used as a mustard gas precursor; John Brown Engineering in the 
Netherlands was approached by the Iranian government in 1987 to build a phosphorous 
pentasulfide factory but the project was blocked by Dutch government and U.S. government 
pressure; MW Kellog in the United Kingdom was contracted to build a $400 million urea and 
ammonia plant in the Khorasan province in Iran of which the feedstock has direct application to 
chemical weapons manufacturing; the Aldrich corporation in the U.SA. has made several attempts 
to ship chemical weapons precursors such as phosphorous pentachloride to the Atomic Research 
Organization of Iran. These items represent only a fraction of the types of deals and methods in 
which materials, equipment, and knowledge has been diverted to chemical weapons programmes. 
One of the major problems with abating chemical weapons proliferation is trying to discern the 
military applications from the complexities of civilian development. For a complete list, see the
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down and it did not seem that a finalized CWC would be imminent. Accordingly, 
it seemed more practical to pursue a different but complementary avenue to at
least try to decelerate the proliferation of the materials and technology needed to 
make chemical weapons. It was also important for different states to co-ordinate 
their non-proliferation policies, as "one glaring weakness in the early national non­
proliferation efforts was that countries tended to include different chemicals in 
their export control lists."27
In 1985, several supplier states agreed to meet and try to co-ordinate policies, and
under the auspices of the Australian Embassy in Paris, the "Australia Group" was
established. Currently the Australia Group is made up of 28 member states
including most of the Western industrialized states as well as the European Union.
New membership applications are considered on an individual basis. The
purpose of the Australia Group is to reduce the availability of potential dual-use
technology to states that are suspected of pursuing an offensive, clandestine, or
hostile chemical weapons programme.29 To achieve these goals, the Group is :
trying to find the right balance between encouraging technological development
j
and restricting the military applications of such materials and technology through :»
]• • • « ' the harmonization of export control measures. As one of the integral foundations
j
_____ _____________________________________________________ _ !
Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from Middle East Defense News (MedNews), Weapons 
of Mass Destruction, The Cases of Iran, Syria and Libya. Los Angeles: August 1992, 114-129.
27Aspen Strategy Group, New Threats. Responding to the Proliferation of Nuclear. Chemical, and 
Delivery Capabilities in the Third World. (Lanham: University Press of America, 1990), 78.
28Charles Flowerree, Controlling Chemical and Biological Weapons and Arms Control” in Richard
Dean Bums, (ed.), Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament. (New York: Charles 4
Scribner's Sons, 1993), 1014. !
29While all weapons development programmes can be considered hostile, if a state is building up a
weapons production capability clandestinely, and in contravention of international norms, then it is ?
reasonable to assume that it might also use these weapons irresponsibly or offensively. An i
opposing viewpoint would argue that it is discriminatory to deny access to materials that one
already possesses so that another state cannot acquire the same weapons capability. J
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of counter-proliferation is good intelligence, information sharing is crucial to the 
work of the Australia Group. Technical, political, and military intelligence is 
circulated among members, although due to the rather sensitive nature of the 
information involved, details are kept rather quiet.30 Information sharing focuses 
on three main issues: ’*1) the strategic nature of sensitive items; (2) the 
procurement policies of threshold countries; and (3) export policies of supplier 
states."31 32
The Australia Group seeks to restrict access not only to dual-use chemicals but 
also to chemical weapons production equipment and related technology and 
manufacturing facilities, as well as to micro-organisms, toxins and equipment used 
in biological weapons programmes."" From the onset of the Australia Group’s 
activities in 1985 there was a great deal of development and enlargement of the 
lists of chemical agents placed under controls. In 1985 there was only a core list 
of five precursor chemicals agreed upon among the member states. Governments 
were required to place export controls on these particular items. Being developed 
in tandem with the core lists were warning lists of dual-use chemicals and 
chemical weapons equipment which were distributed to industry to alert them to 
any suspicious activities that might be used to make chemical weapons. By 1992, 
the list of export controls had been expanded to 54 chemical precursors.""
30Brauch, et al., 16.
3'Van Ham, 41.
32It was felt that it would be in the best interest of such a supplier regime to include controls which 
prevented the acquisition of biological agents, and thus export controls were also established for 
certain microorganisms, toxins and equipment. For a list of these controls please see ACDA 
Chemical and Biological Weapons Reader. February 1995, 19-24.
33see ACDA Factsheet, “Australia Group”, February 10,1995, 1, for a discussion of the evolution 
of Australia Group’s export control lists. For a list of the actual 54 precursor chemicals and their 
role as chemical weapons agents see ACDA Factsheet. "Australia Group Export Controls on
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Having a dual-track approach to restricting chemical agents was a deliberate and 
expedient tactic. Since it would be very difficult to impose formal controls on all 
these chemical agents, it was thought more crucial and realistic to impose 
mandatory controls on the more dangerous agents first, and then deal with the less 
obvious proliferation pathways in a more co-operative manner. Having agents 
placed on a warning list instead of a core list also seemed more palatable to
countries that were more hesitant in their regulation of their chemical industries. 
As a further precaution, there is always the option of upgrading a warning-list 
chemical to core-list status if it became apparent that the chemical agent in 
question is being used for more illicit activities.34 Once the original lists were 
accepted, there was a move to transfer many items on the warning list to the core 
list to be absolutely sure that all proliferation pathways were covered. In the wake 
of the Gulf War, Australia Group members pledged to enact export licence 
requirements for the original warning list chemicals as well (except for those 
exported to other Australia Group members), effectively making the two lists
The Australia Group has both strengths and weaknesses. Its lack of
institutionalization can be viewed as a lack of cohesiveness and commitment. A -!
I
supplier regime that has no enforcement mechanisms and depends upon the
goodwill and co-operation of the participants for its success is inherently weak.
*
Part of the problem is that the common goals of non-proliferation have to j *
Materials Used in the Manufacture of Chemical and Biological Weapons. Control List of Dual-Use 
Chemicals: Commercial and Military Application", February 10, 1995.
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compete with the realist perspective of a state's self-interest. The state's self­
interest may or may not be in the common interest. Conversely, it can be argued 
that it is the very loose structure of the Australia Group which makes it easier for 
the participants to reach agreement. According to Peter Van Ham, "This 
bargaining process would probably be inhibited by further institutionalization, and 
by converting these rather loosely structured gentlemen's agreements into formal 
treaties."34 * 6 Sometimes more can be accomplished in an informal and less 
pressured environment than in an overly bureaucratic process or structure. 
Although the size of the Australia Group makes it exclusive, it also enables it to 
be more pragmatic. As the Australia Group’s membership is composed of states 
from similar backgrounds, members were able to reach agreements and solve 
disagreements among themselves faster than if there was a larger or more diverse 
membership. Still, if more states have a commonality of policy regarding 
chemical weapons, then it is more likely that the actual supply of weapons 
materials can be reduced. Elisa Harris points out that:
Additional efforts will, however, be required if the export controls maintained by 
countries outside the Australia Group, such as India, are to be harmonized with
• those of the Group. Ultimately, consideration will have to be given to expanding
the actual membership of the Group to include non-OECD members.37
The most obvious criticism of the Australia Group is that it does not prevent 
chemical weapons technology and knowledge from spreading, but merely retards 
its progress. Most governments are willing to acknowledge the limitations of the 
Australia Group on this point, but common sense would dictate that some
34 Robinson, op. cit., in Brauch, et al., 161-162.
33lbid., 164 and Van Ham, 30.
33yan Ham, 41.
37 Elisa Harris, “Towards a Comprehensive Strategy for Halting Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Production Proliferation”, Arms Control, Vol. 12, No. 2, September 1991, 133.
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counter-proliferation measures are better than none at all. For example, the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has stated that:
We believe the Group's efforts have made it more costly and more difficult for 
would-be proliferants to obtain inputs to a CW production capability. 
Continuation and expansion of these efforts hold promise for retarding and 
discouraging CW acquisition until a global CW ban is completed.38
The Australia Group is acknowledged to be an intermediary or stop-gap measure 
and not a permanent solution to the problem of chemical weapons proliferation.
Another problem with the Australia Group is that those states who remain outside 
the regime may have a chemical industry, and can produce their own chemical 
weapons or indeed trade with whomever they choose.39 Would-be proliferants 
have this latitude because the materials and knowledge for building chemical 
weapons are not highly complex as compared to nuclear weapons, for example. 
The technological wherewithal and materials needed to make chemical weapons 
are already wide-spread. No one state or group has a monopoly on the ability to 
manufacture chemical weapons; therefore, a supplier regime may slow 
proliferation pathways, but it cannot contain them.40
38Brauch, et al., 167-168, quoting a reference to ACDA-Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
and Department of State 1990. 'Written responses for the record to questions submitted from the 
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science after a 
hearing on 11 July', Proliferation and Arms Control, 274.
33For example, major producers like China, India, Mexico, Romania, South Africa and South 
Korea are not members of the regimes. See Van Ham, 30. But while certain states are not official 
members, they do show a commitment to co-operative security and to the aims of the Australia 
Group by imposing export controls on chemical and biological agents. Poland, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Israel have all agreed to follow these controls. See Janne 
Nolan, (ed.), Global (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1994), 51. In addition,
the Australia Group does expand its membership, although not much is known about this process. 
For example, Finland and Sweden were granted membership at a December 1991 meeting of the 
Group; at a June 1992 meeting, membership applications were considered from Argentina, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Thus, while there is outside suspicion of the regime, there is 
also outside interest in its work. See SIPRI Yearbook 1993,268-269.
40 The knowledge, technology, and materials to manufacture chemical weapons are easier to obtain 
than nuclear weapons. Moreover, these capabilities are no longer in the hands of the few. In
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A control regime is designed to reduce the opportunities for a determined 
proliferant to gain access to weapons-making materials. This is usually 
accomplished by tightening and monitoring legitimate channels of trade or 
instituting specific trade barriers. It is much more difficult for a control regime to
monitor the illicit trade in chemical weapons materials that circumvent trade
barriers. According to William Webster:
They [proliferating countries] are using front companies, falsification of export 
documents, and multiple transshipment points. We are also finding that 
regulations are being circumvented by ordering material or equipment that is just 
below the export guidelines but which, in the aggregate, would be subject to 
con!^rols.* 41
Information about the weak points in the proliferation chain may be shared among 
members of the Group, but this depends on good intelligence and a high leyel of 
co-operation. Sometimes, a state may even turn a blind eye to it. Member states 
must use their own domestic legislation to punish transgressors, and the tenacity of 
enforcement can vary widely between states.
That the Group exists at all and functions in a fairly harmonized manner, could be 
interpreted as a successful venture in itself. It has succeeded in raising awareness 
of states concerning the number of loopholes found in national export controls. 
And most important, it has shown by its very structure that export controls cannot 
exist in a vacuum if they are to be successful against the proliferation of weapons.
contrast to the COCOM era prohibition on technologies, where the West once enjoyed a monopoly, 
there is no such monopoly on chemical weapons.
4lAs quoted in Elisa Harris, op. cit., 132. The remarks of William Webster, former Director of 
Central Intelligence are taken from an address before the World Affairs Council of Boston, 12 
April 1990.
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Unless there is a co-ordinated and co-operative effort among major suppliers,
loopholes will always exist.
Section 3.1.2-Proposed International Land Mine Control Regime
If it comes to fruition, the proposed international control regime currently on the 
table for land mines will be a first of its kind in many ways. As a supplier regime, 
it is unique, as it does not focus on dual-use technology or on weapons 
components. This regime would focus solely on one small weapon in the wider 
conventional weapons trade. For years, there have been proposals for controlling 
conventional weapons, but there has been no concrete action. The exceptions have 
been the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the UN Register of 
Conventional Weapons. The former is a wider part of arms reduction between 
Cold War adversaries and is not part of the conventional arms trade per se. The 
latter is merely a transparency measure with states declaring their major weapons 
holdings. At the time of writing, the Land Mine Control Regime or Programme 
(LCP), had not been officially established, and planning for it still appears to be in 
the embryonic stage. There is also not a great deal of information forthcoming in 
the open sources about this regime. But, it should also be remembered that the 
Australia Group was also slow to develop, enjoyed little publicity, and even today 
is still without formal structures. The purpose of this section is to examine the 
proposed functions of this regime and to assess its relevance and potential.
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The idea of an international control regime for land mines came in response to the 
widening awareness in the early 1990s that the land mine problem had reached 
crisis proportions. It was realized that to prevent the situation from deteriorating 
further, a proactive approach would also have to be taken to restrict access to these
weapons. The main, and at the time the only forum available to accomplish this 
task was the 1981 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).42 43This treaty 
was in the process of revision because in its original form it was wholly 
inadequate to deal with the land mine crisis. The politics of implementing firm 
control mechanisms within treaty boundaries have proved to be very difficult. 
This has been evidenced by the fact that it has taken two extra conferences after 
the supposed final Review Conference to reach agreement. Therefore, it was 
thought to be more practical and expedient to sort out transfer and control issues in 
an alternate forum while the treaty's sticking-points were being resolved.^ This 
proposed control regime would also have very close links with the CCW treaty 
just like the Australia Group has with the CWC. Moreover, if any loopholes or 
weaknesses still remained in the actual treaties, then a control regime would 
supplement the treaty.
42 The full name of the CCW is the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects. The CCW has three protocols; the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices deals specifically with restrictions on the use 
of land mines. Nothing in Protocol II, however, addresses the acquisition and control of land 
mines.
43 While both control regimes are meant to complement treaties, the relationship of the Australia 
Group and the CWC and the proposed Land Mine Control Programme with the CCW are slightly 
different. In the first case, the finished product of a CWC was not a reality, and the prospects for 
its culmination seemed distant. Thus, a control regime was necessary in the absence of any other 
measure. In the case of land mines, the relationship is not as straightforward. Very little faith in the 
CCW perhaps explains the enthusiasm for an outside regime like the LCP.
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The concept of an international control regime was first proposed by U.S.
President Bill Clinton in an address to the 49th Session of the UN General
Assembly on 26 September 1994. In a speech dealing with the problems of peace
and security in the Post-Cold War World, and specifically in the area of non­
proliferation, President Clinton made the following reference to the land mine
crisis and measures to combat it:
And today, I am proposing a first step toward the eventual elimination of a less-
visible, but still deadly threat: the world's 85 million anti-personnel land mines-
one for every fifty people on the face of the Earth. I ask all nations to join with
us and conclude an agreement to reduce the number and availability of those
mines. Ridding the world of those often hidden weapons will help to save the
lives of ten of thousands of men and women and innocent children in the years to 
44come.
Although the language of this statement sounds rather grandiose, President 
Clinton cautiously mentioned his initiative as a ‘first step’ in the elimination of 
land mines. He was pragmatic enough to realize that it would be very difficult 
politically to support a total ban at the time. The Clinton plan for an international 
control regime includes the following elements: 1) Modifying of land mine 
stockpiles so that only a very small percentage are NSD (non self-destructing); 2) 
Limiting the transfers of land mines only to parties that have signed up to the 
obligations of the CCW; 3) Prohibiting transfers of anti-personnel mines to states 
who have provided anti-personnel mines to ineligible parties and; 4) Prohibiting 
exports of NSD mines.44 5 In addition, "The proposed control regime would also 
prohibit the production, stockpiling, and export of any mine that is illegal to use
44See William J. Clinton, Address to the 49th Session of the UNGA, United Nations, New York, 
September 26, 1994, as reproduced in The United States Mission to the United Nations Press 
Release, USUN 124-(94), 5.
45Sarah Walkling, “Clinton, at UN, Proposes New Land Mine Initiative”, in Arms Control Today, 
November 1994, Vol. 24, No. 9, 30. See also Financial Times, 24 January 1995, and U.S. 
Department of State (DOS) Dispatch, “U.S. Policy on a Landmine Control Regime”, September 
26, 1994, Factsheet. October 10, 1994.
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under the CCW"46 This would of course depend on very careful wording of 
Protocol II to the CCW, where more often than not, a particular type of mine is
merely restricted (not banned outright) or is allowed to be used under particular
circumstances.
Ironing out and implementing such a regime has taken longer than expected. 
Reports on the progress towards this regime since President Clinton's speech have 
been very sketchy. At a meeting of 22 states organized to discuss the successor 
regime of the now defunct multilateral export control regime, COCOM, it was 
reported that these same states had reached a tentative agreement to ban the
international sale of land mines.47 At the 40th Annual Session of the North
Atlantic Assembly held in Washington in November of 1994, Resolution 249 on 
"Land Mine Eradication Measures" was adopted. Resolution 249 states that the 
NAA Assembly is:
Convinced that this enormous and pressing humanitarian problem can only 
approach resolution by establishing an effective internationally agreed control 
regime that places strict limitations on the design, production, use and transfer of 
all land mines and other such ordnance,...[and that member states of the NAA 
should] support energetically the Clinton administrations’ proposal for a new 
International Land Mine Control Regime as a matter of priority"48
The only major international meeting dedicated specifically to this proposed 
regime was held in Budapest, 29-30 June 1995 at the initiative of the United 
States and the United Kingdom. Thirty-one states were represented at this 
meeting. Participants met to discuss proposals for a land mine control 
regime/programme, based upon President Clinton's initiative at the UN and the
46Ibid., and U.S. Department of State Dispatch, "U.S. Initiatives for Demining and LandMine 
Control", Factsheet, February 6, 1995.
Financial Times, 17 November 1994.
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British Government's Code of Conduct proposal introduced at the August 1994 
Preparatory Conference of the CCW.48 9 The participants concluded that controls 
on the export of mines was an urgent matter and that at some future point, 
production and stockpiling issues would also have to be included in the controls. 
While it is important that a large number of states did attend this conference, 
China, a major supplier, did not.50 51A control regime with the participation of the 
major states heightens its validity, but its ultimate success depends on the 
participation of all the major suppliers. It has been reported that another meeting 
will be convened this year?1 Sources, however, at the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency have reported that the Landmine Control Programme has 
been held in abeyance so that its work would not interfere with the CCW review 
process, and so that the outcome of that review could be taken into consideration. 
Since the review process was completed in May of 1996, it remains unclear how 
land mine control issues will proceed in the future, either through the LCP, the 
CCW, or the Conference on Disarmament??
Why have land mine control issues been hijacked from a treaty forum to a control 
regime? The answer lies in a variety of motivations. A realist would argue that the 
CCW, already acknowledged to be weak, will still contain significant loopholes 
even in a revamped state, and thus in the practical world it is better to have a
48See "Resolution 249, Land Mine Eradication Measures", Policy Recommendations. North 
Atlantic Assembly (NAA) 40th Annual Session, Washington: D.C. November 1994, 8.
49FCO, Land Mine Control Programme, 1 and 4. The British Code of Conduct was introduced at 
the August 1994 Group of Experts Meeting in Preparation for the Review of the CCW. The Code 
of Conduct was designed as a guide to how states should responsibly conduct their exports of 
mines and was meant to be 'politically, rather than legally, binding'.
50Tom Masland and John Barry, “Buried Terror”, Newsweek. April 8, 1996,24.
51ibid.
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back-up or complementary regime. Another motivation for separating control 
issues from treaty boundaries lies in the fact that many states were reluctant to
debate or include arms control and disarmament issues in what was generally 
thought to be a humanitarian forum. It could also be argued that it is often very 
difficult for states to consent to treaties which include too many obligations. As a
result:
...[T]he U.S. is working separately to draw makers and users of mines into a 
more vigorous code of conduct. The reason Washington gives for thus bypassing 
the UN is more tactical: if all the most far-reaching proposals on land mines are 
built into a UN Convention, then many countries will refuse to sign it and be left 
outside all regulation.* 53
If some states are unwilling to make commitments at the present time, then it
might be more practical to place the real controls in another forum, so that more
states would feel comfortable and thus be willing to ratify the convention.54 The
tenuous review process of the CCW has illustrated that it is extremely difficult to
get states to agree to firm controls. Peter Herby of the ICRC in Geneva has
speculated that perhaps there was not sufficient political will to include tough
export controls in the treaty as it could cause problems for adherence. While an
extra-treaty export control regime might be a more practical option, politically it
might also not be very wise.55 If the treaty is to be seriously reviewed, but at the
1
same time certain states wish to keep specific issues outside it, the integrity and
validity of the treaty itself is placed in question. i
I1
“information supplied by Kate Rodriguez of the Bureau of Intelligence, Verification and
Information Management, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. i
53Financial Times, 24 Januaryl995. !
54 It could also be argued that states which object to particular issues being addressed in the treaty
would also object to them in a control regime. While this may be true, at least some action can be j
taken by the states which are in agreement, and therefore they can make a contribution towards -
reducing the supply of these weapons. Some progress on this matter is better than none at all. I
“interview with Peter Herby of the ICRC. ;
I
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Another motivation for establishing a separate control regime may be political.
This viewpoint is rather sardonically expressed by David Gowdey, former
Demining Consultant to the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs:
Transfers relate to the proposed international control regime only because the 
U.S. wants it to. Transfers could easily be addressed in the treaty, but that would 
give the French credit and the U.S. none. Since this is a major political issue for 
the U.S., they want to propose something to take over from the Moratorium that 
will have the U.S. stamp on it-hence this proposed regime. Of course U.S. 
manufacturers want to ban the export of mines other than their own, but I doubt 
this will happen. If the regime is to be a success it will have to find a common 
ground. If the treaty is a big success, the French and the EU get the credit. If 
Uncle Sam stops the scourge of land mines with U.S. proposed instruments,
Uncle Sam gets the credit. Much of this is about face, and who gets the 
international good guy awards. That's the way the system works in these types of 
situations.56
One of the fundamental questions or criticisms of this regime, is the issue of 
common ground. At the moment, this proposed regime is seeking to ban non-self- 
destructing (NSD) or what is commonly known as “dumb” mines. The reasoning 
for targeting these mines in the control regime and in the treaty certainly has merit. 
These type of mines remain in the ground for years until disturbed, causing 
casualties long after the conflict has ended. They are also the simplest and 
cheapest type of mines to produce. On the surface, this type of regime would 
appear discriminatory as the more advanced producers of mines are allowed to 
export at will while poorer countries must endure limits on mines more useful and
common to them. Moreover:
Other critics say the ban on NSD mines will not stop the indiscriminate killing 
because the new regime could actually increase the demand for self-deactivating 
(SD) landmines. They say if on/y the U.S. and other developed countries
56Written communication with David Gowdey. When he is referring to the French taking credit, he 
is referring to the fact that the French government was the first to call for a Review Conference of 
the CCW. In addition, at the Group of Governmental Experts Meeting in Preparation for the 
Review Conference of the CCW that took place over several sessions in 1994 and early 1995, the 
U.S. qualified only for observer status as it had never ratified the Convention. But the United 
States ratified the CCW shortly before the Vienna Review Conference in September 1995, giving 
the U.S. delegation full voting rights at the Review Conference.
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produce, and sell the more expensive SD land mines, developing states will have 
little incentive to support any limits on any type of land mine.57 58
The type of controls in this regime as it is envisaged now would seem to
encourage the horizontal proliferation of these weapons. The restrictions do not
apply merely to certain parties but rather against certain types of mines. In the case
of land mines, the more advanced, industrialized states are placing limits on land
mines, but only upon a certain type, allowing much more leverage in the use of
high technology mines which are not as commonplace for poorer states. According
to Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt), the main proponent of the U.S. Land Mine
Moratorium legislation, “I am skeptical that an elaborate system of rules, which
CO
permits some kinds of mines but not others, can work in the real world.” So
although the humanitarian reasoning for restricting those particular mine types is
valid, it is also discriminatory and hence problematic.
Besides the issues of discrimination and legitimizing one type of mine over
another, the more practical problem of finance may inhibit this control regime
“because self-destructing mines are much more expensive than long-life ones,
[and] developing countries have argued that they cannot enter the U.S. proposed
system unless rich countries help them.”59 As the majority of mines stockpiled by
poorer states are NSD, there is little incentive for them to incur the expense of
]
refurbishing a weapon system. If these states are truly persuaded by the
humanitarian argument, then there still is the practical problem of finance. In the
START agreement concluded between the United States and Russia, the United
I
57Walkling, op. cit., (November 1994), 30. J
58Senator Patrick Leahy as quoted in Walkling, op. cit., (November 1994), 30.
59Financial Times, 24 January 1995.
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States has agreed to make funds available for the destruction costs of nuclear 
weapons material. If financial incentives are not offered, then it is very difficult to 
put another state to the test in terms of its commitment to non-proliferation in any 
form. A state may plausibly claim that while in spirit they are willing to disarm, 
owing to the lack of finance they cannot. If practical incentives are offered to
them, then the excuse list is much more limited.
Finally, allowing exports to be delivered to states parties while prohibiting exports 
to states which are deemed ineligible parties also presents technical problems. 
First of all, what happens when a state party uses mines illegally or transfers them 
to an ineligible party? A fundamental problem with arms sales is that today's 
friend is tomorrow's enemy. Perhaps the biggest problem with these proposed 
controls is how to actually verify them, and more important, how will they, or 
even how can they, be enforced? Land mines are so compact that they do not 
need a large production or storage infrastructure. In addition, the technology to 
produce land mines is very simple and can easily be reproduced. Thus, 
verification of any controls may prove difficult, especially if parties remain 
outside the control regime.
Section 3.2-National and International Moratoria
Initially, under the sponsorship of Senator Leahy, the Landmine Moratorium Act 
was introduced in the U.S. Senate in July 1992 and was subsequently included in
the FY93 Defense Authorization Bill which became law in October 1992. The 
Bill states that U.S. manufacturers cannot sell, export, or transfer abroad any anti­
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personnel mines for a period of one year. This legislation also encouraged the 
government to lead the international community by example, in promoting the
land mine moratorium on the international scale, or to seek modification to the 
existing Protocol II of CCW Convention.60 In 1993 this moratorium was extended 
for a further three years.61
In addition, Senator Leahy and Representative Lane Evans introduced legislation 
in Congress in June 1995 designed to implement a one year moratorium on the use
of land mines, and convince other countries to take similar action. Senate
legislation S.940, "Landmine Use Moratorium Act" and H.R. 1876, calls for the 
President to fully support modifications at the CCW Review Conference; three 
years after the Bill becomes law, the U.S. military would stop using land mines 
for a period of one year except along internationally-recognized borders which are 
marked and monitored.62 During this time period, the President should also be 
encouraging other states to do the same. If this action were to be successful, then 
the moratorium could be extended for several more years. Finally, S.940 would 
also prohibit the export of these land mines to other countries if they were not 
following the limited-use guidelines.63 As Senator Leahy argues, “rather than 
encouraging the widespread use of self-destruct mines, S.940 seeks to severely 
limit the use of all anti-personnel mines, thus moving unambiguously toward a
60See Senator Patrick Leahy, "Landmine Moratorium: A Strategy for Stronger International Limits", 
Arms Control Today, Jan/Feb 1993, 11.
61 In February of 1996, President Bill Clinton signed into law a bill extending the moratorium on the
export and sale of AP mines for a further year.
“President Bill Clinton signed in January 1996 an amendment to the Foreign Operations 
Appropriations Act which stated that starting in 1999, and initially for a one year period, it will be 
forbidden to use land mines except in demilitarized zones and borders. It was also reported that 
the Defense Department opposed the amendment and were unsure of how the amendment would
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complete international ban.”" By instituting a moratorium on the use of land mines
in addition to their export, the United States hoped to provide a normative
precedent and lead by example.
In keeping with the spirit of its national land mine moratorium legislation, the
United States was also the sponsor of the international land mine moratorium 
legislation placed before the United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 
48/75K, requesting that member states introduce moratoria on the export of anti­
personnel mines, was adopted unanimously on 16 December 1993. Resolution 
48/75/K states that the UN General Assembly is:
Convinced that a moratorium by States exporting anti-personnel mines that pose 
grave dangers to civilian populations would reduce substantially the human and 
economic costs resulting from the use of such devices and would complement the 
aforementioned initiatives....[and therefore] Calls upon States to agree to a 
moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines that pose grave dangers to 
civilian populations; [and] Urges states to implement such a moratorium.* 65
Some of the reservations declared by UN members before the adoption of the 
Resolution shed light on how cautiously or how seriously states accepted the 
moratorium. During the debating period, strategic, economic, and political 
concerns were voiced by various parties. The United Kingdom took the position 
that as Protocol II of the CCW allowed self-destructing mines, "Possession of 
those mines should not be restricted to countries with the capacity to manufacture 
them"66 This was a circumspect way of saying that states which produced these
affect military policy. See Sarah Walkling, “CCW Negotiators Make Headway on Strengthening 
of Landmine Protocol”, Arms Control Todav. February 1996,27.
“See Arms Control Todav. July/August 1995, 24, October 1995, 24.
“Sen Patrick Leahy, "The CCW Review Conference: An opportunity for U.S. Leadership", Arms 
Control Todav. September 1995, 22.
“For full text of Resolution, see Resolution 48/75/K, "Moratorium on the export of anti-personnel 
land-mines", in The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook. Vol. 18, 1993, 211.
“UN Disarmament Yearbook (1993L 210.
106
high-tech mines should be allowed to sell them to whomever they pleased. Other 
states expressed concerns that their rights to obtain weapons for legitimate self­
defence should not be impeded, or that existing security arrangements should not 
be affected. Still others felt that the scope of the moratorium was too limited as it
• 67did not cover production, stockpiling and use of anti-personnel mines. 
Nevertheless, at a very basic level, most states found that the scope of the 
moratorium was acceptable to their policy requirements.
A moratorium on the export of land mines has certain innate flaws. At the most 
basic level, it is requested that state parties only accede to the resolution. There 
are no binding arms control agreements attached to the moratorium, or any 
implementation or verification measures. States can also interpret the language of 
the Resolution to their own advantage thanks to loopholes in its language content.
According to David Gowdey:
The moratorium has enormous loopholes. As it was originally phrased it is 
prohibited to export mines deemed excessively harmful to civilians. What the 
hell does that mean? Is there an AP mine whose detonation is not excessively 
injurious to a child? However, to military men this is understood to mean non­
self-destructing AP mines, to arms exporters this is deemed to mean something 
besides standard existing mine types, and to civilians it means nothing at all.
Given this definition you can export components, technology, whole mine 
factories, anything you want. The loophole is so big you could drive a truck full 
of VS-50s through it.67 8
These vagaries of language can tarnish the shine from the altruistic ideals of an 
export moratorium. For example, the moratorium does not specify a particular 
mine type although it is implied to be NSD or "dumb mines". The moratorium is 
also silent about the production of land mines and the export of land mine
67Ibid.
68Author's correspondence with David Gowdey, Demining Consultant to the UN Department of 
Humanitarian Affairs, February 1995.
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components. This is an important omission, as a state may truthfully claim that it 
is not selling mines when in reality, it may be involved in a joint venture with 
another state where business is being conducted as usual. Land mines are 
frequently produced under licence in a state other than that of its source, making it
extremely difficult, to trace the origin of land mines.
Despite its weaknesses and vagaries, the UN moratorium was probably the only 
type of international control concession which states were willing to make at the 
time. Through a mixture of realism and foresight, the United States introduced the 
draft resolution with the acknowledgement that unilateral moratoria were not 
enough in themselves but that an "international export moratorium was an 
important first step."69 ‘First Step' is perhaps the most accurate description of this 
moratorium. While the moratorium is far from perfect, it does encourage 
international co-operation to reduce the number of land mines made available to 
irresponsible parties.
Section 3.3-Unilateral or National Restraints
Section 3.3.1-Land mines
The UN Moratorium Resolution noted that "...several states have already declared 
moratoriums on the export, transfer, or purchase of anti-personnel land mines and 
related devices." In concert with and encouraged by the international moratorium, 
other states have actually imposed unilateral restrictions on the manufacture or 
stockpiling of land mines. Some have even gone as far as to destroy their own 
stockpiles and no longer produce land mines at all. Still others have joined the 
campaign for a total ban on land mines. These unilateral measures approach
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disarmament, although to be truly effective, the measures must be universal. For 
example, Belgium had a moratorium in place not only regarding the export of anti­
personnel mines, but also on their manufacture and stockpiling. In other words—a 
total ban. To complement and solidify this ban, Belgium took additional 
measures in March 1995 to destroy 340,000 anti-personnel mines currently under 
military control. The Netherlands has also decided to destroy its 423, 000 anti­
personnel mines in stock and in March 1996 it renounced the use of all mines, to 
become effective immediately,69 70 71 France and Germany have also halted the 
production and export of these weapons. In April 1996, Germany also renounced 
the use of all mines, as did Canada earlier in the year. Italy, which produced and 
exported vast quantities of land mines, has also confirmed that it will cease 
producing and exporting anti-personnel mines.72
Most of the members of the European Community are trying to harmonize their 
policies. In keeping with this trend, the European Union Foreign Affairs Council 
in its "Joint Action on Land Mines", 10 April 1995, agreed to a "common 
moratorium on the export of AP land mines."73 In the wake of the global land 
mine ban campaign and the CCW Review Conference at least 39 states have now 
united in calling for a total ban on land mines, including ten of NATO’s sixteen
69UN Disarmament Yearbook, 1993, 209.
70UN RES 48/75 Moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land mines, in UN Disarmament 
Yearbook. (1993). 211.
7lSee Trust and Verify, The Bulletin of the Verification Technology Information Centre 
(VERTIC), No. 55, March 1995 and Stephen Goose, “CCW States Fail to Stem Crisis; U.S. Policy 
Now an Obstacle”, Arms Control Today, July 1996, 16.
72"Landmines Update", Saferworld Update, Autumn 1994, 3.
73See FCO, Land Mine Control Programme, 3. Previously, the European Parliament passed a 
resolution in December 1992 calling for member states to “declare a five year moratorium on the 
export of mines and training in their use.” See also Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “The Land Mine Crisis 
A Humanitarian Disaster”, Foreign Affairs, September/October 1994, 12.
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members.74 As a result of these developments, it may be inferred that the 
advocacy campaign is working and that states are reconsidering their individual 
policies. In the fall of 1996, Canada is will host the first governmental conference 
dedicated to supporting a total ban.75 But until all the major military powers and 
suppliers of mines support a total ban, these national policies are probably 
proffered in vain.
While some states have unilaterally decided to renounce these weapons, others 
have been more hesitant to change policies. Perhaps the real test of a state's 
commitment to resolving the land mine problem is whether it actually produces 
the offensive mine in question, and whether it is willing to take the ultimate step 
and destroy its own stockpiles. For example, the United Kingdom announced that 
it would observe a moratorium on the export of NSD mines but “as the U.K. has 
not exported low-tech styles of mines for over a decade this represents no real 
change in policy.”76 In March 1995, the British government announced that it 
would ban the export of non-detectable mines; interestingly enough, the United 
Kingdom does not actually manufacture non-detectable mine types. British policy 
could be perceived as a policy of appeasement. It certainly will not hurt military 
or commercial interests to place a ban on weapons that are negligible in 
importance to them. It should be remembered that shifts in policy may not always
74 Most recent press reports have placed the number of states calling for a total ban at 39. It is 
likely that this number will increase as the number of states joining the land mine ban campaign has 
increased steadily throughout the year. In February 1996, for example, only 22 states supported a 
total ban on land mines. See International Herald Tribune, June 4, 1996, 8, and Arms Control 
Today, February 1996, 27. The NATO members calling for a total ban are as follows: Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal. 
See Goose, op. cit., 14. For a comprehensive list of countries supporting moratoria or bans on 
mines or particular types of mines see FACTFILE, 32-34, in Arms Control Today, July 1996.
75 Canada has now become the leader of the pro-ban countries with the so-called “Ottawa Process”.
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occur uniformly, as states have to consider humanitarian, political, military, and 
commercial interests in deciding how restrictive their weapons policies should be. 
In the middle of 1996, for example, the British government appeared to reverse its 
earlier policies and advocate a total ban, albeit one with particular conditions.
The United States has also vacillated with policy. Although it has been the leader 
in a great deal of land mine restraint policies, the United States has been reluctant 
to demand an unqualified ban on all land mines.76 77 8 79According to a Pentagon 
spokesman, the United States was looking for a “formula that will meet the 
President’s promise of eliminating the use of anti-personnel land mines...but we
70have to balance the humanitarian imperative with the need to protect our forces.” 
International co-operation or pressure to co-operate can only work if the national 
or unilateral will is present in the first place.
Section 3.3.2-Chemical Weapons
The development of national restraints on chemical weapons has encompassed a 
variety of decisions which have occurred gradually over the decades. In contrast,
76Saferworld Update. Autumn 1994, 3.
77 The U.K. government^ renounced the use of all land mines and called for a total ban. David 
Davis, a Foreign Office Minister, announced to Parliament 22 April 1996 that the U.K. would shift 
its policy to support a global ban on all land mines. Meanwhile, the U.K. government reserves the 
right to use AP mines until a full ban is in place if there is no other alternative, and if use is deemed 
essential after close consultation. The U.K. will destroy 44 percent of its current stockpile of 
“dumb mines”. The U.K., currently does not retain any stocks of smart mines, but reserves the 
right to procure them should the need arise. Information supplied by the Non-Proliferation 
Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 20 June 1996.
78 The Pentagon announced in the Spring of 1996 that the Pentagon would review its land mine 
policy, but little seems to have come out of that review. The Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General John Shalikashvili was quoted as favouring eliminating all anti-personnel mines in 
March of 1996 but later added the stipulation in subsequent interviews that he had to take into 
account the safety of U.S. forces as well. See Trust and Verify, The Bulletin of the Verification 
Technology Centre (VERTIC), No. 65, April 1996,2-3.
79 Philip Shenon, “Joint Chiefs Amend Mine-Ban Effort”, International Herald Tribune, May 13, 
1996,3.
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the decision to stop production, use, and stockpiling of mines occurred very 
rapidly over the past few years, mostly in response to the growing anti-mine
O A
campaign. For chemical weapons, it has been more of a case of “deproliferation” 
or the waning of interest in maintaining a chemical arsenal. Although there has 
always been a humanitarian motivation within the military establishment in not 
resorting to chemical weapons use, there was also a reluctance to relinquish these 
weapons until it was possible to determine that they were no longer important to 
national security. If these weapons were not perceived to be cost-effective or 
useful militarily, there was no need to keep arsenals current. But it should be 
pointed out that not updating chemical weapons capabilities, or allowing them to 
deteriorate, is not the same thing as physically destroying them. Military 
establishments are notoriously hesitant to relinquish a weapon. Nor have these 
practices prevented states from seeking to renew or upgrade their chemical 
weapons capabilities, while also considering the option of banning them 
completely. These actions have demonstrated an ambivalence in pursuing 
chemical weapons control policies.
For example, although the United States possesses a significant chemical weapons 
stockpile, it had not been updated since 1969, at which time the United States 
ceased to produce chemical weapons. In the mid-1980s there was pressure to 
modernize the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile and “replace current, outdated, 
and perhaps dangerously stored and transported chemical munitions with new *
80 Julian Perry Robinson coins this term in his description of the state of chemical weapons in the 
current international security environment. See Robinson, op. cit., in Rioux (ed.), 59.
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binary chemical weapons that produce no lethal hazard until fired.”81 82 83 84The case for 
implementing a U.S. binary weapon programme was unpopular not so much 
because it contradicted the goals of treaty banning chemical weapons but because 
it was controversial on the domestic public front, with environmentalists and with 
NATO allies.*2 Despite these vacillations of policy, “Congress has already taken
... [the U.S.] out of the chemical weapons business, passing a law requiring
83destruction of the entire U.S. chemical weapons stockpile by Dec. 31, 2004.” 
The Soviet Union had also announced in 1987 that it had stopped production of 
chemical weapons although this was actually not quite a truthful statemen*. 
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was also losing interest in the chemical weapons
option.
Other states have more or less given up their stockpiles or refused to have any 
chemical weapons placed on their territory even when part of an Alliance. 
European countries, in particular, seemed to have lost interest in the chemical 
option quite early on. This was due partly to the fact that Europe was the theatre 
for major chemical weapons warfare in World War I, and the “NATO allies- have
®Part of the reason for the deterioration of U.S. chemical weapons stockpiles was the strain on 
resources of the U.S. military from the Vietnam war plus public awareness of the environmental 
hazards of chemical weapons agents. See Frances Norton, "Report Summary of Hugh Stringer, 
Deterring Chemical Warfare: U.S. Policy Options for the 1990s", The Atlantic Community 
Quarterly, 24, No. 2, 1986, 168.
82 For example, when the U.S. was soliciting support amongst its NATO allies for its binary 
weapon programme, the U.S. had to agree to remove its chemical weapons from German territory 
in return for German support on these weapons. See Elisa Harris, “Chemical and Biological Arms 
Control”, in F. Hampson, H. Von Riekhoff and J. Roper, (eds.), The Allies and Arms Control, 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 78.
83 John Holum, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “The CWC: Time for a 
Harvest”, Remarks to an American Bar Association (ABA) Seminar on Implementing the CWC, 
February 7, 1995, 3.
84Goldblat, 97. It was reported in The Washington Times that the Russian Defense Ministry had 
stated that chemical weapons production had not altogether stopped nor had testing although such 
activities were officially banned in April 1992. See The Washington Times, 6 December 1994.
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recognized that if chemical weapons were used in a future European war, they
would again suffer a disproportionate share of the costs.”85 86The United Kingdom
abandoned its offensive chemical weapons capability in the 1950s, although it is
alleged it had an agreement with the Americans to access U.S. stocks should the
need arise. In addition, there was also discussion about British rearmament
although this potentiality never came to fruition. France retained its chemical
stockpile and at one time considered updating it, but later it restricted its activities
ox
to a research programme only.
NATO Allies were given the option of having U.S. chemical weapons placed in
their territories even if they no longer retained their own stockpiles or had ceased
production. But this became a rather unpopular choice for most of the Allies.
Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom reserved the right to deny any possible
future deployments of chemical weapons on their territory, regardless of the
reason. Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway
absolutely refused to even consider the deployment of chemical weapons on their
territory.87 What these reservations and refutations indicate is that various states
I
were establishing a norm against not only their own production and possession of j
!t
chemical weapons, but also that they wanted nothing to do with chemical weapons i
at all.88 5
i
85 Harris, op. cit., in Hampson, et ak, 76.
86Ibid., and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Non-Proliferation: Some Recent Developments", j
Background Brief. June 1995, 3. ;
87Harris, op. cit., in Hampson, et. al., 78.
88 Besides normative reasons for not wanting chemical weapons on their territory, the nuclear
deterrent was seen as sufficient protection. »
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Section 3.4-Bilateral Agreements
Another area engendering further attempts at controls was the area of bilateral
agreements. Bilateral agreements are not applicable to land mines as they are not a
strategic weapon type, and most of the proliferation has occurred in countries
other than the country of manufacturing origin. More important, agreements on 
restrictions on land mines between two or more countries probably would not alter 
the land mine situation. In contrast, as the largest arsenals of chemical weapons
were in the hands of the former Soviet Union and the United States, it has made
sense for these two states to lead in any arms control negotiations. No 
multilateral agreements could be concluded without the co-operation of these two 
major players because "...the initiation of bilateral arms reductions by the two 
superpowers was a spur to further multilateral action, providing both leadership 
and assurances to other states."89 Progress in superpower chemical weapons 
control has faltered within the prevailing political atmosphere. Until the late 
1970s, most of the discussions on limiting chemical weapons remained within the 
boundaries of the multilateral disarmament conference. In 1977, however, the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union had resumed bilateral talks but they later stalled due to 
deteriorating political relations between the two superpowers that pervaded the 
early 1980s.90 Once relations had improved with the ending of the Cold War, 
bilateral negotiations charged into high gear in 1989.
89Joainia Spear, "On the Desirability of Arms Transfer Regime Formation", Contemporary Security 
Policy. Vol. 15, No. 3, December 1994, 92.
wIn March of 1977, U.S. President Jimmy Carter reopened negotiations with the Soviets on the 
banning of chemical weapons. But there was a cessation of negotiations in 1981 which had to do 
with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the fact that discussions had stagnated on crucial 
issues. Nevertheless, these earlier discussions did provide a substantive basis for future progress on 
chemical weapons when they were continued. See A Jack Ooms, "Chemical Weapons: Is Revulsion
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In September 1989 at a Foreign Minister's meeting held between the two sides in 
Jackson Hole, Wyoming, a "Memorandum of Understanding" or MOU was signed 
committing both parties to bilateral verification exercises and information 
exchange.91 * The MOU was roughly divided into two separate phases. Phase I
included the basic exchange of data on both sides’ chemical weapons capabilities 
and visits to military and civil facilities by each party. This exchange began very 
quickly in December 1989 and was completed by February 1991.99 The second 
phase of the MOU was to be enacted once the reality of a completed CWC was at 
hand. This meant more detailed exchanges and experiments designed to 
complement the CWC's work. Both sides signed updated implementation 
documents in January of 1994, and in June of 1994 a detailed exchange of 
information on chemical weapons facilities was concluded by both sides. Finally, 
both sides conducted on-site inspections to verily these declarations. Each side 
was required to conduct inspections at sites from a list provided by their 
counterparts; two of these inspections were of a routine nature, one was a trial 
challenge inspection, and the final two were actual challenge inspections. Phase II 
was completed in December 1994 with the data exchanged and inspections 
conducted.93 Basically, the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding can be seen 
as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) between the two sides encouraging 
openness and transparency with the goal of complementing some of the practical
a Safeguard", in The Atlantic Community Quarterly. 24, No. 2, 1986, 162 and Charles Flowerree, 
op. cit., in Bums, (ed.), 1011.
9'See Flowerree, op. cit., in Bums, (ed.), 1016.
'Ibid., and ACDA, "U.S.-Russian Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding on Chemical 
Weapons", Fact Sheet. I August 1994. ACDA Chemical and Biological Weapons Reader, February 
1995 and ACDA, "Eliminating Chemical and Biological Weapons", Annual Report to Congress, 
1994, Section 11,25.
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measures of the CWC. These bilateral CBMs should not be underestimated as
they provide a trial run and framework for the CWC. As Russia and the United 
States retain the largest stockpiles, this sort of bilateral co-operation is an 
important indication of how a CWC regime might fare.
The next positive measure taken up by the superpowers was at the Malta Summit 
in December 1989. President Bush offered to halt binary production of chemical 
weapons (a major sticking point for negotiations not just for the Soviets but also 
for those involved in the multilateral process) if the Soviets accepted the proposals 
he had made at the United Nations the previous September. Bush had proposed 
that both sides reduce their chemical weapons stockpiles by 20 percent while 
awaiting the finished CWC. Earlier, the U.S. had reserved the right to continue 
with binary production within particular limits and to retain two percent of its 
chemical weapons stockpile. This stockpile was only to be destroyed once all 
chemically-able nations had officially joined the CWC.93 4
With the major stumbling block of binary weapons production now resolved, the 
two sides signed an agreement in June of 1990. The result was the United States- 
Soviet Bilateral Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical 
Weapons and Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning 
Chemical Weapons, or in more condensed form the Bilateral Non-Production and
93Ibid.
94The proposed production of binary agents and retention of a stockpile by the U.S. appeared 
contrary to the goals of a global chemical weapons ban although the U.S. was actively participating 
in negotiations to conclude a CWC. Although U.S. policy seemed contradictory, it can be 
perceived as an attempt to achieve universality of the CWC. Most states viewed this manoeuvre as 
a means for one powerful state to keep an advantage while demanding that others give up, or forgo
i•itj
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Destruction Agreement (BDA). The main intention of this agreement was to
facilitate the destruction of all but 5,000 tons of the superpower chemical agents 
and to halt any future production. 5 The BDA, however, did not enter into force.95 6 97
Technical difficulties were in part responsible for problems in implementing the 
agreement. The verification protocol proved difficult to implement within the 
original time frame as neither party had fully worked out all the technical 
requirements for destroying its own stockpiles. The agreement has now been
suspended, as both sides agreed to let the EIF of the multilateral CWC take 
precedence.98
The only further progress on bilateral chemical weapons came in June 1992 at a 
summit meeting between Presidents Bush and Yeltsin. Both parties pledged their 
commitment to the abolition of chemical weapons, and promised to instruct their 
negotiators in Geneva to facilitate the conclusion of the CWC by August 1992. 
Their mutual support of the Wyoming MOU was also reaffirmed and the parties 
pledged to update the 1990 BDA and bring it into force. A further agreement was 
negotiated entitled the "Agreement on the Safe and Secure Transportation, 
Storage, Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation". 
This agreement included measures to aid Russia on the destruction of its
all chemical weapons. But by May of 1991, the U.S. had dropped this precondition. See Flowerree, 
op. cit., in Bums, (ed.), 1016, and Harris, op. cit., in Hampson, et al., 92.
95Goldblat, op. cit., 97-99.
^Basically the BDA was never ratified or entered into force. See ACDA, Factsheet, "Chronology 
of Arms Control and Related Treaties and Agreements Including Confidence and Security 
Building Measures, and Measures Related to Nonproliferation, Transparency and Defense 
Conversion", December 20, 1993, 9.
97In addition, “because of technical, economic, and political problems, the Russian Republic’s 
efforts to create a capability for the safe destruction lagged markedly,...” See Flowerree, op. cit., 
in Bums, (ed.), 1017.
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Weapons of Mass Destruction and materials, (including transportation and storage 
of such hazardous materials) and "...provides the legal framework for U.S. 
financial support of Russian CW destruction. It entered into force upon signature 
in June 1992 and will remain in force for 7 years."98 9
This matrix of bilateral measures were negotiated to encourage a global CWC, 
but, one that would be in the superpowers’ relative interests. Direct, bilateral 
negotiations have also moved the "power politics" between the respective sides out 
of the multilateral sphere, allowing them to thrash it out amongst themselves. 
Superpower co-operation on bilateral chemical arms control was needed to bring
about the fruition of a multilateral CWC. Without such co-operation, it seems 
highly likely that the CWC would have been kept floundering in the Conference 
on Disarmament. As the issues of chemical disarmament are highly complex (i.e. 
disposal, verification, dual-use, etc.), it makes sense that the two sides with the 
largest arsenals have put their collective resources together to deal with these 
problems.
98By “mutual agreement”, the BDA was aligned with the CWC schedule requiring destruction of 
stockpiles 10 years after EIF. See ACDA, “Eliminating Chemical and Biological Weapons”, 25. 
Also, Goldblat, 99, and Flowerree, op. cit., in Bums, (ed.), 1016-1017.
"For example, in July of 1992, under the Nunn-Lugar program, the U.S. and Russia signed an 
agreement offering 25 million U.S. dollars to plan Russian chemical weapons destruction facilities. 
A further 30 million dollars of this money was approved for Russia to establish a laboratory for 
environmental control of chemical weapons destruction, see ACDA, "Eliminating Chemical And 
Biological Weapons", 1994, 25. See also SIPRI Yearbook (1993), 273.
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Chapter IV
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (The
CWC)
As the Iron Curtain crumbled, the final curtain descended on the bilateral drama 
of superpower arms control. With the demise of the Soviet Union, fears of 
uncontrolled proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have largely displaced 
fears of nuclear conflagration....Given these concerns, the effectiveness of global 
treaties designed to eliminate these weapons from world arsenals or limit their 
spread is being questioned. Thus, multilateral arms control has moved from a 
supporting to a starring role on the world stage*
The Chemical Weapons Convention represents an important milestone in 
multilateral arms control and disarmament. Prior to the present CWC, there were 
other attempts to restrict or even prohibit the use of these weapons through both 
IHL and arms control venues. Efforts have also been made to restrict the supply of 
these weapons, and states have practised self-restraint in their chemical weapons 
policies. None of these efforts has resulted in the complete abolition of these 
weapons. The fact that these weapons warrant a comprehensive treaty 
demonstrates that they are considered -a serious threat and a prioritized issue on the 
arms control agenda. The purpose of this section is to examine the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC). This will begin with a brief review of the 
antecedents and negotiating history of this treaty, followed by an explanation of 
what the CWC has set out to do, and conclude with a critique of its strengths and
weaknesses.
Section 4.1-Antecedents of the CWC
If any long and difficult enterprise could be said, in that rather shopworn 
analogy, to have been like giving birth to an elephant, the negotiations that 
produced the 192-page Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was it. The idea 
of a Convention banning chemical weapons, conceived in 1968, was in gestation
*Marie Isabelle Chewier, “Impediment to Proliferation? Analysing the Biological Weapons 
Convention”, Contemporary Security Policy. Vol. 16, No. 2, August 1995, 72.
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for a decade and a half, and in delivery for nearly another decade....The 
completion of the CWC marks a watershed in the effort to control the 
accumulation and spread of weapons of mass destruction. 2
The official signing ceremony in Paris in January 1993 of the CWC has often been 
acclaimed as the culmination of over 20 years of arduous negotiations. In reality,
although aspirations to ban chemical weapons have been prevalent for most of the
century:
Interest in chemical weapons issues has fluctuated over time. It has tended to 
achieve more attention when other issues on the arms control agenda were 
stymied... In the aftermath of the [Geneva] Protocol little progress was made 
until the early 1970s. Then increased interest was due to America's use of 
Napalm and Agent Orange during the Vietnam War. The widespread use of 
these and their effects on the population led to mounting concerns to minimize 
the cruelty of war for civilians.3
There are three main periods of interest in chemical arms control and disarmament
that are clearly identifiable in this century: the immediate Post World War I era; 
the 1950s and 1960s; and when chemical weapons were officially placed on the 
disarmament agenda.4 The reality of a full chemical weapons ban would take 
almost 20 years to emerge from the Conference on Disarmament, with most of the 
important agreements coming only at the end of that period. Before examining the 
modem deliberations for a Chemical Weapons Convention, a brief review of this
treaty’s antecedents is in order. These antecedents serve as historical building
blocks which have promoted incrementally the political consensus to ban chemical
weapons. According to John Ellis Van Courtland Moon:
Chemical and biological warfare (CBW) is widely regarded as cruel and 
inhumane. This revulsion has its origins in codes and customs, traditions and
^Charles Flowerree, "The Chemical Weapons Convention: A Milestone in International Security", 
in Arms Control Todav. October 1992, 3.
■^Joanna Spear, "On the Desirability and Feasibility of Arms Transfer Regime Formation", 
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 15, No. 3 December 1994, 91.
4 Chemical disarmament negotiations originated in the Committee on Disarmament in 1968, and 
concluded in its successor, the Conference on Disarmament.
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ways of thinking about the conduct and character of war stretching back into 
unrecorded time when today’s chemical and biological weapons were 
inconceivable. It ultimately promoted the development of arms control 
measures—initially in the form of “law of war” and later as treaties—that sought 
to regulate or, often, prohibit CBW.5
The Treaty of Strassbury concluded by the French and Germans in 1675 is perhaps
the first international agreement on poisoned weapons.6 Much like this treaty is the 
Lieber Code of 1863, developed during the American Civil War, which states 
unequivocally that military necessity “does not admit of the use of poison in any 
way.”7 The first well-known international effort to prohibit poison weapons
occurred at the Brussels Conference of 1874. Although the resultant Brussels 
Declaration was never adopted, it did represent an important yardstick for future 
prohibitions. According to Article 13 of this Declaration, the employment of 
poisons or poisoned weapons as a means of injuring an enemy is forbidden.8
Next there were the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 which produced 
declarations prohibiting the use of poison and gas weapons. At this time, it was 
recognized that technological developments had made these weapons all the more 
dangerous.9 As a result, not only were the customary principles against the use of 
poisons reaffirmed, but the Hague Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases 
(1899) declared that “the contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of
$ John Ellis Van Courtland Moon, "Controlling Chemical and Biological Weapons Through World 
War Two" in Richard Dean Bums (ed.), Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), 657.
6 “Prohibition on Poisoned Weapons”, in Bums, (ed.), op. cit., 1368.
7 See Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman, (eds.), The Laws of Armed Conflict. A Collection of 
Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents. 3rd ed., Henry Dunant Institute, (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988), 3-23, for a reproduction of the Lieber Code.
8 Ibid, 29. Brussels Conference of 1874, II-Project of an International Declaration Concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War, (The Brussels Declaration).
9 Van Courtland Moon, in Bums, (ed.), 659.
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projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious 
gases.”10 Although this declaration was more in tune with the modem reality of 
chemical weapons, it still contained significant loopholes. The obligations of the 
prohibition were binding only upon the parties that had signed it; technically, an 
aggressor could attack a non-signatory without being in violation, although 
customary principles prohibiting poisons and unnecessary suffering would have to 
be taken into account. As only “projectiles” are specifically mentioned, other 
delivery systems could be used to deliver the same deadly chemicals. During 
World War I “...German forces had claimed that the lethal gas attack launched at 
Ypres had not violated the Hague Declaration; the gas had been released through 
cylinders, not shells.”11 Therefore, the spirit, if not the letter, of the prohibition 
was violated, thanks to loopholes in the treaty's language.
World War I demonstrated that these prohibitions and agreements were easily 
violated in the name of military expediency. In the war’s immediate aftermath the 
only disarmament measure pertaining to chemical weapons was the Versailles 
Treaty, requiring Germany to relinquish its remaining stocks of chemical weapons. 
This was purely a unilateral measure as part of the wider disarmament of the 
losing side by the victors in World War I. The first multilateral effort aimed at 
prohibiting all cases of chemical weapons use was addressed in the Washington 
Conference of 1922, and the ensuing Washington Treaty on Use of Submarines 
and Gases in Wartime. Had this treaty been implemented, it would have 
constituted a comprehensive prohibition against the use of chemical weapons.
10 “Outlawing Chemical, Bacteriological, and Biological Weapons”, in Bums, (ed.) op. cit., 1389.
11 Van Courtland Moon, in Bums, (ed.), 664.
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Just a few short years later, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of
chemical and biological weapons was enacted:12
The Protocol was envisaged, then, as a reaffirmation, in treaty form, of the long- 
recognized law of war prohibiting the use of poison. That prohibition, 
amounting to a customary rule, rested on a variety of legal foundations; 
immemorial custom, the practice of states (up to 1925), and opinio juris 
following the adoption of inter alia the Brussels Declaration of 1874 and (more 
particularly) the Hague Conventions and Regulations of 1899 and 1907. But in 
the war of 1914-18 it had been brutally thrown aside, at the expense of the 
suffering of some 1,300,000 gassed soldiers.1 $
The Geneva Protocol was an auxiliary result of a conference sponsored by the 
League of Nations, entitled the Conference for the Supervision of the International 
Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in the Implements of War. The original 
Convention was never ratified and the Geneva Protocol became a treaty in its own 
right. At the Conference, the United States delegation first introduced the topic of 
chemical weapons as an international ban on the trade of chemical weapon 
materials. More practical delegates correctly surmised that it would be difficult to 
restrict the export of chemical agents, as states with large chemical industries 
could produce chemical weapons from their own resources if they so wished. It 
was also recognized that it would be very difficult to distinguish chemical agents 
destined for industrial use as opposed to military purposes. Therefore, rather than 
focusing restraints on production routes, it seemed simpler and more expedient to 
just ban the use of chemical weapons.14
The full name of this Protocol is the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.
13 Nicholas Sims, “Commonwealth Reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol”, The Round 
Table, No. 324, 1992,478.
l^See A. Thomas and A.P.V. Thomas, Legal Limits on the Use of Chemical and Biological 
Weapons, (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1970), 70-73, for an account of these 
negotiations leading up to the Geneva Protocol.
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The Geneva Protocol only prohibits the first use of chemical weapons because 
many states pledged to observe the Protocol with the reservation that they be 
allowed to retaliate in kind.15 Consequently, the spectre of chemical weapons still 
loomed as states fearing a chemical weapons attack thought it would be wise to 
retain them for defensive use. While parties have adhered to the Protocol out of 
good faith, they also did so out of fear of retaliation. In cases where the Protocol 
was violated, the initiation of chemical warfare has occurred at times when it was
unlikely that there would be any immediate retaliation.
The strongest criticism against the Geneva Protocol is that it does not disarm 
states of chemical weapons by prohibiting their acquisition, production and 
stockpiling. In addition, there are no verification or enforcement measures 
attached to the Protocol. As Geoffrey Best argues: “Legal prohibitions of weapons, 
unless they are of weapons of such a nature that no country is likely ever to 
possess them, are mere ploughings of the sand unless they are accompanied by 
convincing measures of verification.” 16 If the illegal use of chemical weapons is 
not punished, then any agreement to not use them may be violated at will. The
1 ^The reservations had two components. In the first part, states reserved the right to be bound by 
the Protocol only against states that were also parties to the Protocol. In the second part, parties 
had a right to cease their obligations if another power failed to respect the Protocol. In these initial 
reservations, none of parties except for the government of the Netherlands made any distinctions 
between retaliation with chemical or bacteriological weapons. It was theoretically possible, 
therefore, that a chemical attack could be retaliated against with bacteriological weapons. The 
Netherlands government went on record as stating that bacteriological warfare was too horrendous 
to even consider for retaliatory use. Privately, it was felt that as the use of bacteriological weapons 
was so unpredictable, that they would not be an efficient weapon. Only the United States made this 
distinction as well, but it took almost 50 years to ratify the Protocol. Even when the Biological 
Weapons Convention was introduced, parties did not immediately withdraw their reservations. 
Parties have had to resolve their reservations in the ensuing years in light of their obligations under 
the BTWC and the CWC. For a very detailed discussion of these reservations and source of 
references see Nicholas Sims, op. cit, (1992), 477-479.
125
international community expressed outrage at Iraq’s use of chemical weapons 
during the 1980s against Iraq and especially against Kurdish civilians, but took no 
punitive action against Iraq. Mere prohibitions on the use of these weapons are not 
enough; the temptation to ever use these weapons again must be eliminated.
Nevertheless, the Geneva Protocol was an important agreement which acted as a 
model for the present Chemical Weapons Convention. It was certainly more 
comprehensive than previous treaties; it managed to close the loopholes allowing 
the use of poisonous gases and the means to deliver them. As an added act of 
foresight, bacteriological weapons were also added to the prohibition. Although 
these weapons were not considered as much of a threat at that time as they now 
are, the negotiators of the Protocol took the opportunity to ban a future viable 
weapon. The most important attribute of the Geneva Protocol was the precedent 
and international standard it set against the use of chemical weapons. The Geneva 
Protocol also enjoys an enduring legacy. It has devolved into customary 
international law, binding on all parties regardless of whether they are signatories
or not.16 7
Chemical weapons disarmament issues were debated during both the League of 
Nations' Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference (1926-1930)
16 Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 308.
17 See Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, (eds.) Documents on the Laws of War, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), 139, and N.P. Smidovich, “Limitations on Chemical and Biological 
Weapons”, in Paul Stephan and Boris Klimenko, (eds.), International Law and International 
Security Military and Political Dimensions, (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1991), 127.
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and the actual Disarmament Conference of As a result of all these
discussions, a British draft text on the prohibition of the use of chemical, 
biological and incendiary weapons was introduced with an unconditional 
prohibition on biological weapons. Measures for a commission to investigate the 
violation of these provisions were also included. Although this draft text was 
adopted as a basis for a future Convention, no further agreements were reached, 
and in 1936 any future conferences on the issue were indefinitely postponed,18 9 
Although the Geneva Protocol was the only tangible measure emerging from this 
period, these other negotiations were important because serious thought was given 
to the complexities of restricting and abolishing chemical weapons. These very 
issues would resurface decades later in the negotiations for the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC).
The issue of chemical weapons disarmament lay mostly dormant for another three 
decades until the 1950s and 1960s when the United States was criticized heavily 
for not ratifying the Geneva Protocol, and for using herbicides and riot control 
agents in the Vietnam conflict. A focus on U.S. practices brought the issue of 
chemical arms control back on to the intemational agenda. This debate continued 
in the UN General Assembly and the Conference on the Committee on 
Disarmament (the predecessor of the Conference on Disarmament). Among the
18A variety of issues were explored at the conference. The first area of contention dealt with 
definitional problems—for example, what should be considered as a chemical weapon. There also 
were questions as to whether prohibitions should be imposed on chemical weapons preparedness, 
especially in peacetime. Additionally, should chemical weapons facilities be dismantled? What 
type of verification would be needed and how could prohibitions be enforced against transgressors?
Should biological weapons be prohibited? See Van Courtland Moon in Bums, (ed.), 664-668.
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many resolutions passed was the stipulation that riot control agents and herbicides 
should be considered chemical weapons under the Geneva Protocol, despite the 
steadfast opposition of the United States.20 During the Nixon administration, the 
Geneva Protocol was sent back to the Senate for ratification although no change 
had occurred in the U.S. position regarding pesticides and riot control agents.
There was still dissension between the United States and the intemational
community. But by 1975 the Ford administration reached a compromise between 
the administration and the Senate, and the Geneva Protocol was finally ratified 
with the provision that herbicides and riot control agents be subject to "specific 
restraines."21 It is perhaps not surprising that interest and action on chemical arms 
control took so long to come to fruition. The bickering over a comprehensive 
definition of chemical weapons took almost fifty years to resolve.
In addition, and running parallel, to these discussions was the creation of
substantive bodies to deal with disarmament issues. In 1968, the U.N.
Disarmament Commission added the question of chemical and biological weapons 
to its agenda ■ and inaugurated a study on the topic in 1969. The British
*^Ibid., for a more detailed account of the issues and the reasons why the Disarmament Conference 
did not go any further.
Although these agents were not traditionally considered chemical weapons, they were still 
perceived to be in violation of the Geneva Protocol because they were chemical agents. The United 
States maintained that herbicides and riot control agents were not covered under the Geneva 
Protocol. Indeed, the United States was the only permanent member of the UN Security Council 
at the time not to have ratified the Protocol, and actually withdrew the Protocol from Senate 
consideration in 1951. See Flowerree, op. cit., in Bums (ed.), 1001.
2^The U.S. Senate did not want to endorse an agreement if it was perceived to include pesticides 
and riot control agents as chemical weapons. Thus the compromise of 'specific restraints' meant 
that the military would renounce the first use in war of riot control agents and pesticides with the 
exceptions of use against vegetation around the immediate perimeter of U.S. bases and institutions. 
And riot control agents would only be used in defensive military capacity to save lives. Under 
Executive Order 11850 of 8 April 1975, President Ford confirmed the new U.S. policy. See 
Flowerree op. cit., in Bums, (ed.),1005, and Frits Kalshoven, '"Arms, Armaments and Intemational
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government presented to the Disarmament Committee in Geneva the option of
separating chemical weapons from biological weapons on the disarmament
agenda. This was complemented by a draft convention on biological weapons. The
Western states felt that as chemical weapons disarmament issues were so
complicated, more time and effort would be needed to reach agreement on them.22 
Because biological weapons were viewed as so impractical and horrific, an 
agreement to ban them would be relatively straightforward. The Soviets opposed 
this de-coupling and introduced their own draft Convention. The issue of 
separating the weapon systems was split down East-West lines. In the newly 
named Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), the Eastern Bloc 
finally changed its negotiating position and acquiesced by negotiating a biological 
weapons treaty only. The CCD Draft Convention was submitted to the UN 
General Assembly in December 1971 and the BTWC entered into force in 1975. 
The issue of biological weapons, by disarmament standards, had been swiftly dealt 
with, leaving the path clear for concentrating on chemical weapons. It was 
realized later that the treaty contained serious loopholes as a result of the rush to 
conclude the treaty. In the last few years, negotiators from the states parties to the 
Convention have had to reconvene in Geneva to work out complicated verification 
measures to be included in the treaty. The BTWC also does not contain any 
penalties for violators and few provisions for compliance, except for some
Law", in Recueil Des Cours. Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), 269.
22one of the theories about why it was difficult to move beyond the no-first-use pledge of the 
Geneva Protocol concerned the deterrence issue. Although it was argued that the lack of 
preparation as well as the marginal utility of chemical weapons prevented their use in World War 
II, it was also because of the fear of retaliation. No side wanted to be attacked by chemical 
weapons again, and with advances in aerial technology chemical weapons could be used against 
homelands as well as on battlefields. Thus, it was thought that if states at least held on to a
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consultation and co-operation between states. Although the BTWC bans transfers
of biological agents it has no measures to prevent proliferation?3 Control measures
relating to biological agents have been placed under the auspices of the Australia
Group.
Section 4.1.1-The Negotiating History of the CWC
The next period in CWC development was the inclusion of chemical weapons 
disarmament on to the Conference on Disarmament agenda and the negotiation of 
the CWC proper, which lasted almost 20 years. Unlike the BTWC, this was not to 
be an expedited process, as various draft conventions filtered in and out of the
disarmament committees. It was not until the middle of the 1980s when the
political atmosphere had improved between the main protagonists, the United 
States and Soviet Union, that serious negotiations started. As a further impetus, 
the use of chemical weapons by Iraq during its war with Iran, and the spectre of 
use during the Gulf War demonstrated the pressing need for a chemical weapons
ban.24
By 1984, the Conference on Disarmament convened with the mandate to cease 
exploratory consultations and focus its energies on negotiating a final chemical 
weapons ban?5 The United States’ insistence on retaining a two percent stockpile 
until all states had signed the Convention continued to impede the drive for a
retaliatory capability then at least they were protecting their own security. See SIPRI Yearbook 
1993, 710.
^^Chevrier, 74.
^See SIPRI Yearbook. 1993. 713, for a discussion on the various chronology of initiatives; see 
also Flowerree in Bums, (ed.), 1011-1013. For a concise chronology, see ACDA, "Chronology of 
Events Leading to the Signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention", Factsheet. January 5, 1993.
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complete ban. Originally, this stipulation was introduced by France, which also 
prompted controversy within the Western states. France argued that it was an 
important security concern to all states that small stockpiles be maintained; if there 
were any breakouts, states would still have a limited chemical weapons retaliatory 
capability. Later, however, this claim was renounced.25 6 *During the U.S.-Soviet 
bilateral chemical disarmament negotiations, the U.S. also dropped this 
requirements This was the key turning point in the drive for a complete ban. It is
debatable whether other states would have been as committed to the ideals of a
chemical weapons ban if the main chemical weapons states did not give up all 
their weapons. The U.S. interest in commencing a binary weapons chemical 
weapons programme also seemed contrary to the goals of a truly multilateral 
CWC. Ultimately, the U.S. also conceded on this point. The most glaring bone of 
contention impeding a comprehensive ban was the issue conceming the right to 
use chemical weapons in retaliation, as permitted under the reservations of the 
Geneva Protocol. The U.S. position advocated that during the chemical weapons 
destmction period it should have the right to retaliate if attacked by chemical 
weapons.28 Eventually, this precondition was also dropped. It would have been 
rather difficult to convince states to subscribe to the altruistic goals of a CWC on 
the complete prohibition on use, production, stockpiling if certain states were not 
willing to guarantee their non-retention, non-use, or abstention from using
25SIPRI Yearbook. 1993, 714-715.
2^Elisa Harris, “Chemical and Biological Arms Control”, in F. Hampson, H. Von Riekhoff, and J. 
Roper, (eds.). The Allies and Arms Control. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1992), 92.
2?For a discussion of the U.S.-Soviet arrangements, see Chapter 3.
^Harris, op. cit., in Hampson, et al., 93.
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chemical weapons. In other words, such an exception would have meant that the 
CWC was no improvement over the Geneva Protocol of almost seventy years past.
By 1992, the final stage of the proposed Convention was in place. President Bush 
then requested a one year deadline to a final. Convention. The final stumbling 
block to be dealt with was the issue of "anywhere, anytime inspection". During the 
1980s, this was seen as an attempt to promote the seriousness of verification 
measures; however, the impracticalities of such a measure became apparent and 
this provision was replaced with managed access verification.29 On September 3, 
1992, the CD officially completed work on the CWC and it was opened for
signature in Paris in January of 1993.
Section 4.2-The Main Points of the CWC: What it Does and How it Works
As the first post-Cold War arms control agreement, the Convention fits its time 
and its context....First, it is a multilateral treaty among equals. It was 
authentically negotiated in the international community—between developed and 
developing nations alike—not forged between two superpowers and presented to 
the rest of the world for endorsement. Multilateralism is a central feature of the 
Post-Cold War security environment....The world has said we want not just to 
control these weapons, but to destroy them—to put the genie back in the bottle 
and incinerate the bottle....To make them [chemical weapons] is a waste; to keep
^^Due to the dual-nature of most chemical agents, it was felt that the only way to make verification 
effective was to have unimpeded access to facilities without right of refusal. Originally, the 
positions were drawn strictly across East-West lines. The Soviet Union thought such a measure 
would be an open invitation to spying. Yet by the late 1980s, the Soviets changed their stance and 
accepted the concept. Now it was the U.S. which hesitated, fearing that this measure might 
compromise sensitive institutions. Thus, managed access became the compromise solution. Under 
its main provisions, the inspectors could still be given access to any suspected installation, but the 
host would have the right to take measures to remove sensitive information or equipment. See 
Jessica Eve Stem, "Co-operative Security and the CWC: A Comparison of the Chemical and 
Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Regimes", in Contemporarv Security Policy, Vol. 15, No. 3 
(December 1994), 32-33. Also see Arms Control Today, interview with Ambassador Stephen J. 
Ledogar, “The End of Negotiations”, October 1992, '8-9.
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them an affliction; to use them an abomination. To champion their destruction 
makes us at once more exemplary, more civilized and more secure.30
The basic scope of the Convention is embodied under Article I (General 
Obligations) which prohibits the development, production, acquisition, retention, 
stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons; it also requires the destruction 
of chemical weapons and facilities as well as those a state may possess on another 
state’s territory. In order to accomplish this task, members must submit 
declarations on their chemical weapons holdings and destruction plans.31 Under 
Article VI, the civilian chemical industry is also obligated to submit to on-site 
inspections and verification measures to prove that its activities are in accordance 
with the provisions of the Convention. Through a verification annex, chemicals 
are divided into three different schedules, each according to the levels of utility 
for making chemical weapons. Declarations are required from the facilities 
producing such chemicals, and different levels of verification will be required 
through on-site inspection for these schedules.
The CWC also includes incentives for states to join the Convention. Article X, 
Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons, requires parties to provide 
assistance to other states parties who are facing, or are under a chemical weapons 
assault. This can take the form of establishing a voluntary trust fund to provide the
•^Remarks taken from the address by John Holum, Director of U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency to a seminar on the Chemical Weapons Convention sponsored by the Center 
for Strategic and Intemational Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C. March 31, 1994, 6-8, (Hereafter, 
CSIS Seminar).
31 The CWC requires the destruction of all chemical weapons within ten years after entry into force 
(EIF) of the treaty. A five year extension is possible only if agreement is given by the Executive 
Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as well as final 
approval by the Organization’s Conference of States Parties. See ACDA, “Eliminating Chemical 
and Biological Weapons”, Annual Report to Congress. 1994.
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equipment for chemical defence, arranged assistance measures, or a declaration 
on the type of assistance it may provide in the event of an appeal for help or some 
combination of these. Next, there is Article XI, Economic and Technological 
Development, which is designed to encourage the exchange of technical 
knowledge in the chemical industry between parties in compliance with the 
Convention. It is important to note that while this Article offers economic 
incentives for states parties to join, there are significant penalties for those who 
remain outside the regime. For example, states which are not parties will be 
prohibited from receiving transfers of Schedule I chemicals. Three years after EIF 
of the CWC, chemicals on Schedule II will be banned from transfer to non-parties. 
In this intervening period, non-parties will also be required to submit end-user 
certificates specifying the details and purposes of the sale and transfer. Schedule 
III transfers would also require such certification. After five years of EIF, the 
question of whether further restrictions should be placed on Schedule III schedules 
will be considered by the states parties.32 As a result, non-parties will be isolated
from the technical and economic benefits of the international trade in chemicals.
Article XII, Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, Including 
Sanctions, includes measures for enforcement and compliance when there has 
been a violation of the CWC. At the lowest level of compliance, upon the 
recommendation of the Executive Council, the Conference of States Parties may 
"restrict or suspend the State Party's rights and privileges under this Convention 
until it undertakes the necessary action to conform with its obligation under this
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Convention." (Article XII, para. 2) For more serious infractions of this 
Convention, collective action under the auspices of intemational law may be taken 
against the transgressor. For the most serious infractions, the matter may be 
referred to the UN General Assembly or Security Council for further action. 
Within the treaty itself, there is a built-in promise that violations will be met with 
specific and firm responses.
A treaty as complicated as the CWC also requires some solid and precise 
implementation measures both at the national and intemational levels. National 
implementation measures are covered under Article VII. This Article requires 
states to enact domestic legal legislation to prohibit activities banned under the 
Convention, as well as impose penalties on those who break the law. The second 
part of the Article relates to national co-operation with the intemational body 
responsible for implementing the Convention. Each state party is required to 
establish a national authority as a liaison with the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and other states parties. As a good 
deal of technical and commercial information is being exchanged between various 
bodies, confidentiality is a key factor in the national implementation of this treaty. 
For an intemational treaty to be successfully implemented, there must be 
intemational co-operation, and for intemational cooperation to take place national 
cohesion is paramount.
^^Lee Feinstein, "CWC Executive Summary" in Arms Control Today, October 1992, CWC 
Supplement, 4 and interview with Dr. Ralf Trapp of the OPCW's Verification Bureau (November 
1994).
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Most crucial to the successful implementation of the treaty is the intemational 
body charged with overseeing and administering the requirements of the treaty. 
The intemational organization established under Article VIII is the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), located in The Hague, the 
Netherlands. The OPCW is composed of the Conference of States Parties, the 
Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat. The main decision making body of 
the OPCW is the Conference of States Parties which is responsible for the 
implementation of the treaty. As its title indicates, this body is composed of the 
signatories to the Convention. Once the Convention is implemented, only those
states which have ratified the Convention will be entitled to partake in the 
decision-making process. The Conference is to meet annually with the option of 
holding special sessions if necessary, and has a mandate to debate any issues 
which fall under the scope of the Convention. All states parties are accorded one 
vote each in any decision-making process.
Next, there is the Executive Council which is composed of 41 of the states parties 
at a time, rotating on a geographic basis. Within each geographic grouping, the 
states with the most significant chemical industries are given a percentage of the 
membership of the Executive Council. The Executive Council reports to the
Conference of States Parties. The mandate of the Executive Council is summed up 
under Article VIII, Sect. C, para. 31:
The Executive Council shall promote the effective implementation of, and 
compliance with, this Convention. It shall supervise the activities of the 
Technical Secretariat, cooperate with the National Authority of each State Party 
and facilitate consultations and cooperation among state parties at their request.
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The last organ of the OPCW is the most important. The Technical Secretariat is 
the operational body that carries out the physical work of the Convention. While 
providing administrative and technical support to the OPCW, the main function of 
the Technical Secretariat is to implement verification procedures. The main unit of
the Secretariat is the Inspectorate. This section of the OPCW has the enormous 
task of deciding how inspections are to be carried out, including the training of 
staff to execute them, and to process technical information in a manner ensuring 
confidentiality. The success or failure of the verification implementation of the
CWC depends on the effectiveness of this unit.
The verification provisions of the CWC are extremely complicated and extensive, 
but are ultimately the most important. The CWC’s verification regime sets it apart 
from other arms control treaties. Jay Brin highlights the uniqueness and challenge
of this regime:
Proponents and critics of the CWC agree that ensuring compliance will require 
massive, costly, and intrusive monitoring. Treaties limiting nuclear or 
conventional weapons call for inspections only of government owned 
installations. The CWC by contrast, applies to an estimated 25,000 commercial 
facilities worldwide that produce, process, or consume chemicals with both 
civilian and potential military uses—plus a virtually unlimited number of sites 
where clandestine warfare-agent production might occur....The quantities of 
chemicals needed to manufacture a military significant weapons stockpile would 
be lost in the background noise of international trade. On-site inspections of 
chemical weapons plants will therefore be essential. Indeed, verifying the CWC 
will require more on-site inspections than all previous arms control treaties put 
together.33
Appended to the main treaty text is the Annex on Implementation and 
Verification. This Annex describes the procedures involved for destroying 
chemical weapons: routine inspections of the civil chemical industry, challenge 
inspections, and investigations into use or alleged use of chemical weapons.
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In accordance with Article III of the CWC, states parties must declare their 
stockpiles of chemical weapons and their facilities, with detailed plans for 
destruction. Once these declarations have been completed, the Verification 
Bureau will inspect these declared sites. This is the major transparency focus of 
the Convention. In addition, the Verification Bureau may also carry out 
inspections of storage and destruction sites. These will be routine inspections 
designed to ensure that data submitted by a state party on these facilities is 
accurate. These inspections will also be implemented against commercial 
chemical industry plants. Not only does the CWC give inspectors the right to 
regulate and question the chemical activities of its members, but it also “...ties the 
intrusiveness of routine monitoring to the risk associated with various toxic
chemicals.34
For example, the three levels of schedules each require different levels of 
investigation. Schedule I agents rarely have any industrial uses due to their toxicity 
and are the primary precursors for chemical warfare agents. Schedule II and III 
agents could be used to make chemical weapons or the chemical precursors for 
such weapons. Schedule II agents are used in rather small quantities in commercial 
industries, but Schedule III agents have a far wider commercial application.35 If 
the threshold for production, processing, consumption and import/export of 
Schedule I agents is over 100 grams, then the manufacturing facility must be
33jay Brin, "Ending the Scourge of Chemical Weapons", Technology Review, April 1993, 35.
34Amy Smithson, "Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention", Survival, Vol. 26, No. 1, 
Spring 1994, 82.
35Ibid. and Stem, op. cit., (1994), 32.
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declared. Schedule II reporting requirements range from 1 kg to one metric ton. 
Schedule III chemicals can go up to thirty metric tons. 36 What this means is that 
Schedule I and II facilities will be required to draw up "Facility Agi^e^e^n^e^rtts333 
with the OPCW on how the site is to be inspected. Schedule III facilities will be 
subjected to random selection for routine inspections. There will also be no more 
that two inspections per year, per plant tite.3t
The next level of verification measures are "Challenge Inspections". Challenge 
inspections are designed to detect possible cheating under the CWC. During the 
negotiations, there was discussion of "anywhere-anytime" verification with no 
right of refusal. This was modified in order to reach a compromise agreement 
acceptable to all parties. It was felt that sensitive facilities would be opened up 
to unnecessary snooping by other states. Thus the concept of "managed access" in 
challenge inspections was introduced. This provision still contains no right of 
refusal but the inspection must be carried out under particular guidelines. The
•l^it must be noted that these are threshold amounts and vary according to the type and quantity of 
chemical agent involved. States parties are also allowed to produce an amount of one metric ton of 
Schedule I chemicals for research, medical, and pharmaceutical and defensive purposes. In 
practical terms, this means research into protective gear and antidotes. See Smithson, op. cit., 
(1994), 83, and Richard Guthrie, "The Chemical Weapons Convention: A Guide" in J.B. Poole & 
R. Guthrie, (eds.). Verification 1993. Verification Technology Information Centre, (London: 
Brassey's, 1993), Chapter 3. Also see Annex on Implementation and Verification of the CWC, 
especially Part VI, VII & VIII: "Activities not Prohibited under this Convention in Accordance 
with Article VI".
^Facility Agreements refer to the basic code of conduct between the Inspectorate and the facility 
being inspected. It is an agreement to rules of procedure on how the Inspectorate inspects the site in 
question. The Verification Annex, Part VII, "Activities not Prohibited Under this Convention in 
Accordance with Article VI", deals with Schedule 2 chemicals. Under Inspection Procedures, para 
24, "A facility agreement for the declared plant site shall be concluded not later than 90 days 
after completion of the initial inspection between the inspected State Party and the Organization 
unless the inspected State Party and the Technical Secretariat agree that it is not needed. It shall 
be based on a model agreement and govern the conduct of inspections at the declared plant site. 
The agreement shall specify the frequency and intensity of inspections as well as detailed 
inspection procedures, consistent with paragraphs 25 to 29. "
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Inspectorate cannot simply demand access to sensitive facility and look around 
anywhere it so chooses. Under managed access provisions:
[T]he inspected State Party shall have the right to take such measures to protect 
sensitive installations and prevent disclosure of confidential information and data 
not related to chemical weapons. [Some of the more important measures include 
the following:]
(a) Removal of sensitive papers from office space;
(b) Shrouding of sensitive displays, stores, and equipment;
(e) Restriction of sample analysis to the presence or absence of chemicals listed 
in Schedules 1,2, and 3 or appropriate degradation products;
(f) Using random selective access techniques whereby the inspectors are 
requested to select a given percentage or number of buildings of their choice to 
inspect; the same principle can apply to the interior and content of sensitive 
buildings; (Part X of the Verification Annex of the CWC, "Challenge Inspections 
Pursuant to Article IX", Conduct of Inspections, Managed Access, para 48, p. 
158^) 39
The rules of procedure for challenge inspections are designed to strike a 
harmonious balance between the needs for secrecy and transparency in 
questionable activities. But more important than the procedural aspects of a 
challenge inspection is the process by which one is instigated, and the time 
constraints involved before the inspection can actually take place. The request by 
a state party to the Executive Council of the OPCW for a challenge inspection 
should not be considered a frivolous matter. States are encouraged to try to resolve 
compliance issues between themselves before taking official action. Therefore, 
prior to an official request for a challenge inspection, a request can be made to 
the Executive Council to clarify an ambiguity, or the suspected state may be asked 
to clarify a questionable activity. Once an official request for a challenge 
inspection has been submitted, the Executive Council must, within twelve hours 
and by a three-quarter majority, decide whether the inspection request will be
3^See Stem, op. cit., (1994), 34, 'and Verification Annex of CWC, Part VIII, 136. & Part VIII, 
M2.
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granted. Then, the Director General must inform the inspected party within twelve 
hours that an inspection will take place. Finally, the physical inspection must 
take place within 120 hours of notification.40 Thus, under very controlled 
circumstances, the inspection team will be dispatched to collect and analyze
information to determine whether a violation has occurred.
The final section of the verification component of the CWC is the investigation 
into the actual use of chemical weapons. Any investigation required to determine 
use would mean that verification measures designed to halt the production or 
possession of chemical weapons have already failed. Under the provisions of Part 
XI of the Verification Annex, Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical 
Weapons, a state party must submit an official request for an investigation by the 
Director General and include as much information as possible concerning the 
circumstances of the alleged incident. The Director General will then notify all 
other states parties as well as the Executive Council. The Director General shall 
then select an inspection team from a list of experts; usually this can be drawn 
from the same list of experts who conduct challenge inspections. Additional 
members may be assigned if other types of expertise are required. Usually, the 
inspection team is to be dispatched within 24 hours of a request. If there are any
39piease note that this is not the complete list of managed access provisions, only the main points. 
^These time delays concern the fact that the two parties need to establish a perimeter area (at the 
site or facility) to be searched at the point of entry (of the state party's territory). If the initial 
perimeter is not acceptable, an alternative perimeter area must be designated. In all cases, the 
inspectors must be transported to the suspect site within 36 hours of arrival. The inspected party is 
supposed to provide prompt access to the installation or at least to the alternative perimeter once at 
the site. At the actual site, the inspected party is to agree on provisions for the final perimeter, but 
if agreement still cannot be reached at this point, and before a time span of 72 hours, the alternative 
perimeter shall become the final perimeter or searched area. (See Verification Annex of the CWC, 
Part X "Challenge inspections pursuant to Article IX and also R. Mathews, "Verification of the
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delays, then the Director General is accountable. Once in the territory of the state 
party where the incident has occurred, the inspection team has the right of access 
to samples, interviews, hospitals, or to any area, person, or situation that may 
provide evidence of chemical weapons use. This type of verification activity is 
similar to a challenge inspection except that many more variables must be taken 
into consideration. It must be remembered that no action can be taken against 
violators until it can be proved that illicit use has occurred. Then it may be 
possible to investigate and ferret out stocks of suspected agents to find out where 
previous verification measures have failed.
Section 4.3-The CWC: An Analysis of its Strengths and Weaknesses
The CWC firmly establishes the abolition of chemical weapons as an international 
norm, which is extremely unique in modem arms control, as it seeks to rid the 
world entirely of a weapon of mass destruction. The CWC also supports chemical 
weapons disarmament with further non-proliferation measures as well as 
unprecedented verification and enforcement measures. As the treaty has not yet 
entered into force, it is not possible to take any position regarding its effectiveness 
as opposed to its proposed effectiveness.41 Only time and circumstances will 
attest to the value of this Convention. Nevertheless, an analysis can be made about 
some of the treaty's structural inadequacies and strengths. The purpose of this * 4
Chemical Industry Under the Chemical Weapons Convention", in Poole & Guthrie, (eds.), op. cit., 
Chapter 5.
41 Although the CWC is near to EIF, once it enters into force it would take some time to assess its 
effectiveness. It would not be an immediate result.
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section is to critique the CWC as it now stands, which may offer some indication
of its future effectiveness.
Initially, for a treaty to be successful, it must be universal, non-discriminatory, and
open. States must also ratify and implement this treaty without delay so that the
treaty has order and purpose. If these basic functions are not fulfilled, then no 
matter how comprehensive and well-meaning a treaty is, it will never be truly 
viable. Whatever the altruistic goals of the treaty, they will not come to much if 
the treaty is not widely subscribed to. The CWC also offers positive incentives for 
states to join, such as the prospects of technology access and protection from 
chemical weapons attack. If the treaty did not offer such "carrots", it is doubtful it 
would be successful in attracting membership. States have to see that it is in their 
own interest to join or, at the very least, that it is not contrary to their interests. 
Similarly, the CWC contains "sticks" to make states which do not join reconsider 
their position. If states do not join, their access to specific chemicals which are 
important for the lucrative international chemical trade would be withdrawn, 
dealing a serious economic blow to a state wishing to build up a competitive and 
multinational chemical industry. In the international community there would be 
political and economic costs for not becoming members of the regime. As the 
Convention establishes an important legal norm, those who remain outside the 
regime would be considered as pariahs.
The CWC is also non-discriminatory, as every part is equal. Every member must 
abide by the same rules; there is no two-tiered system like the Nuclear Non­
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in which some states can have these weapons and
143
other cannot. All parties also have the same rights under the CWC. In addition the 
CWC contains extensive openness and transparency measures. Every state is 
required to declare its stocks of chemical weapons and open its commercial 
facilities to intrusive inspections by an outside body. By making transparency 
detailed and mandatory, the CWC requires states to lay bare their chemical 
weapons larder in order to reassure other states that they are not retaining the 
chemical weapons option. Openness is considered a sign of trust, and trust entails 
reciprocity.
While the CWC encourages universality and equality, a state still cannot actually 
be forced to join the Convention. Furthermore, "if chemical weapons are 
outlawed, only outlaws will have chemical weapons. "42 Sub-state actors, involved 
in terrorist activity as evidenced in the Tokyo chemical weapons attack, do not 
honour the belief that the use of these weapons is especially reprehensible or, 
indeed, even care about the political risks of their use. Their objective is simply to 
instil terror and seek attention for their own agenda. The good news is that at the 
initial signing ceremony in Paris in January 1993, some 130 states signed the 
Convention, including many states from areas of tension, or states that are 
suspected to have chemical weapons. The Director of the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA), John Holum, has optimistically pointed out that 
"it is important that three quarters of the 25 countries identified as having a
42Brin, 34.
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chemical weapons potential have signed the CWC. We want them to ratify as
well, and ultimately to attain universal adherence."43
Some of the states which have not signed as yet and are causing concern are the 
following: Angola, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, and Taiwan.44 
The main area of concern for acceptance of the CWC remains the Middle’East. 
Not only is this an area of high tension and strategic value, but it is also the area
where the most recent incidents of chemical weapons use has occurred. The so 
called "Red Sea Gang " wanted their signing of the CWC to be linked to Israel 
signing the NPT. The feeling in this part of the world is that if these states are 
willing to give up a weaker security option such as chemical weapons, then Israel 
should show some good faith and sign the NPT.45 States in this area of the world 
also feel that their security could be compromised if the CWC were to be used as 
a spying mechanism. There is the fear that challenge inspections could be used to 
spy on nuclear programmes. A hypothetical example would be Israel demanding a 
challenge inspection of a facility in Syria, not because it particularly believes that 
illicit chemical weapons activities are taking place, but because it suspects that 
some sort of nuclear programme is being developed.46 Similarly, this situation 
could also be applied in the reverse as Israel also has the same fear of inspectors 
spying under a false pretext.47 But as Jessica Stem points out, the verification
43See ACDA, "Statement of the Honorable John Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency before The Committee on Foreign Relations", United States Senate, Official 
Text, March 22. 1994,2.
^^Smithson, op. cit., (1994), 90.
45James Leonard, “Rolling Back Chemical Proliferation”, Arms Control Today, October 1992, 16.
^Interview Rybka, also see Jessica Eve Stem, "All's Well That Ends Well? Verification and the 
CWC", in Poole and Guthrie, (eds.), Chapter 4.
^Leonard, 16.
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annex is supposed to protect against frivolous inspections; certain parts of 
facilities may be shielded, and not all chemical weapons detection equipment can 
pick up signs of nuclear development.48 While the CWC does offer these 
protective measures, it still remains a problem for the universality challenge as 
long as states perceive that some of their sovereignty and security rights might be 
breached. A combination of diplomatic cajoling, regional peer group pressure as 
well as economic pressures would all be used to bring outsiders into the regime. 
The fact that all parties are held to the same standards, unlike with the NPT, may 
give some moral high ground to diplomatic and peer pressure. If the major states 
do not accede to the treaty, then political pressure would be hollow. Finally, if any 
states wish to have input into the chemical weapons regime on an equal standing 
with any other state, then they must become members. At least on paper, the CWC 
contains enough political and economic incentives to support universality.
Gaining ratification of the treaty has been a difficult and slow task. It is important
to remember that some non-signatories may yet ratify it and that some signatories 
thmay stall ratification. The treaty enters into force (EIF) 180 days after the 65 
instrument of ratification has been deposited. The earliest EIF date for the CWC 
was January 1995. Delays in ratification have extended this process to 1997. The 
delay is partly attributed to the fact that states are hesitant to ratify until the holders 
of the largest chemical weapons stockpiles, the United States and Russia, accede 
to the CWC. According to Ian Kenyon, the Executive Secretary of the OPCW, 
"...many countries had completed their internal ratification procedures but were
"^See Jessica Eve Stem, “All’s Well that Ends Well? Verification and the CWC”, in Poole and 
Guthrie, (eds.), op. cit., Chapter 4.
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waiting for the United States and Russia, the world's biggest declared holders of 
chemical weapons to take the lead."® It is extremely important that the key states 
behind the treaty ratify the CWC. While it is not technically required that these 
two states ratify the CWC, if they do not, smaller states may wonder why they 
should relinquish their use of a particular weapon while larger states retain theirs. 
To not ratify the treaty would be inconsistent as both the United States and Soviet 
Union played a major part in initiating and then negotiating the treaty. More 
important, the United States will also be responsible for a large share' of the costs
of the OPCW.5® A CWC without the U.S. and Russia would be a hollow exercise
and probably not even viable.
Ratification delays mean that the treaty cannot be operational. If ratification does
not take place in a timely fashion, the urgency, credibility and importance of the
treaty will be called into question. While the CWC has acknowledged limitations,
the final product is still a strong, cohesive, and detailed treaty which embraces a
multitude of concerns. The co-operation between differing states in facilitating this
Convention is truly a historical achievement; to lose it through domestic
dissension would truly be a historical dereliction. More important, it is possible
that the enthusiasm*for this treaty will wane if the momentum is not seized with
timely ratifications. Michael Moodie also cautions that:
...[I]t is essential to continue to move aggressively on CWC ratification and 
implementation—and to get implementation right once it begins. If momentum 
flags, it could undermine enthusiasm for the convention and the international 
norm it is intended to create. It could also diminish enthusiasm for multilateral 
arms control as an important approach to dealing with international security
"^Reuters, "Chemical Weapons Agency sees treaty by end-1996", 18 October 1995.
^^The U.S. stockpile is 30,000 metric tons while Russia's is 40,000. See Amy Smithson, "Dateline 
Washington: Clinton Fumbles the CWC}", Foreign Policv. Summer 1995, 172.
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problems, souring the experience in such a way that further pursuit of multilateral 
arms control would hold little attraction.51
If there is enough international consensus to sign this treaty, then it seems
inconsistent that states are so hesitant in their ratification processes. Ratification is
the concern of each state's domestic political structure where internal debates
examine the costs and benefits of the treaty before agreement. This is where the
arms control diplomats take their case to the politicians for debate:
Due to a facet of treaty law designed to protect democratic procedures and 
controls, the signature of an emissary of a state on a treaty does not become 
binding until endorsed in a process of national ratification. In the United States 
as in other democracies, the legislative body must express its consent before 
ratification can be carried out. With more than 150 signatories to the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) since its opening for signature in January 1993, the 
process leading to ratification therefore ensures a nearly global parliamentary and 
public debate....Thus, in the United States, as in many other countries, the 
discussion of chemical disarmament is no longer limited to narrow group of 
specialists.55
Some states simply may have more elaborate bureaucratic processes than others, 
may be undergoing political turbulence, or simply have such a daunting portfolio 
of other matters to consider. As a result, arms control is not given precedence. In 
the case of the United States, a combination of bureaucratic processes and 
domestic politics and a considerable caseload as a world leader has slowed down 
the process. Arms control agreements almost always face a laborious process in 
the U.S. Congress. It would seem that this debate should be made easier as the 
United States is already committed to destroying its chemical weapons stockpile. 
Therefore, it would also seem logical that those debating the CWC in the Senate 
would not question the reason and importance of the CWC. As Amy Smithson 
argues, "by all accounts, except for a handful of Cold War critics, the Convention
31 Michael Moodie, “Evaluating the CWC in the Post-Cold War Security Context”, in Roberts, 
(ed.) op. cit., (1994), 17.
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is a commonsense deal.”53 It is no longer a debate about the utility of chemical 
weapons. Thus, it would seem reasonable that the treaty should not encounter too 
many stumbling blocks to ratification. As the director of ACDA, John Holum, 
points out, “...if we failed to ratify the CWC, and it did not enter into force, we 
would lose the benefit of having other countries legally obligated to eliminate 
weapons that we have chosen to renounce for ourselves^54
There are a variety of reasons why those responsible for the legislative process
wish to debate the merits of the CWC: economic costs to the U.S. (e.g., in a time
of shrinking budgets is it really worth the money to be part of this treaty?); effects
on the chemical industry; risks to the environment; and risks to the security of
both the United States and the international community. One of the more
contentious issues involved, at least in the U.S. ratification process, is the
suspicion that Russia will not or cannot honour its promises. It is feared that:
Russia's chemical stockpile poses a menace similar to "loose nukes". Security 
conditions at Russia's chemical storage sites, lax compared with those at its 
nuclear facilities, have deteriorated since the collapse of the USSR. Instability in 
Russia has made this arsenal quite vulnerable to abuse or theft55
Another problem critics cite is the perception that the treaty is not verifiable. Most 
of the Senate's experiences with arms control treaties have lead it to distrust the 
Soviet Union's compliance record. Verification issues for the CWC are different
32Roberts, op. cit., (1994), 116.
5^Amy Smithson, "Get Moving and Ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention", International 
Herald Tribune, 18 June 1996, 8.
34see John Holum, "The CWC: Time for the Harvest", remarks to an American Bar Association 
(ABA) Seminar on Implementing the CWC, February 7, 1995, 3, (Hereafter, ABA seminar). 
55Smithson., op. cit., (1995), 181.
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from those of nuclear weapons; and past experiences in the field of nuclear arms 
control cannot necessarily be applied to chemical weapons.56
In addition, as there was no real forceful public relations campaign promoting the 
treaty, it was feared that the Senate would take its time in debating the key issues, 
allowing more prominent domestic concerns to take precedence. There has also 
been criticism of the Clinton administration for being slow to transmit the treaty to 
the Senate and not being aggressive enough either in promoting the treaty, or in 
taking the time to educate the Senate as to the pros and cons of the treaty. The 
crucial issue here is that domestic promotion and education are paramount to the 
ratification process.
Domestic squabbling in Congress has also hindered the process. In 1994, ten 
hearings were held in both houses of Congress but this fell to zero in 1995 when 
the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Jesse Helms, 
blocked movement on arms control treaties in Congress to ensure a review of the 
foreign affairs agencies. Under a "unanimous consent agreement", however, the 
administration has agreed to review the standing of the foreign affairs agencies 
within a six-month period. In return, Senator Helms must hold up to four hearings 
on the CWC, and a floor vote must be taken by April 30. As soon as possible, 
former Senate Majority Leader, Bob Dole promised to submit the CWC to the 
Senate for full ratification. The Clinton administration has also promised to
56ibid., 174-175. Smithson traces the routing of the CWC when it first went down the path to 
ratification. While taking time out to criticise the foreign policy of the Clinton she is accurate in her 
assessment that as the CWC represented a new step in arms control, more educating should have 
been done on its behalf.
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promote the CWC more enthusiastically by enlisting the services of its most senior 
foreign affairs staff to testify on the CWC's behalf?? Perhaps a hopeful sign was 
that Congress ratified Start II on 26 January 1996. Thus, it was thought likely that 
the CWC would be ratified by mid-1996. Unfortunately, the prospect of this 
happening is diminished and EIF will probably not occur for another year?8
Recently, it has also seemed that Russia has been dragging its feet on arms 
control agreements. It is interesting to note that the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee included in its Resolution for ratification of the CWC binding
conditions and non-binding declarations concerning Russian commitment to the 
destruction of chemical weapons.® The U.S. has agreed to help both financially 
and technically with the Russian destruction programme but unease still remains.
Indeed, political instability in Russia is worrisome vis-a-vis the stability of 
maintaining arms control agreements, as it is feared that more contentious issues 
in Russian politics will get in the way of progress of the CWC. Peter Herby
observes that:
55information on this process was supplied from an enquiry to Kate Rodriguez of the Bureau of 
Intelligence, Verification & Information Management, U.S. ACDA, researched through its 
Congressional Affairs Liaison Office. Also see Arms Control Today. December 1995/January 
1996,28.
35update. Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did approve on 25 April 1996 a 
resolution for ratifying the CWC, Senator Dole never presented the treaty to the full Senate before 
he left Congress. (Thus, any prospects for ratification must wait until Congress reconvenes after 
the summer recess). Without the United States and Russia on board, the work of the OPCW may be 
held in abeyance. By mid-June 1996, there were still only 53 ratifications deposited. Sixty-five are 
needed for entry into force of the CWC. See Heather Podiich, "Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee Passes CWC Ratification Resolution", Arms Control Todav. April 1996, 21, and 
author's conversation with Kate Rodriguez of ACDA (June 1996).
5^The binding conditions concerning Russia include: presidential certification that Russia has 
completed the data requirements of the U.S.-Soviet Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and 
a report on any Russian discrepancies in the data; and that the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Destruction 
Agreement will be concluded and that verification mechanisms are up to par with that of the CWC. 
Declarations include that in exchange for U.S. financial assistance, Russia must destroy its
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In the Russian Parliament, fierce opposition is focused on both environmental 
and financial considerations....Moreover, the destruction program is not a high 
priority item for Russian legislators currently involved with a number of hotly 
contested political and economic issues....60
Notwithstanding the technical, financial, and political problems in Russia, upon
completion of the signing of the CWC, it did appear that the Russian ratification
process was following the same path as that in the U.S. The Duma committee
charged with overseeing the ratification process submitted a plan to President
Yeltsin soon after the signing of the CWC and commenced hearings on the matter
on March 24, 1994. This was parallel to developments in the United States, where
the Senate had begun hearings two days earlier. More hearings were also
scheduled for later that year. In another sign of Russian commitment to the CWC,
its representatives were also very active in the work of the Preparatory
Commission of the OPCW.61 The bureaucracy of the intergovernmental decision­
making process itself also presents problems.62 Although the political will
appears to be present, technical problems combined with bureaucracy are delaying
the process. The Russian debate on this issue was once again delayed by
Parliamentary elections in December 1995, but the Director General of the OPCW
was assured that ratification would take place by Spring 1996. That date was then
moved up to after the June Presidential elections. As of June 1996, however,
ratification still seems to be in abeyance. Russia is well aware of the political 
consequences of remaining outside the regime. It would lose its right to
stockpile at a proportional rate to that of the U.S. and inform the relevant committees of any 
Russian non-compliance. See Podiich, op. cit., (April 1996), 21.
60peter Herby, "Building the Chemical Disarmament Regime", Arms Control Todav, September 
1993, 18.
^Report on Demonstration of Russian Commitment to Comolv with Three Agreements on i
Chemical and Biological Weapons. From The White House to the Honorable Robert C. Byrd,
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, October 1, 1994,4.
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representation at the OPCW after extensive participation in the Preparatory 
Commission. In addition, much-needed financial aid and technology to destroy its 
chemical weapons stockpile would be jeopardized.
Another problem relating to ratification is the question of implementation, as the
ratification debate often centres on this. As Michael Moodie observes:
A major challenge to those in the arms control community is to shift their focus 
from the “fun” of arms control negotiation to the “drudgery” of arms control 
implementation. In the years ahead, the latter will be as, if not more, important 
than the former, and priorities must shift accordingly. The CWC provides a 
critical test case of how well that transition can be managed. 62 3
It is an important issue because if the treaty is not implemented properly at the 
outset then the chance of success is already weakened. Two possible 
implementation problems facing the CWC are set out by Brad Roberts: finding the 
most effective way to physically dispose of chemical weapons stockpiles while 
maintaining safety in the environment; and the implementation of the reporting 
and declaration requirements of the chemical industry.64 The hazards of chemical 
weapons destruction are really only relevant to the states with major stockpiles to 
destroy. But it is a sensitive issue. The United States has been working on
environmentally safe destruction issues for some time and is actively collaborating 
with Russia on this matter. In terms of industry, the chemical industry took part in 
the negotiations, its constituents were consulted, and indeed the industry supported 
the CWC. Without the chemical industry’s co-operation in the first place, it is 
doubtful whether the CWC would have been so cohesive. Nevertheless, for
62Ibid.
63Moodie, op. cit., in Roberts, (ed.), (1994), 16.
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smaller companies the requirements of CWC verification may appear daunting.
John Holum admits that:
The CWC will impose some additional costs on U.S. companies. Producers, 
processors, and consumers of certain chemicals will have to file required 
declaration forms and host on-site visits by international inspection teams. But 
these costs should be modest—particularly if affected firms plan carefully in 
advance. Those taking part in practice on site inspections and reviewing draft 
declaration forms are finding that complying with the CWC requirements will be 
manageable within the normal scope of activities'^
Although Holum is implying that the CWC does place additional constraints on 
industry, given industry’s previous co-operation and consultation and practice 
runs, the process should not be too rough. A further incentive for U.S. companies 
to support the ratification of the CWC is the economic costs to industry if the U.S. 
does not ratify. They would be frozen out of the chemical trade and as Amy
Smithson argues:
Chemical industry leaders have warned the Senate that their overseas customers 
will begin switching to suppliers in states that have ratified the treaty. The 
Senate's postponement of a vote will have a negative impact on a $60 billion 
U.S. export business and the jobs associated with it.* 66
The same problem would also be applicable to the chemical industries in other 
states if their governments do not ratify the CWC.
Finally, there is the fear that the national authorities will not fullfill their
obligations accordingly once the CWC enters into force. As Peter Herby warns:
[M]any states have neither established national implementation mechanisms or 
educated their own bureaucracies about the eventual demands the CWC will 
place upon them, in terms of planning, material and financial resources.67
64Roberts, op. cit., (1994), 119.
65see John Holum, ABA Seminar, 4-5.
66Amy Smithson, op. cit., (1996), 8.
6^Herby, 17.
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Domestic requirements will cut across the military (defence), the political (foreign
affairs), the penal (justice), the commercial (industry), and commercial-
government (trade or commerce departments).68 While some states may face these
problems, they are not insurmountable. It is simply a matter of co-ordinating
their own national bureaucracies. States may also have another incentive to
harmonize their national policies. After the Tokyo chemical weapons subway
attack, the fear that a non-state actor could gather enough resources for a chemical
attack became all too real. If Japan had tighter laws and penalties in place at the
time of the Tokyo gas subway attack, the Tokyo subway attack probably could
have been prevented. The good news is that the intemational implementation
body, the Preparatory Commission of the PTS of the OPCW, has managed to work
out procedural matters and structures which bodes well for effective EIF.
Hopefully, national measures will be able to "piggyback" off this body. Herby also
praises the achievement of the Preparatory Commission thus far as:
Discharging all these tasks on time would challenge even the most efficiently run 
corporation: achieving these goals within an international organization composed 
of 147 squabbling governments many with conflicting interests beyond the scope 
of the CWC requires extraordinary political skill and the ability to create a sense 
of common purpose in the endeavour.69
The most important aspect of the CWC once it is operational and widely 
subscribed to, is its verification and compliance measures. If a treaty has enough 
loopholes, no verification procedures, or weak compliance mechanisms, then the 
treaty is not worth the paper it is written on, and will be operationally useless in 
the real world. According to Jessica Stem:
The CWC sets a number of important precedents in this regard. It is the first 
arms control treaty since the (never implemented) Baruch Plan of 1946 to
68Ibid.
69Ibid., 15.
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contain explicit wording on collective sanctions against violators, and its 
inspections will be far more intrusive than any other arms control treaty adopted 
so far.70
The only way to ensure that the obligations of the treaty are being met is to verify 
them. The purposes of verification in such a regime are to detect and to deter 
parties from cheating. The CWC is considered to have the most extensive 
verification provisions ever afforded a treaty, and “...establishes new standards in 
multilateral arms control and disarmament treaties in terms of the depth, extent 
and intrusiveness of verification provisions.”71
Although the CWC's verification measures have been applauded, critics of the
CWC claim that it is impossible to verify because the chemical industry is too
large, too many chemicals are of a dual-use nature, and those determined to cheat
simply will not declare their caches of chemical weapons. In response, the
proponents of the treaty have never claimed it would be perfect nor indeed one
hundred percent verifiable. Peter Van Ham acknowledges that:
There can be little doubt that the CWC is not—and never will be—100 per cent 
watertight: determined proliferators will always be able to manufacture chemical 
weapons. However, it can be argued that the CWC provides significant 
verification procedures which deter cheating, and that its mixture of verification, 
confidence-building measures, assurances and sanctions may go a long way in 
encouraging states to abandon this category of weapons.77
John Holum, the Director of ACDA also shares this opinion that "While no treaty
is one hundred percent verifiable, the CWC will substantially increase the risk of
70Ibid.
71 Robert Mathews and Timothy McCormack, "Prevention is Better than Cure: Pre-empting 
Inspection-Related Disputes under the Chemical Weapons Convention", Contemporarv Security 
Policv. Vol. 16. No. 3, 9 December 1995, 38.
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detection and hence deterrence."* 73 In other words, the CWC places very firm 
obstacles in the way of chemical weapons proliferation; they are not perfect, but 
they are still very strong.
How difficult is it for determined actors to cheat and bypass verification controls? 
The easiest and most obvious way of cheating is simply to not declare facilities or 
stockpiles at the outset of the process. The only way to discover a clandestine 
programme or stockpile is through human intelligence, although sometimes 
technical intelligence data can also make inspectors suspicious. Peter Van Ham 
argues that:
[Inspection teams will want to know where to look in the first place. Detailed 
and reliable intelligence will be essential for the OPCW's operation, but it is not 
at all clear how it will obtain the infonnation to enable it to decide which 
facilities warrant inspection. A computer database will be established in The 
Hague comprising information provided by member states. The OPCW will, 
however, not have an independent information-gathering network. This might 
prove a significant lack, since apart from controlling declared chemical 
production facilities, undeclared stock and covert production must also be 
discovered.74
It is all very well to have the right to inspect suspect facilities, but first they must 
be located. As Kathleen Bailey contends: “If a suspicious signatory country 
demands a challenge inspection, the illicit activity at the site will almost surely be 
discovered. But how would the facility be pin-pointed for inspection?”75 The sheer 
abundance of facilities on a global scale which require inspection may over-stretch 
inspection teams, leaving little time for effectively policing suspect facilities.
72peter Van Ham, "Controlling missiles, and chemical and biological weapons", in T. Taylor and 
R. Imai, (eds.), The Defence Trade. Demand, Supply and Control, (London: Royal Institute for 
International Afairs, 1994), 81-83.
73 John Holum, CSIS lecture, 4.
?4see Van Ham, op. cit., in Taylor and Imai, (eds.), 82.
^Kathleen Bailey, "Problems with a Chemical Weapons Ban", Orbis, Spring 1992, 243.
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Chemicals designed for legitimate purposes may also be diverted and used for 
illicit activities. Accounting errors, spillage, mismeasurement, evaporation, and 
falsification of records may also make it difficult to trace renegade chemicals. 76 
There is also the possibility that new chemical agents could be produced in 
separate facilities set aside for defensive research.77 It was recently alleged by two 
Russian scientists that a more toxic nerve agent had been developed despite their 
government’s claim that its chemical weapons activity had been terminated.78 
Most states, however, have chosen to develop the traditional chemical agents, 
because the creation of new ones requires extensive research and development. 
Although the development of new agents may prompt concern, it remains a small 
risk owing to the extensive development costs of such a project. As an added 
safeguard, the CWC schedules of chemicals can be updated and revised to
accommodate any threatening, new innovations.
Cheating may also present a problem for challenge inspections. For example, 
owing to the time delays involved, a cheater may have adequate time to stall and 
cover his tracks. According to Dr. Ralf Trapp of the OPCW's Verification Bureau, 
in the worst case scenario, it would take inspectors about five days to gain access 
to the facilities, during which time a stockpile could be removed. Also, an 
inspection request made to the Director General could be leaked, giving states 
advance warning that a challenge inspection will be forthcoming.79 Through the 
Director General’s use of diplomatic channels and the filing of official documents,
76lbid., 242, and Van Ham, op. cit., in Taylor and Imai, (eds), 81.
^^Bailey, 242.
78Brin, 35.
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the accused state could gain advanced warning, and therefore may be able to hide 
any evidence.80 The crux of the matter is that no state party is going to be blatant 
or indeed foolish enough to leave an exposed trail of evidence for inspectors to 
find. Instead, inspectors will have to search for tell-tale evidence that illicit 
chemical weapons activities have taken place or have been hidden. For example, a 
site that was also engaged in illicit activities would have special, and distinctive, 
design features and storage facilities for this purpose. It probably is not as easy as 
some would argue to reconvert these facilities before an inspection takes place.81
It is has also been alleged that a "cheater could hide illicit chemical production in
the midst of other chemical-industry activity even when allowing the overall
facility to be inspected."82 During the challenge inspection, the cheater could
declare off limits certain areas which may house suspect equipment, materials or
activities. Basically, there are a variety of opinions as to what can be hidden,
disguised, or removed before a challenge inspection. Nevertheless, if the
inspectors are trained properly, they should be able to ferret out the necessary
evidence. Unfortunately, time delays and devious behaviour may give the
advantage to the determined cheater. As Jay Brin argues:
On balance, the CWC may give too much control to the inspected party, who is 
under no legal obligation to cooperate fully. Uncooperative or even deceptive 
behaviour, like that of Iraq toward the U.N. nuclear inspections teams after the 
Gulf War, would be permitted within the letter—though not the spirit of the 
treaty. To make it more difficult for a violator to hide the evidence, it would be
^interview with Dr. Ralf Trapp of the OPCW’s Verification Bureau, conducted 11 November 
1994, The Hague.
^Connie Rybka, U.S. Army Assistant for Negotiations, Under-Secretary for Defense. Interview 
conducted at the Pentagon, 24 July 1995.
81 Interview Dr. Ralf Trapp.
^Bailey, 241.
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better to have access to a suspect site within 48 hours (rather than 120 hours) 
after a challenge inspection has been announced.83 84
Brin makes a relevant point about shorter notice in inhibiting cheating, but more 
importantly, he warns that non-co-operative behaviour would not necessarily place 
the inspected party in violation of the treaty, and could conceivably encourage
such behaviour.
The only genuine example of how intrusive verification procedures are conducted 
in the real world is the UNSCOM operation in Iraq. These unprecedented 
verification and inspection activities may have some fundamental applications for 
the CWC's verification regime. Until the CWC is fully operational and is called 
upon to conduct a challenge inspection, this is the only documented example as to 
how verification activities can be conducted against a state suspected of 
prolfferation.'* It must be cautioned that the CWC inspection regime is designed 
to be much less intrusive than the UNSCOM operation in Iraq. Rod Barton makes
the distinction that:
Even the most rigorous inspections under the CWC will be much less intrusive 
than those allowed by UNSCOM under Resolutions 687 and 707, Thus under 
the CWC, the site to be inspected is to some extent negotiable with the state 
party and the inspectors will be restricted to the site, which will be precisely 
defined.83
It is also important to note that the UNSCOM operation was forced upon Iraq as 
part of a wider security and disarmament mandate following the Gulf War, but the
83 Brin, 40.
84 Trial inspections have also been conducted, but they were simply practice runs.
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CWC is a multilaterally negotiated and freely agreed-to set of obligations. While 
the UNSCOM operation was more intensive than that of the projected CWC, 
"...UNSCOM inspectors (still) noted these anomalies during routine inspections 
without the need to resort to the special powers granted to them’’.86 Therefore, 
even without the highly intrusive verification of the UNSCOM operation, the 
CWC inspections should be able to catch any irregularities. But, it should be 
remembered that even with all of UNSCOM’s powers, Iraq still managed to 
continue an illicit weapons programme and mislead investigators. Perhaps the real 
test of the proposed CWC’s verification regime’s value is whether it would have 
produced the same results as the UNSCOM operation in Iraq. Rob Mathews 
acknowledges that if the CWC had been in place at the time of Iraq's activities, the 
"verification provisions of the CWC would have been sufficiently effective to 
indicate that Iraq was producing and using chemical weapons (but not necessarily 
the extent of the vc^lai^Ktnon)’' An important caveat to remember in this 
argument is that Iraq is a worst-case scenario. It is a risky policy, politically, for 
most states to risk world-wide condemnation by hiding their illicit chemical 
weapons programmes. The major flaw in this regime, however, is the simple fact 
that a state may ultimately choose to remain outside the regime. One could argue 
that the states which have either unilaterally renounced chemical weapons or 
acceded to the treaty are those most unlikely to use them in the first place, but
^Rod Barton, "Chemical Weapons Inspections in Iraq: Verification Implications for the Chemical 
Weapons Convention", Working Paper No. 131, (Canberra: Peace Research Centre, June 1993), 
14-15.
Bfybid, 16. What Barton is saying is that although the CWC verification inspectors may not be able 
to gather detailed information about militarily significant quantities of chemical weapons with the 
powers they now have, they would still be able to find enough evidence to report back to the 
OPCW Executive Council.
^Robert Mathews, “Verification of the Chemical Industry Under the Chemical Weapons 
Convention”, in Poole and Guthrie, (eds.), Chapter 5.
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those that remain outside the regime may not have any reservations about doing 
so. The CWC's verification machinery cannot force a party outside the treaty to
accept intrusive verification.- Any forceful measures would have to be placed
under a mandate or operation such as UNSCOM.
It is not always possible to verify use. As Dr. Trapp points out, it is often difficult 
to pin-point the exact location of an attack, and due to their properties, certain 
agents may have already dissipated by the time an inspection team arrives. If the 
state party formulating the request has been attacked by chemical weapons, it 
would obviously be in its own interest to co-operate fully by giving complete 
access to its own sites and records. When the investigators need to track the 
source of a chemical weapons attack, problems may arise if they need access to 
the territory of a non-state party. According to Part XI of the Verification Annex, 
Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, Para. E-27, States 
Not Party to This Convention, the "Organization shall closely cooperate with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations". This is the only recourse states have 
when claiming a chemical weapons attack. There are also serious complications 
when a non-state party uses chemical weapons on its own territory, as was the case 
of Iraq's attack against the Kurdish population. Verification proves difficult 
because the right of access becomes embroiled in political problems. Thus, while 
the verification provisions of the CWC are not perfect, they are extensive and 
strive to cover various contingencies.
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Chapter V
The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or 
to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW).
The Convention on Conventional Weapons or the Inhumane Weapons Convention 
depending on one's preference, is a unique treaty in many respects. Although it has 
often been described as an international humanitarian law treaty, it is in fact a
curious blend of international humanitarian law and arms control. IHL is the most
prevalent component of the treaty, but the CCW also seeks to restrict the use of 
specific weapons systems. This is in contrast to the general IHL provisions 
regulating the means and methods of warfare, which since the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol had not focused upon specific weapons. The CCW has not been widely 
recognized as an arms control treaty either; perhaps this impression is sustained 
because the treaty emanated from the United Nations rather than through the 
bilateral arms control process, or the Conference on Disarmament. Because the 
treaty was negotiated in a multilateral milieu during the Cold War era, it was not 
accorded much stature or attention while superpower politics and bilateral 
agreements occupied centre stage. The purpose of this section is to examine the 
precedents for humanitarian controls on weapons; the history and motivations 
which brought about this treaty; the main points, strengths and weaknesses of the 
treat>?; and the prospects for success in making it stronger through the review
process.
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Section 5.1-Precedents for Restricting or Prohibiting Weapons on
Humanitarian Grounds.
The aspiration to prohibit weapons based upon their perceived inhumanity is not a 
20th century phenomenon. Attempts to declare certain weapons illegal go back to 
antiquity.1 Some of these attempts are of limited significance while others serve 
as important precedents. Specific restrictions on weapons started to appear when 
the law of war was being codified in the last century. These restrictions also 
occurred as part of the wider peace process. The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration 
was not only one of the first agreements codifying the laws of war but it also 
produced the first international agreement to prohibit a specific weapon with the 
“Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 
400 Grammes Weight”. The Declaration was designed to prohibit a new 
innovation in explosive bullets. The Russian Army had developed bullets to 
explode on hard contact, specifically to blow up ammunition wagons. Later, a 
similar but smaller bullet was invented which exploded on contact with a soft 
surface like human tissue, causing grievous bodily injury. This new development 
was strictly anti-personnel in nature, and did nothing to enhance the original 
military utility of the weapon. Moreover, the Russian government was uneasy 
about other parties acquiring the technology for a new weapon system. Logically, 
once a weapon was widely deployed, it would also be very difficult to convince
* For example, Polybius, an ancient Roman historian, wrote of the outlawing of “secret missile 
weapons” (such as spears, stones, and arrows) by the ancients because they were not an open 
means of combat. The Carthage-Rome Peace Treaty (202 B.C.) and the Peace of Apamea (188 
B.C.) decreed that the losing side had to relinquish its trained war elephants and not use any more 
in the future because they caused panic amongst troops. In the 12“' century, church leaders of the 
Second Lateran Council issued a decree prohibiting the use of crossbows against Christians. 
Although this prohibition was enacted on humanitarian grounds, in reality, there was a fear that the 
crossbow gave the common foot soldier and enemy a strategic advantage over the mighty knight. 
Crossbows could effectively pierce the knight’s armour and make him more vulnerable. See
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other states to rescind their deployment. Thus, it made sense to prohibit this
weapon before it could be widely dispersed?-
It is important to note that the parties involved agreed to a weight of 400 grams as 
the dividing line between the more anti-personnel rifle bullets and the larger
artillery.* 2 3 It is also where the line is drawn between military necessity and 
humanitarian concerns. The larger artillery munitions could certainly disable a 
large number of combatants and inflict disabling injuries during the course of 
action to overcome fortified positions. Their military utility was therefore too 
important to yield to humanitarian considerations, and their destructiveness to 
combatants was a secondary effect of the weapon. In contrast, the smaller rifle 
bullet wounded an opponent far more extensively than was strictly necessary to 
incapacitate him.4 As a result, these bullets were banned on the basis that the 
suffering they caused were disproportionate to their military effects. 
Proportionality regulates the balance between military necessity and humanity, and 
as G.J. F. Van Hegelsom argues:
While the effect of incendiary or explosive bullets for the purpose of wounding 
one man only would be considered disproportionate, as soon as the projectile
Richard E. Bums, (ed.), Encvclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament. (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 1366-1367.
2 Ove Bring, “Regulating Conventional Weapons in the Future—Humanitarian Law or Arms 
Control”, Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 24, No. 3, 1987, 276.
3 Frits Kalshoven, “Arms, Armaments and International Law”, Recueil des Cours. Collected 
Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law. Vol. II, 1985, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1986), 207.
4 According to the St. Petersburg Declaration, “...the only legitimate object which States should 
endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; [therefore], 
...this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the 
sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable;” See Text of the Declaration 
Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight as 
reproduced in Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman, (eds.), The Laws of Armed Conflict A Collection 
of Conventions. Resolutions and Other Documents, 3rd ed., Hemy Dunant Institute, (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988, 101-102.
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could affect more than one, the balance between military necessity and humanity 
would effectively be restored.5
Finally, although the Declaration only prohibited the use of these weapons, 
production of these bullets ceased as a consequence of the total and effective 
prohibition on their use.6 7
The St. Petersburg Declaration, however, did not rid the world of injurious bullets. 
A new manifestation of an excessively injurious bullet was to be found in the so- 
called “dum-dum” bullet which became the subject of prohibition at the Hague 
Peace Conference of 1899. Although the effects of these bullets on humans were 
as injurious as the projectiles prohibited under the St. Petersburg Declaration, the 
British government argued that as the bullets were neither explosive or 
inflammable, the prohibition was not applicable? The Hague Declaration (IV, 3) 
supports the customary principle prohibiting the use of weapons which cause 
unnecessary cruelty and states that, “Contracting parties agree to abstain from use 
of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a 
hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with
incisions.”?
5 G.J.F. Van Hegelsom, “Conventional Means and Methods of Warfare and the Law of Armed 
Conflict—Prospects for Further Restrictions and Prohibitions”, Humanities Vdlkerrecht, 
Informationsschriften, Nr. 4, Oktober 1991, 175.
6 Although there was no legal agreement to ban the production of these weapons, production was 
discontinued voluntarily— a rather unusual outcome in arms control. Had these weapons merely 
been restricted instead of prohibited, a cessation of production would have been unlikely. See Ove 
Bring, op. cit., (1987), 276.
7Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel White, International Law and Armed Conflict, (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth Publishers, 1992), 252.
* See Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets as reproduced in Schindler and Toman, 
109.
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At the next Hague Peace Conference in 1907, the emphasis switched to concerns 
about naval rather than land warfare. The purpose of the 1907 Hague Convention 
VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines was to limit 
the damage mines caused to neutrals and non-combatants both during and after
combat. In this case, the issue at hand was the indiscriminate nature of the
weapon rather than its inherent cruelty. Although there were proposals tabled for 
a total ban, a lack of support prevented this from occurring. Instead, simple 
restrictions were placed on these mines. Article 1.1 of the Convention states that it 
is forbidden “To lay unanchored automatic contact mines, except when they are so 
constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after the person who laid 
them ceases to control them.”9 The significance of this Convention is the 
recognition of the dangers that these mines posed to civilians due to their 
indiscriminateness. This same logic would be applied over 70 years later in the 
case of land mines. But like naval mines, there was not enough support from the 
major powers to completely ban them, because they served a military purpose. 
Indeed, with the exception of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, this Convention was to 
be the last attempt until the 1970s to restrict or ban a weapon that was either 
inhumane or indiscriminate, or whose use was seen to contravene humanitarian 
principles.10 But it should also be pointed out that there were no comparable 
prohibitions on existing categories of weapons in the arms control field either.
9Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, (eds.), Documents on the Laws of War, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), 86, and Bums, (ed.), op. cit., 1502.
10 The Washington Treaty on the Use of Submarines and Gases in Wartime (1922) was never 
ratified. But some of its main points do reflect the thinking of the time with regards to both 
security and humanitarian concerns. The invitation to the Conference which produced this treaty 
stated that “ It may be found advisable to formulate proposals by which in the interest of humanity 
the use of new agencies of warfare may be suitable controlled.” See A. Thomas and A.P.V. 
Thomas, Legal Limits on the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, (Dallas: Southern 
Methodist University Press, 1970), 63.
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Section 5.2-The History Leading up to the Conventional Weapons
Convention
During the height of the Cold War, the superpowers and their respective blocs 
were more concerned with engaging in an arms race than with actually reducing
their armaments. Still, new developments in the weapons race made it rapidly 
apparent that war was becoming more destructive and indiscriminate, raising 
warning signs in both the arms control and humanitarian law arenas. Specifically, 
the extravagances and widespread publicity of the Vietnam conflict led to renewed 
calls for restraint. The Vietnam conflict, though brutal and long, was probably no 
more horrific than any other war, but the fundamental difference was that it was 
heavily televised around the world.11 A variety of conventional weapons were 
causing concern, including incendiary weapons such as napalm, fragmentation 
weapons, cluster bombs and small-calibre weapons. 12 It was on napalm that 
attention was primarily focused, as it seemed to be the most dramatic type of 
weapon. The problems of land mines were not ignored, but initially, they did not 
have the same terrifying and dramatic effect of napalm. * 2 Today, that situation has 
been reversed due to the widespread publicity of the land mines crisis.
At the XXVI session of the UN General Assembly, Resolution 2852 was passed, 
calling for the Secretary General to submit a report on napalm and other 
incendiary weapons. This was submitted to the XXVII session of the UN General
11 Kalshoven, op. cit., (1986), 225, and Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994) , 296-297.
*3 Kalshoven, op. cit., (1986), 225.
*3Best, 299. In addition, land mines were abused by all sides, and therefore were not as 
controversial ideologically.
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Assembly.14 Once the UN began looking into these matters, the 1970s ushered in
various conferences on the reaffirmation of international humanitarian law and the
effects and perceived humanity of certain weapons. In 1971, under ICRC 
sponsorship, the Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts
was convened, with a second session following in 1972. While examining 
prohibitions on specific weapons was not part of the official mandate of the 
Conference, certain proposals were raised by some groups on these weapons. 
Initially the ICRC restrained itself from any official stand, as the organization felt 
that these discussions belonged in the sphere of the UN or disarmament forums. 
Later, however, the ICRC modified its position with the understanding that if no 
other consideration was given to these weapons, it would investigate the 
possibility of looking further into the matter. 15 But critics of the ICRC position felt 
that discussions on these prohibitions, because of their humanitarian nature, 
belonged in the IHL forum. At the second session, the ICRC was requested by 19 
governments to supervise a study by legal, military, and medical experts on the use 
and effects of possibly inhumane weapons. The ICRC acted promptly, and a 
report was produced the following year (1973).16 Although the report was 
intended for purely descriptive purposes and was not an outcome of the 
intergovernmental process, it did lay the groundwork for future conferences, and 
advocated the controversial viewpoints that were to come.
14See Maurice Aubert, “The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Problem of 
Excessively Injurious or Indiscriminate Weapons”, International Review of the Red Cross. No. 
279, November-December 1990,480.
*5See Kalshoven, op. cit., (1986), 228, based upon the commentary of a representative at the 
Conference as referenced in Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. Second Session, 3 
May-3 June 1972, Report of the Work of the Conference, Vol. 1, (Geneva: ICRC, 1972), para. 3:4.
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The next important conference on the agenda was the Conference of Government
Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons held in Lucerne, 
Switzerland in 1974. There was also a follow-up Conference held in Lugano in
1976. At the Lucerne Conference, delegates discussed the all-important legal
criteria or "measuring sticks” to be applied to the use of conventional weaponry. 
These included the concepts of unnecessary suffering, superfluous injury, 
indiscriminateness, and treachery or perfidy, all in relation to delayed action 
weapons. 17 At the next Conference held in Lugano in 1976, France, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands introduced draft proposals on mines and booby- 
traps which firmly distinguished these weapons as the main objects of focus for 
the future weapons conference.18
Although these Conferences had no law-making authority, and were under the 
organizational umbrella of the ICRC, they were very important because of wide 
attendance by numerous technical experts and official representatives from all the 
major powers. The Conferences were significant because they symbolized the 
willingness of states to sit down and discuss seriously the problem and effects of 
such weapons. But as a member of the U.S. Delegation to the original CCW 
conference, explains:
During the 1970s, the United States was not particularly desirous of concluding a 
weapons agreement and neither promoted nor opposed the multilateral 
negotiating process. This neutral position had been taken during the CDDH
i6Kalshoven, op. cit., (1986), 229-232, and Aubert, 480.
1 * See Brigadier A.P.V. Rogers, "The Mines Protocol: Negotiating History", in the ICRC Report, 
Symposium on Anti-Personnel Mines. Montreux, 21-23, April 1993, (Hereafter ICRC, Montreux 
Symposium), 228-229, and also Kalshoven, op. cit., (1986), 234-237 for a discussion on these 
issues.
l3Rogers, op. cit., in ICRC, Montreux Symposium. 229.
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partly because of a widely shared skepticism about both the humanitarian aspects 
of some of the proposals advanced and the prospects for success in prohibiting or 
restricting conventional weapons....19
Although parties were now willing to look at ways to restrict conventional 
weapons, they still remained sceptical about the effectiveness of any restrictions. 
Since even formal arms control treaties may lack teeth, one could also wonder 
whether restrictions on weaponry based upon humanitarian principles might have
even less substance.
Being convened (by the Swiss Government) in the same time period were the 
Diplomatic Conferences on the Reaffirmation and Development of Intemational 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict. Four sessions were held 
between 1974 and 1977 resulting in the adoption of the Additional Protocols to 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions. These conferences were concerned with improving 
the general rules of the law of war rather than dictating specific prohibitions on 
certain weapons, but their influence was important. As an offshoot of the 
Diplomatic Conference, the "Ad Hoc Committee" was established to study 
possible prohibitions or restrictions on conventional weapons. In sum, the Ad 
Hoc committee produced a total of four reports on the issues at hand, further 
adding to the body of knowledge needed for the final weapons conference.
The Diplomatic Conference also adopted Resolution 22, "Follow-up Regarding 
Prohibition or Restriction of the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons" which 
called for a Conference of Government Experts to reach agreements on restrictions
19Captain J. Ashley Roach, "Certain Conventional Weapons Convention: Arms Control or 
Humanitarian Law?", Military Law Review. Vol. 105, 1984,4.
171
or prohibitions on specific conventional weapons.20 The UN General Assembly 
concurred with Resolution 32/152 of 19 December 1977, the green light for 
convening the weapons conference. As a result, two preparatory conferences were
held in 1978 and 1979, and two sessions of the actual conference held in 1979 and
1980 21 In October 1980, the Convention was completed along with its annexed
protocols.
It is doubtful that the Weapons Conference would have taken place if states had 
not spent the intervening years mulling over the issues. As Brigadier A.P.V.
Rogers argues:
By the time of the first preparatory conference in 1978 of the Weapons 
Conference, considerable work on mines had been done. There was available the 
ICRC Report of 1973, the reports of the Lucerne and Lugano conferences, the 
four reports of the Ad Hoc Committee and a reasonably well developed text 
which formed the basis for discussion at the preparatory conference.22
Had it not been for these previous conferences, the conference dedicated to 
establishing the CCW would not have been as quickly negotiated. In the case of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention negotiations conducted in the Conference on 
Disarmament (CD), the nature of the weapon was not in question; otherwise there 
would not have been a move to negotiate the chemical weapons ban in the first 
place. In contrast, before there was even a Convention on Conventional Weapons, 
the types of weapons causing concern had to be identified, and then according to
20Kalshoven, op. cit., (1986), 249-250.
21 See Burris Carnahan, “The Law of Land Mine Warfare: Protocol II to the United Nations 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons”, Military Law Review. Vol. 105, 1984, 75; 
Kalshoven, op. cit., (1986), 249-251; Ove Bring, “The 1981 Inhumane Weapons Convention”, 
Disarmament. Vol. XIII, No. 4, 61; and William J. Fenrick, “The Conventional Weapons 
Convention: A Modest but Useful Treaty”, Intemational Review of the Red Cross. November- 
December 1990, No. 279, 501.
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their nature and properties, restrictions or prohibitions were applied accordingly. 
The CCW was much more of a melange than the CWC, which made the
preparatory work carried out in the 1970s crucially important.
It is also interesting to note that once the mandate for the proposed Convention
had been decided, it was not negotiated in an official disarmament forum. Initially, 
the Soviet Union wanted a prospective CCW to be negotiated at the Conference 
on Disarmament (CD). Hays Parks observes that if the prospective CCW was 
negotiated at the CD, it might never have resurfaced. For example, in the case of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention, it was only through major political pressure 
that the CWC was rescued from the CD after almost 20 years of negotiations. 
Therefore, it would be difficult to deny that states which were not in support of a 
CCW could have buried it or kept it floating around aimlessly on the CD agenda. 
But from another stand-point, placing land mines on the CD agenda would also 
show that this issue was important enough to warrant debate in a serious 
disarmament forum. Throughout history, states have been suspicious of any 
attempts to curtail their right to weapons, regardless of the forum in which they are 
negotiated. Although the CCW was not negotiated under the auspices of an 
official disarmament forum, Captain J. Ashley Roach cautions that:
It should be noted that the negotiators involved in the CCW were, for the most 
part, not major players in CDDH [Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian 
Law]. Indeed, the most remarkable feature of the CCW is that this "son of 
CDDH" was for the most part negotiated by arms control and disarmament 
personnel who had little or nothing to do with the development of the Additional 
Protocols. Indeed, this fundamental change in the members of the delegations 
probably accounts for many of the variances of the CCW treaty and its 
protocols....22 3
22Rogers, op. cit., in the ICRC, Montreux Symposium. 233. To see the history of how the mines 
protocol evolved from Lugano to • the Preparatory Conferences, see Annex A of the "Report on 
Land Mines", from the same symposium.
23Roach, 14.
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Although the CCW was meant to be a IHL treaty, most states had arms control
experts in attendance to assure that there were no excessive adjustments or
restrictions placed upon their weapons policies.
Section 5.3- Major Provisions of the Convention on Conventional Weapons
In contrast to the long and drawn-out CWC, the CCW is by treaty standards quite
short: eight pages of treaty text (the umbrella section) and three annexed protocols.
States may not be party to the treaty without also being party to two out of the
three protocols. Additional protocols on specific weapons can be added to the
treaty as needed. The treaty was designed to be open-ended, allowing for any new
developments. The preamble of the treaty sets out some basic humanitarian law
principles: that the means and methods of warfare are not unlimited and parties
are prohibited from using methods of warfare that would cause superfluous injury
or unnecessary suffering (Paragraph 3). Paragraph 5 reiterates the custom that even
in cases not covered by the Convention:
...[T]he civilian population and the combatants shall at all times remain under 
the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from 
established custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public 
conscience,...
The most unusual section of the preamble, which is often forgotten, is its reference 
to arms control and disarmament. Paragraph 7 and 9 state that the High
Contracting Parties are:
Recognizing the importance of pursuing every effort which may contribute to 
progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control,... [and]
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Wishing to prohibit or restrict further the use of certain conventional weapons 
and believing that the positive results achieved in this area may facilitate the 
main talks on disarmament with a view to putting an end to the production, 
stockpiling and proliferation of such weapons,...
These clauses are important, as they recognize the benefits of disarmament in an 
intemational humanitarian law treaty. No disarmament measures were included in 
the actual treaty because such positions would not have been viable at the time the 
treaty was negotiated. Had supporters of the abolitionist camp insisted on 
including disarmament measures, it is doubtful that there would have been a treaty
at all. Nevertheless, the notion that disarmament measures could be added at some
later point was an important caveat that the treaty authors made sure to include.
The rest of the "umbrella body" is comprised of articles on scope, entry into
force, and relations with other agreements. The scope of this Convention applies
only to intemational armed conflicts rather than to domestic ones. Next, there are
the three Protocols. The first is very brief: Protocol I on Non-Detectable
Fragments states that "It is prohibited to use any weapon the primary effect of
which is to injure by fragments which in the human body escape detection by x-
jj
rays". This is a very simple prohibition and the only Protocol that bans outright a
j
particular weapon. Although such a weapon was conceivable in theory, there was
i
no such weapon system in existence. Frits Kalshoven observes that "...the 1j
prohibition is in line with earlier prohibitions on use of conceivable but not really
j
existing methods or means of warfare, such as the gas projectiles of 1899."24
Technically speaking, some plastic mines may fit this category but the types of
j
injuries inflicted by these mines are not the weapons’ primary effect.25 Although i
24Kalshoven, op. cit., (1986), 252.
25Best, 298.
i
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technology may catch up with some of these prohibitions, legalities may still 
render the prohibition irrelevant. Unless a specific weapon is named, any total 
prohibition will be hollow.
Protocol III on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons 
restricts the use of these weapons when civilians are at risk. There is no total 
prohibition on these weapons. Napalm is never mentioned by name, yet this was 
the incendiary weapon that stirred the most debate in the call for restrictions on 
horrific conventional weapons. As Hays Parks points out, "The legality of 
incendiary weapons was established without qualification....Regrettably, Protocol 
III will provide little, if any, protection for civilians caught up in such [internal] 
wars. "26 Thus, napalm as an instrument of military necessity won the day over the 
humanitarian argument, although its use was to be subject to restraints.
The Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps 
and Other Devices (Protocol II) is composed of a set of restrictions and 
prohibitions designed to protect the civilian population from different types of 
land mines. In the original treaty, no actual mines were banned outright; rather, 
restrictions are placed upon their use. Article One and Two deal with scope and 
definitions. Article Three deals with general restrictions on mines and booby traps. 
Under Paragraph 2, "It is prohibited in all circumstances to direct weapons to 
which this Article applies, either in offence, defence or by way of reprisals, against
26Hays W. Parks, "The Protocol on Incendiary Weapons", International Review of the Red Cross, 
No. 279, November-December 1990, 550.
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the civilian population as such or against individual civilians." The Article also 
prohibits the indiscriminate use of such weapons.
Article Four, Restrictions on the Use of Mines Other than Remotely Delivered
Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices in Populated Areas, complements the
general restrictions of Article Three with measures to protect the civilian 
population. It prohibits using these weapons against a populated area when 
combat is not imminent or occurring, unless the populated area is within the 
vicinity of the military objective of the opposing side, or if the civilians have been 
amply warned by signs and fencing. Article Five, Restrictions on the Use of 
Remotely Delivered Mines, prohibits use of these mines unless the area in 
question is a military objective or contains a military objective, and its location 
can be accurately recorded, according to Article Seven (see below). The 
prohibition is further excepted if a self-neutralizing device is fitted in the mine. In 
addition, advanced warning must be given on any deliveries affecting the civilian 
population unless circumstances do not permit it. The purpose of this Article was 
to restrict the widespread use of these types of mines because they could be 
scattered indiscriminately, without a record of their location.
Article Six, Prohibitions on the Use of Certain Booby-Traps reaffirms one of the 
customs in international law banning the use of perfidious weapons. The article 
describes how booby-traps can be attached to benign, sacred, or neutral objects in 
order to disguise a hidden danger within what is recognized as a safe object, place, 
or haven. For example—the dead or wounded, medical facilities, toys, and 
religious objects. The prohibition extends to using booby-traps which cause
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superfluous or unnecessary suffering. Since booby-traps are not a major weapon 
system per se and are of a perfidious nature, restrictions against them elicited more 
support and co-operation from military establishments than from more utilitarian
or traditional weapons systems.
Article Seven, Recording and Publication of the Location of Minefields, Mines 
and Booby-Traps was included because mines were used on such a large scale, 
that as a precautionary measure, it was deemed important to record their location. 
Parties to a conflict are obligated to record the locations of all pre-planned 
minefields they have laid. They shall also “endeavour to ensure the recording of 
the location of all other minefields, mines and booby-traps which they have laid or 
placed in position.” Next, after the "cessation of active hostilities", parties shall 
retain their records to protect the civilians from the continual effect of mines. 
Each party shall make available to the other and the United Nations the records in 
their possession. The Article also requests that parties make such records available 
to UN forces in the area and release such records when making agreements to end 
hostilities. Article Eight, Protection of United Nations Forces and Missions from 
the Effects of Minefields, Mines and Booby-Traps is a very basic article 
requesting that the warring parties take the necessary measures to protect UN 
forces from land mines. Finally Article Nine, International Co-operation in the 
Removal of Minefields, Mines and Booby-Traps states that it is not enough simply 
to know where the minefields are; they must be rendered harmless, if the civilian 
population is to be safe. Thus the respective parties shall co-operate to remove 
them. Finally, the Protocol contains a technical annex on the Guidelines on 
Recording of the location of minefields.
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Section 5.4-The CCW: A Critique
Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention, the 1980 Convention on
Conventional Weapons has been in force for over a decade, and thus it is possible
to assess its relative value to date. It would be difficult to say that the CCW has 
made any appreciable difference. Senator Patrick Leahy observed that:
When delegates to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Review 
Conference gather in Vienna from September 25 to October 13, they will be 
seeking to improve an agreement so riddled with loopholes and exceptions and 
so lacking in enforcement procedures as to be virtually meaningless: the numbers 
of civilians maimed and killed by land mines continues to climb each year 
despite a specific CCW Protocol limiting land mine use.22
To be absolutely objective, by the time the CCW and its respective Land Mine 
Protocol came into effect, a good deal of the land mine damage had already been 
inflicted by the excesses of conflicts during the 1960s and 1970s. Still, the 
excesses of land mine misuse have continued to the present time. When the CCW 
was first negotiated, the issue of land mines abuse was not as desperate as it is 
today; thus the restrictions seemed adequate at the time. Perhaps this explains why 
the Protocol was not made stronger at the time of its original formulation. More 
germane is that placing these type of restrictions on weaponry was not popular, 
and compromises had to be made to appease the varying interests of many states. 
Sometimes, the political and military consensus to pursue a matter properly simply 
does not exist. A more cynical viewpoint is that states deliberately lobbied for
27patrick Leahy, "The CCW Review Conference: An Opportunity for U.S. Leadership", Arms 
Control Today, September 1995, 20. Senator Patrick Leahy, the ranking minority member of the 
Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee is the main advocate 
and proponent in the U.S. establishment of a land mine ban and was the author of the U.S. Land 
Mine Moratorium and other legislation. However, his viewpoints are not necessarily those of, or 
the policy of the U.S. government.
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restrictions in the vaguest terms, full of loopholes, in order to bury the issue. But 
issues have a habit of returning, and in the limelight they are hard to ignore.
Technological advances have also outpaced strategic concerns. For example, the
Land Mines Protocol should be commended for placing some restrictions on
remotely delivered mines (an emerging technology at the time) which were not
then in as widespread use as they are today. But the drafters of the Convention did
have enough foresight to envisage it as open-ended and allowed for further review,
taking into account the future development and effects of weaponry. As the former
Secretary General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar acknowledges:
Despite all the upheavals which have occurred since the Convention was 
adopted, it has retained all its relevance and validity. Designed as an open- 
ended treaty, with a scope for further protocols to be added to those included 
when it was adopted, there is no risk of future events making it obsolete. The 
authors of the Convention thus foresaw the need to adapt the Convention to 
changing circumstances.28
Precisely under the right-to-review mechanism of the treaty, France, as a party, 
made a formal request to the United Nations that a Review Conference be
convened.29
The CCW importantly recognized that under international humanitarian law,
restrictions on the use of specific weapons systems needed to be addressed. It
stands as a rather historic agreement because states were at least willing to limit
the use of conventional weaponry. As Jozef Goldblat argues:
...The Inhumane Weapons Convention [as the CCW has been called] may be 
regarded as an achievement, modest but significant, because in regulating the use
28Javier Perez de Cuellar, "Introduction", International Review of the Red Cross, No. 279, 
November-December 1990, 471.
29Under Article Eight of the Convention, a Review Conference may be held ten years after the 
treaty was ratified.
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of certain weapons in certain circumstances it has given precedence to 
humanitarian imperatives over military consideration . 30
For the first time since the Geneva Protocol, states were willing to examine the 
humanitarian effects of their weapons in relation to their military utility. Even 
Richard Falk who is generally critical of Protocol II, admits that “The Landmines 
Protocol advances some laudable objectives, identifying land mines as requiring 
attention, as well as restating the customary international law duty to protect
civilians from indiscriminate mine warfare.”31 32
Although the treaty does establish some important precedents, it is a weak - treaty,
nonetheless. David Gowdey offers a realistic explanation as to why the treaty is
worth improving:
...[W]e need to fix the Protocol because it is the only existing law governing the 
use of land mines. In its present state it is worthless. If we can put some teeth 
into it, it will save lives, perhaps lots of lives. It is not the solution to the 
problem, but rather a step along the way.32
Former Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali aptly
summarizes the failings of the CCW Land Mines Protocol this way:
The land mines protocol is not applicable to internal warfare, and does not 
regulate the stockpiling, transfer, or export of antipersonnel mines. The 
conventional weapons convention also does not include any provisions for 
enforcement. There is no procedure to monitor compliance and no designated 
venue for lodging allegations of breaches. There is no method for seeking redress 
or cessation of unlawful acts and no penalty for the intentional or indiscriminate 
use of mines against civilians. Even if mines are laid according to wartime rules, 
the protocol fails to take into account the delayed impact of mines after a war 
ends.33
30Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. International Peace 
Research Institute, Oslo, (London: Sage Publications, 1994), 196.
3*Richard Falk, "The Tightrope of International Humanitarian Law", in Kevin A. Cahill, (ed.), 
Clearing the Fields Solutions to the Global Land Mines Crisis, (New York: Basic Books & Council 
on Foreign Relations, 1995), 78.
32 David Gowdey, then Demining Consultant to the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 
correspondence with the author, February 8, 1995.
33Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "The Land Mine Crisis A Humanitarian Crisis", Foreign Affairs, 
September/October 1994, 12.
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Perhaps one of the biggest failings of the Convention is that its scope does not 
apply to the internal armed conflicts, in which most of the indiscriminate land 
mine use typically occurs. Attempts were made to apply the Protocol to internal 
conflicts in the original negotiations but no agreement could be reached. The 
problem was that certain states considered this to be an infringement upon their 
national sovereignty.
If rules of conduct regarding the means and methods of warfare are applicable in
international armed conflict, then there is no reason why they should not also be
respected in internal conflicts. Although the specific circumstances may be
different, war is war. Yves Sandoz eloquently sums up the moral argument for
applying the same principles of war to internal conflicts:
When children are blown up by land mines during non-international armed 
. conflicts, the relevant legal provisions can—and indeed must—be examined and
if necessary taken back to the drawing-board. But, morally speaking, States must 
be asked whether they can grant themselves the right in internal conflicts, to use 
methods against their own citizens which they have agreed to forgo in
international armed conflicts.* 34
The problem with scope is two-fold. While the customary rules of warfare are 
applicable in all types of conflict, by limiting specific and more enforceable rules 
to international conflict, a very large loophole remains intact. Most present day 
conflicts are internal and it is difficult to say the least, to make both regular and 
irregular forces respect the rules of warfare.
S'Yves Sandoz, "The Question of Prohibiting or Restricting the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons", International Review of the Red Cross, No. 279, November-December 1990,476.
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Another problem with the CCW is its lack of implementation, verification and
enforcement mechernisms.35 As Frits Kalshoven notes:
The student of the Weapons Convention finds in this instrument hardly any of 
those many and variegated devices and mechanisms designed to promote 
implementation, which are so abundantly available in the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and in Additional Protocol I of 1977.36
Proposals have been made to transfer some of the implementation mechanisms 
from other humanitarian law treaties. These would include the following 
measures: providing legal advisers in the militaries to instruct personnel on certain 
weapons; requiring that Armed Forces be trained in humanitarian law; translating 
the Convention into local languages and incorporating it into national laws; and 
establishing an international fact-finding commission. Additionally, a supervisory 
body could also investigate violations while at the same time serving to promote 
and implement the treaty.37 Some sort of implementation body could serve as a 
central point of reference for all state parties. Fact-finding commissions and 
supervisory bodies could also be used as monitoring bodies. As land mine misuse 
is occurring at a rapid scale it is of paramount importance to have a means for 
centrally collating information, and for reporting on the violation situation.
35 There is one small exception to the lack of implementation in the CCW. Under Article Six, 
states parties are requested to disseminate information about the Convention in their own states and 
especially to their militaries. Unfortunately, this is only a very basic request and often tends to fall 
by the wayside, especially in the case of irregular forces.
3®Frits Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War. (Geneva & Dordrecht: ICRC & Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 152.
3?Yves Sandoz, "Turning Principles Into Practice: The Challenge for International Conventions 
and Institutions", in Cahill, (ed.), (1995), 187-188, and "The Rationale for Amending Protocol II 
of the 1980 Convention", Group of Governmental Experts to Prepare the Review Conference of the 
States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects, Background Documentation prepared by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, April 1994, Annex 123-24. (Hereafter ICRC, Background Document April 1994 ).
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As part of the implementation procedures, demining requirements should be 
obligatory rather than voluntary.38 Current treaty language contains only vague or 
polite requests to demine. If certain parties were made to take responsibility for the 
mines they laid, a large part of the land mine problem would be alleviated. As 
Tore Skedsmo trenchantly observes: "Mines seem to change ownership before and 
after they are buried. This is a strange thing. You bury them and somebody else 
owns the problem."39 Knowing which party bears official responsibility for mine 
removal would facilitate implementation of the Convention. After ail, if no party 
is obligated to clear mines it has laid, then the protections in the treaty become 
quite worthless.
Next, and closely related to the issue of implementation, are the ratification and
universality problems of the treaty. Woefully few countries have subscribed to it.
As Bruno Zimmermann of the ICRC acknowledges:
There is also a call addressed to all states to become parties to the Convention.
So far there are only 42 states which are party to the treaty, and that is far from 
satisfactory. We here at the ICRC hope that the possibility of taking part in the 
review might motivate some states to take that step which has been postponed for 
years.40
While taking an active role in the original CCW negotiations and current review 
proceedings, the United States did not ratify the treaty until 24 September 1995. 
Yet even before the ratification the United States acknowledged the importance of 
universality as “with only 41 parties, even the most far reaching changes will have
38Paul Cornish, AP Mines Confrolling the Plague of Butterflies, Royal Institute of Intemational 
Studies, (London: Chatham House, 1994), 26.
39Comments from Tore Skedsmo, Deputy Demining Expert for the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, from a forum held at the UN 16 November 1994, entitled "The Land 
Mine Crisis Humanitarian Disaster: What Can be Done?" as reproduced in United Nations, Ending 
Reliance on Nuclear and Conventional Arms, Disarmament, (New York: United Nations, 1995), 
121. (Hereafter, UN Land Mine Forum).
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limited real world impact. The United States is actively encouraging more States, 
particularly the worst offenders, to become Party to the CCW.”40 1
Obviously, the United States’ calls for universality would be hollow and
hypocritical if it had not finally ratified the CCW in 1995. Part of the reason that
adherence has been so weak was the lack of an active sponsor. The ICRC was
more active in promoting the Geneva Conventions, while the UN, the depository
and sponsor of the treaty, was lacklustre in its promotion. And no particular state
or group of states took up the torch.42 This situation changed when:
Last Fall, The Intemational Committee of the Red Cross opened a campaign to 
ban anti-personnel land mines. It was a highly unusual step for the organization, 
which is not an advocacy organization and only once before has called for a 
weapons ban—of chemical weapons in the 1920s 43
In the last few years numerous organizations and states have taken up aggressive 
campaigning on behalf of the Convention due directly to heightened intemational 
awareness of the land mine disaster 44 U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy points out that
40Ibid., 125. Comments by Bruno Zimmermann Deputy Head of Delegation for the ICRC.
41 See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Hidden Killers: The Global 
Landmine Crisis, 1994 Report to the U.S. Congress on the Problem with Uncleared Landmines 
and the United States Strategy for Demining and Landmine Control, Washington: December 
1994. 28. (Hereafter DOS, Hidden Killers). Since the time of this publication, the number of 
ratifications and hence parties to the CCW has increased to 57. See Article 4, p. 6. of MAIN 
COMMITTEE 1, Draft Final Declaration, CCW/CONF.IZWP. I/Rev. I., Review Conference of the 
States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have 
Indiscriminate Effects, 2nd Resumed Session, Geneva, 22 April-3 May 1996. (Hereafter CCW 
Main Committee Draft Final Declaration-May 1996).
42W. Hays Parks, “The Humanitarian Law Outlook”, in Cahill, (ed.), (1995), op. cit., 52.
43Raymond Bonner, "Pentagon Weighs Joining Move to Ban Land Mines", International Herald 
Tribune, 18 March 1996, 9.
44For example, the ICRC has been the most influential intemational organization promoting 
changes in the treaty and has been granted observer status at the review conferences. While 
numerous other NGOs such as Human Rights Watch have not been granted this status, they have 
been active in the land mines campaign. The UN and its humanitarian agencies have also become 
most active; the UN is usually the central coordinator for demining efforts. Most important, a good 
number of states have become more active as well, with many calling for a total ban. Even if they 
are not calling for a ban, much of their traditional arms control staff have expanded into the mines
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the CCW has only recently gained widespread international support. “Only 50 
countries have ratified it [the CCW], and of those, 14 did so only in the past two 
years"45 *This is related directly to a heightened awareness of the review process.
Of course, some states may straddle the fence at the Review Conference. It is
surprising perhaps, that states with the most severe land mine problems, do not
participate more fully in the Geneva consultations and negotiations.4® Incredibly 
"nearly three quarters of the states most plagued by land mines (including Angola, 
Cambodia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Somalia) have not signed 
the treaty..""? It is also likely that if the Review fails, they will continue in their 
inaction; if it is a success, they may be more inclined to join. So the success or
failure of the CCW Review Conference could have serious ramifications for wider
adherence.
Because it is inherently unenforceable, the Convention could be considered a 
failure. Unfortunately, the observance of IHL depends on reciprocal good will,
issues. So this has been an area of colossal growth within the last few years and a variety of actors 
. are paying attention to it.
45Leahy, op. cit., (September 1995), 20.
®From author's own observations at the Third Preparatory Conference. For example, Cambodia, 
Afghanistan and Iran attended with only Observer Status. Cambodia and Afghanistan made a few 
statements, but really did not participate in the negotiations. Iran was slightly more active. Angola 
was not even present. Other observers like the United States and the United Kingdom were quite 
active. Even observers with only one delegate, like South Africa and Estonia, participated fully in 
the negotiations. Full fledged states parties, with no land mine problem per se, or no longer having 
an interest in the trade were also extremely active (Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, for 
example). A cynic would argue that each state is out to protect its own interests, be it security or 
economics. While land mines are not a big windfall in the hierarchy of the arms trade, some states 
feel that it is their inherent right to sell what they wish. Certainly all the big land mine producers 
and possible future producers showed up en masse. Still, it appears that some states are active in 
promoting the collective good, without direct benefits to themselves. But the states that really need 
these benefits are most inactive. Perhaps as one seasoned former U.S. and UN diplomat argues, 
quite often these states cannot afford to send substantive and well-briefed delegations to the very 
expensive Geneva (even the richer states complain about the costs of supporting delegations) for 
long periods of time to debate these issues. Rather, they stretch the resources of whatever 
diplomats that may already be stationed in Geneva.
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but obviously in the case of the Land Mines Protocol this has not been adequate. 
Hays Parks offers the following insight into this problematic area of the law of
war treaty:
It is important to bear in mind that the law of war is negotiated, and nations 
become party to law of war treaties, on the assumption that there will be a good- 
faith effort towards compliance. That assumption must be balanced with the 
reality that there are some in the world who have no intention of respecting any 
law unless it is likely to operate to their advantage—which also is true with 
respect to domestic law. The effort internationally or domestically is to develop 
better law—and a mechanism for encouraging respect and enforcement when that 
fails. '
Another weak area concerning enforcement of the CCW is the lack of punitive 
options such as sanctions. Although the CCW and Additional Protocol I of the
Geneva Conventions are linked in intent:
The 1980 Convention does not allow for sanctions against violations of its own 
rules. Its reference to the Geneva Conventions cannot entail application of the 
provisions they contain for the prosecution of grave breaches, since these 
provisions concern only such breaches as are committed within the framework of 
the said Convention.47 * 9
As there is no official legal linkage between the two Conventions or official 
language on punitive measures, there is no recourse against violators. Captain 
Ashley Roach points out: "...this weapons convention has no positive provision in 
this regard [for violations] and no provisions for the individual or state 
responsibility for violation of its terms."50
47Sarah Walkling, "First CCW Review Conference Ends in Discord Over Landmines", Arms 
Control Todav. November 1995,26.
"*9ee Parks, op. cit., in Cahill (ed.), (1995), 48.
49As Aubert explains, "in application, these two legal instruments complement each other from the 
miltary point of view, since the precepts contained in Additional Protocol I on the methods and 
means of warfare and the protection of civilians against the effects of hostilities are given direct 
application in the restrictions on the choice and use of weapons formulated in the Protocols to the 
1980 Convention". See Aubert, 492.
50 Roach, 62.
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Most crucial to the survival of the treaty is that groups engaged in both internal 
and external conflict respect it. Even when a peace treaty is in operation, 
minefields are deliberately left behind. For example, the Serbs departing from 
Sarajevo's suburbs have been accused of deliberately setting mines, hand grenades 
and booby-traps to kill and injure those remaining or returning to these areas.51 
These actions illustrate how land mines can be deliberately misused with impunity 
by certain parties. If however, there were strong compliance measures available 
for punishing transgressors the situation might be different. David Gowdey argues
that:
If there are severe penalties imposed on any party violating the provisions of the 
Convention, then armed groups in an internal conflict will have a strong incentive 
to adhere to its provisions. Additionally, if provisions regarding grave breaches 
are inserted in the Convention, then those persons responsible for such breaches, 
from whatever party to the conflict, could be tried as war criminals. Hopefully, 
this could be a rather serious disincentive to the indiscriminate laying of mines.52
Not only does the CCW lack some fundamental strengths, but the restrictions in 
place are weak and problematic. The "General Restrictions" under Article 3.2 are 
designed to protect the civilian population from direct attack from land mines. The 
definition of what constitutes a civilian is not spelled out, and unfortunately, direct 
attacks on civilians do occur.53 *Article 3.3 is designed to prohibit the 
indiscriminate use of land mines, by distinguishing between military and civilian 
targets. Human Rights Watch argues that this Article:
51 Askold Krushelnycky, "Pain and Mistrust Mark the Handover of Power in Sarejevo", The 
European, 21-27 March, 1996, 8.
52Comments from correspondence with author.
53 Article Three does not actually include a definition of a civilian or civilian population. But a
definition albeit a broad one is found under Article 50 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions. A civilian is any person who is not a member of the armed forces as defined 
under Article 43 of this Convention and Article (A) (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Geneva 
Convention. If there is doubt whether a person is a civilian, then that person shall be presumed to 
be one.
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...[Rjeflects the failure of its authors to make the analytic distinction between 
indiscriminate weapons use (which can be minimized if combatants take care to 
distinguish military targets from civilians), and the indiscriminate effects that 
naturally result from a mine’s delayed-action operation.54
Another problem with the indiscriminate use of land mines is found under Article
3.3(c) which prohibits the use of mines ".. .which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and military advantage anticipated." According to HRW, this
interpretation is often left to the judgement of ground forces. For example, a
commander in the field may decide that the mining of an agricultural area which
civilians have fled may give him a short-term advantage over his opponents. But
when the civilians return, and there is no longer any military advantage, the mines
still remain, placing civilians in that area at risk. Therefore:
The temporal dimension of landmine use hopelessly complicates the calculation; 
it requires combatants to weigh anticipated military utility against dangers that, 
because of the time lag involved in mine explosions, might not emerge until far 
into the future.55
There are also other vagaries of language that weaken this Article. For example, 
Article 3.4 states that "All feasible precautions should be taken to protect civilians 
from the effects of weapons to which this Article applies." Feasible precautions 
are then vaguely described under this Article as “Those precautions which are 
practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at 
the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.” According to the
ICRC:
The term "feasible" allows for great flexibility in interpretation....Furthermore, 
the provision is weak because feasible measures would include the installation of 
fences or signposts, but experience has shown that these can be removed by the 
local population, either out of ignorance or from the profit they can derive from 
such items.56
54HRW, A Deadly Legacv. 286.
55HRW, A Deadlv Legacy. 288.
56See ICRC Background Document. (April 94), 25.
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Using the term feasible has numerous problems since no specific precautions are 
named, thus it is left at the field level to decide exactly when military necessity 
will prevail over humanitarian concerns. But as the ICRC also acknowledges, 
more stringent terms of restraint may not have been acceptable to the military.57 58 59
This is where the military imperative won the argument over humanitarian needs, 
as “...Conference participants noted that requiring effective measures implied 
more of a guarantee. Whereas requiring only feasible steps without other 
precautions failed to place sufficient emphasis on humanitarian considerations.”^
In addition, the definition of what constitutes a military objective is also vaguely 
termed. For example it is prohibited under Article 3.3(a) and 3.3(b) to use
weapons against targets not defined as a military objective, or to use a method or
means of delivery that cannot be directed against a specific military objective.
Under Protocol II, Article 2, Definitions, it is stated that:
"Military Objective" means, so far as objects are concerned, any object which by 
its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to the military 
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. '
This vagary of language makes this definition open to a variety of interpretations.
According to David Gowdey, this is:
...[A] terrible definition from the humanitarian view. They have used the 
definition in Article I of the 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Convention, which 
basically says that a military objective is anything that may have military utility, 
including hospitals, schools, or anything else you can think up. It is a 
fundamental issue, but one that we encountered in all foray dealing with civilians 
and the military at war. 59
57Ibid.
58See HRW, A Deadlv Legacv. 291-292, citing a discussion in the Report of the CCW Preparatory 
Conference. UN Doc. A/CONF 95/3 (May 25, 1979) Annex II, 3.
59Comments from correspondence with author.
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Article Four deals with restrictions on mines other than remotely delivered mines
(and booby-traps and other devices) in populated areas. Like Article 3, this Article
is designed to protect the civilian population but unfortunately suffers from the
same vagaries of language. Article 4.2 prohibits the use of mines in populated
areas when combat is not taking place or does not appear to be imminent. It
would be unrealistic to think that civilians do not sometimes get caught in the
crossfire when a battle is being waged. Still, this protection of civilians is
“.. .subject to exceptions which remove much of its apparent force."6° Article 4.2
may be waived if this concentration of civilians happens to be:
...[P]laced on or in the close vicinity of a military objective belonging to or 
under the control of an adverse party; [Paragraph 2a] or, measures are taken to 
protect civilians from their effects, for example, the posting of warning signs, the 
posting of sentries, the issue of warnings or the provision of fences. [Paragraph 
2b]
On the surface, this Article seems to contradict itself and the notion that only 
military objectives should be targeted. As a result, even if combat is not taking 
place, if an enemy target is located within a civilian concentration, then that 
civilian concentration can become a legitimate target. The second part of the 
exception is also problematic. The measures to protect civilians produce a very 
minimal list, and it is not even mandatory. At the original Preparatory 
Conference, both the terms "effective" or "all feasible precautions" were debated. 
The former Soviet Union thought that "effective" measures were too restrictive 
while the Western powers thought "all feasible" were too vague. The compromise 
was the even vaguer term "Measures". According to Carnahan, "The present 
compromise language requires that some measures be taken to protect civilians, *
60Camahan, 81.
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but does not guarantee the "effectiveness" of the measures."61 62Basically, this article
has shown that poor semantics contribute to the ineffectiveness of the protections
under this Article. •
Article Five deals with restrictions on remotely delivered mines. During the
original negotiations there were discussions about these mines vis-a-vis an 
outright ban; however, the abolitionists lost the fight. Instead, remotely delivered 
mines are subject to the general restrictions placed on other mines: “The use of 
remotely delivered mines is prohibited unless such mines are only used within an 
area which is itself a military objective or which contains military objectives" 
(Paragraph 1). These prohibitions are further alleviated by two exceptions: " 
[Unless] (a) their location can be accurately recorded in accordance with Article 7 
(1) (a); or (b) an effective neutralizing mechanism is used on each such mine,..." 
Unfortunately, one of the biggest problems with remotely delivered mines is that 
they are difficult to record, making it most difficult to define the parameters of the 
minefield. There are also no specific time limits designated for these mines to be 
destroyed or rendered inactive. Remotely delivered mines are often used to reach 
deep into enemy territory, and are often designed to meet a specific and speedy 
military objective. bnce this objective has been met, the mines will remain a 
hazard.66 The final problem with this restriction is that Paragraph 2 states that 
"Effective advanced warning shall be given of any delivery or dropping of 
remotely delivered mines which may affect the civilian population, unless 
circumstances do not permit". Of course, what actually constitutes "effective
61 Ibid., 81.
62HRW, A Deadly Legacy. 301.
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advanced warning” is not defined. And the phrase "unless circumstances do not 
permit" is a get-out clause. For example, surprise military advantage may preclude 
any warnings as well as "concern for the safety of the aircraft dropping remotely 
delivered mines"63 The Article says nothing about warning the population after 
the mines have been dropped, which would be possible when the military 
advantage and safety of combatants have been assured.64
Finally, Article Seven, Recording and Publication of Minefields, Mines and 
Booby-Traps also contains flaws. According to Hays Parks: "The recording 
provisions contained in Article 7 are far too general, [and] are related to outmoded 
methods,..."65 The Article only requires that "the parties to a conflict shall record 
the location of: all pre-planned minefields laid by them;..." (Paragraph la). In 
theory this sounds practical, except that no definition is given of what constitutes a 
pre-planned minefield.66 But at least parties are required to record the location of 
the minefields. The problem is that “...such a detailed military plan could not exist 
for the vast majority of minefields emplaced during wartime. In the heat of 
combat many minefields will be created to meet immediate battlefield 
contingencies with little “planning” or “preplanning”.”67
63see A.P.V. Rogers, "Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices", Intemational Review of the Red 
Cross, No. 279, November-December 1990, 528.
64Camahan, 80.
65Parks, op. cit., in Cahill, (ed.), (1995), 56-57.
66Although a definition was not forthcoming from the conference it was thought to mean a certain 
degree of advanced preparation that goes beyond being strictly 'planned'. According to Carnahan, 
"Since “pre-planned” means more than “planned”, a "pre-planned" minefield, is, by its nature, one 
for which a detailed military plan exists considerably in advance of the proposed date of 
execution." At the same time, minefields are not necessarily considered “pre-planned” simply 
because there are military plans available before the outbreak of hostilities. See Carnahan, 84.
67Ibid.
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Regarding other types of minefields, the provisions are also quite weak. For 
example, "The parties shall endeavour to ensure the recording of the location of 
all other minefields,..."(Paragraph 2) The term "endeavour" means that the party 
does not have to record these minefields, but must try to do so. If a condition is 
not made mandatory then it relies strictly upon good-will. This can be problematic 
as parties technically would not be breaching rules by not following procedures. 
Another problem is that not all armies keep proper records, or else they are 
honestly lost at some point.68 If an army is in retreat, making sure it has retained 
the proper records would probably not be a priority. Bosnia is a case in point; in 
the aftermath of that conflict, accurate records are hard to find. According to the
ICRC:
The weakness of the requirements for recording and publication of location 
contained in the Landmines Protocol have been remarked upon by many. From a 
humanitarian perspective, it would be desirable to require that all minefields be 
recorded, not just “preplanned” minefields....It should be recognized, however, 
that even the present loose requirements have been routinely ignored by nearly 
all users of land mines.69
In addition, records are not always accurate. For example:
Even when combatants endeavor to keep precise and detailed maps of the mines 
they lay, as the British did during the Falklands/Malvinas War, the records have 
proved wildly inaccurate. The location of landmines shift with changing weather 
conditions and the passage of time. In the case of remote delivery, many mines 
are placed outside the intended target area.70
Even if records are accurate, unless mines are removed promptly, the purpose of 
recording mine locations becomes futile.
68Yves Sandoz, “Turning Principles into Practice: The Challenge for International Conventions 
and Institutions”, in Cahill, (ed.), (1995), 189.
69ICRC, Background Document. (April 1994), 63.
7oHRW: A Deadlv Legacy, 293.
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The rest of the Protocol basically requests that for the protection of civilians the 
relevant parties exchange mine record information once hostilities have ceased. 
Again vagaries of language weaken these clauses. Article 7.3 (a) states that these 
mine record disclosures shall commence “immediately after the cessation of active 
hostilities.” Cessation of Active Hostilities is not so defined. It is supposed to lie 
somewhere between beyond a temporary cease-fire and before a formal peace 
treaty. In addition, there is also the presumption that hostilities will not resume. 
The logic behind this clause is that states should not prolong the suffering of their 
civilians. Yet at the same time, they may be reluctant to volunteer minefield 
locations if there is some possibility that these mines may retain some tactical 
value in the future.71 The problem here, is one of interpretation. States involved in 
long civil conflicts would have a hard time dealing with, and implementing this
clause.
Section 5.5-The Review of the CCW (How it Stands Today)
This section will examine the issues that warranted serious negotiations at the 
Preparatory Conference, and what key issues remain to be resolved,72 The Review
Conference, preceded by four Preparatory Conferences of the Group of 
Governmental Experts, was seen as a timely opportunity to amend the 
shortcomings of the CCW. The pragmatists simply wanted to strengthen the 
existing Protocol, realizing that it would be difficult to get any major changes
7lIn other words, they may wish to reuse them. Carnahan, 88.
72It should be noted that any references to the Third Preparatory Conference will be attributed to 
the author's observations, but any Conference working papers will not be quoted directly, due to the 
author's attendance while a UN intern. The general discussions as to what occurred and the various
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through. Controversial positions simply will not go anywhere. As a result, certain 
compromises will have to be made and as Joost Hiltermann, Director of the Arms 
Project of Human Rights Watch cautions, the drive for a total ban may not 
succeed. He predicts that:
The States Parties that are currently reviewing the Convention are not about to 
make great changes to the text of the Convention. There are three main proposals 
on the table at Geneva. The first one is the one proposed by Sweden and 
supported by the ICRC which calls for a ban on all anti-personnel mines. This is 
the best position, which unfortunately, probably will not go anywhere. The 
second position is the one proposed by the U.S. and Denmark, which says, yes, 
land mines can be used, but they must have self-destruct or self-neutralizing 
mechanisms, unless they are placed in marked and fenced areas....The third 
position is the one presented by France and Germany which says that land mines 
are a bad thing, but in certain circumstances the mines do not even have to have 
the self-destruct, self-neutralizing mechanism or have to be placed in fenced and 
marked areas, in times of conflict, or when there is an imminent threat to one's 
forces....The U.S. position is inadequate, but it is probably the only position that 
has any chance of passing. The Swedish position, which is very good, stands 
little chance of getting much of an audience.73
Critics of the Review Conference process thus far have viewed it as a major 
disappointment. The failure of the September-October 1995 Review Conference to 
reach agreements after four preparatory conferences can be characterized by the 
word "discord". The problem may lie in the negotiating process itself; since 
parties are acting by consensus "... the lowest common denominator prevails, with 
obstructionist states holding the trump cards."74 As a result, a resumed session of 
the Review Conference was held in Geneva from 15-19 January 1996 on military- 
technical issues, with the concluding session held 22 April to 3 May in Geneva. 
Despite the problems encountered during this extended review process, certain
positions can be debated. Any official texts gained or discussions held with other participants 
concerning that conference may also be used.
73Hiltermann in UN Land Mine Forum, 125-128. Currently, it is estimated that some 39 states are 
in favour of a total ban. See International Herald Tribune, June 4, 1996, 8. It should be noted 
however, that while some parties or organizations remain adamant on particular positions, other 
delegations at the Conference have managed to keep their options open and shift their positions. 
They are, as one delegate phrased it like "moving targets."
74Stephen Goose, “CCW States Fail to Stem Crisis: U.S. Policy Now an Obstacle”, Arms Control 
Today, July 1996, 14.
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substantive changes have been made to the texts of the CCW and its Protocols.
Whether these represent real changes or are in effect simply window-dressing
remains to be seen?5
Changing the scope of the treaty to include internal conflicts created a good deal
of conflict and discussion between negotiators. This issue was drawn mostly along 
North-South lines; the Western states encouraged the change, but the other non-
aligned and Third World states hesitated as most of the relevant internal conflicts 
have taken place in their part of the world. The official argument championed by 
the anti-scope coalition at the Third Preparatory Conference was that wider 
adherence to the Protocol was necessary before any expansions of its mandate 
should take place. This was seen as a tactic to indefinitely delay changing the 
scope of the Convention. Some of these delegations also insisted on the inclusion 
of a note stating that there was no consensus on changing the scope. In response, 
other delegations verbally requested that it should be noted that there was such a 
consensus.75 6 After the Fourth Preparatory Conference in January 1995, it seemed 
likely that pro-change advocates were going to win. According to the DHA 
delegate, David Gowdey, there was sufficient agreement on changing the scope 
“although there will undoubtedly be some discussion on this point at the Review
75It should be noted that all texts and discussions either in the rolling texts of the Preparatory 
Conferences, or in the President's Text of January 1996 only reflect the present state of 
negotiations at the time and are not binding until the final Review Conference. While certain 
proposals have been consistent from the Experts Meetings through the first Review Conference, 
others are still inviting controversy. Throughout the various meetings and through the author's own 
observations at the Third Preparatory Conference, commentaries in periodicals and newspapers as 
well as through contact with participants, a certain final framework of the review process is 
envisaged. The January (1996) President's Text was used as a measuring stick for most of these 
discussions. Indeed, it is expected 'that there will be little change to the final Review Conference of 
April 1996.
76Author's observations and notes from Third Preparatory Conference, ( Geneva, August 1994).
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Conference itsellf.”77 According to Peter Herby of the ICRC, agreement on
changing the scope seemed within grasp as India changed sides.78 At the end of
the final Preparatory Conference, there were two different versions 'on scope'
ready to be submitted to the Review Conference.
Alternative A, Paragraph 2 states that "With the main purpose of protecting the 
civilian population, the Protocol shall apply in all circumstances including armed 
conflict and peace."79 80Although "all circumstances" is a rather vague description,
one could take it to mean at all times of conflict—which would include internal
conflicts. Alternative B, on the other hand, is more specific. Paragraph 3 states
that:
In cases of conflicts referred to in para. 2 above that take place in the territory of 
a High Contracting Party that has accepted this Protocol, the dissident armed 
groups in this territory shall be automatically bound to apply the prohibitions and 
restrictions of this Protocol on the same basis.^0
At the Review Conference itself, although the issue of scope remained 
contentious, the language of the article was promising. Paragraph 3 of Article 1, 
Scope of Application stated that “In case of armed conflicts not of an international 
character occurring in the territory one of the High Contracting Parties, each party 
to the conflict shall be bound to apply the prohibitions and restrictions of this
77Commimication between delegate and the author.
78Telephone communication between delegate and the author.
79Altemative A as reproduced in The Chairman's Rolling Text, CCW/CONF.I/GE/CRP.2/Rev. 3, 
Group of Governmental Experts in Preparation for the Review Conference of States Parties to the 
Convention on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,4th Session, January 1995, (Hereafter CCW Rolling 
Text. January 1995).
80lbid.
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Protocol.”81 Thus, non-intemational armed conflicts are actually defined in the 
prohibition and "each party" rather than a "dissident group" is obligated to observe
the Protocol. "Each Party" also carries a more neutral connotation and does not
differentiate between the types of combatants. At the final Review Conference, 
the amended Protocol II kept this language intact regarding the scope of 
application.
The next major area where it was hoped that there would be some progress in 
strengthening the treaty was the inclusion of verification measures. In the review 
process, this area has proved to be the most problematic and controversial. As 
Tore Skedsmo saliently observes, "When things like verification are brought up, it 
touches the values of nations which they do not want touched. That is the sad 
part of it."82 The case for and against verification seemed to fall mostly down 
North-South lines as did the divisions over changing the scope. Some delegations 
claimed that verification would hinder universal adherence, which should be the
primary focus of the treaty. The anti-verification coalition also claimed that the 
idea of a verification commission would be premature because it would be 
difficult to implement against states who remain outside this Convention. A 
further objection was that a verification commission would incur responsibilities 
and costs to poorer states which would further stretch their already limited 
resources. The pro-verification coalition argued that if verification had been
81 See Article I "Scope of Application", of the President's Text. CCW/CONF.I/WP.4/REV.1, 
Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to 
Have Indiscriminate Effects, 1st Resumed Session, Geneva, January 1996. (Hereafter CCW 
President's Text. January 1996). It should be noted that the language of the text reflects only the 
stage of negotiation, it is not binding until the final Protocol is ready to be adopted.
82Tore Skedsmo, in UN Land Mine Forum, 131.
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included in the original treaty, the CCW treaty would have been much stronger. 
This viewpoint also supported verification as a necessity for the integrity of the 
treaty. If there are violations of the treaty, then they must be exposed if the treaty 
is to work. The pro-verification advocates also strongly disagreed with the 
position that a verification regime would discourage wider adherence.83
The proposals for a verification regime warrant attention because there was a good 
deal of support for these measures and some well-thought-out proposals were put 
forward. They illustrate how important and necessary was the inclusion of 
verification to some delegations. The basic verification article states that any state 
party should be able to request the depository (the UN), to convene a verification 
commission to inquire into the alleged violations of the Protocol. The 
commission would be open to any state party with decision making to be taken by 
consensus or majority. It would have the option of deciding within 48 hours 
whether the request is frivolous or whether to proceed with an inquiry (Alternative 
C, Article 10, Verification Commission).84 The next step in the inquiry process 
would be to dispatch a fact-finding mission to the relevant location with 24 hours 
prior notice. The inspected party would have to co-operate but at the same time 
would be allowed to protect its sensitive interests. Then the fact-finding 
commission would transmit its results to the Depository within one week after the 
fact-finding team leaves the territory (Alternative C, Article 11, Fact-Finding 
Missions).85 Finally, the compliance article would act on the verification 
commission's and the fact-finding commission’s results. Either a request can be
83Author’s observation at the 3rd Preparatory Conference.
84CCW, Rolling Text. (January 1995).
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made to the party in violation to "remedy the situation", or else "the States parties 
shall consider measures designed to encourage compliance, including collective
measures in conformity with international law, and may, in accordance with the
UN Charter, refer the issue to the attention of the Security Council" (Alternative C,
Article 12 Compliance, paragraphs 2 and 3).85 6 * *Finally, the grave-breach provisions 
of the 1949 Geneva Protocols would also apply to this Protocol, meaning that any 
deliberate acts resulting in injury or death would make the party responsible liable 
for its actions. It is interesting to note that much of the verification, fact-finding, 
and compliance measures envisaged here are remarkably similar to those of the 
CWC. Although sanctions are not specifically mentioned, they could be enforced
under collective measures.
At the final Preparatory Conference held in January 1995, the Chairman tried to
reach a compromise between transparency measures and a verification
commission but was unsuccessful. The anti-verification coalition felt that any
verification regime would be manipulative and intrusive. This coalition also
insisted on the inclusion of the reservation that "the concept of Verification for this
Protocol is not accepted by a group of countries."8? The prevailing mood at the
end of the Conference was that if anything came out of the Review Conference, it
would be very weak verification measures. As David Gowdey explained:
Verification and Compliance issues are completely up in the air at the present 
time. The Gang of Four objects to any verification at all, and others want a 
strong political filter over whether any investigation can be conducted. This will 
be a mess at the Review Conference.89
85 Ibid.
86jbid.
8?lbid., Appendix I, Proposals relating to Verification and Compliance.
8*From telephone conversation with Peter Herby one of the ICRC delegates.
with the author.
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Ultimately, no verification or fact-finding components were incorporated into the 
President's Text of January's resumed Review Conference, or in the final April-
May conference. But some enforcement mechanisms were incorporated as
encompassed under Article 14 of the January President's Text. There is no 
mention, as there were in previous texts, of referring violations to the Security 
Council. The only substantiating measure is addressed under Paragraph 2 of 
Article 14, Compliance with the Protocol, stating that any wanton violations of 
this Protocol would be treated as a "grave breach". 9° The inclusion of "grave 
breaches" under the compliance text places a greater obligation on parties, stating 
that any violations will be cited officially and will be recognized as such. In the 
final amended Protocol, the compliance issue remained intact, was strengthened, 
and made even more specific. Penal sanctions against violators are actually now 
required. For example, under Article 14.1 “Each High Contracting Party shall take 
all appropriate steps, including legislative and other measures, to prevent and 
suppress violations of this Protocol by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction
or control.”90 1
The January 1996 Review Conference text also explored some implementation 
measures under Article 11, Technological Cooperation and Assistance, and Article 
13, Consultations of the High Contracting Parties. Previously, these were
90CCW, President's Text (January 1996).
91 Protocol II as Amended on 3 May 1996 Annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. CCW/CONF.I/14. Review Conference of 
the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
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proposed in a similar framework in the final Preparatory Conference as 
Alternative A, Commission of States Parties and Alternative B, Compliance 
Monitoring. These were introduced as alternatives to verification and compliance 
although "several delegations expressed the view that, whilst not agreeing to
every provision of each proposal, the three alternatives A, B, and C, were not 
exclusive but complementary to each other."92 One could argue that while 
verification is a necessity, implementation measures are also important.
Article 11, Technical Cooperation and Assistance requests that the High 
Contracting Parties exchange information and equipment concerning the 
Protocol's implementation requirements: share information on mine clearance; 
provide financial assistance through a voluntary fund; and request assistance in 
mine clearance. In the final text in the revised Protocol adopted in May 1996, this 
Article has remained essentially the same. Article 13, Consultations of High 
Contracting Parties, conceived of a conference of the High Contracting Parties to 
be convened yearly. This Conference shall review annually the status and 
adherence of the Protocol; consider new technologies to protect civilians from the 
indiscriminate effects of land mine use; review reports on implementation 
procedures, and prepare for Review Conferences. The High Contracting Parties 
will also provide reports on the dissemination of the Protocol's requirements to 
their armed forces and civilians; mine clearance programmes; progress towards 
meeting technical requirements of the Protocol; and information exchange and
Indiscriminate Effects, 2nd Resumed Session, Geneva 22 April-3 May 1996, (Hereafter CCW 
Amended Protocol II May 1996).
92Pootnote I from Appendix I of the Proposals Relating to Verification and Compliance. See CCW 
Rolling Text. January 1995.
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technical cooperation. The final amended Protocol also kept this Article intact. In
addition, the Draft Final Declaration of Main Committee I of the Review
Conference declared that the First Review Conference should be held five years 
following the EIF of the adopted amendments to the CCW but not later than
2001.93
The proposals for a total prohibition on mines or particular types of mines met 
with mixed results. The case for banning specific types of mines, namely self- 
destructing or "dumb" mines, non-detectable mines or remotely delivered mines 
received more serious negotiation. The prohibitions on "dumb" mines and 
remotely delivered mines contain significant exceptions, so in effect these mines 
are not banned. There is, however, a complete ban on non-detectable mines. 
Article 4 of the January 1996 President's Text, Restrictions on the Use of Anti­
Personnel Mines, stipulates that "It is prohibited to use anti-personnel mines 
which are not detectable, as defined in paragraph 2 of the Technical Annex." This 
would seem fairly straightforward and comprehensive, except that there were 
disputes about what, exactly, constitutes the technical specifications of an 
undetectable mine. The issue could not be resolved during the first Review 
Conference. The basic dispute is whether to specify an exact minimum figure for 
metal content or to leave the language vague (mines should be easily detected by 
commonly available and conventional methods or equipment).94 The current 
Annex in the January 1996, President's text requires that mines should incorporate
93CCW, MAIN COMMITTEE I. Draft Final Declaration, (May 1996). In addition, parties have 
also agreed to annual consultations about the Protocol.
94It is not enough for mines to be detected only by commonly available equipment; as some mines 
contain only minute amounts of metal. When there are other elements in the ground, it becomes
204
a device that enables them “to be detected by commonly-available technical mine 
detection equipment and provides a signal response equivalent to a signal from 
eight grams or more of iron in a single coherent mass.”* 95
States with large stockpiles of mines under eight grams of iron would simply be 
reluctant to change them. These mines would be banned completely if the eight 
gram rule becomes official. The President’s text also contains some other 
proposals which may weaken this prohibition. In an effort to appease those who 
possess stockpiles of mines not fitting this requirement, two additional paragraphs 
describe a phase-in period. Paragraph 2b, Specifications on Detectability, in the 
Technical Annex, states that mines produced before this protocol takes effect will 
have to be altered to meet the detectability requirements. But, Paragraph 2c relaxes 
this requirement in the case of parties which are not immediately able to comply 
with these modifications. In accepting this Protocol, they must also promise to 
minimize use of these mines during a deferral period. This is a rather disputed 
paragraph, viewed almost as a get-out clause, and many delegations expressed 
their reservations about its inclusion. Some delegations felt that the time period 
was too lenient while others objected to any time limits at all.96 In the amended 
Protocol, the specific technical requirement of the eight gram rule prevailed, but
very difficult to differentiate between a mine detection and background noise from the soil. 
Therefore, it is crucial that a specific metal content be required for mine detection purposes.
95See the Technical Annex of the CCW, President's Text, (January 1996).
96See CCW, President's Text (January 1996), Technical Annex, (2) Specifications on Detectability, 
15. In addition, China opposed the idea of retrofitting its stockpiles to make them more detectable 
and India wanted an indefinite phase-in period for making mines detectable; see Walkling, op. cit., 
(November 1995), 26. There was some compromise made in the negotiating position between the 
First Review Conference (October 1995) and the resumed Conference in January of 1996. India 
backed down from insisting on an indefinite phase-in period to agreeing to eight years, and China 
lowered its original position of twenty five years down to twelve. See Sarah Walkling, "CCW 
Negotiators Make Headway On Strengthening Of Landmine Protocol", Arms Control Today, 
February 1996, 27.
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only on mines produced after 1 January 1997. The High Contracting Parties will 
then have nine years (from the EIF of this amended Protocol) to incorporate these 
measures, but in the intervening period they must minimize the use of these mines.
Thus there is a solid and strict basis as to what constitutes a detectable mine. The
good news is that states have agreed to ban them. The had news is that they have 
nine years to do so during which they only have to promise to minimize use. The 
concept of “minimum” use is not defined and could later prove to be problematic. 
More important, there is no way to actually verify the minimum-use requirement.
There has also been a tightening of general restrictions on non-self-destructing and 
remotely delivered anti-personnel mines. Article Five of the January 1996 
President's Text, Restrictions on the Use of Anti-Persormel Mines Other than 
Remotely Delivered Mines prohibits the use of non-self-destructing (NSD) or non­
self-deactivating mines unless the following conditions are met. These mines must 
be placed in a clearly marked perimeter area and monitored by military personnel, 
and they must be cleared before the area is vacated, unless the area comes under 
the jurisdiction of another state which takes responsibility for the mines. 
Paragraph 3 of this Article is perhaps the most problematic. A party to the conflict 
is relieved from its obligations if “...such compliance is not feasible due to 
forcible loss of control of the area as a result of enemy military action, including 
situations where direct enemy military action makes it impossible to comply.” 97 In 
addition, Paragraph 4 states that forces which gain control of an area “...shall, to 
the maximum extent feasible, maintain and, if necessary, establish the protections 
required by this Article until such weapons have been cleared.”
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Exceptions have severely weakened this Article. At the final Preparatory 
Conference, a group of states held out for a total prohibition against non self- 
destructing mines, while others simply wanted restrictions on use. Something 
cannot be truly prohibited, if there are exceptions to its prohibition. But those
parties which possess large stocks of non-self-destructing mines did not want them
banned outright. Initially, it was a group of Western states which supported the
exception to the prohibition on the use of non self-destructing mines as long as
they are in a marked and monitored area. Part of the reason that states are reluctant
to completely relinquish NSD mines is because they are the only type of mines
that can be used to protect border and military installations. The Russian
delegation insisted on including the clause stating that parties are excluded from
clearance obligations if military action makes it impossible. The problem here is
that loss of control of an area is not specifically defined—it could be anywhere
within a country?8 Thus, the party who sowed the mines may not be required to
clear them. As Senator Patrick Leahy cautions:
...[T]he administration [U.S.] must take a firm stand in opposing a Russian 
proposal that would establish an exception to the self-destruct and marked and 
monitored minefield requirements,...Such a broad exception would virtually 
negate the effect of these requirements 9
This particular clause relies on good faith compliance, but in the real world will 
probably be impractical or unrealistic. In the heat of battle, combatants may have 
to shift positions very rapidly in order to protect their own forces. Their own
9?Article 5 of the President's Text, January 1996.
98Telephone conversation with ICRC delegate after the January 1995 Preparatory Conference.
99Leahy, op. cit., (September 1995), 23.
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survivability or military necessity would take precedence over responsibilities for 
a minefield, and would outweigh the humanitarian argument.
There is also the problem of deciding which forces actually control an area. For
example, it would be difficult to attribute responsibility for the mines to guerrilla
forces who come down from the mountains at night into a village. Their control 
of the area is only temporary. The concept of direct enemy military action is not 
sufficiently defined; there are no criteria specifying exactly when enemy action 
would prevent forces from complying with their obligations—and when they 
would be legitimately absolved. Finally, after combat has ceased, when exactly do 
obligations resume? 100 In reality, the restrictions on this mine type can be easily 
circumvented. In the amended Protocol, both the restrictions and exceptions were 
adopted intact from the January President's text.
The review process has also tightened restrictions on remotely delivered mines.
Under Article Six, Restrictions on the Use of Remotely Delivered Mines:
It is prohibited to use remotely delivered mines other than anti-personnel mines 
unless they are self-deactivating (and) (or) equipped with an effective mechanism 
of self-destruct or self-neutralisation so they will not function as mines as soon as 
it is anticipated that they will no longer serve the military purpose for which they 
were placed in position.101
The time period for mines to self-destruct or self deactivate is important in terms 
of the safety requirement, which overrides the military utility of the weapon. 
Previous contributions at the final Preparatory Conference placed the time period 
for self-destruction from 7 to 90 days, and self-deactivation from 30 to 365
10°Author’s correspondence with David Gowdey.
101 Article 6. 2 in CCW. President's Text (January 1996), 6.
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days.102 It is significant that there is a combination of self-destructing and self­
deactivating requirements. If a mine is self-destructing then a particular 
percentage will fail and remain a hazard. If the mine is self-deactivating, then from 
a mine-clearance perspective, it has to be treated like a live mine because there is 
no way to tell the difference. Another danger in using only the self-deactivating 
option is that the mine could be picked up and reused. Thus, combining both 
options lessens the risk from these mines. In addition, it is very difficult to fence 
the parameters of remotely delivered mines, so it is important that they be 
rendered useless as quickly as possible, especially if they fall outside the target 
area. The amended Protocol specifications require that all remotely delivered 
mines be designed so that no more than ten percent fail to self-destruct after thirty 
days. There should also be a back-up self-deactivation feature so that no more 
than one in a thousand mines will function 120 days after dispersal.103 Finally, the 
requirements for self destruction and self deactivation, may be deferred for a 
period not to exceed 9 years.104
There was also heated debate about including disarmament measures during the 
review process. The hope of a broad blanket ban on land mines was perhaps
l02See CCW, Rolling Text, (January 1995) & Leahy, op. cit, (September 1995), 23.
103CCW, Amended Protocol II. (May 1996), Technical Annex, Paragraph 3, Specifications for 
self-destruction and self-deactivation, 16.
104Eight years is considered middle-of-the-road for a phase-in period. Some reports from the 
negotiations had China demanding a 25-year phase-in period and Russia at least 15 years. Both 
states were reluctant to specify a time limit for self-deactivating mines. See Disarmament 
Diplomacy, February 1996, 45, and Walkling, op. cit., (November 1995), 26. Such a long time 
period would make a mockery of the whole process. Basically, many states with large stockpiles of 
so-called dumb mines resent the fact that other states wish to keep their own expensive and high 
technology smart mines but ban the older types. There is no "carrot" of financial aid in this process. 
Thus, they are balking at replacing stocks. As "dumb mines" have caused much of the land mine 
devastation problem, most states have accepted that eventually they will have to be eliminated. But 
an outright ban would upset the sensibilities of states with large stockpiles. So a phase-in period to
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unrealistic. Michael Matheson, the head of the U.S. delegation, went on record as 
saying that "there are very few major military powers that would consider a ban 
on all anti-personnel mines- So its not a serious negotiating possibility...."105 * 07
Logically, if a mine is restricted or prohibited, then it should be made certain that 
it is not readily available. During the Preparatory Conferences, both transfer, 
production and stockpiling issues were fiercely debated. Several delegations 
acknowledged that while in theory they may have supported prohibitions in this 
area, in the current negotiating environment they pursued a path of compromise. 
One delegation proposed separating the transfer issue from the even more 
controversial issues of production and stockpiling. It was thought that wider 
support would be given to transfer restrictions—therefore it made sense to focus 
upon it. At the same time, there was also an interesting proposal to create a 
separate Protocol that simply banned the use, transfer, stockpiling and 
manufacture of anti-personnel mines. States wishing to support a total ban were 
free to take that option. Unfortunately, states could also choose to ignore this 
protocol. 100 By the final Preparatory Conference, there were optional Articles 6 bis 
relating to prohibitions on the use, development, manufacture, stockpiling, and 
transfer of certain mines and booby-traps, and 6 ter on transfers. These articles 
also came with a note of reservation that they were not accepted by all 
delegations.
eventually get rid of them is seen as a compromise solution. If it is too long and drawn out, 
however, then it really will not be a good compromise at all.
105Pisarmament Diplomacv. January 1996, 40. Although it has been reported that the Pentagon is 
reassessing its policy and other states are now supporting a total ban on land mines, unless the 
major opponents of a ban suddenly switch their positions as well, it is debatable whether such a 
move would be accepted across the board.
106Author's observations at 3rd Preparatory Conference.
l07Note 3 Article 6 bis, p. 7 CCW, Rolling Text. (January 1995). The terms 6 bis and 6 ter refer to 
the second and third Article 6 respectively.
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The Article relating to a total ban disappeared after the Review Conference. The
Article that dealt solely with transfers fared better, as little was changed from the
final Preparatory Conference to the Review Conference texts. Article Eight, 
Transfers (previously Article Six in the rolling text), requires that the High 
Contracting Parties relir^^^n from the transfer of any mines for which use under the 
Protocol is prohibited; refrain from transferring mines to a non-state recipient;
exercise restraint in transfers of mines whose use is restricted; and refrain from
transferring to states which are non-parties to the treaty. Under the current 
wording, no distinction is made between land mines and land mine components 
and technology, which could be used to circumvent transfer restrictions. This text
also was incorporated into the final amended Protocol.
There are also some clearer and stricter restrictions concerning the mine marking, 
monitoring, and clearance measures designed to protect civilians. For the first 
time, the issue of responsibility is clearly defined and spelt out under the current 
Article Three, General Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices. Under Paragraph 2:
Each High Contracting Party or party to a conflict is, in accordance with the 
provisions of this Protocol, responsible for all mines, booby-traps, and other 
devices employed by it and undertakes to clear, remove, destroy or maintain 
them as specified in Article 10 of this Protocol. 108
There is also a more specific description of prohibiting the indiscriminate use of 
these weapons which cannot be directed against a military objective. Paragraph 8a
of the final text now states that:
108CCW, President's Text. January 1996, 3.
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...In a case of doubt as to whether an object which is normally dedicated to 
civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, or a house or a dwelling or a 
school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall 
be presumed not to be so used;... 109 *
Thus this expansion actually gives the benefit of the doubt to the humanitarian 
side. Paragraph 8 of the President’s Text (Paragraph 9 of Amended Protocol II) 
also makes another important clarification in that “Several clearly separated and 
distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing 
a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects cannot be treated as a single 
military objective.”
This is an important distinction, as it means that an entire area can no longer be 
treated, conveniently, as a military objective. The concept of feasible precautions 
to protect civilians from the effects of these weapons is spelled out. For example, 
Paragraph 10 of the final text defines the circumstances of what constitutes 
feasible precautions: ,
(a) the short-and long-term effect of mines upon the local civilian population for 
the duration of the minefield.
(b) possible measures to protect civilians (for example, fencing, signs, warning 
and monitoring);
(c) the availability and feasibility of using alternatives; and
(d) the short and long term military requirements for a minefield..1 10
In the midst of hostilities there may not be time to consider these options, or else 
they may be conveniently ignored. Still, they do provide some sort of framework 
for what feasible precautions should entail. Finally, the Review Conference did 
introduce a new protocol on the use of laser weapons. Although both the ICRC 
and Sweden pressed very hard for it during the preparatory conferences, it was
109 Article 3.8 (a) of the CCW, Amended Protocol II. (May 1990).
* 10 Article 3.10 (a) to (d) of the CCW, Amended Protocol II, (May 1990).
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deemed subordinate to the work of revamping the mines Protocol. Therefore, the 
addition of a laser protocol was seen as a surprising but welcome step in the
control of another anti-personnel weapon.
The results of this review process are disappointing to some, but to most
pragmatists, they are not surprising. Changing the scope of the Convention to
include internal conflict is a significant improvement, but if no means exist to
verify the misuse of land mines, then the seriousness of the treaty is called into
question. By legitimizing the high technology mines, the use and acquisition of
these mines will be encouraged. In turn, states which possess or produce "dumb"
mines will perceive themselves as victims of discrimination. In addition, the
phase-in period for retrofitting or changing stockpiles still allows for "dumb"
mines to be used. Much stricter restrictions on the use of remotely delivered mines
now exist. They will not blight the landscape forever, as did their older
predecessors. But as one observer points out:
U.S. delegates fought hard for the new protocol on the grounds that it would 
lower civilian casualties, but this is by no means guaranteed. Modem mine 
systems can distribute thousands of mines in minutes. The notion that a village 
that has been blanketed by mines is somehow "safer" because they may deactivate 
within four months is hard to take seriously.111
The Conference Chairman, Johan Molander of Sweden, has summed up the results 
of the Conference as the "lowest common denominator...[but] an honest
compromise."112
11'lain Guest, "Revised Agreement is no Victory in War Against Land Mines", international 
Herald Tribune, 4 June 1996, 8.
112James Barry, "At Least 50 Nations Agree To Limits on Land Mines", International Herald 
Tribune, May 3, 1996, 1
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There was hope that the growing international land mine ban supported by over 
forty states and numerous NGOs and international organizations would have 
tipped the scale in favour of a total ban. The review process has exposed 
weaknesses in the argument that these weapons can be used responsibly. Although 
it may be a more practical option to completely prohibit these weapons (instead of 
having complicated rules on the use of particular mines under certain 
circumstances), it still takes time politically for all states to reach agreement. 
There is talk of an eventual ban, possibly for the next Review Conference in five 
years’ time. In the meantime, mere restrictions will not be enough.
The revamping of the Conventional Weapons Convention has proved to be 
difficult and contentious. Nevertheless, the Convention has finally found the 
notoriety it has sorely needed in the last decade. It has opened up a virtual 
Pandora's box of issues dealing with restrictions on land mines. It has scrutinized 
both the strong and weak points of humanitarian law and related them to a specific 
weapon system. It has placed on the world stage the contest between military 
necessity, humanitarian need and political will. It has also forced states to re­
examine their policies. Most important, this process has brought the restrictions 
and prohibitions on weaponry based upon humanitarian principles back into the 
limelight regarding how weapons should be controlled. Perhaps, ultimately, the 
entire process of revamping such a treaty will be to no avail. Lives will certainly 
be saved, but probably not enough of them. What this complicated process does 
show, however, is that partial restraints on the use of land mines may not be
214
enough; ultimately, a total ban on all anti-personnel mines may be the only
effective solution. !*2
113 An important analogy can be found in the case of chemical weapons. George Reid ponders 
what the world would be like if there were only partial restrictions on chemical weapons, like the 
current restrictions on land mines: “Mustard gas was banned forever in 1925 because it was evil, 
indiscriminate, broke the rules of war, and caused undue suffering. If current Geneva rules had 
applied then, we would have had' proposals to colour it purple, blow whistles and sound sirens 
when it was launched. See George Reid, “No Halt Sign for Massacres in Slow Motion”, The 
Scotsman, 18 April 1990, 17.
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Chapter VI
Conclusion
These two case studies of the evolution of restraints on chemical weapons and
land mines illustrate what an incredibly complex and difficult task it is to place
legal prohibitions on the use of weapons, let alone orchestrate their abolition. The 
threat or perception of threat that these weapons pose to international security, and 
the depth and assortment of responses they evoke, are distinctive to each weapon. 
Even so, the result of both processes may ultimately be the same. To a certain
extent these differences can be attributed to the circumstances of the time, but
even more important, there are certain inherent causal factors in each case which 
influence the two anns control processes differently. To limit or remove weapons 
from the arsenals of most states, a variety of interests must be taken into account.
Primary to these interests is “national security”, and armaments are acquired to 
protect it. The perception of national security is not always homogeneous, as 
political, military, economic, and social factors may compete with each other 
regarding what issues are considered important to national security.1 Moreover, 
other states in the international system often have differing security concerns. As 
a result, states have to seek, and find, a common ground in terms of arms control. 
The purpose of this section is to sum up the main similarities and differences in 
responses to chemical weapons and land mines, in order to understand what 
criteria are necessary for prohibiting a weapon system.
I if i* >1 ft yA
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Section 6.1-Criteria for Comparison Between Chemical Weapons and Land
Mines
Section 6.1.1-Distinctive Histories
Both these weapons have had distinctive histories. Attempts to abolish chemical
weapons have historically been much stronger, more consistent, and indeed 
longer-lived than those for abolishing land mines. Restraints and prohibitions 
against poisons stretch back for centuries. For modern chemical weapons, the 
Geneva Protocol of 1925, banning the first use of chemical weapons, was an 
important normative precedent that has survived mostly intact. In addition, many 
states have pursued policies of self-restraint either by renouncing the use of 
chemical weapons on their territories; abandoning their chemical warfare 
programmes; or entering into bilateral arrangements. Counterbalancing this trend, 
other states and even non-state actors have sought to acquire chemical weapons, 
further hindering global non-proliferation efforts. To counter this threat, the 
international community joined together under the auspices of the Australia Group 
to restrict access to the trade in chemical agents needed to produce chemical 
weapons. Finally, although it took almost 20 years of arduous negotiations to 
produce the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1993, the treaty is fitting in 
time and place as the logical sequel to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The only way 
to effectively guarantee the non-use of chemical weapons was to secure an 
agreement that prohibited the production, stockpiling, and development of these 
weapons, and required the destruction of current stockpiles. Finn verification and
' Julian Peiry Robinson, Chemical Warfare Arms Control: A Framework for Policy Alternatives, 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRl), (London and Philadelphia: Taylor & 
Francis, 1985), 27-28.
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enforcement measures were included in this treaty to assure that this task was
fulfilled.
In contrast, there is a much shorter history regarding restraints on land mines, 
although they constitute a weapon system that has been in existence almost as
long as chemical weapons. With the exception of World War I, land mines have 
also been used with much more frequency and intensity than chemical weapons. 
The regularity and indeed the ordinariness of their use essentially legitimized land 
mines; for many years this seeming ordinariness prevented full-fledged demands 
for their restraint. To some extent, this is attributable to a long-standing 
reluctance by most states to place restraints on conventional weapons. It was not 
until the end of 1970s that any sort of action was taken to restrain land mines. 
During the decade, there were debates about which conventional weapon systems 
should be subject to restriction. As a result. Protocol II of the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons (CCW) restricts the use of land mines under certain 
circumstances. There is no agreement bamting mines as a complete weapon 
system, which occured in the case of chemical weapons. In the last few years, 
however, motivated by public pressure, there has been an abundance of interest in 
regulating and abolishing land mines. Some states have taken one small step 
towards this goal by unilaterally renouncing the possession, use, and production of 
land mines. Others states have been observing an international moratorium on the 
export of mines, and groups of states have discussed establishing an export control 
regime for land mines. A large group of states has even joined forces with other 
actors in the international system, such as NGOs and international organizations, 
in the anti-mine campaign. The land mine control/disarmament issue has now
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been upgraded from its IHL treat)' status and placed on the Conference on 
Disarmament agenda. Canada has also called for a new treaty prohibiting land
mines to be negotiated in December 1997, independently of any official
disarmament forum.
Section 6.1.2-Nature of the Threat
In terms of threat analysis, it would initially appear that land mines and chemical 
weapons have little in common. Chemical weapons are widely perceived as 
weapons of mass destruction and land mines as common, even ordinary 
conventional weapons. Therefore, it would seem that their respective capacities 
for destructiveness would be vastly different. Certainly if chemical weapons were 
to be used in a strategic capacity against unprotected civilian areas, casualties 
would be enormous. Thus far this has yet to occur, but it is not out of the realm of 
possibility. Land mines are not a strategic weapon system, and it is doubtful that 
they could alter local balances of power. The communities effected by these 
weapons are different as well. Land mines are no longer a hazard only to military 
forces. Because of remote delivery dissemination techniques, mines are deployed 
on a massive scale all over the countryside, interfering with crucial infrastructures 
and placing mainly civilians at risk. As a result, mines have become the weapon 
of choice in low-intensity conflicts, causing environmental contamination and 
preventing poor, rural societies from recovering from the effects of war. In
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contrast, it is the military community that has been most affected by chemical
weapons.2
The nature of the injuries and casualties from these weapons have some common 
threads. Injuries and casualties emanate from the anti-personnel nature of the 
weapon; these weapons both inflict horrendous and lingering injuries, and they 
cannot distinguish between a combatant and non-combatant. While chemical 
weapons have always been considered inhumane, there is still much disagreement 
in classifying land mines the same way. Pail of the reason is that the ill effects of 
land mines are attributable to the hazards of war and the misuse of these weapons,
while the effects of chemical weapons are a result of their correct usage. On 
balance, however, land mines have been responsible for much more carnage than 
chemical weapons, a fact which is directly related to land mines having been used 
with such frequency and intensity.
Section 6.1.3-Comparative Perceptions of Military Utility
One of the most important subjects for comparison and analysis is the role of 
military establishments in the restraints on weapons. The perceived militaiy utility 
of a weapon is crucial to any decisions to restrict, ban, or relinquish it. While the
2Certain militaries maintain anti-chemical protection equipment, but civilians are unlikely to have 
these defences. Civilians may have been caught in the wake during cases of alleged use since 
World War I. In terms of civilians being specifically targeted by these weapons, the only recent 
case is that of Iraq’s attacks on the Kurdish population at Halajaba. During the Iran-Iraq War in 
which chemical weapons were used, main civilian population centres were not targeted. In 
addition, in the Tokyo subway attack, a non-state actor targeted civilians in a terrorist attack. 
Although civilians have been victimized by chemical weapons, to date chemical weapons have 
been primarily a military threat. There is the fear, however, that in the future the primary threat 
may shift to targeting civilians.
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military disdain for a weapon may be a crucial first step in accepting restrictions or 
prohibitions on it, this is still not enough. Military establishments are supposed to 
protect the national security interests of the state, and therefore, they must balance 
the operational utility of the weapon in question against their own preferences or 
reservations. Historically, the role of the military establishment in its responses to 
chemical weapons and land mines has been, quite different, although recently the
differences between them seem to be closing.
Chemical weapons have always been treated with disdain by militaiy 
establishments. They have been widely viewed as the weapons of armies without 
honour. Still, this did not preclude annies from retaining these weapons as 
insurance against attack. In other words, strategists felt that chemical weapons, 
however abhorrent, served a useful deterrence purpose when the enemy’s ‘honour’ 
could not be relied upon. Over time, however, specialists began to question the 
operational utility of chemical weapons with the emergence of doubts that these 
weapons would ever be used, even in retaliation. Moreover, anti-chemical 
protection gear could be used to lessen the impact of any offensive chemical 
attack. Because these weapons were cumbersome, unpredictable, and possibly a 
hazard to one’s forces, they were not considered weapons assuring the security of 
the state. Since they also were not a frequently used weapon, this infrequency 
became analogous with their lack of military utility. Consequently, tlie militaiy 
hierarchy eventually resigned itself to the fact that these weapons could be 
forsaken without damaging security interests. In addition, chemical weapons 
which utilized tum-of-the-century technology could now be replaced by “smart 
ordnance” that was more effective and precise.
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To complicate matters, East-West strategy and perspectives are not the only ones 
which matter. While most states would question whether they could win a war 
with chemical weapons, weaker states with fewer resources may perceive them as 
desirable, or even the next best thing to nuclear weapons. Perceptions of the 
military utility of chemical weapons will vary according to the security 
requirements of particular regimes. Also, non-state actors such as terrorist 
organizations which do not conform to the operational utility requirements of most 
military units may seek these weapons because they suit their particular needs and 
objectives much better. As long as some militaries or other bodies see some 
advantages in possessing chemical weapons, they will still seek to acquire them
even in lieu of a world-wide ban.
In contrast, the frequency and enthusiastic use of land mines suggests that military 
establishments viewed mines as a viable and legitimate weapon system. For the 
most part, that has been true. Military strategists are quick to point out that it is 
the misuse of these weapons which cause problems, and that if used concctly, 
civilians would not be adversely affected. Traditionally, soldiers have had to take 
their chances with these weapons; the military establishment has never viewed 
land mines with as much disdain as chemical weapons. Recently, however, there 
has been dissension within military ranks regarding both the humanity and utility 
of land mines; disagreements have occurred between military conunanders in the 
field and military planners. Those who have first hand experience with mines in 
action are appalled by their devastating impact to both soldier and civilian.
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In response to the burgeoning land mine problem, military establishments around
the world are reassessing the operational utility and need for land mines—much
more so than with chemical weapons. There are certain conditions which, on the
surface would seem to indicate that the militaries could relinquish the land mine
option. Land mines have never been perceived as crucial to strategic stability;
likewise, the outcome of wars would not be decided by land mines. The ICRC
commissioned a study by high level military officers on the operational utility of
land mines and came to the following conclusion:
...[T]he use of anti-personnel mines in accordance with law and doctrine is 
difficult, if not impossible, even for modern professional armies. This shows that 
the indiscriminate effects of landmines cannot be contained in most cases.
Further it was found that the military' utility of such mines is most often 
negligible or even counterproductive for the layer.3
As it is debatable whether mines are operationally useful, one would think that
militaries would be more willing to relinquish these weapons. To date, as the
worst mine damage has occurred in the Third World, it would also be logical that
if mines are not used in great quantities in the Western context, then why not
forgo them? In addition, Western militaries are increasingly being exposed to the
perilous nature of land mines during peacekeeping or humanitarian missions in
areas of conflict, and as David Gowdey observes:
[L]and mines are the second largest cause of casualties to interventionary 
forces—UN or coalition forces. In Kuwait, Somalia, the Former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda, etc., significant numbers of the soldiers of big powers have been killed
3 This study was endorsed by 52 senior military commanders from 19 countries. See Statement by 
the ICRC to the United Nations General Assembly, 51* Session, First Committee. Agenda items 71 
and 75, “General and Complete Disarmament Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to 
Have Indiscriminate Effects”, New York, 18 October 1996, 2 (Hereafter ICRC, “General and 
Complete Disarmament”, October 1996). There have been other studies or assessments by military 
establishments/ think-tanks/ leaders which call for the abolition of land mines. For example, an 
open letter to President Clinton was sent to The New York Times by a dozen retired generals calling 
for a complete ban on land mines.
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or wounded by land mines. Whether this is sufficient to make them want to limit 
their use in the Third World is open to debate, but I do know that the U.S. 
military was more willing to listen to our views on the issue after Kuwait and 
Somalia than they were prior to the operations.4
Despite these drawbacks of land mine use, many military planners still insist that 
mines have a legitimate militaiy function; that to completely abolish their use 
would be foolhardy as long as others retain them. More important, there are no 
other alternatives which would replace the function of land mines as protectors of 
borders or de-militarized zones.5 States situated in these areas, or in control of 
them, regard mines as crucial to the security of the area. Therefore, while 
chemical weapons could be replaced by smarter and more precise weapons, the 
same criteria does not necessarily hold true for land mines even though they are 
very basic and unsophisticated weapons. It is no coincidence that militaries which 
have refused to forgo the land mine option, and especially the non-self-destructing 
mine option, are the ones situated in areas where mines are needed for this 
protective function.
Thus far, some militaries have renounced the use, production, transfer, and 
stockpiling of land mines, while others have pursued more ambivalent policies by 
calling for their eventual elimination. Complicating this situation is the fact that 
mines have become the weapon of choice in many low-intensity conflicts 
throughout the world, and armies in these regions may not be willing to relinquish 
these inexpensive, low-technology weapon systems. To ask these armies to give 
up their stocks of “dumb” mines in favour of “smart” mines is simply not
4 Author’s written correspondence with David Gowdey, then Demining Consultant to the United
Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, (February' 1995).
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conceivable or desirable for many militaries. In conclusion, the military
perceptions about the lack of utility of land mines are not homogeneous—unlike 
the case of chemical weapons in which militaries have concluded that they could 
forgo that weapon option.3 * * 6 7The fact that there is dissension, however, and that 
momentum is building against land mine use will most likely shift the balance in
favour of a ban.
Section 6.1.4-The Institutional Process
Another factor that carries repercussions for weapons controls is the institutional
process of weapons production, planning, and development. In this institutional
process or the so-called military-industrial complex, ‘‘Specific military missions
of the armed forces are institutionally coordinated with administrative segments of
the civilian and military administration, with research and development
laboratories, and with the production plants for weapon systems.” The prospects
for arms control are therefore tied not only to the perceived military utility of a
weapon, but also to the armaments dynamic itself. In the case of chemical
weapons, Julian Perry Robinson argues that:
During World War I, the waging of CW required each belligerent to create a 
supporting infrastructure of R & D establishments, headquarters, directorates, 
CW-speciality service commands, production capacity and the like. New
3 Mines in these areas need to be non-self-destructing as they are designed to prevent incursions
across these areas. Although this technology is very basic, thus far no alternative solutions have
been found to replace land mines in this particular capacity.
6 A note of caution is in order. Although most militaries have intrinsically disliked chemical 
weapons, they remained divided for a number of years over whether chemical weapons had an 
important military or operational utility. Thus, it should be remembered that it can be a long and 
complicated process for military establishments to decide whether a weapon has an important 
operational utility. Decisions are also influenced by the circumstances of the time.
7 See Dieter Senghaas, “Arms Race Dynamics and Arms Control”, in Nils Gleditsch and Olav 
Njolstad, (eds.), Arms Races Technological and Political Dynamics, International Peace Research 
Institute (PRIO), (London: Sage Publications, 1990), 18.
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institutions thus came into existence; and because they were highly specialized, 
the livelihood, ambitions and career patterns of their occupants inevitably 
became intertwined to some degree with their special mission. They thus 
acquired a self-propagating character....it was thus virtually inevitable that part 
of the across-the-board increases in military appropriations should come to 
revitalize moribund chemical-weapons programmes: though the military logic 
might be weak, the institutional logic was strong.®
The institutional infrastructure and the specialized nature of chemical armaments 
policy cannot be dissolved overnight. Therefore, although important players may 
agree that these weapons should be banned, the self-perpetuating nature of the 
chemical weapons institution can hinder any efforts to disarm. The time lag 
between the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Chemical Weapons Convention of 
1993 indicates just how difficult it has been to wind down the chemical weapons- 
armaments dynamic. Even while negotiations were well underway for a 
disarmament treaty, some states w'ere still considering the modernization or 
reinvigoration of their chemical option. Chemical weapons were still 
institutionalized into operational planning. There are also practical problems 
associated with the institutional process, as “...any interruption of the work in 
these institutions is considered intolerable by the political and military elites, due 
to the long lead-time requirements of modern weapon technology.”8 9 Disamiament 
has been held at bay for the simple reason that special, institutional interests and 
planning take a long time to be phased out.
Like most weapons, land mines are integrated into future military planning and 
force structures. As a result it may be difficult at least initially, to renounce them
8 For a discussion of the institutional origins of CW armament policy see Julian Perry Robinson, 
op. cit., (1985), 41 -45. Dieter Senghaas also takes a similar position to Robinson by pointing out 
that arms control tends to be more successful if there is also some control over the institutional 
process. See Senghaas, op. cit., in Gleditsch and Njolstad, (eds), 25.
9 Senghaas, op. cit., in Gleditsch & Njolstad, (eds.), 20.
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as a weapon system. This may be why some states are willing to institute national 
moratoria on these weapons, but not to renounce them outright, while they study 
the situation. They need to know that either another weapon can replace the land 
mine functionally, and that operational planning can be adjusted to exclude the 
land mine option. In contrast to chemical weapons, the institutional attachment to 
land mines has not been very powerful. There simply are not as many institutional 
infrastructures or specialized interests associated with these weapons. In addition, 
there are no harmful effects linked to the destruction of land mine stockpiles, 
unlike chemical weapons, where the process of destroying them can be dangerous 
if done incorrectly. In practical terms, this means that there should be fewer 
institutional obstacles in the way of abolishing land mines. Should military 
establishment conclude that these weapons no longer serve an operational purpose, 
then there probably will be a much quicker pace towards disarmament. In the last 
few years alone, certain states have already managed to shut down their land 
mines-armaments dynamic.10
Section 6.1.5-Verification
There are also substantial differences between the verification and implementation 
mechanisms between the chemical and land mine regimes. “Verification has often 
been regarded as the crncial element in arms control, implying that agreements 
that are not 100% watertight in terms of detecting cheating are of dubious
10 Many of these states are those which support a full ban on land mines. Some of these states 
began with a moratorium on the use and export of mines, but many have gone further and destroyed 
existing stockpiles. In some states, land mine programmes had already petered out, so destroying 
any remaining mines may have been a logical conclusion.
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value.5'11 12The CWC, for example, has some of the most extensive and intrusive 
verification mechanisms ever found in a treaty; in contrast, the CCW has none. ‘ 
Critics have argued that the CCW would be difficult if not impossible to verify 
because mines have already proliferated in such vast numbers that they would be 
impossible to trace. Because mines are such small weapons, they can easily be 
hidden. Land mines are also simple to produce, or mass-produce. While this may 
be a valid argument, it should also be remembered that initially, it was thought 
that a chemical weapons regime was unverifiable because of the complexities of 
dual-use chemicals. Critics of the CWC still may insist that the regime is 
unverifiable. The fundamental difference between these two weapons systems is 
that it is far more difficult to achieve verification in partial disarmament regimes 
than in full disarmament regimes. Verification can sometimes be a complex 
process, but it still remains far simpler to verify that an infraction has occurred if 
the weapons is banned in its entirety, rather than banned under specific
circumstances.
The problem with taking land mines seriously as an arms control or disarmament 
issue is that if no one attempts to verify that agreements are being followed, or that 
consequences will b£ levied against those who do not observe the rules, then there 
is a great temptation to break these rules. If the prospects for verification appear 
weak or problematic, then the international community might not wish to pursue 
any further restrictions or prohibitions on these weapons. Conversely, treaties may
11 United Nations, The Unfinished Disarmament Agenda, Disarmament, Special NGO Committee 
for Disarmament, Geneva, February' 1995,
12 In the review process of the CCW, parties lobbied hard to include verification and compliance 
measures in the revised treaty, but other factions absolutely refused to include these measures in the 
amended treaty'.
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be negotiated to be deliberately weak, if there is no serious interest in restricting 
these weapons. The issue of verification can be used as a political cover for not
advocating or promoting disarmament treaties.
Section 6.1.6-Perceptions of Political Utility
As Senator Patrick Leahy quotes The Washington Post in a recent
editorial:
A simple renunciation of land mines would give the United States a strong platform from 
which to persuade others. But in the end, things must come to a table. Diplomacy seems 
a wickedly sluggish way to tame the bloody scourge of land mines, but a necessary way1?3
Politics in the form of diplomacy is one of the most important elements in the 
arms control decision-making process. Weapons that are prioritized on the 
international political or diplomatic agenda are more likely to be prioritized on the 
arms control agenda. The political circumstances of the time, among potential 
signatories, may be the key to concluding weapons control agreements. Currently, 
both land mines and chemical weapons are rated high on the international 
diplomatic and arms control agendas. Politicians in democracies are also 
responsible to public demands and must work with their military establishments to 
resolve any disputes between humanitarian and security concerns. Politicians must 
also rely on their military advisors to explain the benefits or drawbacks of signing 
on to an arms control agreement. To facilitate these agreements, politicians are 
obligated to find a balance between public interests and core interests which 
involve protecting the security of the state. 13
13 “Tale of Two Treaties”, The Washington Post, April 14, 1997 as quoted by Senator Patrick 
Leahy, in a letter titled “Treaty for Land Mines”, in The Washington Post, April 27, 1997, C6.
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Chemical weapons remained in the realm of superpower politics for many years.
Most major arms control agreements had to include these powers if they were to 
be successful. The progress of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was 
directly related to the improved political atmosphere between East and West. 
States which stayed outside this regime risked being classified as political pariahs 
or rogue regimes; therefore, politically, joining the CWC was a pragmatic choice. 
In addition domestic politics has also played an important role in treaty 
implementation. For a treaty to become operational, it must be ratified, and in 
some states, bureaucratic politics can impede the process.14 The ratification 
process has been especially problematic in the United States and Russia. Political 
dissension within national governments hinders disarmament measures, even if 
official negotiators have agreed to abolish a particular weapon.
Originally, land mines were not ranked high on the international political agenda. 
They were never part of the strategic, bilateral anns control process, partly because 
they were not seen as a major weapon system that could affect East-West 
balances. As a result, the CCW was not negotiated in an official disannament 
fomm. From the beginning, the establishment of the CCW was negotiated in a 
multilateral environment, with the full participation of the major powers but 
without much enthusiasm. The improvement in East-West relations did not 
suddenly set the stage for co-operation in restricting land mines, but it enabled 
players laige and small to turn attention to other conflicts throughout the world
^Ratification has been stalled in the U.S. Congress over two main issues relating to the CWC: the 
opinion that the CWC is non-verifiable: and the CWC will not stop non-signatories from 
developing chemical weapons. The United States has a reputation for conducting a slow 
ratification process. For example, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 was not ratified for almost fifty 
years.
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and to the types of weapons being deployed. Previously, the use of land mines did 
not gain much attention politically because it was not considered to be crucial to 
the core interests of the major powers; the land mine crisis was seen as a 
peripheral problem occurring mostly in poor Third World countries. Politically, 
even for the major powers, it is now an issue that can no longer be ignored. 
Political responses to the public interest seems to play a much larger role in the
current drive to control land mines than it ever did in the case of chemical
weapons. As land mines are viewed primarily to be a humanitarian problem,
governments gain a great deal of political mileage by calling for a ban or an
eventual ban. Public relations and media campaigns have successfully brought the
land mine problem to a high point on the international diplomatic agenda. As a
result, governments now have to respond in some manner rather than ignore the
problem. As David Gowdey explains it:
In the case of the democracies, public pressure has caused states, most notably 
Britain, to redefine their interests on this issue. They need to be seen to be 
doing something about these horrible weapons that kill babies and women, so 
that their electorate, who have been galvanized on these issues, will not turn them 
out of office.15
Politically, the land mine crisis has shifted from a peripheral problem to one 
garnishing a great deal of political interest.
Land mines are also a contentious issue politically, with some distinctive North-
South cleavages. As land mines are a low-technology weapon system, it is not
difficult for any state to gain access to them. There is often resentment by some
i
states that other powers are trying to dictate what type of weapons they may retain. $
I
Also, some Western states are criticised for retaining the so-called “smart” mines.
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reducing the efficacy of their more lowly opponents’ “dumb” mines. This policy 
is usually viewed as hypocritical. Still, the political costs of remaining outside any 
land mine control regimes is not as high as those for chemical weapons. 
Therefore, in the case of land mines, it may be harder to encourage restraint.
Section 6.1.7-The Role of Particular States and Institutions
Particular states, institutions such as disarmament forums, as well as non-state
actors, namely intemational and non-governmental organizations, special interest 
groups, and the media all have a role to play in the development of the CWC and 
CCW regimes. The quest for a chemical weapons ban has been confined primarily
to the official disamiament forum, the Geneva based Conference on Disarmament,
but the driving force behind this treaty has been from superpower collaboration. 
Although chemical weapons were abhorred almost universally by most parties 
whether civilian or military, no other specialized institutions were involved with 
the exception of the Intemational Committee of the Red Cross. There have not 
been any lobbying groups, citizen or media campaigns working towards the 
elimination of these weapons. For example, anti-nuclear lobbies have orchestrated 
massive demonstrations world-wide, but this simply has no parallel in the case of 
chemical weapons. Chemical weapons were not an issue that greatly aroused the 
emotions of the general public. This reaction is understandable as there was no 
ongoing crisis with these weapons that horrified the public conscience (which 
occurred in the case of land mines), and these weapons were unlikely to cause 
world destruction (like nuclear weapons). Recently, in the wake of the Gulf War
15 Author’s correspondence with David Gowdey.
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and Tokyo chemical subway attack, and the problems of the CWC ratification,
chemical weapons have been given more attention in the media. But this media 
attention has not really been about advocacy, instead it focuses more on public
debate over chemical disannament issues.
The CCW review process has been orchestrated through the UN in a truly
multilateral fashion, but not in a traditional arms control forum. Even more
recently, the land mines issue has been elevated in importance and moved to an
official arms control forum, The Conference on Disarmament, where the CWC 
was negotiated.16 In contrast to chemical weapons, there has been a massive 
international anti-land mine campaign orchestrated through the media, 
international institutions and advocacy groups. This is perhaps understandable, as 
the anti-land mine campaign arose directly from a humanitarian threat to civilians 
created by anti-personnel mines. The United Nations, and the ICRC, the lead 
agencies of the anti-mine campaign, participated in the CCW review and 
preparatory conferences with observer status. The enormous public pressure to 
ban mines was embodied by the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines 
(ICBL), which is compromised of over 650 NGOs in over 40 countries. Thanks to 
these public pressure campaigns, states were made aware of the land mine 
problem if only from the bottom up, and began to re-examine their own policies. •
'‘While it is an important move politically for the land mine issue to be elevated to an official 
disarmament forum, it may not be a good move in practical terms as contentious issues can 
sometimes be buried by the negotiating process. Senator Patrick Leahy has complained that in the 
U.N. Disannament Conference, “...any one holdout can and will block action indefinitely.” See 
Leahy letter to The Washington Post, op. cit., C 6.
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What is perhaps unique to the land mines eradication campaign is that states have 
also been shamed by outside actors into taking action, and have joined in the anti­
land mine campaign. Initially, the role of the state was rather cautious, with the 
United States taking the lead in introducing moratoria and calling for the eventual 
elimination of all land mines. But at the present time, the United States has not 
actually agreed to a total ban on all land mines. Unlike the chemical weapons 
issue, which was superpower-oriented, the drive to ban land mines has been 
orchestrated by a more diverse group of states (outside any formal negotiating 
bodies) with Canada emerging as the leader. Currently 50 states comprising the 
Ottawa Group (including many NATO members) are committed to the elimination 
of land mines.17 Through this process, the roles of outside actors such as 
international organizations, NGOs, media organizations, and those of individual 
states have been fused in a commonality of purpose.
Section 6.1.8-Commercial Influences
Commercial interests and economic gain have often if not usually been blamed for 
the proliferation of weapons especially in the conventional arms trade. In the 
wake of recent military downsizing in many countries, the arms trade has been 
described as a buyer’s market. If this is the case, then do the conditions of 
international military trade influence arms control efforts? For the most part, the 
regulation of chemical weapons and land mines has been affected very little by
|7An “Agenda for Action” was declared at the Ottawa Conference in October 1996. The Canadian 
initiative stressed how moral and political leadership can end the land mine crisis; the global 
prohibition and elimination of land mines should be implemented initially, at the national and then 
regional level; Foreign Ministers are to be invited to Ottawa in December 1997 to negotiate a new
234
commercial interests; in fact, commercial concerns may encourage adherence to 
control agreements. There is no legal trade in chemical weapons per se, but there 
are very large multinational chemical and pharmaceutical industries from which 
the means to make chemical weapons may be drawn.* 18 One of the arguments 
against prohibiting chemical weapons was that it would be impossible to verify 
diversion of chemical dual-use technology to weapons development. It was always 
felt that intrusion into the affairs of the chemical industry would have serious 
repercussions for international trade and development. This argument became 
outdated when the chemical industry began to advise and participate in the 
chemical weapons negotiations process. With the co-operation of industry it then 
became possible for verification provisions to be implemented as required by the 
CWC. Banning chemical weapons would not adversely affect the economies of 
most states, but if a state chose not to comply with the CWC’s provisions, it would 
eventually be excluded from the lucrative international chemical trade. In addition, 
the chemical industry as a whole was compelled for practical reasons to co­
operate, as significant penalties would be levelled against those finns or 
individuals found to be involved in the illegal chemical trade. From a commercial 
standpoint, therefore, it is in the interest of most states to co-operate and to agree 
to the terms of the CWC.19
treaty dedicated to a full ban on land mines. ICRC, “General and Complete Disarmament”,
(October 1996), 2.
18 For example, during the early 1980s Western firms were severely criticized for aiding the 
development of chemical weapons programmes in regions of concern. To make sure this did not 
continue, tighter controls and laws were established.
19 There is also the opposing viewpoint that the chemical industry would be compromised by 
intrusive verification which might lead to the theft of sensitive commercial secrets. This issue 
received much attention during the CWC negotiation and ratification process, but this has become a 
rather moot point to states that have already acceded to the treaty.
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Unlike chemical weapons, land mines have been part of the regular military trade 
for years. But land mines are not big-ticket items, as most manufacturers do not 
specialize exclusively in the production of land mines. For most modem 
economies, the loss of this type of military sale would have minimal impact, thus 
creating a more favourable economic environment for a land mine ban. Bad public
relations incurred by companies selling land mines or land mine components 
would further spur an end to the sale of these weapons. As Joost Hiltermann 
argues: “Companies are sensitive: they are concerned about public relations. Land 
mines are usually a very small component of weapons manufacture. Companies 
can easily stop producing without losing a lot of money.”20 *
Therefore, it makes more sense for manufacturing companies to agree to and to 
follow restrictions. But, poorer states may not be willing to relinquish their niche 
in this market especially if they retain large stockpiles of “dumb” mines. They may 
not want to pay the price to replace or retrofit these mines. Furthermore, some 
wealthier states reserve the right to sell high technology mines even if they no 
longer produce the low technology versions?' As a result, even though in most 
economies mines are not a huge industry in themselves, to some parties economic 
interests, however small they may be, may conflict with the ideal of a ban.
20 Comments of Joost Hiltermann as found in “The Land Mines Crisis Humanitarian Disaster: What 
Can be Done?”, Forum held at the United Nations, 16 November, as reproduced in Ending 
Reliance on Nuclear and Conventional Arms, Disarmament. (New York: United Nations, 1995), 
po.
Poorer states have accused richer states of being hypocritical in policy, in calling for a ban on 
low technology mines while they continue to profit from sales of high technology models.
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Section 6.1.9-The Role and Impact of Stigmatization
Both politically and economically, the stigmatization of these weapons has had an 
important impact on the degree of controls placed upon them. To warrant
disarmament, there must be something terrible about the weapon on humanitarian 
groimds. Very few weapons are classified in this manner. Still, chemical weapons, 
along with nuclear and biological warfare, have always conjured up horrific 
images. The stigmatization of chemical weapons has been consistent and cohesive 
at least in the Western context, and originates within the Western military 
establishments from their experiences with chemical warfare during World War I. 
In fact, throughout history, poisons as a method of warfare have been condemned.
There was no stigmatization of land mines when they were first introduced as a 
weapon system. In contrast to chemical weapons, mines were viewed as legitimate 
weapons; as a result, only certain uses of mines have been restricted. Recently 
however, mines have become rapidly stigmatized because of their devastating 
impact on the civilian sector. As one observer has noted, “Weapons are not 
stigmatized generally, but land mines are increasingly stigmatized as weapons that 
are particularly nasty.”22 This has been in direct response to the heightened 
awareness of the land mine crisis world-wide in which many anti-mine 
humanitarian and advocacy groups have taken an interest. As one commentator
has observed:
22 Hiltermann in UN Land Mine Forum, 130.
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This campaign has been so successful that the image of an amputee now evokes 
the same revulsion and anger once reserved for those of Hiroshima victims or 
soldiers blinded by mustard gas in World War I. The goal is simple: to put land 
mines on that select list of weapons, with the nuclear bomb and chemical arms, 
that are so indiscriminate and uncontrollable that the only solution is their total 
eliminaiinn.23
Land mine ban advocates have increasingly placed land mines in the same 
category as chemical weapons, hoping that such a powerful stigmatization could 
also work to achieve an eventual ban. When this sort of categorization and 
thinking fully pervades militaiy establishments, and all anti-personnel land mines 
are branded as intolerable, then a ban will be very realistic goal.
Section 6.1.10-The Role and Influence of IHL
The role and influence of international humanitarian law in establishing restraints 
on these two weapon systems also presents an interesting comparison. IHL is not 
simply an interplay between humanitarian considerations and military necessity; 
the necessity of the weapon in question is considered along with political, strategic 
and economic factors in deciding whether the humanitarian option should prevail. 
IHL may be a less ambitious approach to restricting weapons than traditional anns 
control, but it has the value of identifying and restricting the type of weapons that 
require controls. The importance of IHL is that it can be used as a yardstick for 
measuring the humaneness of a particular weapon, and can stigmatize the weapon 
in question. Unfortunately when IHL rules on the use of weapons are violated,
23 Iain Guest, “Revised Agreement is No Victory in War Against Land Mines”, International 
Herald Tribune, June 4, 1996, 8. In an open letter to the President Clinton published in The New 
York Times, a group of retired generals favouring a complete ban also stated that “They [land 
mines] are in a category similar to poison gas”. See the International Herald Tribune, 5 April 
1996, 1.
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this clearly indicates that the parties involved cannot be depended upon to use
these weapons conectly.
In the case of chemical weapons, the influence of IHL has been extremely
important. Poisonous weapons incurred humanitarian restraints long before they
were classified as chemical weapons in the modem context. Soldiers will use
whatever weapon might give them an advantage, but when the weapon causes far
more human damage than is gemtane or necessary for any perceived advantage,
then it is time to re-think the necessity of the weapon. After the horror of chemical
weapons warfare was demonstrated during World War I, states arrived at the
common understanding through the Geneva Protocol that these weapons should
never be used again. Part of the moving spirit behind this co-operation arose from
the wider peace movement seeking disannament, but it also had vitality because
these weapons were perceived as too horrific to be used in war. It was also feared
that the use of such weapons would spread to civilian areas.
For the most part the pledge not to use chemical weapons except in retaliation has
been respected. Breakouts have usually occurred where players have no interest in
such restraints, and perhaps because of lack of experience with chemical weapons
warfare. It is important to stress that the Geneva Protocol is essentially a moral
code of conduct; it contains no disarmament or verification measures. Even states
which had not signed the Protocol are considered bound by it under customay' 
international law. Once chemical weapons began to be perceived as weapons of 
mass destruction, the concept of prohibition moved into the realm of Cold War 
politics. The CWC, the long awaited successor to the Geneva Protocol, has been
i 
i
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hailed as a great step forward for humankind. Removing a weapon that is 
indiscriminate, excessively injurious to both civilian and combatant alike is in 
keeping with general humanitarian principles for making war more humane. 
Without the precedent of chemical weapons being prohibited under international 
humanitarian law, the prospects for chemical disarmament would have been made
much more difficult.
IHL has focused attention on land mines through the regulation of the use of land 
mines under the Convention on Conventional Weapons, an IHL treaty. The current 
CCW review process has really only served to tighten the rules, but it has no way 
to really enforce them, which is perhaps the greatest failing of humanitarian law. 
Part of the problem is that land mines are perceived as legitimate weapons of war 
even under IHL, therefore, their use is only restricted, and not prohibited. Since 
the Geneva Protocol of 1925, IHL has not succeeded in prohibiting a weapon 
entirely. As a result, land mines have not been stigmatized as a weapon as were 
chemical weapons. This means that it may be more difficult to incorporate
disarmament measures at a later date if the IHL restraints are not absolute.
The distinctions of IHL applications to these two weapons draw jrom perceptions 
regarding the nature of each weapon versus its effects. Chemical weapons have 
been widely held to be inhumane as the nature of the weapon is considered 
indiscriminate. The effects of these weapons on human beings, causing 
unnecessary suffering to soldiers and civilians alike, were considered 
disproportionate to any military advantage they may have provided. Although 
land mine injuries are just as horrific as those from chemical weapons, they have
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not been classified as inhumane weapons. In fact, there was a reluctance under
IHL to classify land mines as inherently inhumane; instead, attention has focused
on restricting their use. In the case of chemical weapons, on the other hand;
...delegates to the diplomatic conference [that resulted in the Geneva Protocol] 
did not make a minute legal analysis of the effects of chemical weapons as 
compared with other weapons, or make a careful assessment of their military 
necessity as compared with the suffering they caused, but rather boldly stated that 
the use of these weapons was “barbaric” and “horrific” and therefore to be 
outlawed.24
Land mines only received attention when civilians began to be caught in their 
indiscriminate wake. Soldiers had to take their chances with these weapons. The
ill effects of land mine use are usually blamed upon incorrect use of the weapon 
rather than on the weapon itself. What is happening in the case of land mines is 
that the nature and the effects of the weapon are inevitably linked, and as a result, 
IHL is being undermined. Currently, a reassessment concerning the nature and 
effect of these weapons, and the shift in thinking is now leaning more towards the 
perception that these weapons are in fact inhumane. For example, land mines
cannot discriminate between civilians or combatants, this has become even more
problematic because of the time-delay properties of these weapons. When entire 
civilian areas are blanketed by these mines, then the effects of these weapons may 
be disproportionate to the original military utility these weapons were intended to 
serve. Mines can also be seen as perfidious weapons because of their hidden 
qualities. Still, the primary problem with declaring these weapons inhumane is 
whether they can be considered excessively injurious, or causing unnecessary
24 “The Rationale for Amending Protocol II of the 1980 Convention, The Ways and Means of 
Improving Protocol II, The Military and Humanitarian Perspectives Concerning the Amendment of 
Protocol II”, Group of Governmental Experts to Prepare the Review Conference of States Parties 
to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Background 
Documentation prepared by the ICRC, April 1994.
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suffering to combatants as well as civilians. In the case of chemical weapons,
virtually no one disputed that these weapons caused more suffering than was
needed for a combatant’s incapacitation. Currently, there may be sufficient
agreement that the humanitarian consequences of land mines use are excessive in
relation to their military utility. If these weapons were accorded the stigma of
causing unnecessary suffering to combatant and civilian alike, then it would be
much easier to place land mines in the same IHL category as chemical weapons.
Section 6.1.11-Partial Versus Comprehensive Disarmament Regimes
These two case studies also represent the degree of ease and difficulty in
establishing partial or comprehensive disarmament regimes. The fundamental
difference between these weapons is that the CWC has committed states to
comprehensive disarmament, but the CCW requires only selective disarmament.
From a practical and political stand-point, it is much easier to negotiate
international agreements on partial restrictions of a weapon system. Full and
comprehensive disarmament is a very difficult level of control to attain. The CCW
review process has succeeded in banning only the use of the most injurious mines
under certain circumstances, and parties have up to nine years to convert j
stockpiles. Anns control measures include a ban on the transfer of restricted or j
i
prohibited mines. The only mines that are banned outright are non-detectable j
plastic mines and mines with anti-handling devices. These distinctions between i
mine types complicate disarmament issues. By placing limits only on a particular
type of anti-personnel mine but not on others, mines are legitimized as a weapon j
system. Moreover, selective disarmament cannot be as effective as total ’
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disarmament because it is difficult to monitor. Any use, possession, or transfer of 
an illegal weapon would be a violation, but when certain uses and types of land 
mines are permitted, distinctions between legality and illegality will invariably 
blur. Selective disarmament may actually encourage more mine use as mines are 
still perceived as a legitimate weapon system.23 Finally, selective disarmament 
may be more difficult to reconcile with humanitarian ideals. Despite these 
drawbacks to selective disarmament, most participants at the review process 
would agree that these restraints are a compromise—the best that can be achieved 
under present political circumstances.
Historically, comprehensive disarmament has been an elusive goal. The Chemical 
Weapons Convention, therefore, is a considerable achievement. The right political 
conditions and military judgements must be present before international 
agreements can be achieved. When the disarmament regime is not universal or is 
discriminatory, the co-operation needed to produce full disannament agreements 
becomes even more elusive. The goal of comprehensive chemical disarmament 
became a realistic one when parties agreed to disarm with no exceptions or 
conditions. The benefit of comprehensive disarmament is that it is easier to 
enforce, because any detection of a chemical weapon deployment would be in 
violation, unambiguously. In terms of the land mine problem, comprehensive 
disarmament might be the more effective and desirable option, but realistically, 
selective disarmament may be the only option available as a short term solution.
" If mines are not completely renounced as a weapon system, then some combatants may take this 
as a green light to continue using mines, especially the high-technology mines.
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Section 6.2-Some General Conclusions
A number of general conclusions can be drawn from this comparative study and
they have repercussions for arms control in the Post-Cold War enviromnent. The 
most interesting and perhaps striking difference between the two regimes is the 
selective disarmament for the land mines regime and the comprehensive or full 
disarmament in the case of chemical weapons. The question is why has this 
happened? What conditions must be in place before comprehensive disarmament 
could prevail over partial disamament? First, there must be universal agreement 
that all uses of the weapon in question should be deemed illegal. There can be no 
exceptions; the weapon must be stigmatized absolutely, in political, moral, and 
military terms. If any disputes arise, then partial restrictions on the use of these 
weapons are unlikely to be transformed later into full disarmament measures. To 
date, the use of anti-personnel land mines as a weapon system has not been 
condemned, making it very difficult to negotiate a total ban. With chemical 
weapons, there was never any question about the inhumane nature of the weapon. 
Therefore, comprehensive disarmament vis-a-vis chemical weapons was an
achievable goal, as evidenced by the cuiTent CWC.
The complete military renunciation of a weapon is also necessary for 
comprehensive disarmament to occur. Not only must militaries disdain the 
weapon in question but they must also conclude that its operational utility is 
marginal at best. As long as a military establishment believes that it needs a 
particular weapon, then it will not abandon it without a fight. In order to forgo a 
weapon it should either be substitutable or the function it serves, deemed no
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longer important. This has to be a unqualified military viewpoint, and not the 
opinion of a select few within the military establishment. Another important 
factor affecting the prospects for comprehensive disarmament is the issue of 
verification and compliance. Any prudent strategist knows that it is unwise to 
relinquish a weapon unless it can be guaranteed that an adversary will do the 
same. The prospects for the CWC became more realistic when significant 
verification provisions were incorporated. The problem is that it is probably futile 
to negotiate full disarmament regimes if mechanisms for verification and 
compliance do not exist. This glaring deficiency is most likely what is impeding 
the creation of a land mine disarmament regime. The United States has indicated 
that it does not want to sign the Ottawa treaty because this prospective treaty does 
not include verification measures.26
These two case studies have shown just how important is the support of the 
military establishment when trying to establish weapons controls. With very few 
exceptions, military establishments have been united in their abhorrence of
• chemical weapons, as well as in concluding that these weapons were no longer 
crucial to national security. With the militaiy finnly on board in support of a ban, 
it was then possWe to abolish these weapons. More important, the military 
establishment was not involved in a tug-of-war with the political establishment, 
making it easier to establish a unified policy.
26 “Ban Mines Now”, The Economist, May 24, 1997, 16. Instead, the United States feels that a 
treaty banning land mines would be useful only if all the major suppliers are in agreement and 
verification is included; therefore, the U.S. prefers approaching the issue of a land mine ban in the 
Conference on Disannament.
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Military support for the abolition of land mines by contrast has not been as
forthcoming and opinions remain divided. There is not a strong military ethic 
against these weapons; for the most part, soldiers have had to take their chances 
with these weapons and accepted them as an occupational hazard. Currently, 
some militaries even question whether mines are more than marginally useful. 
Because of these divergences in opinion among militaries and often within them, 
these establishments largely hinder rather than help in the drive toward a ban. The 
influence of military establishments can also stymie the political policy process. 
For example, United States policy on the land mine issue would, on the surface, 
seem dedicated to an international ban, but in reality it has been described "... as a 
struggle between a military determined to preserve certain mine options and a 
president reluctant to expose himself in a political campaign as commander in 
chief inattentive to the prerogatives of his hx^^pp”27 8 Until, there is stronger and 
more unified support from the military establishment in favour of a ban it is 
unlikely that a ban will become a unified national policy objective.
Moves are now underway around the world to ban land mines in their entirely, like 
chemical weapons. Does this mean that humanitarian and security concerns can 
be reconciled in the arms control process? Or will security concerns always take 
precedence over the humanitarian ones? In the real world, even if a weapon is 
generally considered to be inhumane, states may hold on to them as long as they 
can, so long as they do not become a severe liability (operationally or politically). 
Although the use of chemical weapons has been banned since 1925, states still
27 This does not mean that all parties within the military establishment necessarily approved of the
weapon, but it was not as intrinsic or strong a dislike as that for chemical weapons.
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retained them in their arsenals even though they ceased to have major military 
value to the major powers. Recently, however, new and renewed fears about the 
threat from these weapons have reinvigorated the quest for a total ban. Therefore, 
the humanitarian concerns and security concerns about these weapons could be 
reconciled as the major powers no longer needed these weapons, and could 
support the humanitarian argument as well as using it to stigmatize non-compliant
actors.
In the case of land mines, these weapons are wreaking such havoc that the
humanitarian consequences can no longer be ignored. Therefore, the
circumstances of the time may be responsible for shifting the balance to favour
humanitarian concerns over those of security. As a result;
...[TJhere is now a need for land mines law to consider the next step, to consider not only 
the prohibition of use, as was in force for chemical weapons between 1925 and the 
beginning of the 1990s. but to consider the next step, which would be a ban on the 
production of those land mines;?9
Humanitarian concerns over land mines may also benefit security interests. There 
is the realization in the Post-Cold War security enviromnent that security has 
many facets, and as such the humanitarian option may well benefit the security 
requirements of some states. Countries with extensive land mine problems may 
remain unstable; the costs in international aid is becoming astronomical; and 
soldiers participating in peacekeeping missions are being increasingly exposed to 
this hazard. Thus, weapons controls based on the inhumane nature and effects of 
these weapons fits in time and place, and indeed in the self-interest of most states. 
Still, a more basic explanation may work in favour of a ban as “the humanitarian
28 “Land Mine Fiasco”, International Herald Tribune, May 21, 1996, 8.
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consequences of these small land mines that are now proliferating to such huge 
numbers override the issue of the legitimate uses of these weapons.”3(2 When the 
humanitarian consequences of land mine use are disproportionate to any perceived 
military gain, then the humanitarian argument should eventually prevail.
Does the willingness of the international community to place restrictions on 
particular weapons because of their humanitarian consequences reflect changes in 
the international security order, or are they unique occurrences? Is it also possible 
to say that these regimes of restraint reflect future trends in arms control? To a 
certain extent, the incredibly rapid developments of restraints on land mines and 
calls for their abolition are unique. Land mines have been an emotional issue that 
has touched the public conscience, and in doing so, has demanded a response. 
Chemical weapons were an emotive issue for the military but not especially so for 
the general public. Despite these different paths resulting in restrictions or 
prohibitions of these weapons, both these weapons evoked responses because of 
their nature and effects. Currently, in the Post-Cold War environment the 
international community does seem more willing to engage in an examination of 
the legaHyz and humanity of particular weapons
To a certain degree, in the Post-Cold War world weapons have proliferated to such 
an extent that there is a pressing need for scrutinizing and re-assessing weapons 
policies. And all states need to be involved in this process if it is to be successful. 
First, as so few weapons have been restricted or abolished because of their nature
29 Bruno Zimmermann. in UN Land Mine Forum. 125.
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or effects, it may be difficult to establish that any trends are taking place per se: 
however, certain conclusions can be inferred. For example, there is a great deal of 
fear that if the Pentagon acquiesced on the matter of land mines, it would open up 
a virtual pandora’s box of weapons controls.30 1 32 33As Joost Hiltermann argues:
The main reason why the Pentagon is not interested in widening the scope of the 
1980 Convention is that they see it as a dangerous precedent. As soon as we 
have a victory' on land mines, we could start moving on to other weapons, such as 
anti-vehicle land mines and sub-munitions.j2
But militaries may now be willing to adjust their support for arms control policies. 
How far a military is willing to go in terms of restrictions on other weapons may 
depend on “...whether a case can be made that these weapons are qualitatively 
different from other types of system legitimately used on the battlefield.” For 
example, the Pentagon initially rejected the idea of placing controls on the use of 
blinding laser weapons as anti-personnel weapons; it feared that commanders in 
the field could be held liable for any infractions concerning the use of these 
weapons and therefore hesitate in their duties. Yet, the Pentagon reversed this 
policy, and dropped its opposition to adding an extra protocol (Protocol IV) to the 
CCW dealing specifically with restrictions on the use of blinding lasers as an anti­
personnel weapon. As the ICRC points out:
Not only does this prohibit an abhorrent new means of warfare, but it also means 
that, for only the second time in history, the international community' has been 
able to proscribe an inhumane weapon before having to witness its effects on the 
battlefield.34
30 Comments of Ambassador Karl Inderfurth, Special Political Affairs Officer at the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations as reproduced in the UN Land Mine Forum, 117.
31 Other weapons that may be cause for concern in the future are small-calibre bullets, cluster 
bombs, fuel-air explosives, and high-tech directed energy weapons (high power microwave 
weapons). For a description of these weapons and their effects see UN. “The Unfinished 
Disarmament Agenda”, 32-35.
32 Hiltermann in UN Land Mine Forum, 129.
33 Joanna Spear, “On the Desirability and Feasibility of Arms Transfer Regime Formation”. 
Contemporary Security Policy. Vol. 15, No. 3, December 1994, 104.
34 ICRC, “General and Complete Disannament”, (October 1996), 3.
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In the case of blinding laser weapons, member states have agreed that these 
weapons should be restricted even before they were widely fielded. This is in 
keeping with the obligations embodied under international humanitarian law
requiring that military planners consider whether the development of new weapons
would be prohibited under IHL or contrary to its general principles?3
hi the Post-Cold War environment, the legality of using particular weapons based 
upon either their nature or their effects is receiving more serious attention than 
ever, which may bode well for arms control and disannament efforts. More 
normatively, legalistic approaches are competing with the traditional realist 
approaches to the arms control process. This does not necessarily mean that 
realist approaches are obsolete, but that different approaches may be more useful 
or acceptable owing to the circumstances of the time:?6 Taking the general 
principles of the law of war as a measuring stick to determine if a weapon should 
be considered illegal is a very normative approach to arms control and
disarmament.
For example, there seems to be more interest in the international community in 
debating the legality of particular weapons, as evidenced by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) taking up the issue of nuclear weapons. In an advisory 
opinion, the ICJ ruled that the use of nuclear weapons is generally unlawful but it
35 Ibid.. 3.
36 In the conduct of international affairs in the Post-Cold War era, the international community 
seems to be moving towards the resolution of problems through united action backed by legal 
mandates. This is evident in international peacekeeping and coalition operations and humanitarian 
interventions. (Recent examples include the coalition forces in the Gulf War to liberate Kuwait 
after Iraq’s invasion, humanitarian intervention in Somalia, and peacekeeping mandates in Bosnia.)
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could not agree on whether there should be exceptions: would these weapons be 
illegal if used in retaliation or for the survival of the state? The ICJ also ruled that 
the threat or the use of nuclear weapons violates international humanitarian law. 
Although the ICJ hedged on declaring the use of nuclear weapons illegal in all 
circumstances, and did not advocate an outright ban on these weapons, this non­
binding advisory opinion can be viewed potentially as an first step towards the 
eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.37 It may also be possible that other 
weapons could be subjected to intemational jurisprudence.
Can it also be concluded that arms control policy-making process is now more
responsive to the needs of intemational society rather than to the interests of its
strongest members? The strongest members will still have the most influence on
the amis control process, but now other states and actors are taking a more active
role in, and influencing, the process. Therefore, the interests of the international f
community as a whole are opened up for consideration, and with it the ethical and 
moral concerns facing the intemational society. When states seek to ban weapons 
because of their inhumanity they are contributing to the common good. Indeed, the 
process of anns control can be considered more responsive when it actually
addresses the concerns and circumstances of intemational society. i1
I
Therefore, it is not surprising that these approaches have filtered down to the arms control field as
well. j
17While this may be an overly optimistic viewpoint, “...its potential influence to augment the
intemational opinion that favors abolition of nuclear weapons cannot be overlooked. It will put the
nuclear-club countries under increased moral pressure and responsibility to work harder on
nuclear-disarmament issues.” See “Netherlands: U.N. Court’s Ruling on Nuclear Arms Can be
Step Toward Eventual Ban”, Nikkei Weekly, 15 July 1997. j
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With more actors involved in the arms control process, however, it may be more 
difficult to achieve cohesion in armaments policies, as there are so many different
interests at stake. In other words, the international community may not necessarily
work together towards a common good. Certain states habitually create obstacles 
to hinder the arms control or disarmament negotiating process. As voting is by 
consensus, the failure of the CCW review process has been blamed on particular 
“holdout states” that block any realistic hope for a ban..38 39The placing of land 
mines on tlie Conference on Disarmament agenda has also been criticized, as 
negotiations in that fomm tend to be bogged down by the opposition of particular 
states. But, states now seem more willing to take the power away from hold-out 
states so that arms control accords can take shape. For example, the prospects for 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) were jeopardized when India and 
Iran blocked the transmittal of the treaty to the UN General Assembly. In 
response Australia with 127 co-sponsors introduced a resolution that sent the 
treaty directly to the UN General Assembly for consideration^ thereby 
circumventing the loopholes in the treaty negotiation process that had allowed a 
minority of states to block legislation.
In the case of land mines, similar action is now occurring; Canada has proposed 
the establishment of a completely new treaty dedicated specifically to a total ban 
on land mines. By taking control of the process, Canada is avoiding the pitfalls of
38 One of the recurring problems with the arms control negotiation process is that co-operation is 
usually best achieved between states with similar political and security concerns. It could also be 
argued that certain states may blame these holdout states for hindering the negotiation process, 
when in fact, they themselves do not want a particular issue to be passed.
39 “The Signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty”, Arms Control Today. September 1996, 8,
and Craig Cemiello, “India Blocks Consensus on CTB, Treaty May Still Go the UN”, Arms 
Control Todav. August, 1996, 31. -
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the traditional arms control negotiation process. The advantage to this approach is
that states which favoured a ban, but did not fight for one in the CCW review 
process because they did not think it would be a realistic negotiating position, 
would now be able to support a intemational ban on land mines. Critics would 
argue that states that would not support a ban in the CCW would shun any new 
regime. But as Senator Patrick Leahy argues:
Like the Chemical Weapons Convention, which the administration rightly pushed 
even though some pariah governments have refused to join, the Canadian treaty 
will establish a global norm making these indiscriminate weapons unacceptable.40 
If there is genuine support in the international community for a ban on particular 
weapons, then it is possible for the interests of the community as a whole to
triumph over the narrow interests of the few.
A variety of approaches may be used to control weapons. Whether they include 
supplier regimes, moratoria, IHL treaties, or unilateral actions, they are important 
as arms control building blocks and should be seen as complementary to each 
other. They are also indicative of what the intemational community can achieve 
politically according to circumstances of the time. Abolishing weapons tends to be 
a complicated process; it cannot be achieved overnight. The path to a chemical 
weapons ban has been long but fairly straightforward. The aspiration for and drive 
towards a land mine ban has followed a more tortuous path—but a path that is 
evolving very rapidly. The current land mine campaign also benefits from lessons 
learned from the historical process of banning chemical weapons. As the ICRC
argues:
...[Ejxperience, which took almost a century to develop in the case of chemical 
weapons, has revealed the need to take probable new weapon developments
40 Leahy letter to The Washington Post, (April 27, 1997), C6.
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seriously, to take preventative measures through the total prohibition in principle 
of weapons that are likely to be damaging, and to back these up with effective 
disarmament and arms control measures.41
From this study we can conclude that the process of restraining these weapons 
may have different orientations, and that different factors may influence and 
encourage the process in respect to each weapon. Ultimately, a fundamental 
criterion has to be evident if the weapon is to be banned. The weapon in question 
must be considered to have only marginal militaiy utility. The weapon must not be 
deemed crucial to maintaining intemational security, and states that relinquish the 
weapon would not be at risk from other states that still possess these weapons. 
Once this basic criterion has been met, then the argument to ban the weapon on 
humanitarian grounds can prevail. The fact that land mines are an ‘active’ 
problem (the intemational humanitarian crisis caused by anti-personnel land 
mines) that cannot be ignored has actually forced military establishments to 
reassess their policies. The current international security environment is becoming 
increasingly responsive to both humanitarian and proliferation concerns. As a 
result, the restriction or removal of pernicious weapons is becoming a more 
realistic goal. In the case of land mines, it is likely that (in the future) they will go 
the way that chemical weapons have gone.
41 ICRC, Background Document, April 1994, 6.
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Appendix I-The Original Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW)
CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE 
USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL VTEAONS WHICH MAY BE 
DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE
INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS
The High Contracting Parties,
ReceJ.lii.ng that every State has the duty, in conformity with the ■ CiaaTter of 
the United Nations, to refrain in its international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes 
of the United Nations,
Further recalling the general principle of the protection of the civilian 
popiULation against the effects of hostilities,
Basing themselves on the principle of international lav that the right of 
the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not 
unlimited, and on the principle that prohibits the enployment in armed conflicts 
of weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering,
Also, recalling that it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare 
which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-tem and severe 
damage to the natural environment,
Confirming their determination that in cases not covered by this Convention 
and its annexed Protocols or by other international agreements, the civilian 
population and the combatants shall at all times remain under the protection 
and authority of the principles of international law derived from established 
custom, from the principles of humnity and from the dictates of public 
conscience,
Desiring to contribute to international detente, the ending of the arms race 
and the building of confidence among States, and hence to the realization of the 
aspiretion of all peoples to live in peace,
Recojgaizing the importance of pursuing every effort which may contribute to 
progress towards general and complete disaroament under strict and effective 
international control,
1
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Reaffirming the need to continue the codification and progressive 
development of the rules of international lav applicable in armed conflict,
Wishing to prohibit or restrict further the use of certain conventional 
weapons and believing that the positive results achieved in this area may 
facilitate the main talks on disamiament with a view to putting an end to the 
production, stockpiling and proliferation of such weaixms,
EmpphsSaing the desirability that all States become parities to this 
Convention and its annexed Protocols, especially the militarily significant 
States,
Bearing in mind that the General Assembly of the United Nations and the 
United Nations Disarmament Comission may decide to examine the question of a 
possible broadening of the scope of tihe prohibitions and restrictions contained 
in this Convention and its annexed Protocols,
Further bearing in mind that tihe Comittee on Disarmament may decide to 
consider tihe question of adopting further measures to prohibit or restrict the use 
of certain conventional weapons,
Haye agreed as follows;
A~ti.de 1
Scope of application
This Convention and its annexed Protocols shdi apply in tihe situations 
referred to in Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 19^9 for 
the Protection of War Victims, including any situation described in paragraph h 
of Article 1 of Additional Protocol I to these Conventions.
Article 2
Relations with other international agreements
Nothing in this Convention or its annexed Protocols shall be interpreted as 
detracting from other obligations imposed upon tihe High Contracting Parties by 
international huImattlariat lav applicable in armed conflict.
j
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Article 3
Signature
This Convention shaOLl be open for signature by all States at United Nations 
Headquarters in New York for a period of twelve months from 10 April 1981.
Article k
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by
the Signatories. Any State which has not signed this Convention may accede to it.
2. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shd-l 
be deposited with the Dejp>sitary.
3. ■ Expressions of consent to be bound by any of the Protocols annexed to 
this Convention shall be optional for each State, provided that at the time of 
the deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, of this 
Convention or of accession thereto, that State shall notify the D'ejxjsitary of its 
consent- to be bound by any two or more of these Protocols.
1. At any time after the deiposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance
or approval of this Convention or of accession thereto, a State may notify the 
Depositary of its consent to be bound by any annexed Protocol by which it is not 
already bound.
5. Any Protocol by which a High Contracting Party is bound shall for that 
Party fora an integral part of this Convention.
Article 5
Entry into force
1. This Convention shal1 enter into force six months after the date df 
dejposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approvd or 
accession.
i
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2. For any State which depcsits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession after the date of the de]x>sit of the twentieth instrument 
of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shaLl enter 
into force six months after the date on which that State has deposited its 
instriment of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
3. Each of the Protocols annexed to this Convention shall enter.into force 
six months after the date by which twenty States have notified their consent to
be bound by it in accordance with paragraph 3 or k of Article U of this Convention.
1. For any State which notifies its consent to be bound by a Protocol annexed
to this Convention after the date by which twenty States have notified their consent 
to be bound by it, the Protocol sh^Ll enter into force six months after the date 
on which that State has notified its consent so to be bound.
Article 6
Dissemination
The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of armed 
conflict, to diss<minate this Convention and those of its annexed Protocols by 
which they are bound as widely as possible in their respective countries and, in 
particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military 
instruction, so that those instnments miay become known to their armed forces.
Article 7
Treaty relations upon entry into force of this Convention
1. Wien one of the parties to a conflict is not bound by an annexed 
Protocol, the parties bound by this Convention and that annexed Protocol shaLl 
remain bound by them in their mutual, relations.
2. Any High Contracting Party shaLl be bound by this Convention and any 
Protocol annexed thereto which is in force for it, in any situation contemplated 
by Article 1, in relation to any State which is not a party to this Convention 
or bound by the relevant annexed Protocol, if the latter accepts and applies 
this Convention or the relevant Protocol, and so notifies the Depositary.
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5. The Depositary shall immediately inform the High Contracting Parties
concerned of any notification received under paragraph 2 of this Article.
lt. This Convention, and the annexed .Protocols by which a High Contracting
Party is bound, shEd.l apply with respect to an armed conflict against that High 
Contracting Party of the type referred to in Article 1, paragraph k, of Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Au^gist 19^9 for the Protection of War 
Victims:
(a) where the High Contracting Party is also a party to Additional Protocol I 
and an authority referred to in Article 96, paragraph 3, of that Protocol has 
undertaken to apply the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I in accordance 
with Article 96, paragraph 3, of the said Protocol, and undertakes to apply this 
Convention and the relevant annexed Protocols in relation to that conflict; or
(b) where the High Contracting Pwty is not a party to Additional Protocol I 
and an authority of the type referred to in subparagraph (a) above accepts and 
applies the obligations of the Geneva Conventions and of this Convention and the 
relevant annexed Protocols in relation to that conflict. Such an acceptance and 
application sh^Ll have in relation to that conflict the following effects:
(i) the Genieva Conventions and this Convention and its relevant annexed 
Protocols are brought into force for the parties to the conflict with 
immeddate effect;
(ii) the said authority assumes the same rights and obligations as those 
which have been assumed by a High Contracting Party to the Geneva 
Conventions, this Convention and its relevant annexed Protocols; and
(iii) the Geneva Conventions, this Convention and its relevant annexed Protocols 
are equally binding unon all parties to the conflict.
The High Contracting Party and the authority may also agree to accept and apply 
the obligations of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on a reciprocal 
basis.
Article 8
Review and amendments
I.(a) At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any High 
Contracting Party may propose amendments to this Convention or any annexed Protocol
f
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by which it is bound. Any proposal for an amendment stotll be coOTnuuncated to the 
Dejpjsitary, who sObOLI notify it to all the High Contracting Parties and sh^l seek 
their views on whether a conference should be convened to consider the proposal.
If a minority, that shtOLl not be less than eighteen of the High Contracting 
Parties so agree, he shall promptly convene a conference to which all High 
Contracting Parties stell be invited. States not parties to this Convention shall
be invittd to the conference as observers.
(b) Such a conaerence mny am*e® upon amendments which shall be adopted wad 
shall enter into force in tihe same manner as this Convention and tihe annexed 
Protocols, provided that amendments to this Convention be adopted only by the
High Contracting Parties and that amendments to a specific annexed Protocol may 
Op adopted only by the High Contracting Parties which are bound by that Protocol.
2. (a) At any time after tihe entry into force of this Convention any High
Contracting Party mtay propose additional protocols relating to other categories 
of conventional weapons not covered Oy the existing annexed protocols. Any such 
proposal for an additional pro-toco:! shsaLlL be coeeuatcated to tihe Depositary, who 
shall notify it to nil tihe High Contracting Parties in accordance with - ' ‘
subparagraph 1(a) of this Article. If a mdority, that shall not Oe less than 
eighteen of the High Contracting .Parties so agree, tihe Depositary shall promptly 
convene a conference to which all States shall Oe invited.
(0) Such a coneerence mny amree, wi-th tht fuH furticipation of aio States 
represented at the conference, upon additional protocols which shall Op adopted 
in Vie same manner as this Convention, sheaL^ Oe annexed thereto and shall enter 
into force as provided in paragraphs 3 and k of Article 5 of this Convention.
3. (a) If, after a period of ten years following the entry- into force of 
this Convention, no conference has been convened in accordance with 
subparagraph 1(a) or 2(a) of this Article, any High Contracting Party may request 
the Depositary to convene a conference to which all High Contracting Parties 
shall Op invited to review the scope and operation of this Convention and the 
Protocols annexed thereto and to consider any proposal for amendments of this 
Convention or of the existing Protocols. States not parities to this Convention 
shaLl Op invited as observers to the conference. The conference may agree upon 
amendments which shall be adopted and enter into force in accordance with 
subparagraph 1(b) above. .
(b) At such canOeiencd pnndideratdon may also be oiven -tv nny propopal for 
additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not
6
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covered by the existing annexed Protocols. AL1 States represented at the
conference may participate fully in such consideration. Any additional protocols 
shaLl be adopted in the same manner as this Convention, shall be annexed thereto 
and shall enter into force as provided in paragraphs 3 and b of Article 5 of 
this Convention.
(c) Such s conferonce may consider vhethw provision should be mabe for tfo
convening of a further conference at the request of any High Contracting Party 
if, after a similar period to that referred to in subparagraph 3(a) of this Article, 
no conference has been convened in accordance with subparagraph 1(a) or 2(a) of 
this Article.
Article 9
Denunciation
1. Any High Contracting Party my denounce this Convention or any of its 
annexed Protocols by so notifying the De]s>sitaty.
2. Any such demrnciation shaLl only take effect one year after receipt by
the Depositary of the notification of denunciation. If, however, on the expiry 
of that year the denouncing High Contracting Party is engaged in one of the 
situations referred to in Article 1, the Party shall continue to be bound by the 
obligations of this Convention and of the relevant annexed Protocols until the 
end of the armed conflict or occupation and, in any case, until the termination 
of operations connected with the final release, repatriation or re-establismient 
of the persons protected by the rules of international lav applicable in armed 
conflict, and in the case of any annexed Protocol containing provisions concerning 
situations in which peace-keeping, observation or similar functions are performed 
by United Nations forces or missions in the area concerned, until the termination 
of those functions.
3. Any henleriation of this Convention shall be considered as also applying 
to all annexed Protocols by which the hereuncirg High Contracting Party is bound.
b . Any denunciation shall have effect only in respect of the denouncing
High Contracting Party.
5. Any denvuiciation shaLl not affect the obligations already incurred, by
reason of an nfmed conflict, under this Convention and its annexed Protocols by 
such denouncing High Contracting Party in respect of any act comnOtteh before 
this denunciation berooed effective.
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Article 10
Depositary
1. The Secretary-General of the United Hations shall be the Depositary of 
this Convention and of its annexed Protocols.
£. In addition to his usual functions, the Depositary shall inform all 
States of:
(a) sir.natures affixed to this Convention under Article 3;
(t) deposits of instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval of or 
ai'ce. sicn tc this Convention deposited under Article ;
(c) notifications of consent to be bound by annexed Protocols under 
Article t;
(d) the dates of entry into force of this Convention and of each of its 
annexed Protocols under Article 5» and
(e) notifications of denunciation received under Article 9 and their 
effective date.
Article 11
Authentic texts
The original of this Convention with the annexed Protocols, of which the 
Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, 
shall be deposited with the Depositary, who shall transmit certified true copies 
thereof to all States.
8
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PROTOCOL ON NON-DETECTABLE FRAGMENTS 
(FROTOCOL I)
It is prohibited to use any’weapon the primary effect of which is to injure 
,, fre-nentn which in the human body escape detection by X-rnys.
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PROTOCOL ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF MINES, 
BOOBY-TRAPS AND OTHER DEVICES
(PROTOCOL II)
Article 1
Material scope of application
This Protocol relates to the use on land of the mines, booby-trans and other 
devices defined herein, inclxtding mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway 
crossings or river crossings, but does not apply to the use of anti-ship mines 
at sea or in inland waterways.
Article 2.
Definitions
For the purpose of this Protocol:
1. "Mine" means any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other 
surface area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the presence, proximity 
or contact of a person or vehicle, and "remotely delivered mine" means any mine
so defined delivered by artillery, rocket, mortar or similar means or dropped from 
an aircraft.
2. "Booby-trap" means any deviee or material which is designed, constructed 
or adapted to kill or injure and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs 
or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act.
3. "Other devices" means manually-emplaced munitions and devices designed
to kill, injure or damage and which are actuated by remote control or automatically 
after a lapse of time.
h. "Military objective" means, so far as objects are concerned, any object 
which by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to 
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, 
in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
5. "Civilian objects" are all objects which are not military objectives 
as defined in paragraph h.
10
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6. "Recording" means a physical, achninistrative and technical operation
designed to obtain, for the purpose tf registration in the official records, ell 
available infoimation facilitating the location tf minefields, mines seh booby- 
traps .
Article 3
General restrictions oe the use of mines, booby-traps 
and other devices
j. This Article applies to:
(s) mines;
(b) booby-traps; and
Ip) other devices. . '
2. It is prohibited in all circumstances to direct weapons to which this 
Article applies, either in offence, defence or by way of reprisals, against the 
civila an population as such or against individual civilians.
3. The indiscriminate use of weapons to which this Article applies is 
prohibited. Indiscriminate use is any placement of such weapons:
fa) which is not on, or directed against, a military objective; or
(b) which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed
at a specific military objective; or
(c) which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated
j. ALI feasible precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from the
effects of weapons to which this Article applies. Feasible precautions are those 
precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all 
circumstances ruling at the time, including lumaiCtarian and military
considerat ions.
11
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Article
Restrictions on the use of mines other than remotely delivered
mines, booby-traps and other devices in populated areas
1. This Article applies to:
fa) mines other than remotely delivered mines;
(b) booby-traps; and
(c) other devices.
2. It is prohibited to use weapons to which this Article applies in any city, 
town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians in 
which combat between ground forces is not taking place or does not apnear to be 
imminent, unless either:
fa) they are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military objective 
belonging to or under the control of an adverse party; or
(b) measures are taken to protect civilians from their effects, for example, 
the posting of warning signs, the posting of sentries, the issue of warnings or 
the provision of fences.
Article 5
Restrictions on the use of remotely delivered mines
i
1. The use of remotely delivered mines is prohibited unless such mines are .[
only used within an area which is itself a military objective or which contains 
military objectives, and unless: ]
I
(a) their location can be accurately recorded in accordance with Article 7(l)(a);• 
or
(b) an effective neutralizing mechanism is used on each such mine, that is to 
say, a self-actuating mechanism which is designed to render a mine harmless or 
cause it to destroy itself when it is anticipated that the mine will no longer
serve the military purpose for which it was placed in position, or a remotely-controlled 
mechanism which is designed to render harmless or destroy a mine when the mine no 
longer serves the military purpose for which it was placed in position.
i
i
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2. Effective advance warning shall be given of any delivery or dropping of 
remotely delivered mines which may affect the civilian population, unless 
circumstances do not permit.
Article 6
Prohibition on the use of certain booby-traps
1. Without prejudice to the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict relating to treachery and perfidy, it is prohibited in all circumstances 
to use:
(a) any booby-trap in the form of an apparently harmless portable object which 
is specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material and to detonate 
when it is disturbed or approached, or
(b) booby-ti'aps which are in any way attached to or associated with:
(i) internationally recognized protective emblems, signs or signals;
(ii) sick, wounded or dead persons;
(iii) burial or cremation sites or graves;
(iv) medical facilities, medical equipment, medical supplies or medical 
transportation;
(v) children’s toys or other portable objects or products specially designed 
for the feeding, health, hygiene, clothing or education of children;
(vi) food or drink;
(di) kitchen utensils or appliances except in military establishments, military 
locations or military supply depots;
(viii) objects clearly of a religious nature;
(ix) historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the 
cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples;
(x) animals or their carcasses.
2. It is prohibited in all circumstances to use any booby-trap which is designed 
to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
13
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Article 7
Recording and publication of the location of minefields,
. mines and booby-traps
1. The parties to a conflict shaLL record the location of:
(a) all pre-planned minefields laid by them; and
(b) all areas in which they have made large-scale and pre-planned use of 
booby-traps.
2. The parties shaLl endeavour to ensure the recording of the location of 
all other minefields, mines and booby-traps which they have laid or placed in 
position.
3. AL1 such records shall be retained by the parties who shall:
(a) immediately after the cessation of active hostilities:
(i) take all necessary and appropriate measures, including the use of 
such records, to protect civilians from the effects of minefields, 
mines and booby-traps; and either
(ii) in cases where the forces of neither party are in the territory of
the adverse party, make available to each other and to the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations all information in their possession 
concerning the location of minefields, mines and booby-traps in the 
territory of the adverse party; or
(iii) once complete withdrawal of the forces of the parties from the territory 
of the adverse party has taken place, make available to the adverse 
party and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations all information 
in their possession concerning the location of minefields, mines and 
booby-traps in the territory of the adverse party;
(b) when a United Nations force or mission performs functions .in any area, 
make available to the authority mentioned in Article 8 such information as is 
required by that Article;
(c) whenever possible, by mutual agreement, provide for the release of 
information concerning the location of minefields, mines and booby-traps, 
particularly in agreements governing the cessation of hostilities.
1»
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Article 8
Protection of United Nations forces and missions from the
effects of minefields, mines and booby-traps
1. Wien a United Nations force or mission performs functions of peace-keeping, 
observation or similar functions in any area, each party to the conflict sheOLl, if 
requested by tihe head of tihe United Nations force or mission in that area, as for
as it is able:
(a) remove or render harm.ess all mines or booby-traps in that area;
(b) take such measures as may be necessary to protect the force or mission from 
the effects of minefields, mines and booby-traps while carrying out its duties; and
(c) mike available to the head of the United Nations force or mission in that 
area, all information in the party's possession concerning tihe location of minefields 
mines end booby-traps in that area.
2. W^n a United Nations fact-finding mission performs functions in any area,
any party to tihe conflict concerned shall provide protection to that mission except 
where, because of the size of such mission, it cannot adequately provide such 
protection. In that case it shall make available to tihe head of tihe mission the
information in its possession concerning the location of minefields, mines and 
booby-traps in that area.
Article 9
International co-operation , in the removaL of minefields, 
mines and booby-traps
After the cessation of active hostilities, tihe parties shaLl endeavour to reach 
agreement, both among themselves and, where appropriate, with other States and with 
international organizations, on the provision of information and technical and 
Mterial assistance - including, in appropriate circumstances, Joint operations - 
necessary to remove or otherwise render ineffective minefields, mines and booby-traps 
placed in position during the conflict.
15
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Technical Annex to the Protocol on Prohibitions 
or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-traps
and Other Devices (Protocol II) 
Guidelines ~<?n_ hecording
Whenever an obligation for the recording of the location of minefields, mines 
and i.xooby-traps arises under the Protocol, the following guidelines shall be taken 
into account.
1. With regard to pre-plimned minefields and large-scale and pre-planned use 
of booby-traps:
(a) mans, diagnms or other records should be made in such a way as to indicate 
the extent of the m.nefield or booby-trapped area; and
(b) the location of the minefield or booby-trapped area should be specified 
by relation to the co-ordinates of a single reference point and by the estimated 
dimensions of the area containing mines and booby-traps in relation to that single 
reference point.
2. With regard to other minefields, mines and booby-traps laid or placed in
position:
In so far as possible, the relevant information specified in paragraph 1 
above should be recorded so as to enable the areas containing minefields, mines 
and booby-traps to be identified.
16
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PROTOCOL ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF 
INCENDIARY WEAPONS
(PROTOCOL III)
.Article 1
ions
For the purpose of this Protocol:
1. "Incendiary weapon" means any weapon or ranition which is primarily 
designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through tihe 
action of flfme, heat, or a combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction 
of a substance delivered on the target.
(a) Incendiary weapons can take the form of, for example, floe throwers, 
fougasses, shells, rockets, grenades, mines, bombs and other containers of 
incendiary substances. '
(b) Incendiary weapons do not include:
(i) Mu it ions which have incidental incendiary effects, such as illmiinants,
tracers, smoke or signalling systems;
(ii) ^^ulitiois designed, to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation effects 
with an additional incendiary effect, such as armouu-piercing projectiles, 
fragmentation shells, explosive bombs and similar combince-effects 
mvuitions in which the incendiary effect is not snecifically designed to 
cause burn injury to oersons, but to be used against military objectives, 
such as armoured vehicles, aircraft and installations or facilities.
2. ’,Conieniratioi of civilians" means any concentration of civilians, be it 
permanent or temporary, such as in inhabited parts of cities, or inhabited towns or 
villages, or an ir. camps or columns of refugees or evacuees, or grouos of nomads.
3. "Military objective" mens, so far as objects arc concerned, . any object which 
by its nature, location, purpose or use mf^es an effective contribution to military 
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
17
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!
1. "Civilian objects” are all objects which are not military objectives as
defined in paragraph 3.
5. "Feasible precautions” are those precautions which are practicable or
practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the t^e, 
including humaaitarian and military considerations.
Article 2
Protection of civilaans and civiiaan objects
1. It is prohibited in all circumstances to mike the civilian population as 
such, individual civiliwis or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary 
weapons.
2. It is prohibited in all circumstances to m^e any military objective 
located within a concentration of civiHans the object of attack by air-delivered 
incendiary weapons.
3. It is further prohibited to rnke any military objective located within a 
concentration of civilians the object of attack by means of incendiary weapons other 
than air-delivered incendiary weapons, except when such military objective is 
clearly separated from the concentration of civilians and all feasible precautions 
are taken with a view to lmiting the incendiary effects to the military objective 
and to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civiliwis and damage to civilian objects.
k. It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the object
of attack by incendiary weapons except when such natural el<ments are used to 
cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are 
themselves military objectives.
18
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PROTOCOL ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON 
THE USE OF MINES, BOOBY-TRAPS
AND OTHER DEVICES AS AMENDED ON 3 MAY 1996 
(PROTOCOL II AS AMENDED ON 3 MAY 1996)
ANNEXED TO THE CONVENTION 
ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE 
OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED
TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE •INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS ' *'
ARTICLE 1: AMENDED PROTOCOL
The Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, 
Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) , annexed to the Convention 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects ("the Convention") is hereby amended. The text 
of the Protocol as amended shall read as follows: .
"Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on 
the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices 
as Amended on 3 May 1996 
(Protocol II as amended on 3 May 1996)
Article 1
Scope of application
1. This Protocol relates to the use on land of the mines, booby- 
traps and other devices, defined herein, including mines laid to 
interdict beaches, waterway crossings or river crossings, but does not 
apply to the use of anti-ship mines at.sea or in inland waterways.
2« This Protocol shall apply, in addition to situations referred to 
in Article l of this Convention, to situations referred to in Article 
3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. This Protocol 
shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, 
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts 
of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.
ENCLOSURE 1
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23. In case of armed conflicts not of an international character occurring in the territory 
of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply the 
prohibitions and restrictions of this Protocol.
y
4. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty
of a State or the responsibility of the Government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or 
re-establish law and order in the Stote or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity 
of the State. ’ •
5. NoUring in this Protccool shall be rnvoked as a jutiificaiion for intervening , direclly
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external 
affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of which that conflict occurs.
6. The app^ai^on of the p^i^t)\ii^K^I^s of thus Protocol to to a conflict , which are
not High Contracting Parties that have accepted this Protocol, shall not change their legal 
status or the legal status of a disputed territory, either explicitly or implicitly.
Article 2
Definitions
For the purpose of this Protocol:
1. "Mine" means a munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area
and designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle.
2. "Re moldy-deb vend! mme” meanss a mme nol cir^<ctty' emplacdl bul deiiverd by 
arttllery, missile, rocket, mfrtart or similar means, or dropped from an aircraft Mines 
delivered from a land-based system from less than 500 metres are not considered to be 
"remotely delivered", provided that they are used in accordance with Article 5 and other 
relevant Articles of this Protocol.
3. "Anti-personnel mine" means a mine primarily designed to be exploded by the 
presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or 
more persons.
4. "Booby-trap" means any device or material which is designed, constructed, or adapted 
to kill or injure, and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an 
apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act.
• t
5. "Other devire"" morns mlmuallytemplac<di muntitons and devcces n^ch^du^g 
improvised explosive devices designed to kill, injure or damage and which are actuated 
manually, by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time.
6. "Military objective" means, so far as objects are concerned, any object which by its 
nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose
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3total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage.
7. "Civiirnt objects" are till which a^i^e not miliia^i^y objectives as defined in
paragraph 6 of this Article.'
8. "Minefield" ss a defined area tn which nines have been emplaced rrnd "mined area" 
is an area which is dangerous duetto the presence of mines. "Phoney minefield" means an 
area free of mines that simulates a minefield. The term "minefield" includes phoney 
minefields.
9. "Recordmg" mtaans a physccal , admintsr^ative mad techmcal operation designed to 
obtain, for the purpose of registration in official records, all available information facilitating 
the location of minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices.
10. "Self-destruction mechamsm" aurins an incolporated or 6x16012!^ ^t^c^h^^d
automatically-functioning mechanism which secures the destruction of the munition into 
which it is incorporated or to which it is attached. ,
11. "Self-neutralization mechanism" means an incorporated automatically-functioning 
mechanism which renders inoperable the munition into which it is incorporated.
12. "Self-deactivating" means automatically rendering a munition inoperable by means of
the irreversible exhaustion of a component, for example, r battery, that is essential to the 
operation of the munition. .
13. "Remote conrrol" means consol by commands from a distance.
14. "Anri-handling device" means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part 
of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is 
made tO tamper with the mine.
15. "Transfer" involves, in addition to the physical movement of mines into or from 
national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the 
transfer of territory containing emplaced mines.
*Arttcle 3
General restrictions on the use of mines.
boobv-trros and other devices
1. This Article applies to:
(a)
Cb)
(c)
mines;
booby-trapst and 
other devcces.
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42. Each High Contracting Party or party to a conflict is , nt with the
provisions of this Protocol, responsible for all mines, booby-traps, and other devices 
employed by it and undertakes to clear, remove, destroy or maintain them as specified in 
Article 10 of this Protocol.
3. It is prohibit<—t nt alt ct^cumraiices ot use arny mme, booby-trap or other device winch 
is designed or of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
i ; .
4. Weapons to winch this Article appiies shal t strictly comply wtth the sarndards antd 
limitations specified in the Technical Annex with respect to each particular category. •
5. I t is prohibtedt to use mines , booby-fraps err other devcces winch emptoy a mechnism 
or device specifically designed to detonate the munition by the presence of commonly 
available mine detectors as a result of their magnetic or other non-coniict influence during 
normal use in detection operations.
6. t t is prohibtKdt to use a sel--dicrt.iirting nnne ^up^jedl whit an anti-handhng devcce
ihai is designed in such a manner that the iiii-hiidling device is capable of fliciioiiig after 
the mine has ceased to be capable of functioning. • .
7. It is p^^ohibit^^ nt allt ctccumrii^ces to (irr^t weapons to winch this Artide appHes, 
either in offence, defence or by way of reprisals, against the civilian population as such or 
against individual civilians or civilian objects.
8. The indiscriminate use of weapons to whtec this Article applies is prohibited. 
Indiscriminate use is any placement of such weapons:
(a) which is not on, or directed against, a military objective. In case of doubt as 
to whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of 
worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective 
coitnburioi to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used; or
(b) which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed at a 
specific military objective; or
(c) which may be expected to cause iicidritil loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
9. Several clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, 
village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects are no­
te be treated as a single military objective. . *
10. All feasible precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from -Ci effects of weapons 
to which this Article applies. Feasible precautions are those precautions which are 
practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at -Ci time, 
including Cuminiiariii and mili-iry considerations. These circumstances include, but are not 
limited to:
)
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5(a) the short- and long-term effect of mines upon the local civilian population for 
the duration of the minefield;
(b) possible measures to protect civilians (for example, fencing, signs, warning 
and monitoring);
(c) the availability and feasibility of using alternatives; and
(d) the short- and long-term military requirements for a minefield.
11. Effective advance warning shall be given of any emplacement of mines, booby-traps 
and other devices which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not 
permit.
Article 4
Restrictions on the use of anti-personnel mines , •
It is prohibited to use anti-personnel mines which are not detectable, as specified in 
paragraph 2 of the Technical Annex.
Article 5
Restrictions on the use of anti-personnel mines
other than remotely-delivered mines
1. This Article applies to anti-personnel mines other than remotely-delivered mines.
2. . It is prohibited to use weapons to which this Article applies which are not in 
compliance with the provisions on self-destruction and self-deactivation in the Technical 
Annex, unless:
(a) such weapons are placed within a perimeter-marked area which is monitored 
by military personnel and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective 
exclusion of civilians from the area. The,.marking must be of a distinct and durable character 
and must at least be visible to a person who is about to enter the perimeter-marked area; and
(b) such weapons are cleared before the area is abandoned, unless the area is 
turned over to the forces of another State which accept responsibility for the maintenance of 
the protections required by this Article and the subsequent clearance of those weapons.
3. A party to a conflict is relieved from further compliance with the provisions of sub- 
paragraphs 2 (a) and 2 (b) of this Article only if such compliance is not feasible due to 
forcible loss of control of the area as a result of enemy military action, including situations 
where direct enemy military action makes it impossible to comply. If that party regains
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6control of the area, it shall resume compliance with the provisions of sub-paragraphs ' 2 (a) 
and 2 (b) of this Article.
4. If the forces of a party to a conflict gain control of an area in which weapons to
which this Article applies have been laid, such forces shall, to the maximum extent feasible, 
maintain and, if necessary, establish the protections required by this Article until such 
weapons have been cleared. 4 .
5. All feasible measures shall be taken to prevent the unauthorized removal, defacement, 
destruction or concealment of any device, system or material used to establish the perimeter 
of a perimeter-marked area.
6. Weapons to which this Article applies which propel fragments in a horizontal arc of 
less than 90 degrees and which are placed on or above the ground may be used without the 
measures provided for in sub-paragraph 2 (a) of this Article for a maximum period of 72 
hours, if:
(a) they are hccaed in immediate proxintity to the mlltariy untt that emplaced
them;.and • ,
(b) the area, is monttoed by miiiaary personnet to ensure the efeeciive exclusoon 
of civilians.
Article 6
Restrictions on the use of remotely-delivered mines
1. It is prohibitd to use remotely-detiverd mines unless they are recorded n accordance 
with sub-paragraph 1 (b) of the Technical Annex.
2. Itt is prohibttd to use ^emotely-de^vetd arnti-personnet mines which arre not n 
compliance with the provisions on self-destruction and self-deactivation in the Technical 
Annex.
3. It is prohibit<d:i to use remotely-debvred other than ^ti-J?^I^^c^nntlt ,
.unless, to the extent feasible, they are equipped with an effective self-destruction or self­
neutralization mechanism and have a back-up self-deactivation feature, which is designed so 
. that the mine will no longer function as a mine when the mine no longer serves the military 
purpose for which it was placed in position.
4. Effective advjncce wanting shal t be gwen of any-denvert or dropprng of remoeely-
delivered mines which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.
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7Arti^cle 7
Prohibitions on the use of booby-traps and other devices
1. V/nhout prejudice to the ndes of inleIilaitonall law applicable nt armed conflcct relating 
to treachery and perfidy, it is prohibited in all circumstances to use booby-traps and other 
devices which are in any way itticCrdJto or associated with:
(a) rnle^lationally recognized proeeciive embdenis, signs or signals;
(b) scckt wounded or dead pesoons;
(c) buriat or cremation sUes or graves;
(d) medticat aaclitties , m(-iicat ^up^n^^l-t, m^edic^^ suppHes os medtoal 
transportation;
(e) c^tiikii^^n’s toys or other objecis or products spedaHy for the
feeding, health, hygiene, ciotCiig or rdlciiioi of chiidtei; '
(f) hood or drink;
(g) kicchen utenslis or appi^ces except nt mlitar^y ^s^tliisf^m^rt^^, mUttey 
iocitlois or mliitiry supply depots;
(h) objects ck^rly of a religoous nature;
(i) historic monuments t works of art or places of worship winch conrtitule the 
clliltai or spiritual hrri-igr of peoples; or
(j) . animals or them carcasses.
2. I t is prohibtKdt os use booby-taaps or othes devcces nt the form of apparentiy harmless 
portable objects which are specifically designed and coisirlcird to contain explosive 
material.
3. Wtthout prejudice to the provisoons of «Anide 3t tt is prohibttidt to use h^^i5t^ns to 
which this Article applies in any city, town, village or other area coitiiilig a similar 
concentration of civilians in which combat beiwrri ground forces is not taking place or does 
not appear to be imminent, unless either:
(a) they are paaced on or nt the close yicl^iily of d miit^y objectives or
(b) measures are tdeen to protect cmti^is from them effectSt for examplet the 
posting of warning seiiries, the issuing of witiiigs or the provision of fences.
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8Article 8
Transfers
1. In order to promote the purposes of this Protocol, each High Contracting Party:
(a) undertakes not to transfer any mine the use of which is prohibited by this
Protocol;
(b) underrttices not to transfer any mine to any recipient other than a State or a 
State agency authorized to receive such transfers;
(c) undertttices to ^x^^i^c^i^e resrraint in the transfer of amy mine the use of which 
is restricted by this Protocol. In particular, each High Contracting Party undertakes not to 
transfer any anti-personnel mines to States which are not bound by this Protocol, unless the 
recipient State agrees to apply this Protocol; and
(d) unddrraites to ensure that suny rransfer m accordance wirti this Article takes 
place in full compliaacc, by both the transfeITisg ang the raepient State, with the rejevant 
provisions of this Protocol and the applicable norms of international humanitarian law.
2. In the event that a High Contacting Party dedares that tr wllt defer compHance wttii 
specific provisions on the use of certain mines, as provided for in the Technical Annex, sub­
paragraph 1 (a) of this Article shall however apply to such mines.
3. All! High Contacting , pendnng the entiy mto force of this Protocol, will
refrain from any actions which would be inconsistent with sub-paragraph 1 (a) of this Article.
Article 9
Recording and use of information on minefields, 
mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices .
1. Alt mformaiion minefields, mmed areais t mines t boobyttaps and other
devices shall be recorded in accordance with the provisions of the Technical Annex.
*
2. Alt such records shall be by the parties to a conflictt who wtthout dday
after the cessation of active hostilities, take all necessary and appropriate measures, including 
the use of such information, to protect civilians from the effects of minefields, mined areas, 
mines, booby-traps and other devices in areas under their- control.
• • f .
At the same time, they shall also make available to the other party or parties to the 
conflict and to the Seoretary-Gecfrai of the United Nations all such information in their 
possession ooccerclcg minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices laid by 
them in areas no longer under their control; provided, however, subject to reciprocity, where 
the forces of a party to a oocSliot are in the territory of an adverse party, either party may 
withhold such information from the Secretary-General and the other party, to the extent that
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9security interests require such withholding, until neither party is in the territory of the other. 
In the latter case, the information withheld shall be disclosed as soon as those security 
interests permit. Wherever possible, the parties to the conflict shall seek, by mutual 
agreement, to provide for the release of such information at the earliest possible time in a 
manner consistent with the security interests of each party.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 10 mid 12 of this
Protocol. . "
Article 10
Removal of minefields, mined areas, mines, boobv-traps
and other devices and international cooperation
1. Without delay after the cessation of active hosiiHiies, alt minefields , mindt areas ,
mines, booby-traps and other devices shall be cleared, removed, destroyed or maintained in 
accordance with Article 3 and paragraph 2 of Article 5 of this Protocol. . . ,
2. ‘ High Contracting Parties and parties to a conflict bear such responsibility with respect 
to minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices in areas under their control.
3. Whit to , mmed , rnni^s, booby-traps mid other devices ki^d
by a party in areas over which it no longer exercises control, such party shall provide to the 
party in control of the area pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article, to the extent permitted 
by such party, technical and material assistance necessary to fulfil such responsibility.
4. At alt times r^e^c^essary,, the shal 1 to mcch , both among
themselves and, where appropriate, with other States and with international organizations, 
on the provision of technical and msierial assistance, including, in appropriate circumstances, 
the undertaking of joint operations necessary to fulfil such responsibilities.
Article 11
Technological cooperation and assistance
1. Each High Contracting Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to 
participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and 
technological information concerning the implementation of this Protocol and means of mine 
clearance. In particular, High Conirscting Parties shall notjmpose undue restrictions on the 
provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian 
purposes.
2. Each High Contracting Party undertakes to provide information to the database on 
mine clearance established within the United Nations System, especially information 
concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert 
agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.
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3. Each High Contracting Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine 
clearance through the United Nations System, other international bodies or on a bilateral 
basis, or contribute to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine 
Clearance.
4. Requests by High Contracting Parties for assistance, substantiated by relevant 
information, may be submitted to the United Nations, to other appropriate bodies or to other 
States. These requests may be submftfed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
who shall transmit them to all High Contracting Parties and to relevant intemational 
organizations.
5. In the case of requests to the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, within the resources available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, may 
take appropriate steps to assess the situation and, in cooperation with the requesting High 
Contracting Party, determine the appropriate provision of assistance in mine clearance or 
implementation of the Protocol. The Secretary-General may also report to High Contracting 
Parties on any such assessment as well as on the type and scope of assistance required.
6. Without prejudice to their constitutional and other legal provisions, the,High 
Contracting Parties undertake to cooperate and transfer technology to facilitate the 
implementation of the relevant prohibitions and restrictions set out in this Protocol.
7. Each High Contracting Party has the right to seek and receive technical assistance, 
where appropriate, from another High Contracting Party on specific relevant technology, 
other than weapons technology, as necessary and feasible, with a view to reducing any period 
of deferral for which provision is made in the Technical Annex.
Article 12
Protection from the effects of minefields, mined areas, mines.
booby-traps and other devices
1. Application
(a) With the exception of the forces and missions referred to in sub-paragraph 
2(a)(i) of this Article, this Article applies only to missions which are performing functions
• in an area with the consent of the High Contracting Party on whose territory the functions 
are performed.
(b) The application of the provisions of this Article to parties to a conflict which 
are not High Contracting Parties shall not change their .legal status or the legal status of a 
disputed territory, either explicitly or implicitly.
(c) The provisions of this Article are without prejudice to existing intemational 
humanitarian law, or other intemational instruments as applicable, or decisions by the 
Security Council of the United Nations, which provide for a higher level of protection to 
personnel functioning in accordance with this Article.
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2. Peace-keeping and certain other forces and missions
(a) This paragraph applies to:
(i) any United Nations force or mission performing peace-keeping, 
observation or similar functions in any area in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations;
j «
(ii) any mission established pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter of the 
United Nations and performing its functions in the area of a conflict.
(b) Each High Contracting Party or party to a conflict, if so requested by the head 
of a force or mission to which this paragraph applies, shall:
(i) so far as it is able, take such measures as are necessary to protect the 
force or mission from the effects of mines, booby-traps and other devices in any area 
under its control;
(ii) if necessary in order effectively to protect such personnel, remove or 
• render harmless, so far as it is able, all mines, booby-traps and other devices in that
area; and
(iii) inform the head of the force or mission of the location of all known 
minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices in the area in which 
the force or mission is performing its functions and, so far as is feasible, make 
available to the head of the force or mission all information in its possession 
concerning such minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices.
3. Humanitarian and fact-finding missions of the United Nations System
(a) ’ This paragraph applies to any humanitarian or fact-finding mission of the 
United Nations System.
(b) Each High Contracting Party or party to a conflict, if so requested by the head 
of a mission to which this paragraph applies, shall:
(i) provide the personnel of the mission with the protections set out in sub- 
paragraph 2(b)(i) of this Article; and *
(ii) if access to or through any place under its control is necessary for the 
performance of the mission’s functions and in order-to provide the personnel of the 
mission with safe passage to or through that place: ff"
(aa) unless on-going hostilities prevent, inform the head of the 
mission of a safe route to that place if such information is available; or
Jt
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(bb) if information identifying a safe route is not provided in 
accordance with sub-paragraph (aa), so far as is necessary and feasible, clear 
a lane through minefields.
4. Missions of the Intemational Committee of the Red Cross
(a) This paragraph applies to. any mission of the Intemational Committee of the 
Red Cross performing functions with,the consent of the host State or States as provided for 
by the Geneva Conventions of 12 'August 1949 and, where applicable, their Additional 
Protocols.
(b) Each High Contracting Party or party .to a conflict, if so requested by the head 
of a mission to which this paragraph applies, shall:
(i) provide the personnel of the mission with the protections set out in sub- 
paragraph 2(b)(i) of this Article; and
(ii) take the measures set out in sub-paragraph 3(b)(ii) of this Article.
5. Other humanitarian missions and missions of enquiry
(a) Insofar as paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above do not apply to them, this paragraph 
applies to the following missions when they are performing functions in the area of a conflict 
or to assist the victims of a conflict:
(i) any humanitarian mission of a national Red Cross or Red Crescent 
society or of their Intemational Federation;
(ii) any mission of an impartial humanitarian organization, including any 
impartial humanitarian demining mission; and
.*•*
(iii) any mission of enquiry established pursuant to the provisions of the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and, where applicable, their Additional
Protocols.
(b) Each High Contracting Party or party to a conflict, if so requested by the head 
of a mission to which this paragraph applies, shall, so far as is feasible:
(i) provide the personnel of the mission with the protections set out in sub- 
paragraph 2(b)(1) of this Article; and
(ii) take the measures set out in sub-paragraph 3(b)(ii) of this Article.
► r
6. Confidentiality
All information provided in confidence pursuant to this Article shall be treated by the 
recipient in strict confidence and shall not be released outside the force or mission concerned 
without the express authorization of the provider of the information.
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7. Respect for laws and regulations
Without prejudice to such privileges and immunities as they may enjoy or to the 
requirements of their duties, personnel participating in the forces and missions referred to 
in this Article shall:
(a) respect the laws and regulations of the host State; and
(b) reftran from any action or activity incompattble with the impartial and 
international nature of their duties.
Article 13
Consultations of High Contracting Parties
1. The High Contracting I^^^i^s underage to consutt and coopeaate with each other on
all issues related to the operation of this Protocol. For this purpose, a conference ,of High 
Contracting Parties shall be held annually. • ,*
2. Participation in the c^t3nf^]r^nc;^s shalt be determined by their ^g^r^^d Rules of
Procedure. .
3. The work of the conference shall include:
(a) review of the operation and status of this Protocol;
(b) consideration of matters arising from reports by High Contracting Parties 
according to paragraph 4 of this Article;
(c) preparation for review conferences; and
(d) consdderation of the development of technologies to protect civilians against 
indiscriminate effects of mines.
4. The High Contracting Parties shall provide annual reports to the Depositary, who
shall circulate them to all High Contracting Parties in advance of the Conference, on any of 
the following matters: *
(a) dissemmation of information on this Protocol to their armed forces and to the
civilian population; -
.•.i
(b) mine clearance and rehabinadion programmes;
(c) steps taken to mee^t technical requirements of this Protocol and any other
relevant information pertaining thereto;
(d) legisaation related to this Protocol;
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(e) measures taken on international technical information exchange, on 
international cooperation on mine clearance, and on technical cooperation and assistance; and
(f) other relevant matters.
5. The cost of the Conference of High Contracting Parties shall be borne by the High 
Contracting Parties and States not parties participating in the work of the Conference, in 
accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
Article 14
Compliance’
1. Each High Cornracting Party shal 1 atoe al 1 steps , including legislative add
other measures, to prevent and suppress violations of this Protocol by persons or on territory 
under its jurisdiction or control.
2. The m^st^]^^s m paragraph 1 of thus Artide rndude appropriaHi measures
to ensure the imposition of penal sanctions against persons who, in relation to an armed 
conflict and contrary to the provisions of this Protocol, wilfully kill or cause serious injury 
to civilians and to bring such persons to justice.
3. Each Hg^h Conr-acring Party shall also f^urre thal ks armed forces sssue 
military instructions and operating procedures and that armed forces personnel receive 
training commensurate with their duties and responsibilities to comply with the provisions 
of this Protocol.
4. The Hggh Parties underage to consutl ^ch other and to cooperate wtth
each other bilaterally, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations or through other 
appropriate international procedures, to resolve any problems that may arise with regard to’ 
the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Protocol.
Technical Annex
1- Recording
(a) Recording of tog location o( mmes other toan rerho^lremiltvl^r-dl mires,
minefields, mined otoos, booby-traps and other devices shall be carried out in aooordaeog
‘ with the following provisions; .
(i) the location of the minrnleldSr mindd areas and arem of roobo-traps 
md other devices shall be specified accurately by rglartfe to the coordinates of at 
least two rgfergncg points and the esrtmotga dimensions of the oreo 0^^^ these 
weapons in relation to those refgrgncg points;
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(ii) maps, diagrams or other records shall be made in such a way as to 
indicate the location of minefields, mined areas, booby-traps and other devices in 
relation to reference points, and these records shall also indicate their perimeters and 
extent; .
(iii) for purposes of detection and clearance of mines, booby-traps and 
other devices, maps, diagrams or other records shall contain complete information on 
the type, number, emplacing4 method, type of fuse and life time, date and time of 
laying, anti-handling devices''(if any) and other relevant information on all these 
weapons laid. Whenever feasible the minefield record shall show the exact location 
of every mine, except in row minefields where the row location is sufficient. The 
precise location and operating mechanism of each booby-trap laid shall be individually 
recorded.
(b) The estimated location and area of remotely-delivered mines shall be specified 
by coordinates of reference points (normally comer points) and shall be ascertained and when 
feasible marked on the ground at the earliest opportunity. The total number and type of mines 
laid, the date and time of laying and the self-destruction time periods shall also be recorded.
• ■
. (c) Copies of records shall be held at a level of command sufficient to guarantee
their safety as far as possible.
(d) The use of mines produced after the entry into force of this Protocol is 
prohibited unless they are marked in English or in the respective national language or 
languages with the following information:
(i) name of the country of origm;
(ii) month and year of production; and
(iii) serial number or lot number.
The marking should be visible, legible, durable and resistant to environmental effects, as far 
as possible.
2. Specifications on detectability
(a) With respect to anti-personnel mines produced after 1 January 1997, such 
mines shall incorporate in their construction a material or device that enables the mine to be 
detected by commonly-available technical nyne detection equipment and provides a response 
signal equivalent to a signal from 8 grammes or more of iron in a single coherent mass.
(b) With respect to anti-personnel mines produced before 1 January 1997, such 
mines shall either incorporate in their construction,*-6r have attached prior to their 
emplacement, in a manner not easily removable, a material or device that enables the mine 
to be detected by commonly-available technical mine detection equipment and provides a 
response signal equivalent to a signal from 8 grammes or more of iron in a single coherent 
mass.
287
16
(c) In the event that a High Conrracting Party determines that it cannot 
immediately comply with sub-paragraph (b), it may declare at the time of its notification of 
consent to be bound by this Protocol that it will defer compliance with sub-paragraph (b) for 
a period not to exceed 9 years from the entry into force of this Protocol. In the meantime it 
shall, to the extent feasible, minimize the use of anti-personnel mines that do not so comply.
3. Specifications on self-destruction and self-deactivation
—*——— ...... J < ........... .. ■ 1J - -
t *.
(a) All remotely-^^ellveercd ' anti-personnel mines shall be designed and constructed 
so that no more than 10% of activated mines will fail to self-destruct within 30 days after 
emplacement, and each mine shall have a back-up self-deactivation feature designed and 
constructed so that, in combination with the self-destruction mechanism, no more than one 
in one thousand activated mines will function as a mine 120 days after emplacement.
(b) All non-remotely delivered anti-personnel mines, used outside marked areas, 
as defined in Article 5 of this Protocol, shall comply with the requirements for self­
destruction and self-deactivation stated in sub-paragraph (a).
(c) In the event that a High Contracting Party determines that it • cannot 
immieliately comply with sub-paragraphs (a) and/or (b), it may declare at the time of its 
notification of consent to be bound by this Protocol, that it will, with respect to mines 
produced prior to the entry into force of this Protocol defer compliance with sub-paragraphs 
(a) and/or (b) for a period not to exceed 9 years from the entry into force of this Protocol.
During this period of deferral, the High Contracting Party shall:
(i) undertake to minimize, to the extent feasible, the use of anti-personnel 
mines that do not so comply, and •
(ii) with respect to remotely-delivered anti-personnel mines, comply with 
either the reqqirempeis ffo 561^0^^00 or the requreemenrs for sflfrde^aftd^i^t^ion 
and, with respect to o ther rnti-personnel mmi^^ comply whit a t teast therequirempntr 
for self-deactivation.
4. International signs for minefields and mined areas
Signs similar to the example attached and as specified below shall be utilized in the 
marking of minefields and mined areas to ensure their visibility and recognition by the 
civilian population:
(a) size and shape: a triangle or square no smaller than 28 centimetres (11 inches)
by 20 centimetres (7.9.inches) for a triangle, and 15 centimetres (6 inches) per side for a 
square; ' f
(b) cotaur: red or orange with a yellow reflecting
(c) symbol: the symbof ilRisr^^t^ m the Attachment: or an ^t^rr^^t^^ve readily 
recognizable in the area in which the sign is to be displayed as identifying a dangerous area;
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(d) language:: the sign should contain the word "mines" in one of the six official 
languages of the Convention (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish) and 
the language or languages prevalent in that area;
(e) spacing: signs should be placed around the minefield or mined area at a
distance sufficient to ensure their visibility at any point by a civilian approaching the area. "
i-
*
• r
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ARTICLE 2; ENTRY INTO FORCE
This amended Protocol shall enter into force as provided for in paragraph 1 (b) of 
Article 8 of the Convention.
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Appendix III-The Chemical Weapons Convention
------- -------- —------------------------ CW Convention----------------------------------------------
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons
And on Their Destruction
Preamble
The States Parties to this Convention,
Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards 
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective interna­
tional control, induding the prohibition and elimination of all types of 
weapons of mass destruction.
Desiring to contribute to the realization of the purposes and prin­
ciples of the Charter of the United Nations,
Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has 
repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the prinaples and objec­
tives of the Protorol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiat­
ing, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of 
Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 (the Geneva Protocol of 
1925),
Recognizing that this Convention reafBrms prinaples and objectives 
of and obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
their Destruction signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 
April 1972,
Bearing in mind the objective contained in Artide IX of the Conven­
tion on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruc­
tion,
Determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the 
possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the implementation 
of the provisions of this Convention, thereby complementing the 
obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 1925,
Recognizing the prohibition, embodied in the pertinent agreements 
and relevant prinaples of international law, of the use of herbicides as 
a method of warfare,
Considering that achievements in the field of chemistry should be 
used exclusively for the benefit of mankind,
Desiring to promote free trade in chemicals as well as international 
cooperation and exchange of scientific and technical information in the 
field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention in order to enhance the economic and technological 
development of all States Parties,
Convinced that the complete and effective prohibition of the develop­
ment, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use 
of chemical weapons, and tlwir destruction, represent a necessary step 
towards the achievement of these common objectives,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I: General Obligations
1. Each State Patty to th is Conveotion undertakes never under any 
circumstances:
(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain 
chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical 
weapons to anyone;
(b) To use chemical weapons;
(c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical 
weapons;
(d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to 
engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this 
Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons it owns 
or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or 
control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
3. Each State Party undertakes to destroy all chemical weapons it 
abandoned on the territory o/another State Party, In accordance with 
the provisions of this Convention.
4. Each State Party undertakes to destroy any chemical weapons 
production facilities it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place 
under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of 
this Convention.
5. Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a 
method of warfare.
Article II: Definitions and Criteria
For the purposes of this Convention:
1. "Chemical Weapons" means the following, together or separately:
(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where in­
tended for purposes not prohibited under tWs Convention, as 
long as the types and quantities are consistent with such pur­
poses;
(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause 
death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic 
chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which would be 
released as a result of the employment of such munitions and 
devices;
(c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in 
connection with the employment of munitions and devices 
specified in subparagraph  '(b).
2. 'Toxic Chemical" means:
Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes ; 
can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to j 
humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their j 
origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they ) 
are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.
(For the purpose of implementing this Convention, toxic chemicals 
which have been identified for the application of verification measures i 
are listed in Schedules contained in the Annex on Chemicals.) .
3. "Precursor" means: I
Any chemical reactant which takes part at any stage in the produc- i
tion by whatever method of a toxic chemical. This includes any key 
component of a binary or multicomponent chemical system.
(For the purpose of implementing this Convention, precursors » 
which have been identified for the application of verification measures 
are listed in Schedules contained in the Annex on Chemicals.)
4. "Key Component of Binary or Multicomponent Chemical Sys- j 
tems" (hereinafter referred to as "key component") means:
The precursor which plays the most important role in determining ! 
the toxic properties of the final product and reacts rapidly with other 1 
chemicals in the binary or multicomponent system. }
5. "Old Chemical Weapons" means:
(a) Che^Caal weapons which were produced before 1925; or I
(b) Chemical weapons produced in the period between 1925
and 1946 that have deteriorated to such extent that they can no I
longer be used as chemical weapons. J
6. "Abandoned Chemical Weapons" means: i
t
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Chemical weapons, including old chemical weapons, abandoned by 
a State after 1 January 1925 on the territory of another State without the 
consent of the latter. •
7. "Riot Control Agent" means:
Any chemical not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly 
in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disap­
pear within a short time following termination of exposure.
8. "Chemical Weapons Production Facility":
(a) Means any equipment, as well as any building housing 
such equipment, that was designed, constructed or used at any 
time since 1 January 1946:
(i) As part of the stage in the production of chemicals
(“final technological stage") where the material flows 
would contain, when the equipment is in operation:
(1) Any chemical listed in Schedule 1 in the 
Annex on Chemicals; or
(2) Any other chemical that- has no use, above 1 
tonne per year on the territory of a State Party or in 
hny other place under the jurisdiction or control of 
a State Party, for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention, but can be used for chemical weapons 
purposes;
or
(ii) For filling chemical weapons, including, inter alia, 
the filling of chemicals listed in Schedule 1 into munitions, 
devices or bulk storage containers the filling of chemicals 
into Containers that form part of assembled binary muni­
tions and devices or into chemical submunitions that form 
part of assembled unitary munitions and devices, and the 
loading of the containers and chemical submunitions into 
the respective munitions and devices;
(b) Does not mean:
(i) Any facility haring a production capacity for syn­
thesis of chemicals specified in subparagraph (a) (i) that is 
less than 1 tonne;
(ii) Any facility in which a chemical specified in sub­
paragraph (a) (i) is or was produced as an unavoidable 
by-product of activities for purposes not prohibited under 
this Convention, provided that the chemical does not 
exceed 3 per cent of the total product and that the facility 
is subject to declaration and inspection under the Annex 
on Implementation and Verification (hereinafter referred 
to as "Verification Annex"); or.
(iii) The single small-scale facility for -production of 
chemicals listed in Schedule 1 for purposes not prohibited 
under this Convention as referred to in Part VI of the 
Verification Annex.
9. "Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Convention" means:
(a) Industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical 
or other peaceful purposes:
(b) Protective purposes, namely those purposes directly re­
lated to protection ag«flnst toxic chemicals and to protection 
against chemical weapons;
(c) Military purposes not connected with the use of chemical 
weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of 
chemicals as a method of warfare;
(d) Law enforcement including domestic riot control pur­
poses.
10. "Production Capacity" means:
The annual quantitative potential for manufacturing a specific 
chemical based on the technological process actually used or, if the 
process is not yet operational, planned to be used at the relevant facility. 
It shall be deemed to be equal to the nameplate capacity or, if the 
nameplate capacity is not available, to the design capacity. The
nameplate capacity is the product output under conditions optimized 
for maximum quantity for the production facility, as demonstrated by 
one or more test-runs. The design capacity is the corresponding 
theoretically calculated product output.
11. "Organization" means the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons established pursuant to Article VIII of this Conven­
tion-
12. For the purposes of Article VI:
(a) "Production" of a chemical means its formation through 
chemical reaction;
(b) "Processing" of a chemical means a physical process, such 
as formulation, extraction and purification, in which a chemical 
is not converted into another chemical;
(c) "Consumption" of a chemical means its conversion into 
another chemical via a chemical reaction.
Article III: Declarations
1. Each State Party shall submit to the OrganiMtion, not later than 
30 days after this Convention enters into force for it, the following 
declarations, in which it shall:
(a) With respect to chemical weapons:
(i) Declare whether it owns or possesses any chemical 
weapons, or whether there are any chemical weapons 
located in any place under its jurisdiction or control;
(ii) Specify the precise location, aggregate quantity and 
detailed inventory of chemical weapons it owns or posses­
ses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction 
or control, in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraphs 1 to 
3, of the Verification Annex, except for those chemical 
weapons referred to in sub-subparagraph (m);
(iii) Report any chemical weapons on its territory that
are owned and possessed by another State and located in 
any place under the jurisdiction or control of another State, 
in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 4, of the Verifica­
tion Annex; ,
(iv) Declare whether it has transferred or received, 
directly or indirectly, any chemical weapons since 1 
January 1946 and specify the transfer or receipt of such 
weapons, in accordance with Part IV (A), para^aph.5, of 
the Verification Annex:
(v) Provide its general plan for destruction of chemical 
weapons that it owns or possesses, or that are located in 
any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance 
with Part IV (A), paragraph 6, of the Verification Annex;
(b) With respect to old chemical weapons and abandoned 
chemical weapons:
(i) Declare whether it has on its territory old chemical 
weapons and provide all available information in accord­
ance with Part IV (B), paragraph 3, of the Verification 
Annex;
(ii) Declare whether there are abandoned chemical 
weapons on its territory and provide all available informa­
tion in accordance with Part IV (B), paragraph 8, of the 
Verification Annex;
(ui) Declare whether it has abandoned chemical 
weapons on the territory of other States and provide all 
available information in accordance with Part IV (B), para­
graph 10, of the Verification Annex;
(c) With respect to chemical weapons production facilities:
(i) Declare whether it has or has had any chemical 
weapons production facility under its ownership or pos­
session, or that is or has bMn located in any place und'er 
its jurisdiction or control at any time since 1 January 1946;
(ii) Specify any chemical weapons production facility
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it has or has had under its ownership or possession or that 
is or has been located in any place under its jurisdiction or 
control at any time since 1 January 1946, in accordance 
with Part V, paragraph 1, of the Verification Annex, except 
for those facilities referred to in sub-subparagraph (iii);
(iii) Report any chemical weapons production facility 
on its territory that another State has or has had under its 
ownership and possession and that is or has been located 
in any place under the jurisdiction or control of another 
State at any time since 1 January 1946, in accordance with 
Part V, paragraph 2, of the Verification Annex;
(iv) Declare whether it has transferred or received, 
directly or indirectly, any equipment for the production of 
chemical weapons since 1 January 1946 and specify the 
transfer or receipt of such equipment, in accordance with 
Part V, paragraphs 3 to 5, of the Verification Annex;
(v) Provide its general plan for destruction of any 
chemical weapons production facility it owns or posses­
ses, or that is located in any place under its jurisdiction or 
control, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 6, of the 
Verification Annex;
(vi) Specify actions to be taken for closure of any chemi­
cal weapons production facility it owns or possesses, or 
that is located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, 
in accordance with Part V, paragraph 1 (i), of the Verifica­
tion Annex;
(vii) Provide its general plan for any temporary conver­
sion of any chemical weapons production facility it owns 
or possesses, or that is located in any place under its 
jurisdiction or control, into a chemical weapons destruc­
tion facility, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 7, of the 
Ver^^c^t^on Annex;
(d) With respect to other facilities:
Specify the precise location, nature and general scope of 
activities of any fadlity or establishment under its ownership or 
possession, or located in any place under its jurisdiction or 
control, and that has been designed, constructed or used since 1 
January 1946 primarily for development of chemical weapons. 
Such declara tion shall include, in/er alia, laboratories and test and 
evaluation sites;
(e) With respect to riot control agents: Specify the chemical 
name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) 
registry number, if assigned, of each chemical it holds for riot 
control purposes. This declaration shall be updated not later than 
30 days after any change becomes effective.
2. The provisfovs of this Artide and tire relevant provisos ot Part 
IV of the Verification Annex shall not, at the discretion of a State Party, 
apply to chemical weapons buried on its territory before 1 January 1977 
and which remain buried, or whidi had been dumped at sea before 1 
January 1985.
Article IV: Chemical Weapons
1. The provisions of this Article and the detailed procedures for its 
implementation shall apply to all chemical weapons owned or pos­
sessed by a State Party, or that are located in any place under its 
jurisdiction or control, except old chemical weapons and abandoned 
chemical weapons to which Part IV (B) of the Verification Annex ap­
plies.
2. Detailed procedures for the implementation of this Article are set 
forth in the Verification Annex.
3. All locations at which chemical weapons specified in paragraph I 
are stored or destroyed shall be subject to systematic verification 
through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments, in 
accordance with Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex.
4. Each State Party shall, immediately after the declaration under 
Article III, paragraph I, has been submitted, provide access to chemical
weapons specified in paragraph 1 for the purpose of systematic verifica­
tion of the declaration through on-site inspection. Thereafter, each Sta te 
Party shall not remove any of these chemical weapons, except to a 
chemical weapons destruction facility. It shall provide access to such 
chemical weapons, for the purpose of systematic on-site verification.
5. Each State Party shall provide access to any chemical weapons 
destruction facilities and their storage areas, that it owns or possesses, 
or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, for the 
purpose of systematic verification through on-site inspection and 
morutoring with on-site instruments.
6. Each State Party shall destroy all chemical weapons spiecified in 
paragraph 1 pursuant to the Verification Annex and in accordance with 
the agreed rate and sequence of destruction (hereinafter referred to as 
"order of destruction"). Such destruction shall begin not later than two 
years after this Convention enters into force for it and shall finish not 
later than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention. AState Party 
is not precluded from destroying such chemical weapons at a faster rate.
7. Each State Party shall:
(a) Submit detailed plans for the destruction of chemical 
weapons specified in paragraph 1 not later than 60 days before 
each annual destruction period begins, in accordance with Part 
IV (A), paragraph 29, of the Verification Annex; the detailed plans 
shall encompass all stocks to be destroyed during the next annual 
destruction period:
(b) Submit declarations annually regarding the implementa­
tion of its plans for destruction of chemical weapons specified in ■
paragraph 1, not later than 60 days after the end of each annual 
destruction period; and
(c) Certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction process 
has been completed, that all chemical weapons specified in para­
graph 1 have been destroyed.
8. If a State ratifies or accedes to this Convention after the 10 year j 
period for destruction set forth in paragraph 6, it shall destroy chemical! 
weapons specified in paragraph I as soon as possible. The order ofj 
destruction and procedures for stringent verification for such a State , 
Party shall be determined by the Executive Council.
9. Any chemical weapons discovered by a State Party after the initial 
declaration of chemical weapons shall be reported, secured andj 
destroyed in accordance with Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex. j
10. Each State Party, during transportation, sampling, storage andlj 
destruction of chemical weapons, shall assign the highest priority tq 
ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment. Each- 
State Party shall transport, sample, store and destroy chemical weaponns 
in accordance with its national standards for safety and emissions, j
11. Any State Party which has on its territory chemical weapons that
are owned or possessed by another State, or that are located in any place 
under the jurisdiction or control of another State, shall make the fullest 
efforts to ensure that these chemical weapons are removed from its 
territory not later than one year after this Convention enters into force 
for it If they are not removed within one year, the State Party maji 
request the Organization and other States Parties to provide assistance 
in the destruction of these chemical weapons. ij
12. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with other States Partiej
that request information or assistance on a bilateral basis or through th| 
Technical Secretariat regarding methods and technologies for the saft 
and efficient destruction of chemical weapons. ) 4
13. In carrying out verification activities pursuant to this Article an;
Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex, the Organization shall conside 
measures to avoid unnecessary duplication of bilateral or multilatera 
agreements on verification of chemical weapons storage and thei 
destruction among States Parties. j
To this end, the Executive Council shall decide to limit oeritiaatit! 
to measures complementary to those undertaken pursuant to such 
bilateral or multilateral agreement, if it considers that: |
(a) VerifiVation pronistovs oosuch sn agreement are consistent t 
with the verification provisions of this Artide and Part IV (A) of •
i
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the Verification Annex;
(b) Implementation of such an agreement provides for suffi- 
aieat assurance of compliance with the relevant provisions of this 
Convention; and
(c) Parties to the bilateral or multilateral agreement keep the 
Organization fully informed about their verification activities.
14. If the Executive Council takes a decision pursuant to paragraph 
13, the Organization shall have the right to monitor the implementation 
of the bilateral or multilateral agreement.
15. Nothing in paragraphs 13 and 14 shall affect the obligation of a 
State Party to provide declarations pursuant to Article IE, this Article 
and Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex.
16. Each State Party shall meet the costs of destruction of chemical 
weapons it is obliged to destroy. It shall also meet the costs of verifica­
tion of storage and destruction of these chemical weapons unless the 
Executive Coundl derides otherwise. If the Executive Coundl decides 
to limit verification measures of the Organization pursuant to para­
graph 13, the costs of complementary verification and monitoring by 
the Organization shall be paid in accordance with the United Nations 
scale of assessment, as specified in Article VIII, paragraph 7.
17. The provisions of this Article and the relevant provisions of Part 
IV of the Verification Annex shall not, at the discretion of a State Parly, 
apply to chemical weapons buried on its territory before 1 January 1977 
and which remain buried, or which had been dumped at sea before 1 
January 1985.
Article V: Chemical Weapons Production Facilities
1. The provisions of this Artide and the detailed procedures for its 
implementation shall apply to any and all chemical weapons produc­
tion facilities owned or possessed by a State Party, or that are located in 
any place under its jurisdiction or control.
2. Detailed procedures for the implementation of this Article are set 
forth in the Verification Annex.
3. All chemical weapons production fadlities sped lied in paragraph 
1 shall be subject to systematic verification through on-site inspection 
and monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with Part V of 
the Verification Armex.
4. Each State Party shall cease immediately all activity at chemical 
weapons production fadlities specified in paragraph 1, except activity 
required for closure.
5. No State Party shall construct any new chemical weapons produc­
tion fadlities or modify any existing facilities for the purpose of chemi­
cal weapons production or for any other activity prohibited under this 
Convention.
6. Each State Party shall, immediately after the dedaration under 
Article DI, paragraph 1 (c), has been submitted, provide access to 
chemical weapons production fadlities spedfied in paragraph 1, for the 
purpose of systematic verification of the declaration through on-site 
inspection.
7. Each State Party shall:
(a) Close, not later than 90 days after this Convention enters 
into force for it, all chemical weapons production fadlities 
specified in paragraph 1, in accordance with Part V of the 
Verification Amnex, and give notice thereof; and
(b) Provide access to chemical weapoiw production fadlities 
specified in paragraph 1, subsequent to closure, for the purpose 
of systematic verification through on-site inspection and 
monitoring with on-site instruments in order to ensure that the 
facility remains dosed and is subsequently destroyed."
8. Each State Party shall destroy all chemical weapons production 
facilities spedfied in paragraph 1 and related fadlities and equipment, 
pursuant to the Verification Annex and in accordance with an agreed 
rate and sequence of destruction (hereinafter referred to as "order of 
destruction"). Such destruction shall begin not later than one year after 
this Convention enters into force for it, and shall finish not later than 10
years after entry into force of this Convention. A State Party is not 
preduded from destroying such fadlities at a faster rate.
9. Each State Party shall:
(a) Submit detailed plans for destrudion of chemical weapons 
production fadlities spedfied in paragraph 1, not later than 180 
daj^ before the destrurtion of each fadlity bqptss;
(b) Submit declarations annually regarding the implementa­
tion of its plans for the destruction of all chemical weapons 
production fadlities spedfied in paragraph 1, not later than 90 
days after the end of each annual destruction period; and
(c) Certify, not later than 30 days after the destrudtion process 
has been completed, that aU chemical weapons production 
fadlities specified in paragraph 1 have been destroyed.
10. If a State ratifies or accedes to this Convention after the 10-year 
period for destruction set forth in paragraph 8, it shall destroy chemical 
weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1 as soon as 
possible. The order of destruction and p rocedures for stringent verifica­
tion for such a State Party shall be determined by the Executive Coundl.
11. Each State Party, during the destruction of chemical weapons 
production facilities, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the 
safety of people and to protecting the environment. Each State Party 
shall destroy these chemical weapons produrtion facilities in accord­
ance with its national standards for safety and emissions.
12. Chemical weapons produrtion facilities specified in paragraph 
1 may be temporarily converted for destruction of chemical weapons 
in accordance with Part V, paragraphs 18 to 25, of the Verification 
Annex. Such a converted faci-nty must be destroyed as soon as it is no 
longer in use for destrudtion of chemical weapons but, in any case, not 
later than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention.
13. A State Party may request, in exceptional cases of compelling 
need, permission to use a chemical weapons production fadlity 
specified in paragraph 1 for purposes not prohibited under this Con­
vention. Upon the reao^uaeaCattoa of the Executive Council, the Con­
ference of the States Parties shall deride whether or not to approve the 
request and shall establish the conditions upon which approval is 
contingent in accordance with Part V, Section D, of the Verification 
Annex.
14. The chemical weapons produrtion fadlity shall be converted in 
such a manner that the converted fadlity is not more capable of being 
reconverted into a chemical weapons production fadlity than any other 
facility used for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, phar­
maceutical or other peaceful purposes not involving chemicals listed in 
Schedule 1.
15. All converted facilities shall be subject to systematic verification 
through on-site taspedioa and monitoring with on-site instruments in 
accordance with Part V, Section D, of the Verification Annex.
16. In carrying out verification activities pursuant to this Article and 
Part V of the Verification Annex, the Organization shall consider 
measures to avoid unnecessary duplication of bilateral or multilateral 
agreements on verification of chemical weapons produrtion facilities 
and their destrurtion among States Parties.
To this end, the Executive Council shall dedde to limit the verifica­
tion to measures complementary to those undertaken pursuant to such . 
a bilateral or multilateral agreement, if it considers that:
(a) Verification provisions of such an agreement are consistent 
with the verification provisions of this Artide and Part V of the | 
Verification Annex;
(b) Implementation of the agreement provides for suffident j 
assurance of compliance with the relevant provisions of this 
Convention; and
(c) Parties to the bilateral or multilateral agreement keep the j
Organization fully informed about their verification adtivities. f
17. If the Executive Council takes a derision pursuant to paragraph'
16, the Organization shall have the right to monitor the implementatior:. 
of the bilateral or multilateral agreement, i
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18. Nothing in paragraphs 16 and 17 shall affect the obligation of a 
State Party to make declarations pursuant to Article 111, this Artide and 
Part V of the Verification Annex.
19. Each State Party shall meet the costs of destruction of chemical 
weapons production fadlities it is obliged to destroy. It shall also meet 
the costs of verification under this Artide unless the Executive Council 
decides otherwise. If the Executive Council decides to limit verification 
measures of the Organization pursuant to paragraph 16, the costs of 
complementary verification and monitoring by the Organization shall 
be paid In accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment, as 
specified in Artide VIII, paragraph 7.
Article VI: Activities Not Prohibited 
Under This Convention
1. Each State Party has the right, subject to the provisions of this 
Convention, to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer 
and use toxic chemicals and their precursors for purposes not 
prohibited under this Convention.
2. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that 
toxic chemicals and their precursors are only developed, produced, 
otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used witirin its territory or 
in any other place under its jurisdiction or control for purposes not 
prohibited under this Convention. To this end, and in order to verify 
that activities are in taaorCanae with obligations under this Convention, 
each State Party shall subject toxic chemicals and their precursors listed 
in Schedules 1,2 and 3 of the Annex on Chemicals, fadlities related to 
such chemicals, and other ttcilities as sped Red in the Verification 
Annex, that are located on its territory or in any other place under its 
jurisdiction or control, to verification measures as provided in the 
Verification Annex.
3. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in Schedule 1 
(hereinafter referred to as 'Schedule 1 chemicals") to the prohibitions 
on production, acquisition, retention, transfer and use as specified in 
Part VI of the Verification Annex. It shall subject Schedule 1 chemicals 
and ttdlitiss specified in Part VI of the Verification Armex to systematic 
verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site 
instruments in accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex.
4. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in Schedule 2 
(hereinafter referred to as "Schedule 2 ahemiasls") and facilities 
specified in Part VII of the Verification Annex to data monitoring and 
on-site verification in accordance with' that Part of the Verification 
Annex.
5. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in Schedule 3 
(hereinafter referred to as "Schedule 3 chemicals") and facilities 
specified in Part VIII of the Verification Armex to data'monitoring and 
on-site verification in accordance with that Part of the Verification 
Armex.
6. Each State Party shall subject fadlities spedfied in Part DC of the 
Verification Armex to data monitoring and eventual on-site verification 
in accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex unless dedded 
otherwise by the Conference of the States Parties pursuant to Part DC 
paragraph 22, of the Verification Annex.
7. Not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into toras for 
it, each State Party shall make an initial declaration on relevant chemi­
cals and ftdilitiss in accordance with the Verification Annex.
8. Each State Party shall make annual declarations regarding the 
relevant chemicals and fadlities in accordance with the Verification 
Annex.
9. For the purpose of on-site verification, each State Party shall grant 
to the inspectors access to fadlities as required in the Verification Annex.
10. In conducting verification activities, the Technical Secretariat 
shall avoid undue intrusion into the State Party's chemical adivities for 
purposes not prohibited under this Convention and, in particular, abide 
by the provisions set forth in the Annex on the Protection of Confiden­
tial Information (hereinafter referred to as "Confidentiality Annex").
11. The provisions of this Artide shall be implemented in a manner 
which avoids hampering the economic or technological development
of States Parties and international cooperation in the field of chemical 
activities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, induding 
the international exchange of scientific and technical information and 
chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of 
chemicals for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.
Article VII: National Impl jmentation Measures
General undertakings
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional proces­
ses, adopt the necessary measures to implement Its obligations under 
this Convention. In particular, it shall:*
(a) Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its ter­
ritory or in any other place under its jurisdiction as recognized 
by international law from undertaking any activity prohibited to 
a State Party under this Convention, including enacting penal 
legislation with respect to such activity;
(b) Not permit in any place under its control any activity 
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention; and
(c) Extend its penal legislation enacted under subparagraph
(a) to ony adcvfty prohibited to o State ear-ay under tlus CCnven- 
tion undertaken anywhere by natural persons, possessing its 
nationality, in conformity with international law.
2. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties and 
afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to taailitsts the im­
plementation of the obligations under paragraph 1.
3. Each State Party, during the implementation of its obligations 
under this Convention, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the 
safety of people and to protecting the environment, and shall cooperate 
as appropriate with other States Parties in this regard.
Relations between the State Party and the Organization
4. In order to fulfill its obligations under this Convention, each State 
Party shall designate or establish a National Authority to serve as the 
national focal point for eftsatioe liaison with the Organization and other 
States Parties. Each State Party shall notify the Organization of its 
National Authority at the time that this Convention enters into force for 
it-
5. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the legislative 
and administrative measures taken to implement this Convention.
6. Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford speda 
handling to information and data that it receives in aontiCenas from th 
Organization in ahnnsation with the implementation of this Conven 
tion. It shall treat such information and data exclusively in connectim 
with its rights and obligations under this Convention and in saaorCsno 
with the provisions set forth in the Confidentiality Annex.
7. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organizatio' 
in the exercise of all its functions and in particular to provide assista^ 
to the Technical Secretariat.
Article VIII: The Organization
A. General Provisions
1. The States Parties to this Convention hereby establish the O 
ganization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to achieve tl 
object and purpose of this Convention, to ensure the implementafio 
of its provisions, including those for international osritiaation of con 
pliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and ahoperatia 
among States Parties.
2. All States Parties to this Convention shall be members of ti 
Organization. A State Party shall not be deprived of its membership 
the Organization.
3. The seat of the headquarters of the Organization shall be T 
Hague, Kingdom of the Netherlands.
4. There are hereby established as the organs of the Organizatic 
the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council, and t 
Technical Secretariat.
5. The Orgaidzation shall conduct its verification satioitiss provid
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for under this Convention in the least intrusive manner possible con­
sistent with the timely and efficient accomplishment of their objectives. 
It shall request only the information and data necessary to fulfill its 
responsibilities under this Convention. It shall take every precaution to 
protect the confidentiaUty of information on civil and military activities 
and facilities coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this 
Convention and, in particular, shall abide by the provisions set forth in 
the Confidentiality Annex.
6. In undertaking its verification activities the Organization shall 
consider measures to make use of advances in science and technology.
7. The costs of the Organization's activities shall be paid by States 
Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment 
adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the 
United Nations and this Organization, and subject to the provisions of 
Articles IV and V. Financial contributions of States Parties to the 
Preparatory Conunission shall be deducted in an appropriate way from 
their contributions to the regular budget. The budget of the Organiza­
tion shall comprise two separate chapters, one relating to adminis­
trative and other costs, and one relating to verification costs.
8. A member of the Organization which is in arrears in the payment 
of its financial contribution to the Organization shall have no vote in 
the Organization if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the 
amount of the contribution due from it for the preceding two full years. 
The Conference may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it 
is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control 
of the member.
B. The Ccnfnretine of the State^ie Parties ■■
Composition, procedures and decision-making
9. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter referred to as "the 
Conference") shall be composed of all members of this Organization. 
Each member shall have one represen ta five in the Conference, who may 
be accompanied by alternates and advisers.
10. The first session of the Conference shall be convened by the 
depositary not later than 30 days after the entry into force of this 
Convention.
11. The Conference shall meet in regular sessions which shall be held 
annually unless it decides otherwise.
12. Special sessions of the Conference shall be convened:
(a) When derided by the Conference;
(b) When requested by the Executive Coundl;
(c) When requested by any member and supported by one 
third of the members; or
(d) In accordance with paragraph 22 to undertake reviews of 
the operation of this Convention.
Except in the case of subparagraph (d), the special session shall be 
convened not later than 30 days after receipt of the request by the 
Director-General of the Technical Secretariat, unless spedfied otherwise 
in the request.
13. The Conference shall also be convened in the form of an Amend­
ment Conference in accordance with Artide XV, paragraph 2.
14. Sessions of the Conference shall take place at the seat of the 
Organization unless the Conference derides otherwise.
15. The Conference shall adopt its rules of procedure. At the begin­
ning of each regular session, it shall elect its Chairman and such other 
officers as may be required. They shall hold office until a new Chairman 
and other officers are elected at the next regular session.
16. A majority of the members of the Organization shall constitute a 
quorum for the Conference.
17. Each member of the Organization shall have one vote in the 
Conference.
18. The Conference shall take decisions on questions of procedure 
by a simple majority of the members present and voting. Decisions on 
matters of substance should be taken as far as possible by consensus. If 
consensus is not attainable when an issue comes up for derision, the
Chairman shall defer any vote for 24 hours and during this period of 
deferment shall make every effort to fadlitate achievement of consen­
sus, and shall report to the Conference before the end of this period. If 
consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Conference shall 
take the dedsion by a two-thirds majority of members present and 
voting unless spedfied otherwise in this Convention. When the issue 
arises as to whether the qu estion is one of substance or not, that question 
shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise dedded by 
the Conference by the majority required for derisions on matters of 
substance.
Powers and functions
19. The Conference shall be the prindpal organ of the Organization. 
It shall consider any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this 
Convention, including those relating to the powers and functions of the 
Executive Coundl and the Technical Secretariat. It may make recom­
mendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues 
related to this Convention raised by a State Party or brought to its 
attention by the Executive Council.
20. The Conference shall oversee the implementation of this Con­
vention, and ad in order to promote its object and purpose. The 
Conference shall review compliance with this Convention. It shall also 
oversee the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical 
Secretariat and may issue guidelines in accordance with this Conven­
tion to either of them in the exercise of their functions.
The Conference shall:
(a) Consider and adopt at i ts regular slars ions the report, 
programme and budget of the Organization, submitted by the 
Executive Council, as well as consider other reports;
fij) Decide on the scale of finandal contributions to be paid by 
States Parties in accordance with paragraph 7;
(c) Eleri the members of the Executive Coundl;
(d) Appoint the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Director-General'');
(e) Approve the rules of procedure of the Executive Council 
submitted by the latter;
(f) Establish such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for 
the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Convention;
(g) Foster international cooperation for peaceful purposes in 
the field of chemical adivities;
(h) Review srientific and technological developments that 
could affed the operation of this Convention and, in this context, 
dired the Director-General to establish a Sdentific Advisory 
Board to enable him, in the performance of his functions, to 
render specialized advice in areas of science and technology 
relevant to this Convention, to the Conference, the Executive 
Coundl or States Parties. The Scientific Advisory Board shall be 
composed of independent experts appointed in accordance with 
terms of reference adopted by the Conference;
(i) Consider and approve at its first session any draft agree­
ments, provisions and guidelines developed by the Preparatory 
Commission;
(j) Establish at its first session the voluntary fund for assis­
tance in accordance with Artide X;
(k) Take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with 
this Convention and to redress and remedy any situation which 
contravenes the provisions of this Convention, in accordance 
with Artide XU.
22. The Conferencer shah not later than one y<ne after the expiry oi 
the fifth and the tenth year after the entry into force of this Convention, 
and at such other times within that time period as may be decided upon, 
convene in spedal sessions to undertake reviews of the operation of this 
Convention. Such reviews shall take into account any relevant sdentific 
and technological developments. At intervals of five years thereafter, 
unless otherwise decided upon, further sessions of the Conference shall 
be convened with the same objective.
\rr.
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C. Tlie lexecuC^ve Counal
Composition, procednre and decision-making
23. The Executive Council shall consist of 41 members. Each State 
Party shall have the right, in accordance with the principle of rotation, 
to serve on the Executive Council. The members of the Executive 
Council shall be elected by the Conference for a term of two years. In 
order to ensure the effective functioning of this Convention, due regard 
being specially paid to equitable geographical distribution, to the im­
portance of chemical industry, as well as to political and security 
interests, the Executive Council shall be composed as follows:
(a) Nine Stales Parties from Africa to be designated by States
Parties located in this region. As a basis for this designation it is 
understood that, out of these nine States Parties, three members 
shall, as a rule, be the States Parties with the most significant 
national chemical industry in the region as determined by inter­
nationally reported and published data, in addition, the regional 
group shall agree also to take into account other regional factors 
in designating these three members;
(b) Nine States Parties from Asia to be designated by States
Parties located in this region. As a basis for this designation it is 
understood that, out of these nine States Parties, four members 
shall, as a rule, be the States Parties with the most significant 
national chemical industry in the region as determined by inter­
nationally reported and published data: in addition, the regional 
group shall agree also to take into account other regional factors 
in designating these four members;
(c) Five States Parties from Eastern Europe to be designated 
by States Parties located in this region. As a basis for this desig­
nation it is understood that, out of these five States Parties, one 
member shall, as a rule, be the State Party with the most sig­
nificant national chemical industry in the region as determined 
by internationally reported and published data, in addition, the 
regional group shall agree also to take into account other regional 
factors in designating this one member;
(d) Seven States Parties from Latin America a nd the Caribbean 
to be designated by States Parties located in this region. As a basis 
for this designation it is understood that, out of these seven States 
Parties, three members shall, as a rule, be the States Parties with 
the most significant national chemical industry in the region as 
determined by internationally reported and published data; in 
addition, the regional group shall agree also to take into account 
other regional factors in designating these three members;
(e) Ten States Parties from among Western European and 
Other States to be designated by States Parties located in this 
region. As a basis for this designation it is understood that, out 
of these ten States Parties, five members shall, as a rule, be the 
States Parties with the most significant national chemical in­
dustry in the region as determined by internationally reported 
and published data; in addition, the regional group shall agree 
also to take into account other regional factors in designating 
these five members;
(f) One further State Party to be designated consecutively by 
States Parties located in the regions of Asia and Latin America 
and the Caribbean. As a basis for this designation it is understood 
that this State Party shall be a rotating member from these 
regions.
24. For the first election of the Executive Council 20 members shall 
be elected for a term ofone year, due regard being paid to the established 
numerical proportions as described in paragraph 23.
25. After the fulUmplementation of Articles IV and V the Conference 
may, upon the request of a majority of the members of the Executive 
Council, review the composition of the Executive Council taking into 
account developments related to the principles specified in paragraph 
23 that are governing its composition.
26. The Executive Council shall elaborate its rules of procedure and 
submit them to the Conference for approval.
27. The Executive Council shall elect its Chairman from among its 
members.
28. The Executive Council shall meet for regular sessions. Between 
regular sessions it shall meet as often as may be required for the 
fulfillment of its powers and functions.
29. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one vote. 
Unless otherwise specified in this Convention, the Executive Council 
shall take deasions on matters of substance by a two-thirds majority of 
all its members. The Executive Council shall take decisions on ques­
tions of procedure by a simple majority of all its members. When the 
issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that 
question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise 
decided by the Executive Coundl by the majority required for decisions 
on matters of substance.
Powers and fnnctions
30. The Executive Council shall be the executive organ of the Or­
ganization. It shall be responsible to the Conference. The Executive 
Council shall carry out the powers and functions entrusted to it under 
tWs Convention, as well as those functions delegated to it by the 
Conference. In so doing, it shall act in conformity with the recommen­
dations, decisions and guidelines of the Conference and assure their 
proper and continuous implementation.
31. The Executive Council shall promote the effective implementa­
tion of, and compliance with, this Convention. It shall supervise the 
activities of the Technical Secretariat, cooperate with the National 
Authority of each State Party and fadlitate consultations and coopera­
tion among States Parties at their request.
32. The Executive Coundl shall:
(a) Consider and submit to the Conference the draft 
programme and budget of the Organization;
(b) Consider and submit to the Conference the draft report of 
the Organization on the implementation of this Convention, the 
report on the performance of its own activities and such spedal 
reports as it deems necessary or which the Conference may 
request;
(c) Make arrangement^ for the sessions of the Conference 
including the preparation of the draft agenda.
33. The Executive Coundl may request the convening of a spedal
session of the Conference. „
34. The Executive Coundl shall;
(a) Conclude agreements or arrangements with States and 
international organizations on behalf of the Organization, subject 
to prior approval by the Conference;
(b) Conclude agreements with States Parties on behalf of the 
Organization in connection with Article X and supervise the | 
voluntary fund referred to in Artide X;
(c) Approve agreements or arrangements relating to the im- :
plementation of verification activities, negotiated by the Techni- ; 
cal Secretariat with States Parties. j
35. The Executive Council shall consider any issue or matter within 
its competence affecting this Convention and its implementation, in j 
eluding concerns regarding compliance, and cases of non-compliance, 
and, as appropriate, inform States Parties and bring the issue or matter* 
to the attention of the Conference.
36. In its consideration of doubts or concerns regarding compliance 
and cases of non-compliance, induding, intfr alia, abuse of the rights 
provided for under this Convent ion, the Executive Coundl shall consult 
with the States Parties involved and, as appropriate, request the State 
Party to take measures to redress the situation within a spedfied time 
To the extent that the Executive Council considers further action to be 
necessary, it shall take, inter alia, one or more of the folio wing measures’
(a) Inform all States Parties of the issue or matter;
(b) Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference; |
(c) Make recommendations to the Conference regarding j
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measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance.
The Executive Council shall, in cases of particular gravity and 
urgency, bring the issue or matter, including relevant information and 
conclusions, directly to the attention of the United Nations General 
Assembly and the United Nations Security Council. It shall at the same 
time inform all States Parties of this step.
D. The Technical Secretariat
37. The Technical Secretariat shall assist the Conference and the 
Executive Council in the performance of their functions. The Technical 
Secretariat shall cany out the verification measures provided for in this 
Convention. It shall carry out the other functions entrusted to it under 
this Convention as well as those functions delegated to it by the 
Conference and the Executive Council.
38. The Technical Secretariat shall:
(a) Prepare and submit to the Executive Council the draft 
programme and budget of the Organization;
(b) Prepare and submit to the Executive Council the draft 
report of the Organization on the implementation of this Con­
vention and such other reports as theConference or the Executive 
Council may request;
(c) Provide administrative and technical support to the Con­
ference, the Executive Council and subsidiary organs;
(d) Address and receive communications on behalf of the 
Organization to and from States Parties on matters pertaining to 
the implementation of this Convention;
(e) Provide technical assistance and technical evaluation to 
States Parties in the implementation of the provisions of this 
Convention, including evaluation of scheduled and un­
scheduled chemicals.
39. The Technical Secretariat shall:
(a) Negotiate agreements or arrangements relating to the 
implementation of verification activities with States Parties, sub­
ject to approval by the Executive Council;
(b) Not later than 180 days after entry into force of this 
Convention, coordinate the establishment and maintenance of 
permanent stockpiles of emergency and humanitarian assistance 
by States Parties in accordance with Article X, paragraphs 7 (b) 
and (c). The Technical Secretariat may inspect the items main­
tained for serviceability. Lists of items to be stockpiled shall be 
considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to para­
graph 21 (i) above;
(c) Administer the voluntary fund referred to in Article X, 
compile declarations made by the States Parties and register, 
when requested, bilateral agreements concluded between States 
Parties or between a State Party and the Organization for the 
purposes of Article X.
40. The Technical Secretariat shall inform the Executive Council of 
any problem that has arisen with regard to the discharge of its functions, 
including doubts, ambiguities or uncertainties about compliance with 
this Convention that have come to its notice in the performance of its 
verification activities and that it has been unable to resolve or clarify 
through its consultations with the State Party concerned.
41. The Technical Secretariat shall comprise a Director-General, who 
shall be its head and chief administrative officer, inspectors and such 
scientific, technical and other personnel as may be required.
42. The Inspectorate shall be a unit of the Technical Secretariat and 
shall act under the supervision of the Director-General.
43 The Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference upon 
the recommendation of the Executive Council for a term of four years, 
renewable for one further term, but not thereafter.
44. The Director-General shall be responsible to the Conference and 
the Executive Council for the appointment of the staff and the organiza­
tion and functioning of the Technical Secretariat. The paramount con­
sideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of
the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest 
standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. Only citizens of States 
Parties shall serve as the Director-General, as inspectors or as other 
members of the professional and clerical staff. Due regard shall be paid 
to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis 
as possible. Recruitment shall be guided by the principle that the staff 
shall be kept to a minimum necessary for the proper discharge of the 
responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat
45. The Director-General shall be responsible for the organization 
and functioning of the Scientific Advisory Board referred to in para­
graph 21 (h). The Director-General shall, in consultation with States 
Parties, appoint members of the Sdentific Advisory Board, who shall ’ 
serve in their individual capaaty. The members of the Board shall be. ? 
appointed on the basis of their expertise in the particular sdentific fields 
relevant to the implementation of this Convention. The Director- 
General may also, as appropriate, in consultation with members of the 
Board, establish temporary working groups of sdentific experts to: 
provide recommendations on specific issues. In regard to the above, 
States Parties may submit lists of experts to the Director-General.
46. In the performance of their duties, the Director-General, the; 
inspectors and the other members of the staff shall not see or receive 
instructions from any Government or from any other source external to 
the Organization. They shall refrain from any action that might reflect 
on their positions as intemational officers responsible only to the Con­
ference and the Executive Coundl.
47. Each State Party shall respect the exclusively intemational chan; 
acter of the responsibilities of the Director-General, the inspectors and 
the other members of the staff and not seek to influence them in the 
discharge of their responsibilities.
E. Privileges and Immunities
48. The Organization shall enjoy on the territory and in any other 
place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party such legal; 
capaaty and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the 
exercise of its functions.
49. Delegates of States Parties, together with their alternates and'
advisers, representatives appointed to the Executive Council togetheri 
with their alternates and advisers, the Director-General and the staff of; 
the Organization shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are' 
necessary in the independent exercise of their functions in connection' 
with the Organization. |
50. The legal capaaty, privileges, and immunities referred to in this'
Artide shall be defined in agreements between the Organization and 
the States Parties as well as in an agreement between the Organization! 
and the State in which the headquarters of the Organization is seated:! 
These agreements shall be considered and approved by the Conference 
pursuant to paragraph 21 (i). ■
51. Notwithstanding paragraphs 48 and 49, the privileges and im­
munities enjoyed by the Director-General and the staff of the Technical 
Secretariat during the conduct of verification activities shall be those set 
forth in Part II, Section B, of the Verification Annex. ;
Article DC Consultations, Cooperation and Fact-Finding j
1. States Parties shall consult and cooperate, directly among them}
selves, or through the Organization or other appropriate intemationa1 
procedures, induding procedures within the framework of the Unitec 
Nations and in accordance with its Charter, on any matter which ma] 
be raised relating to the object and purpose, or the implementation oi 
the provisions, of this Convention. |
2. Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to request i 
challenge inspection, States Parties should, whenever possible, firs 
make every effort to clarify and resolve, through exchange of informa 
tion and consultations among themselves, any matter which may caus- 
doubt about compliance with this Convention, or which gives rise t 
concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous 
A State Party which receives a request from another State Party fd 
clarification of any matter which the requesting State Party believe 
causes such a doubt or concern shall provide the requesting State Part 
as soon as possible, but in any case not later than 10 days after th
Ji
i
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request, with information sufficient to answer the doubt or concern 
raised along with an explanation of how the information provided 
resolves the matter. Nothing in this Convention shall affect the right of 
any two or more States Parties to arrange by mutual consent for inspec­
tions or any other procedures among themselves to clarify and resolve 
any matter which may cause doubt about compliance or gives rise to a 
concern about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. 
Such arrangements shall not affect the rights and obligations of any 
Stale Party under other provisions of this Convention.
Procedure for requesting clarification .
3. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council 
to assist in clarifying any situation which may be considered ambiguous 
or which gives rise to a concern about the possible non-compliance of 
another State Party with this Convention. The Executive Council shall 
provide appropriate information in its possession relevant to sudi a 
concern.
4. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council 
to obtain clarification from another State Party on any situation which 
may be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to a concern about 
its possible non-compliance with this Convention. In such a case, the 
following shall appfy:
(a) The Executive Council shall forward the request for 
clarification to the State Party concerned through the Director- 
General not later than 24 hours after its receipt;
(b) The requested State Party shall provide the darification to 
the Executive Council as soon as possible, but in any case not 
later than 10 days after the receipt of the request;
(c) The Executive Council shall take note of the clarification 
and forward it to the requesting State Party not later than 24 
hours after its receipt;
(d) If the requesting State Party deems the clarification to be 
inadequate, it shall have the right to request the Executive Coun­
cil to obtain from the requ<sttd State Party further clarification;
(e) For the purpose of obtaining further clarification requested 
under subparagraph (d), the Executive Council may call on the 
DiredorGJeneral to establish a group of experts from the Techni­
cal Secretariat, or if appropriate staff are not available in the 
Technical Secretariat, from elsewhere, to examine all available 
information and data relevant to the situation causing the con­
cern. The group of experts shall submit a factual report to the 
Executive Council on its findings;
(0 If the requesting State Party considers the clarification 
obtained under subparagraphs (d) and (e) to be unsatisfactory, it 
shall have the right to request a special session of the Executive 
Council in which States Parties involved that are not members of 
the Executive Council shall be entitled to take part. In such a 
special session, the Executive Council shall consider the matter 
and may recommend any measure it deems appropriate to 
resolve the situation.
5. A State Party shall also have the right to request the Executive 
Council to darify any situation which has been considered ambiguous 
or has given rise to a concern about its possible non-compliance with 
this Convention. The Executive Coundl shall respond by providing 
such assistance as appropriate.
6. The Executive Coundl shall inform the States Parties about any 
request for clarification provided in this Artide.
7. If the doubt or concern of a State Party about a possible non-com­
pliance has not been resolved within 60 days after the submission of the 
request iordarificat ion to the Executive Coundl, or it believes its doubts 
warrant urgent consideration, notwithstanding its right to request a 
challenge inspection, it may request a special session of the Conference 
in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 12 (c). At such a special 
session, the Conference shall consider the matter and may recommend 
any measure it deems appropriate to resolve the situation.
Procedures for Clmlleiige Inspections
8. Each State Party has the right to request an on-site challenge
inspection of any facility or location in the territory or in any other place 
under the jurisdiction or control of any other State Party for the sole 
purpose of clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible 
non-compliance with the provisions of this Convention, and to have 
this inspection conducted anywhere without delay by an inspection 
team designated by the Director-General and in accordance with the 
Verification Annex.
9. Each State Party is under the obligation to keep the inspection 
request within the scope of this Convention and to provide in the 
inspection request all appropriate information on the basis of which a 
concern has arisen regarding possible non-compliance with this Con 
vention as specified in the Verification Annex. Each State Party shal 
refrain from unfounded inspection requests, care being taken to avoid 
abuse. The challenge inspection shall be carried out for the sole purpose 
of determining facts relating to the possible non-compliance
10. For the purpose of verifying compliance with the provisions oi 
this Convention, each State Party shall permit the Technical Secretaria 
to conduct the on-site challenge inspection pursuant to paragraph 8.
11. Pursuant to a request for a challenge inspection of a facility 
location, and in accordance with the procedures provided for in t 
Verification Armex, the inspected State Party shall have:
(a) The right and the obligation to make every reasonable 
effort to demonstrate its compliance with this Convention and, 
to this end, to enable the inspection team to fulfill its mandate;
(b) The obligation to provide access within the requested site 
for the sole purpose of establishing facts relevant to the concern 
regarding possible non-compliance; and
(c) The right to take measures to protect sensitive installations, 
and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data, 
not related to this Convention.
12. With regard to an observer, the following shall apply:
(a) The requesting State Party may, subject to the agreement 
of the inspected State Party, send a representative who may be a 
national either of the requesting State Party or of a third State 
Party, to observe the conduct of the challenge inspection.
(b) The inspected State Party shall then grant access to the 
observer in accordance with the Verification Annex.
(c) The inspected State Party shall, as a rule, accept the 
proposed observer, but if the inspected State Party exercises a 
refusal, that fact shall be recorded in the final report.
13. The requesting State Party shall present an inspection request fi 
an on-site challenge inspection to the Executive Council and at the san 
time to the Director-General for immediate processing.
14. The IHrector-General shall immediately ascertain that the inspe 
tion request meets the requirements specified in Part X, paragraph 4, 
the Verification Annex, and, if necessary, assist the requesting Sta 
Party in filing the inspection request accordingly. When the inspects 
request fulfills the requirements, preparations for the challenge inspe 
tion shall begin.
15. The Director-General shall transmit the inspection request to t 
inspected State Party not less than 12 hours before the planned arrii 
of the inspection team at the point of entry.
16. After having received the inspection request, the Executi 
Council shall take cognizance of the Director-General's actions on t 
request and shall keep the case under its consideration throughout I 
inspection procedure. However, its deliberations shall not delay t 
inspection process.
17. The Executive Coundl may, not later than 12 hours after havi 
received the inspection request, dedde by a three-quarter majority 
all its members against carrying out the challenge inspection, ii 
considers the inspection request to be frivolous, abusive or dea 
beyond the scope of this Convention as described in paragraph 
Neither the requesting nor the inspeded State Party shall participh 
such a decision. If the Executive Coundl decides against the challer 
inspection, preparations shall be stopped, no further action on
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inspection request shall be taken, and the States Parties concerned shall 
be informed accordingly.
18. The Director-General shall issue an inspection mandate for the 
conduct of the challenge inspection. The inspection mandate shall be 
the inspection request referred to in paragraphs 8 and 9 put into 
operational terms, and shall conform with the inspection request.
19. The challenge inspection shall be conducted in accordance with 
Part X or, in the case of alleged use, in accordance with Part XI of the 
Verification Annex. The inspection team shall be guided by the principle 
of conducting the challenge inspection in the least intrusive manner 
possible, consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of its 
mission.
20. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team 
throughout the challenge inspection and facilitate its task. If the in­
spected State Party proposes, pursuant to Part X, Section C, of the 
Verification Annex, arrangements to demonstrate compliance with-this 
Convention, alternative to full and comprehensive access, it shall make 
every reasonable effort, through consultations with the inspection 
team, to reach agreement on the modalities for establishing the facts 
with the aim of demonstrating its compliance.
21. The final report shall contain the factual findings as well as an 
assessment by the inspection team of the degree and nature of access 
and cooperation granted for the satisfactory implementation of the 
challenge inspection. The Director-General shall promptly transmit the 
final report of the inspection team to the requesting State Party, to the 
inspected State Party, to the Executive Council and to all other States 
Parties. The Director-General shall further transmit promptly to the 
Executive Council the assessments of the requesting and of the in­
spected States Parties, as well as the views of other States Parties which 
may be conveyed to the Director-General for that purpose, and then 
provide them to all States Parties.
22. The Executive Council shall, in accordance with its powers and 
functions, review the final report of the inspection team as soon as it is 
presented, and address any concerns as to:
(a) Whether any non-compliance has occurred;
- (b) Whether the request had been within the scope of this
Convention; and
(c) Whether the right to request a challenge inspection had 
been abused.
23. If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in keeping with 
its powers and functions, that further action may be necessary with 
regard to paragraph 22, it shall take the appropriate measures to redress 
the situation and to ensure compliance with this Convention, including 
specific recommendations to the Conference. In the case of abuse, the 
Executive Council shall examine whether the requesting State Party 
should bear any of the financial implications of the challenge inspec­
tion.
24. The requesting State Party and the inspected State Party shall 
have the right to participate in the review process. The Executive 
Council shall inform the States Parties and the next session of the 
Conference of the outcome of the process.
25. If the Executive Council has made specific recommendations to 
the Conference, the Conference shall consider action in accordance with 
Article XII.
Article X* Assistance and Protection 
Against Chemical Weapons
1. For the purposes of this Article, "Assistance* means the coordina­
tion and delivery to States Parties of protection against chemical 
weapons, including, inter alia, the following: detection equipment and 
alarm systems; protective equipment; decontamination equipment and 
decontaminants; medical antidotes and treatments; and advice on any 
of these protective measures.
2. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as impeding the 
right of any State Party to conduct research into, develop, produce, 
acquire, transfer or use means of protection against chemical weapons,
for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.
3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right 
to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material 
and scientific and technological information concerning means of 
protection against chemical weapons.
4. For the purposes of increasing the transparency of national 
programmes related to protective purposes, each State Party shall 
provide annually to the Technical Secretariat information on its 
programme, in accordance with procedures to be considered and ap­
proved by the Conference pursuant to Article VID, paragraph 21 (i).
5. The Technical Secretariat shall establish not later than 180 days 
after entry into force of this Convention and maintain, for the use of any 
requesting State Party, a data bank containing freely available informa­
tion concerning various means of protection against chemical weapons 
as well as such information as may be provided by States Parties.
The Technical Secretariat shall also, within the resources available to 
it, and at the request of a State Party, provide expert advice and assist 
the State Party in identifying how its programmes for the development 
and improvement of a protective capacity against chemical weapons 
could be implemented.
6. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as impeding the 
right of States Parties to request and provide assistance bilaterally and 
to conclude individual agreements with other States Parties concerning 
the emergency procurement of assistance.
7. Each State Party undertakes to provide assistance through the 
Organization and to this end to elect to take one or more of the following 
measures:
(a) To contribute to the voluntary fund for assistance to be 
established by the Conference at its first session;
(b) To conclude, if possible not later than 180 days after this
Convention enters into force for it, agreements with the Or­
ganization concerning the procurement, upon demand, of assis­
tance;
(c) To declare, not later than 180 days after this Convention 
enters into force for it, the kind of assistance it might provide in 
response to an appeal by the Organization. If, however, a State 
Party subsequently is unable to provide the assistance envisaged 
in its declaration, it is still under the obligation to provide assis­
tance in accordance with this paragraph.
8. Each State Party has the right to request and, subject to th< 
procedures set forth in paragraphs 9,10 an 11, to receive assistance anc 
protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons if i 
considers that:
(a) Chemical weapons have been used against it;
(b) Riot control agents have been used against it as a method 
of warfare; or
(c) It is threatened by actions or activities of any State that are 
prohibited for States Parties by Article I.
9. The request, substantiated by relevant information, shall be sul 
mitted to the Director-General, who shall transmit it immediately to tl 
Executive Council and to all States Parties. The Director-General sha 
immediately forward the request to States Parties which have volu: 
teered, in accordance with paragraphs 7 (b) and (c), to dispatch eme 
gency assistance in case of use of chemical weapons or useof riot contr 
agents as a method of warfare, or humanitarian assistance in case 
serious threat of use of chemical weapons or serious threat of use of ri 
control agents as a method of warfare to the State Party concerned r 
later than 12 hours after receipt of the request. The Director-Gene 
shall initiate, not later than 24 hours after receipt of the request, 
investigation in order to provide foundation for further action. He sh 
complete the investigation within 72 hours and forward a report to t 
Executive Council. If additional time is required for completion of I 
investigation, an interim report shall be submitted within the sai 
time-frame. The additional time required for investigation shall i 
exceed 72 hours. It may, however, be further extended by sim 
periods. Reports at the end of each additional period shall be submit
r t>.t
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to the Executive Council. The investigation shall, as appropriate and in 
conformity with the request and the information accompanying the 
request, establish relevant facts related to the request as well as the type 
and scope of supplementary assistance and protection needed.
10. The Executive Coundl shall meet not later than 24 hours after 
receiving an investigation report to consider the situation and shall take 
a decision by simple majority witWn the following 24 hours on whether 
to instruct the Technical Secretariat to provide supplementary assis­
tance. The Technical Secretariat shall immediately transmit to all States 
Parties and relevant international organizations the investigation report 
and the decision taken by the Executive CotmdL When so decided by 
the Executive Council, the Director-General shall provide assistance 
immediately. For this purpose, the Director-General may cooperate 
with the requesting State Party, other States Parties and relevant inter­
national organizations. The States Parties shall make the fullest possible 
efforts to provide assistance.
11. If the information available from the ongoing investigation or 
other reliable sources would give suffident proof that there are victims 
of use of chemical weapons and immediate action is indispensable, the 
Director-General shall notify all States Parties and shall take emergency 
measures of assistance, using the resources the Conference has placed 
at his disposal for such contingencies. The Director-General shall keep 
the Executive Coundl informed of actions undertaken pursuant to this 
paragraph.
Article XI: Economic and Technological Development
1. The provisions of this Convention shall be implemented in a
manner which avoids hampering the economic or technological 
development of States Parties, and international cooperation in the field 
of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under this Conven­
tion including the international exchange of sdentific and technical 
information and chemicals and equipment for the production, process­
ing or use of chemicals for purposes not prohibited under this Conven­
tion.
2. Subject to the provisions of this Convention and without prejudice 
to the prindples and applicable rules of international law, the States 
Parties shall:
(a) Have the right, individually or collectively, to conduct 
research with, to develop, produce, acquire, retain, transfer, and 
use chemicals;
(b) Undertake to fadlitate, and h'ave the right to partidpate
in, the fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment and 
sdentific and technical information relating to the development 
and application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under 
this Convention; •
(c) Not maintain among themselves any restridions, indud­
ing those in any international agreements, incompatible with the 
obligations undertaken under this Convention, which would 
restrid or impede trade and the development and promotion of 
scientific and technological knowledge in the field of chemistry 
for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or 
other peaceful purposes;
(d) Not use this Convention as grounds for applying any 
measures other than those provided for, or permitted, under this 
Convention nor use any other international agreement for pur­
suing an objedive inconsistent with this Convention;
(e) Undertake to review their existing national regulations in 
the field of trade in chemicals in order to render them consistent 
with the objed and purpose of this Convention.
Article XII: Measures to Redress a Situation 
and to Ensure Compliance,lncluding Sanctions
1. Tire Conferenfe ehall take the necessacy naeasmres, as se t sorth in 
paragraphs 2,3 and 4, to ensure compliance with this Convention and 
to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions 
of tliis Convention. In considering adion pursuant to this paragraph, 
the Conference shall take into account all information and recommen­
dations on the issues submitted by the Executive Council.
2. in cases where a State Party has been requested by the Executive 
Council to take measures to redress a situation raising problems with 
regard to its compliance, and where the State Party ■fails to fulfill the 
request within the specified time, the Conference may, inter alia, upon 
the recommendation of the Executive Coundl, restrid or suspend the 
State Party's rights and privileges under this Convention until it under­
takes the necessary adion to conform with its obligations under this 
Convention.
3. In cases where serious damage to the objed and purpose of this 
Convention may result from adivities prohibited under this Conven­
tion, in particular by Artide I, the Conference may rycommyhC collec­
tive measures to States Parties in conformity with international law.
4. The Conference shall in cases of particular gravity, bring the issue, 
induding relevant information and cond^^ns, to the attention of the 
United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security 
Council.
Article XIII: Relation to Other International Agreements
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way 
limiting or departing from the obligations assumed by any State under 
the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Baderiological Methods of Warfare, 
signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and under the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bac­
teriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 
signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972.
Article XIV: Settlement of Disputes
1. Disputes that may arise concerning the application or the inter 
pretation of this Convention shall be settled in accordance with th< 
relevant provisions of this Convention and in conformity with th< 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties, o
between one or more States Parties and the Organization, relating to th 
interpretation or application of this Convention, the parties concern* 
shall consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of th 
dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties' choc* 
induding recourse to appropriate organs of this Convention and, b 
mutual consent, referral to the International Court of Justice in contem 
ity with the Statute of the Court. The Stales Parties involved shall kee 
the Executive Council informed of actions being taken. j
3. The Executive Council may contribute to the settlement of 
dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering i 
good offices, calling upon the States Parties to a dispute to start tl 
settlement process of their choice and recommending a time-limit fi 
any agreed procedure.
4. The Conference shall consider questions related to disputes rate 
by States Parties or brought to its attention by the Executive Counc 
The Conference shall, as it finds necessary, establish or entrust orga ■ 
with tasks related to the settlement of these disputes in conformity wi 
Article VM, paragraph 21 (0.
5. The Conference and the Executive Council are separately er 
powered, subject to authorization from the General Assembly of t 
United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice to give 
advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scope of t 
adivities of the Organization. An agreement between the Organizati 
and the United Nations shall be concluded for this purpose in accoi 
ance with Article VIII, paragraph 34 (a).
6. This Article is without prejudice to Article IX or to the provisic 
on measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, includi 
sanctions.
• Article XV: Amendments
1. Any State Party may mroposo amendmnnts eo thio Conventi 
Any State Party may also propose changes, as spearied in paragrap 
to the Annexes of this Convention. Proposals for amendments shal 
subject to the procedures in paragraphs 2 and 3. Proposals for chanj 
as specified in paragraph 4, shall be subject to the procedures in p<
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graph 5.
2. The test of a proposed amendment shall be submitted to the 
Director-General for circulation to all States Parties and to the 
Depositary. The proposed amendment shall be considered only by an 
Amendment Conference. Such an Amendment Conference shall be 
convened if one third or more of the States Parties notify the Director- 
General not later than 30 days after its circulation that they support 
further consideration of the proposal. The Amendment Conference 
shall be held immediately following a regular session of the Conference 
unless the requesting States Parties as for an earlier meeting. In no case 
shall an Amendment Conference be held less than 60 days after the 
circulation of the proposed amendment.
3. Amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties 30 days 
after deposit of the instruments of ratification or acceptance by all the 
States Parties referred to under subparagraph (b) below:
(a) When adopted by the Amendment Conference by a posi­
tive vote of a majority of all States Parties with no State Party 
casting a negative vote; and
(b) Ratified or accepted by all those States Parties casting a 
positive vote at the Amendment Conference.
4. In order to ensure the viability and the effectiveness of this 
Convention, provisions in the Annexes shall be subject to changes in 
accordance with paragraph 5, if proposed changes are related only to 
matters of an administrative or technical nature. All changes to the 
Annex on Chemicals shall be made in accordance with paragraph 5. 
Sections A and C of the Confidentiality Annex, Part X of the Verification 
Annex, and those definitions in Part I of the Verification Annex which 
relate exclusively to challenge inspections, shall not be subject to chan­
ges in accordance with paragraph 5.
5. Proposed changes referred to in paragraph 4 shall be made in 
accordance with the following procedures:
(a) The test of the proposed changes shall be transmitted 
together with the necessary information to the Director-General. 
Additional information for the evaluation of the proposal may 
be provided by any State Party and the Director-General. The 
Director-General shall promptly communicate any such 
proposals and information to all States Parties, the Executive 
Council and the Depositary;
(b) Not later than 60 days after its receipt, the Director-General 
shall evaluate the proposal to determine all its possible conse­
quences for the provisions of this Convention and its implemen­
tation and shall communicate any such information to all States 
Parties and the Executive Council;
(c) The Executive Council shall examine the proposal in the 
light of all information available to it, induding whether the 
proposal fulfills the requirements of paragraph 4. Not later than 
90 days after its receipt, the Executive Council shall notify its 
recommendation, with appropriate explanations, to all States 
Parties for consideration. States Parties shall acknowledge 
receipt within 10 days;
(d) If the Executive Coundl recommends to all States Parties 
that the proposal be adopted, it shall be considered approved if 
no State Party objects to it within 90 days after receipt of the 
recommendation. If the Executive Coundl recommends that the 
proposal be rejected, it shall be considered rejected if no State 
Party objects to the rejection within 90 days after receipt of the 
recommendation;
(e) If a recommendation of the Executive Council does not 
meet with the acceptance required under subparagraph (d), a 
decision on the proposal, including whether it fulfills the require­
ments of paragraph 4, shall be taken as a matter of substance by 
the Conference at its next session;
(0 The DirectorGeneral shall notify all States Parties and the 
Depositary of any dedsion under this paragraph;
(g) Changes approved under this procedure shall enter into 
force for all States Parties 180 days after the date of notification
by the Diredor-General of their approval unless another time 
period is recommended by the Executive Coundl or decided by 
the Conference.
Article XVI: Duration and Withdrawal
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exerdsing its national sovereignty, h< 
the right to withdraw from this Convention if it deddes that extraoi 
nary events, related to the subject matter of this Convention, h: 
jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notict 
such withdrawal 90 days in advance to all other States Parties, 
Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations Secui 
Council. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordirc 
events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
3. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall no1 
any way affect-the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligate 
assumed under any relevant rules of intemational law, particularly 
Geneva Protocol of 1925.
Article XVII: Status of the Annexes
The Annexes form an integral part of this Convention. Any referei 
to this Convention includes the Annexes.
Article XVIII: Signature
This Convention shall be open for signature for all States before 
entry into force.
Article XIX: Ratification
This Convention shall be subject to ratification by States Signatoi 
according to their respective constitutional processes.
Article XX: Accession
Any State which does not sign this Convention before its entry i 
force may accede to it at any time thereafter.
Article XXI: Entry Into Force
1. This Convention shall enter into force 180 days after the dat 
the deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification, but in no case eai 
than two years after its opening for signature.
2. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession 
deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it s 
enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of t 
instrument of ratification or accession.
Article XXII: Reservations
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservatii 
The Annexes of this Convention shall not be subject to reservati 
incompatible with its object and purpose.
Article XXIII: Depositary
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby design: 
as the Depositary of this Convention and shall, inter alia:
(a) Promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the dal 
each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratificatio 
accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, an 
the receipt of other notices;
(b) Transmit duly certified copies of this Convention to the Gov 
ments of all signatory and acceding States; and
(c) Register this Convention pursuant to Article 102 of the Cha 
of the United Nations.
Article XXIV: Authentic Texts
This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, Fre 
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited > 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly author 
to that effect, have signed this Convention.
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